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Archive for the ‘Bin Laden’ Category

Two weeks ago, WikiLeaks released its so-called “Gitmo Files”—hundreds of pages of classified documents detailing intelligence that captured terrorists provided the United States. As I point out in this morning’s Washington Post, the documents WikiLeaks made public included a file on Abu Faraj al-Libi, one of several CIA detainees who helped lead the agency to Osama bin Laden’s courier. While it garnered little attention at the time, the Abu Faraj document WikiLeaks exposed contained explosive information that could very well have tipped off al Qaeda that the CIA was closing in on bin Laden.

The document says that Abu Faraj “reported on al-Qai’da’s methods for choosing and employing couriers, as well as preferred communications means” and described him as the “communications gateway” between bin Laden and his operatives in Pakistan. It states that “in July 2003, [Abu Faraj] received a letter from UBL’s designated courier” (to whom he referred by a false name, Abd al-Khaliq Jan) in which “UBL stated [Abu Faraj] would be the official messenger between UBL and others in Pakistan.” It continues that “in mid-April 2005, [Abu Faraj] began arranging for a store front to be used as a meeting place and drop point for messages he wanted to exchange” with bin Laden’s courier.

But the most damaging disclosure was this: in order to carry out his new responsibilities, “in mid-2003, [Abu Faraj] moved his family to Abbottabad, PK, and worked between Abbottabad and Peshawar” up until his arrest in 2005. In other words, the WikiLeaks document exposed the fact that CIA detainees had linked bin Laden’s courier to Abbottabad, the city where bin Laden was killed one week ago.

If al Qaeda leaders had read this classified document before Navy SEALs reached bin Laden’s compound, the results could have been disastrous. The terrorists would have been alerted to the fact that the CIA was on the trail of bin Laden’s principal courier, and had made the connection between the courier, bin Laden, and Abbottabad, which could have blown the entire bin Laden operation.

Was it a mere coincidence that the bin Laden raid took place almost a week to the day after the release of the WikiLeaks documents? Or did U.S. officials move in to get bin Laden before al Qaeda had time to figure out that that the CIA had learned about the Abbottabad connection?

One thing is clear: WikiLeaks remains a menace to U.S. national security. Yet despite promises to take action to stop the group’s serial disclosures, the Obama administration has done virtually nothing to shut down WikiLeaks or bring its leaders to justice. It is far past time for the Obama administration to indict, arrest, and try Julian Assange. His unlawful dissemination of classified materials may have almost cost us Osama bin Laden. For this disclosure alone, Assange should be put away for life.

Norman J. Ornstein

Man About Town

By Norman J. Ornstein

May 9, 2011, 1:20 pm

The treasure trove of information coming from Osama bin Laden’s sanctuary has a new, embarrassing revelation: it turns out that bin Laden did not stay entirely as a recluse inside the compound. He made regular visits to Abbadabad’s strip club, the Abbadabing.

Step back from the bellicose statements issued by the Pakistani army and foreign ministry after the killing of Osama bin Laden, and the eruption of prayers and stray protests on behalf of the slain terrorist, and you’ll find an outpouring of thoughtful analysis by some of the country’s leading public intellectuals.

In an essay in the New Republic, reprinted in the delightfully named Goatmilk blog, my former colleague Ahmed Rashid sums up the lesson that ought to be learned:

What Pakistanis desperately need is a new narrative by their leaders—a narrative that does not blame the evergreen troika of India, the United States, and Israel for all of the country’s ills, that breaks the old habit of blaming outsiders and instead looks at itself more honestly and more transparently. Pakistanis as a nation seem incapable of self-analysis, of apportioning blame according to logic and reason rather than emotion.

In Dawn, the country’s leading English newspaper, Cyril Almeida, one of the few non-Muslims of any prominence in Pakistan, strikes a similar note:

Where do we go from here as a country?

As long as national security and foreign policy remain in the hands of a cabal of generals—unaccountable and untouchable, a law unto themselves, and in thrall to their own irrational logic—what future can this country have? Surely, not much of a future.

And here’s Pervez Hoodbhoy, perhaps the country’s most outspoken critic of radical Islam.

Bin Laden’s death should be regarded as a transformational moment by Pakistan and its military. It is time to dispense with the Musharraf-era cat and mouse games. We must repudiate the current policy of verbally condemning jihadism—and actually fighting it in some places—but secretly supporting it in other places. Until the establishment firmly resolves that it shall not support armed and violent non-state actors of any persuasion— including the Lashkar-e-Taiba—Pakistan will remain in interminable conflict both with itself and with the world.

