The Enterprise Blog

Archive for the ‘Bin Laden’ Category

During an online question and answer session on Monday, President Obama “exposed” a covert action program when, for the first time, he acknowledged the existence of the CIA’s drone campaign against al Qaeda. The drone program is, of course, an “open secret” in Washington. U.S. officials routinely discuss it on deep background, and Obama has referred to it obliquely in the past. But this was the first time an American president had openly acknowledged that the United States was using unmanned drones to kill al Qaeda terrorists.

The president made his remarks in the context of defending the program against charges from critics on the left that it has led to the deaths of a large number of civilians. “Drones have not caused a huge number of civilian casualties,” the president declared. “There’s a perception that we’re just sending a whole bunch of strikes willy-nilly. This is a targeted, focused effort at people who are on a list of active terrorists who are trying to go in and harm Americans … It is important for everybody to understand that this thing is kept on a tight leash.”

He added that, far from a source of tension with countries where strikes occur (he judiciously avoided mentioning Pakistan by name), relations would be further frayed if drones were not available to go after al Qaeda and the United States had to use manned missions to kill the terrorists instead. “We have to be judicious in how we use drones,” the president said, “but we have to understand that probably our ability … to limit our incursions into somebody else’s territory is enhanced by the fact that we are able to pinpoint-strike an al Qaeda operative in a place where the capacity of that military in that country may not be able to get them.”

At almost the same time the president spoke, eleven terrorists, including four local commanders, are reported to have been killed in a U.S. drone airstrike in a southern Yemeni province where al Qaeda’s affiliate controls significant ground. And earlier this month, the United States resumed drone strikes in Pakistan after a nearly two month pause following an American air strike in November that killed two dozen Pakistani troops. According to the Long War Journal, this was the longest pause in strikes since the program was ramped up in the summer of 2008 by President George W. Bush. Here is LWJ’s list of the pauses in drone attacks:

Number of days between Predator/Reaper strikes in Pakistan since August 2008, eight days or greater

2011:

•    33 days, Nov. 16 to Dec. 19

•    11 days, Nov. 3 to Nov. 15

•    11 days, Oct. 15 to Oct. 27

•    12 days, Sept. 30 to Oct. 13

•    11 days, Sept. 11 to Sept. 23

•    17 days, Aug. 22 to Sept. 11

•    9 days, May 23 to June 3

•    19 days, April 21 to May 6

•    25 days, March 17 to April 13

•    14 days, Feb. 21 to March 8

•    27 days, Jan. 23 to Feb. 20

2010:

•    9 days, Dec. 17 to Dec. 27

•    19 days, July 25 to Aug. 14

•    15 days, June 29 to July 15

•    12 days, May 28 to June 10

•    12 days, March 30 to April 12

•    10 days, Feb. 24 to March 8

•    11 days, Feb. 2 to Feb. 14

2009:

•    19 days, Nov. 18 to Dec. 8

•    13 days, Sept. 30 to Oct. 14

•    9 days, Sept. 14 to Sept. 24

•    10 days, Aug. 27 to Sept. 7

•    8 days, Aug. 11 to Aug. 20

•    9 days, June 23 to July 3

•    28 days, May 16 to June 14

•    9 days, April 19 to April 29

•    10 days, April 8 to April 19

•    9 days, March 15 to March 25

•    11 days, March 1 to March 12

•    12 days, Feb. 16 to March 1

•    21 days, Jan. 23 to Feb. 14

•    20 days, Jan. 2 to Jan. 23

2008:

•    11 days, Nov. 29 to Dec. 11

•    13 days, Sept. 17 to Oct. 1

A few weeks ago, I pointed out here at the Enterprise Blog and the Washington Post that Ron Paul had come out against the operation that killed Osama bin Laden, declaring it showed a lack of “respect for the rule of law, international law.”

At last night’s Fox News debate, moderator Brett Baier confronted Paul with his own words. Paul’s response was, to put it mildly, an incomprehensible jumble.

At first Paul denied ever uttering them. Then he said he had voted to give the president the authority to kill bin Laden. Then he said the operation that did kill him showed no respect for the sovereignty of Pakistan. Then he complained that “once they waited ten years, I don’t see any reason why they couldn’t have done it like they did after Khalid Sheikh Mohammed” (ie. working together with Pakistan)—ignoring the fact that bin Laden was hiding out right under the shadow of Pakistan’s