Ayesha Siddiqa, whose Military Inc. is the definitive work on the army’s vast business interests, weighs in with a typically pugnacious op-ed:

It is the first time after 1972 that the civilian government has an opportunity to question the unlimited powers of the defence establishment….The fact is that if the political forces won’t do it now, they may never get another opportunity again.

For my money, Pakistan’s beleaguered English-speaking elites are among the bravest people in the subcontinent, willing to speak truth to power, whether military or clerical, in a land where this can carry deadly consequences.

And though it would be foolish to exaggerate their influence—the salons of Lahore and Karachi have little sway over either the masses or the generals—they nonetheless offer a glimmer of hope for the country’s future. President Obama should not squander this opportunity to press for real change in Pakistan along the lines that the most thoughtful voices in that country suggest.

After the “general leadership of al Qaeda” confirmed the death of its leader Osama bin Laden earlier today, the Afghan Taliban also released a statement on its Pashto website, offering condolences to bin Laden’s family and followers and vowing revenge against the United States. The statement warned that his death would only strengthen jihad in Afghanistan as well as in other “occupied” Muslim countries. Below is an excerpt from the statement:

May Allah the Great accept his martyrdom, and with the blessing of his Jihad and martyrdom, rescue the Muslim community from the current crisis… He sincerely and courageously partnered with the Afghans in the war against the Soviet invasion. The Islamic community will always be proud of sacrifices he rendered in this path. In addition, Sheikh Osama bin Laden, peace be upon him, was a strong defender of Muslims’ first Qiblah [the direction Muslims must face when praying], the al-Aqsa Mosque, and the occupied Palestine. He was a relentless fighter against the Crusaders and Zionist occupations throughout the world… If the American occupiers and their allies think that the martyrdom of Sheikh Osama bin Laden, peace be upon him, will weaken the authority and morale of the mujahedin in Afghanistan or in other occupied Islamic countries, this will be their big mistake… The Islamic Emirate believes that the martyrdom of Sheikh Osama bin Laden, peace be upon him, will give new life to the ongoing jihad against the occupiers at this critical juncture. The jihadist movement will become stronger.

The statement by the Taliban’s leadership council discredits the myth by the critics of the Afghan war that the Taliban is a nationalist resistance movement focused only on Afghanistan, and not a terrorist organization with a global agenda. The statement endorses bin Laden’s terrorist campaign worldwide. It also indicates that the Taliban will not distance itself from al Qaeda after bin Laden’s death. As Mullah Zaeef, the Taliban’s former ambassador to Islamabad, told the BBC Persian on Monday that the Taliban has an “ideological connection” with al Qaeda which will not end with bin Laden’s demise.

On Wednesday, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said bin Laden’s death could help convince the Taliban to cut ties with al Qaeda and reach a political settlement in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s statement, however, shows the group has no such intention. It will be a huge mistake if the United States and NATO allies use bin Laden’s death as a pretext to scale down the fight against the Taliban and withdraw troops from Afghanistan prematurely. Diplomatic efforts with the Taliban leadership will not work until the group is defeated militarily.

It is a little-known fact that the U.S. government continues to employ waterboarding. But we don’t waterboard terrorists anymore; we only waterboard … Navy SEALs.

Today, President Obama travelled to Fort Campbell, Kentucky to meet with some of those waterboarding victims. CNN reports:

President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe Biden met privately Friday afternoon with members of the military team responsible for conducting the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound.

White House Press Secretary Jay Carney confirmed that Obama and Biden spoke with “special operators” involved in the mission.

The president and vice president met with members of Navy SEAL Team 6 at Fort Campbell—home to the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the group that operated the helicopters used in the raid.

Obama and Biden thanked the commandos and were briefed on the operation by the unit members who conducted it, according to a White House official.

No word on whether the president asked members of the unit whether they thought waterboarding was torture. He most likely would not have liked the answer. CNN also reports:

Obama awarded a Presidential Unit Citation to the units involved in the mission, the official said. The citation is the highest such honor that can be given to a military unit.

It is a well-deserved honor. Let’s see if the president does the same for the CIA interrogators who got the intelligence that made last Sunday’s raid possible.

John Brennan, President Obama’s counterterrorism coordinator, told ABC television on Tuesday that Pakistan had launched an internal investigation to determine whether any individuals within the government or intelligence service (ISI) were involved in sheltering Osama bin Laden in that country’s military heartland. Brennan said he was certain that the “Pakistani officials want to get to the bottom of this, and we’re working closely with them to help them in this investigation.” Pakistan, he emphasized, was a “strong counterterrorism partner.”

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A press release just now from the FBI is warning that al Qaeda’s most famous recently deceased has morphed into malware that is attacking computers:

The FBI today warns computer users to exercise caution when they receive e-mails that purport to show photos or videos of Usama bin Laden’s recent death. This content could be a virus that could damage your computer. … The Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) urges computer users to not open unsolicited (spam) e-mails, including clicking links contained within those messages. Even if the sender is familiar, the public should exercise due diligence.

What was that Time story today about al Qaeda facing a possible cash crunch now that their No. 1 pitchman is fish food? “From the desk of Barrister al-Zawahiri. Your assistance is needed. Could you help us with a loan? For you to be a party to the transaction, you must have holdings at an Abbottabad bank of $100,000 or more…”

Sadanand Dhume

What Next for Pakistan?

By Sadanand Dhume

May 3, 2011, 3:58 pm

In tomorrow’s Wall Street Journal, I argue that the United States should not waste this opportunity to demand real reform from Pakistan’s most important institutions: the army and its infamous intelligence wing, Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI. And there’s no better time than now to convince ordinary Pakistanis that their men in khaki aren’t worth the cost:

Almost since the nation was carved out as a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India in 1947, the army has dominated Pakistan’s national life. Though it employs barely 600,000 of Pakistan’s 170 million citizens, it uses ginned-up fears about India to consume around one-fourth of the national budget each year, more than twice as much as education and health care combined. Generals have ruled Pakistan directly for 34 of its 64 years. For most of the rest, they have exercised more power—especially over foreign and strategic policy—than their ostensible civilian masters.

What does Pakistan have to show for this? The less said about the army’s prowess in battle the better. Its wars with India have either ended in stalemates or defeats. Meanwhile, militant Islamist groups spawned by the ISI from the 1980s onward, albeit initially with U.S. blessing in Afghanistan, have spun out of control. Since 2009, Islamists have killed more than 3,000 Pakistanis. Over the past two decades, they’ve caused even more mayhem in India.

Perhaps most important, the army’s longstanding love affair with jihadist groups ranging from al Qaeda to the India-centric Lashkar-e-Taiba have tarred Pakistan’s reputation. According to Gallup, more than three-quarters of Americans hold a negative view of Pakistan; for neighboring India it’s one in five. That bin Laden was found in a $1 million mansion in an army garrison town will only increase global suspicion.

For more on Pakistan and the impact of bin Laden’s death on the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, check out our panel discussion here at AEI Thursday.

Today’s hearing on “The Threat to the U.S. Homeland Emanating from Pakistan” hosted by the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence is very timely, given Osama bin Laden’s death and the debate over the way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As many of my AEI colleagues have argued, bin Laden’s demise will not put an end to the al Qaeda threat, although it is a significant achievement in the war on terror. Frederick Kagan, the director of AEI’s Critical Threats Project, is testifying at this hearing now. Here are some highlights.

The impact of Osama bin Laden’s death:

The death of Osama bin Laden is highly unlikely to mark a turning point in the conflict between the United States and its allies on the one hand and militant Islamism epitomized by al Qaeda on the other… But al Qaeda itself, to say nothing of the numerous franchises and affiliated movements sharing common goals with it, will not be defeated by the death of a single leader, even its founder and figurehead. Nor is it clear that its operational capabilities even in Pakistan will be seriously degraded with bin Laden’s passing–available information suggests that he abandoned day-to-day operational control over the moment long ago, and the organization has survived the deaths of many senior leaders more actively involved in its activities.

U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan:

The current American and NATO strategy in Afghanistan is designed to degrade the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and HiG within Afghanistan and to demonstrate beyond question that those groups will be unable to direct the course of events in Afghanistan even after Western forces hand over security responsibilities to the Afghan government and are significantly reduced in number. Demonstrating that those groups will fail will compel anyone in Pakistan who believes supporting them as proxies to be a plausible strategy for securing Pakistan’s interests to re-evaluate that approach fundamentally. The challenge for American strategy toward Pakistan will be finding ways to accompany progress against Islamist proxies in Afghanistan with efforts to help Pakistan’s ruling elite come to consensus on the overall dangers that Islamist groups within Pakistan pose and on the need to accept the costs and risks of combating and defeating them within Pakistan itself.

In conclusion:

The worst thing we could do now would be to take bin Laden’s death or the progress made to date in Afghanistan as an excuse to withdraw forces prematurely, thereby easing the pressure on militant Islamist groups in Afghanistan just as we would otherwise approach the point of maximum pressure on them and those who support them. Now is the time to reinforce success by exercising patience in Afghanistan and allowing the strategy designed to persuade everyone in Afghanistan and in Pakistan that the militant Islamists in Afghanistan will fail to continue to work.

The full text of Frederick Kagan’s testimony is available, and please register for the AEI event “The Death of Bin Laden and the Future of Pakistan” this Thursday.

Check out the New York Times’s Room for Debate page with two AEIers weighing in.

Here’s Fred Kagan with Kim Kagan, president of the Institute for the Study of War:

The very difficulty we encountered in finding and killing Bin Laden should warn us against the danger of seeing in such operations a magical, low-cost, small-footprint silver bullet for the problems we face.

Michael Rubin follows:

That Bin Laden survived almost 10 years after his attacks on New York and Washington should be an indictment of both parties and, more broadly, the American way of diplomacy.

Read it all.

 

Justice doesn’t bring back the dead and it doesn’t erase a responsibility to the living. The fight against al Qaeda is part of the challenge America faces in this long war, and killing bin Laden and winning in Afghanistan will help us prevail. But there is another key component: Building the alternative to the option offered by Wahhabis and their ilk. No Navy SEAL team can do that. There are men, women, and children dying in Libya and Syria right now fighting for an alternative vision to bin Laden’s. They are looking to President Obama and America to help them, yet the thought, the courage, and the leadership it took to pursue bin Laden is all but absent.

It has been said many times, and he deserves to hear it again and again: The president made a courageous and smart decision about the operation to kill the al Qaeda leader. But there’s another fight going on that needs his attention and his commitment. Muammar Qadhafi must go; Assad must go. No boots on the ground are needed… Just close air support in Libya. Jamming of Libyan State TV. Sanctions against Assad in Syria. Actual rhetorical commitment from Obama. Practical support for democracy. It is good to kill your enemy, but it’s great to champion the free.

The killing of Osama bin Laden by U.S. forces outside Islamabad is a milestone in the war on terrorism and will be a tremendous psychological blow to al Qaeda and its affiliates worldwide. Bin Laden was an iconic figure not only for al Qaeda but also for a cluster of terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, such as the Haqqani group, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and the Punjabi Taliban.

Despite bin Laden’s close ties to the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, however, his death will not affect the war in Afghanistan in the short term. Quite the contrary, we will see more intense fighting in the country in the months ahead. On May 1, the Taliban announced their long-awaited spring offensive, and two suicide attacks killed more than a dozen people in eastern Paktika and Ghazni provinces the next day. More spectacular attacks and suicide bombings will follow soon. On Monday, one Taliban commander said the group would soon launch an operation called Bader “to avenge the killing of Osama.”

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Marc Thiessen

It Ain’t Over Over There

By Marc Thiessen

May 2, 2011, 7:46 pm

This morning, when I went out to get coffee and a paper after a late night celebrating the demise of Osama bin Laden, the lady behind the counter pointed to the front-page picture of the late al Qaeda leader and said: “I guess the war is finally over.” Millions of Americans are saying the same thing today. On Fox News, a Marine at Camp Pendleton said he was relieved at bin Laden’s death because “we’re all ready for this war to be over.” And on CNN last night, Peter Bergen declared: “Killing Bin Laden is the end of the war on terror. We can just sort of announce that right now.”

No, we can’t. The temptation to see this as the culmination of a long struggle is understandable. It has been nearly ten years since the attacks of September 11, 2001. The war on terror is the longest military struggle in our nation’s history, and one that is unlike any our nation faced before. In the past, America’s wars ended with a dramatic event—a surrender ceremony on the deck of the USS Missouri, or allied armies marching into Berlin. Bin Laden’s death feels to many like that kind of event. It is not. Ayman Zawahiri will not respond to the killing of Osama bin Laden by packing it in and returning to his medical practice.

Neither will Adanan Shukrijuma—an American citizen who currently holds Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s former position as al Qaeda’s operational commander—give up jihad and retire. Neither will Anwar al-Awlaki or the other leaders of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, who have twice nearly blown up planes over the United States, give up the fight and go quietly into the night. These terrorists will do everything in their power to avenge the death of their fallen leader. And they are convinced that best way they can do so is by repeating the destruction he wreaked on America. They will seek to mark tenth anniversary of 9/11 in spectacular fashion. We had better be ready.

Vice President Cheney put it well this morning when he said: “Though bin Laden is dead, the war goes on. We must remain vigilant, especially now, and we must continue to support our men and women in uniform who are fighting on the front lines of this war every day.”

So let us revel in a great military victory today. But those celebrating in Times Square and other parts of America today should remember this is not V-J Day. As we dance in the streets, the enemy is regrouping and planning the next attack. Which means that, tomorrow, we need to get back to work and stop them.

Cross-posted from NRO.

 

Tom Donnelly

You Get What You Pay For

By Tom Donnelly

May 2, 2011, 5:00 pm

Charles Krauthammer has it right: the number one take-away from Osama bin Laden’s killing is the “reach, power and efficiency” of the American military. The reach is global, the power is both immense and immensely precise (President Obama was able to reject the bomb-it-to-smithereens option on Osama bin Laden’s compound in favor of the special operations raid), and the application of force produced exactly the outcome intended. Even more than its efficiency, the effectiveness of this very complex operation was astonishing; many television commentators tellingly contrasted it to Operation Eagle Claw, the ill-fated Iran hostage rescue attempt.

Reach, power, and effectiveness come with a price tag, however. At $700 billion per year when the costs of wartime operations are factored in, it’s not cheap. But at less than 5 percent of gross domestic product, it’s more than affordable and at a relatively low level by recent historical standards. Over five decades, Cold War annual budgets averaged half again as much. And when measured by the other costs to American society, such as the fact that the active-duty force totals about one-half of 1 percent of the population, the U.S. military is a bargain that cannot be beat.

This effectiveness is the product of long investment, over many administrations, but also one set of very large investments during Ronald Reagan’s two terms. That “Cold War military” allegedly remains the core of today’s force, providing the bulk of the personnel and training systems, the main weapons systems and, even more important, the esprit and morale that have proved so durable in the post-9/11 years. Those investments have paid handsome dividends, but have never been fully renewed.

Thus it would be ironic–if it weren’t so obvious and a reflection of a bipartisan failure of will–that this stunning success comes at the moment when the U.S. military faces a further downsizing and diminution of capability. Two weeks before giving the “go order” to take out Osama bin Laden, President Obama proposed his third round of defense budget reductions, taking another $400 billion from the Pentagon. It may be that Congress, whether through the House leadership or the Senate’s “Gang of Six,” not only accepts that proposal but also increases the cuts.

The Osama bin Laden raid may be a singular success, but it comes at the end of a decade’s worth of persistent effort and constant conflict amortizing investments made a generation ago. Global reach, unequalled combat power, and battlefield efficiency–in other words, victory–demand a 24-7-365, all-the-time effort. We will not get what we do not pay for.

Cross-posted from The Weekly Standard blog.

The Critical Threats Project here at AEI is all over today’s hottest story. In this exclusive video clip, CTP Director Frederick W. Kagan discusses Osama bin Laden as a martyr and implications surrounding this:

Here, Kagan and Tom Donnelly, director of AEI’s Center for Defense Studies, discuss the possibility of backlash from the slaying of bin Laden:

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has for years propagated the conspiracy theory of 9/11 as an event orchestrated by “some segments within the U.S. government” to “reverse the declining American economy and to tighten its grips on the Middle East in order to save the Zionist regime.” Even today, official Islamic Republic news agencies reported on the death of Osama bin Laden in the context of the “suspicious events of September 11.”

The Iranian public, however, has never subscribed to the conspiracy theories of the regime and most Iranian Internet users expressed joy at the death of the notorious terrorist. The following examples are extracted from Tehran-based Asr-e Iran News:

“We too are happy. Those who shed the blood of innocent people will pay for it.” “May God curse him!” “I wish Bin-Laden had used his money and intelligence fighting against ignorance, illiteracy and health issues in Muslim countries.” “This is the destiny awaiting all terrorists…” “There is an end to crime, injustice and usurpation. But there is no end to the agony of conscience, curses of the people and God’s punishment…” “I pray for annihilation of all rootless terrorists who have made a bad name for the Muslims. Amen!” “I am happy about the death of this murderer who has killed so many people. This is the first time that someone’s death has made me happy. Forgive me God. I hope that one day all megalomaniac terrorists will pay for their crimes, regardless who they are.” “May God curse this criminal who could have created factories and jobs for the people of Afghanistan but instead started killing innocent people. News of the death of this bloodthirsty [person] enchanted me. Inshallah [God willing] all criminals will suffer the destiny of this infidel.”

Such comments are hardly surprising. Iranians, after all, have been victims of Islamist terror since 1979.

Sadanand Dhume

The AIG of Nation-States

By Sadanand Dhume

May 2, 2011, 2:19 pm

Steve Coll’s excellent post over at the New Yorker is full of insights into Pakistan and the likely role of its army in sheltering Osama bin Laden. But the line that strikes me as most memorable is his characterization of the country as “the AIG of nation-states.”

In short, Pakistan—or the generals and spooks who effectively run it—feel that they can get away with anything because Pakistan’s nukes make it too big to fail. So far, the generals have been proved right, but is any country really too big to fail forever? And by making Pakistan synonymous with terrorism for many people, aren’t the Pakistani army and the ISI effectively diminishing the very country they claim to protect? In other words, it’s death by a thousand self-inflicted cuts.

In public, the United States may be compelled to make cooing noises about Islamabad’s cooperation, particularly as the fighting season gets underway in Afghanistan next door. But if I were a Pakistani general, I wouldn’t bet on American forbearance forever. There are measures short of invasion—denying visas to generals and their families, targeting illegal assets held overseas (the United Kingdom and Canada are favorites), and offering embarrassing leaks to the press—that can be used to loosen the army’s grip on society and the state. And, as I’ve argued before, loosening that grip is necessary if Pakistan is to have any hope of rescuing itself from its current predicament.

Was Bin Laden Really Given a Proper Muslim Burial?

By Lazar Berman

May 2, 2011, 2:15 pm

Why did the United States bury bin Laden’s body at sea?

There seem to be two primary reasons:

— Muslim law stipulates that bodies must be buried within 24 hours, preferably before the sun sets that day.

— A burial site could have turned into a shrine for al-Qaeda sympathizers.

Government officials emphasized the sensitivity toward Islamic practice: “We are ensuring that it is handled in accordance with Islamic practice and tradition,” said an American official. “This is something that we take very seriously. And so therefore this is being handled in an appropriate manner.”

But it seems that neither reason necessitated the burial at sea. An umarked grave somewhere would not have turned into a shrine, and the burial at sea actually contradicts Muslim burial law, according to most opinions.

According to the Authentic Step by Step Illustrated Janazah [Funeral] Guide, by Mohamed Ebrahim Siala, the burial (Al-Dafin) is ideally supposed to be done in the city where one lived, as soon as possible after death. After washing and shrouding, the body should rest in a dirt grave on its right side, with the face toward the Qiblah (facing Meccah). This is obviously impossible for a body buried at sea.

Fox News reported that bin Laden’s body was wrapped and washed, and the Janazah prayers said in accordance with Islamic law.

“They can say they buried him at sea, but they cannot say they did it according to Islam,” said Mohammed al-Qubaisi, Dubai’s grand mufti. “If the family does not want him, it’s really simple in Islam: You dig up a grave anywhere, even on a remote island, you say the prayers and that’s it … Sea burials are permissible for Muslims in extraordinary circumstances. This is not one of them.”

The only cases where burial at sea could be permissible are if death occurs on a ship and there is no way to prevent decay until landfall, or if an enemy is looking to desecrate the grave of the deceased.

It has also been suggested that there were no countries willing to accept him, but it should not have been too difficult to find a secret place for an unmarked grave in the United States or one of its territories.

A curious, but creative, solution to a complex problem.

We’re pushing out analysis left, right, and center from the team at AEI. If you’re interested, here’s a cheat sheet:

First reports from the battlefield are notoriously inaccurate, and it’s to be expected that some will be confusing and contradictory—and, considering that “sources and methods” and Pakistani sensibilities are fairly important in this case, probably intentionally misleading. The initial stories about the raid that killed Osama bin Laden may not stand the test of time. But here are some pertinent operational and tactical questions:

  • What did the Pakistanis know, and when did they know it? Abbottabad is a long way from Afghanistan by helicopter, and the raid team is supposed to have been in four choppers, one of which went down. Marc Ambinder, a reporter well-wired into the Obama administration, reports that the raid was staged from Ghazi air base in Pakistan, which means the Pakistani military aided and abetted the operation, even if Pakistan’s president Asi ali Zardari was in the dark.
  • How was the intelligence “operationalized?” It was one thing to find Osama bin Laden and track him, quite another to figure out how and when to strike. It will have involved extremely meticulous planning and rehearsal, and it’s a good bet there’s a mock-up of the bin Laden complex that was built some place.
  • What were the “eyes on target?” This is not an operation that would have been launched, or not aborted at the last moment, without being sure that Osama bin Laden was at home. The compound is in a built-up, urban environment, about 300 meters from a Pakistani military academy. There may well have been some very small team of watchers plus a lot of overhead surveillance, verifying the situation on the ground before inserting the raiding party.
  • Tell me, again, exactly the distinction between “counterterrorism” and “counterinsurgency?” Let’s not miss the forest for the trees. The raid is part of a much larger geopolitical effort to create a decent order in those parts of the Muslim world that have been such a danger to United States and international security interests, and indeed to Muslims themselves.

The largest lesson of the raid is not the virtues of the dogged counterterrorism experts, however. The ability to generate the intelligence and conduct the raid is the product of years of effort, not just by the intelligence and special operations communities but by the entire American military, diplomatic corps, and political leadership. It’s the result of persistence, not just inspiration. The opportunity would never have come about but for the continuity of U.S. policy from the Bush to Obama administrations, by the sacrifices of Americans in uniform and across the government, of our allies—most especially our Muslim allies.

The temptation to declare victory in the “global war on terror” is, a decade after 9/11, very strong. But Osama bin Laden was only a part of the problem of the “greater Middle East,” and even among the constantly metastasizing forms of al Qaeda. And all Americans can share in the feeling of justice done to an extremely evil enemy. But the so-called “Long War” will continue. A good strategist instinctively reinforces success rather than using it as a cover for retreat.

Cross-posted from The Weekly Standard blog.

Today is a day to celebrate a major victory in the war on terror. It is also a day to remember the more than 3,000 people killed on Osama bin Laden’s orders in the 9/11 attack, the attacks on our embassies in East Africa, the U.S.S. Cole and other acts of terror.

In today’s Washington Post, I tell the story of one of those individuals—a Navy intelligence officer named Dan Shanower, who died a few corridors down from me in the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, on the first battlefield of the war on terror.

Did Hamas Really Just Say That?

By Lazar Berman

May 2, 2011, 12:15 pm

What was Hamas thinking?

Just when they have a conceivable path to some measure of international legitimacy with the impending Cairo agreement with Fatah, Ismail Haniyeh, head of the Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip, condemned the U.S. killing of Osama Bin Laden.

Hamas is often described as an organization with a fairly sophisticated understanding of international PR. If there is one thing that is guaranteed to make Americans across the political spectrum oppose the idea of engagement with Hamas, it is condemning bin Laden’s killing and hailing him as an “Arab Holy Warrior.”

We know they think it, but why would they say it out loud?

It is a clear indication that Hamas is far more concerned with domestic opinion and appealing to certain elements within the Arab world than it is about American opinion. It also underscores that Hamas continues to see Fatah as a rival, and is looking to capitalize on the earlier remark by Ghassan Khatib of the Palestinian Authority that “Getting rid of Bin Laden is good for the cause of peace worldwide.” Hamas saw an opportunity here to outflank the PA and portray themselves as defenders of jihad and standard bearers of the Arab/Muslim struggle against American and Israeli aggression.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Ready to Step In

By Katherine Zimmerman

May 2, 2011, 11:59 am

Osama bin Laden’s death is unlikely to herald the collapse of the al Qaeda network. Al Qaeda’s Yemen-based branch, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), is the network’s most active al Qaeda node and is operationally independent of al Qaeda Central. AQAP conducted two successful attacks on the United States since its January 2009 founding and, unlike other al Qaeda-linked plots, the operational planning for these attacks does not have links back into Pakistan’s tribal regions. The prolonged political upheaval in Yemen has already expanded the group’s operating space—Yemen’s counter-terrorism units were redeployed into the capital to protect the president’s interests and tracking of AQAP operatives’ movements has suffered.

The conditions in Yemen will continue to benefit AQAP, as will any of the potential outcomes to the unrest. President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the United States’s partner in the fight against AQAP, is currently fighting for his own political survival. The recommencement of counterterrorism operations, which had been conducted sporadically prior to the unrest, is likely to be delayed in any scenario, whether it be a negotiated transition of power, military coup, or even a stalemate. The most likely result in Yemen is that AQAP will consolidate its network in areas under its control and will take advantage of Saleh’s and the United States’s distraction to conduct operations within the Arabian Peninsula, and also against Western targets.

It is unclear what impact the removal of al Qaeda’s leader will have on the broader al Qaeda network, but there are indications that bin Laden’s death may, in fact, lead to an upsurge in attacks, especially from AQAP. Bin Laden’s approval was previously sought for large-scale operations against the West; sign-off from al Qaeda Central’s leadership may no longer be required. Should bin Laden’s death lower al Qaeda Central’s profile, there may be jockeying within the al Qaeda network for the lead position. AQAP is already poised to assume the lead: it has quickly risen to the top of the network through the successful execution of its attacks on the West and it hosts one of al Qaeda’s top propagandists, American-born Yemeni cleric Anwar al Awlaki.

Yemen’s President Saleh will likely frame himself as the only viable leader in Yemen who can take on AQAP. His hold on power in Yemen will lead to continued unrest, and is unlikely to permit any sustained fight against AQAP. The United States should be wary of confusing bin Laden’s death with the defeat of the al Qaeda network. A first step in Yemen for the United States is a strong counterterrorism partner who is able, and willing, to take on the fight against AQAP.

Katherine Zimmerman is a Critical Threats Project Analyst and Gulf of Aden Team Lead at AEI.

(Official White House photo)

President Obama’s administration is to be congratulated for the flawless execution of the operation that killed Osama bin Laden.  Also, buried in the stories may be yet another sign of the vindication of the Bush administration’s war on terror policies. Anonymous government sources say that the al Qaeda courier who led our intelligence people to bin Laden was a protege of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the architect of the 9/11 attacks who was captured in 2002, subjected to enhanced interrogation methods, and yielded a trove of intelligence on al Qaeda. Those same sources admit that interrogation of al Qaeda leaders, presumably by the CIA, yielded the identity of the courier. That identity was then combined into a mosaic of other information from other detainee interrogations, electronic intercepts, and sources in other countries, to eventually identify bin Laden’s hideout.

Without the tough decisions taken by President Bush and his national security team, the United States could not have found and killed bin Laden. It is the continuity of policies in the war on terror that has brought success, not the misguided effort of the last two years to disavow them.

Al Qaeda Network Lives on after bin Laden

By Maseh Zarif

May 2, 2011, 11:40 am

The United States and the rest of the world are better off with Osama bin Laden dead. This welcome development in the effort to defeat militant Islamism is a testament to the sacrifice and bravery of countless numbers of American men and women who work to keep the United States and our allies safe.

The successful mission that killed bin Laden, however, does not necessarily spell defeat for the al Qaeda network. Al Qaeda’s evolution since 9/11 has resulted in the rise of largely independent franchises that pose a serious threat. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), for instance, has an established leadership core in Yemen that has coordinated multiple attacks on the United States in the last few years. Indeed, amid the unrest in Yemen that has allowed AQAP to operate more freely, U.S. signals intelligence picked up on information that pointed to a possible AQAP attack on the United States, beyond the chatter that is typically picked up.

Within Pakistan, the al Qaeda network’s capacity to coordinate attacks is not confined to a single compound in Abbottabad. On Friday, I wrote about the al Qaeda cell detained by German authorities who described the three operatives as posing a concrete, immediate threat. The leader of that cell had traveled to Waziristan, Pakistan, for training and coordination and reportedly took orders from al Qaeda leaders there. As this case demonstrated, the broader al Qaeda network’s safe havens, not individual leaders like bin Laden, serve as the most important asset for terrorists who pose a threat to the West.

In short: justice has been rightly meted out, but the fight goes on.

Maseh Zarif is research manager for AEI’s Critical Threats Project.


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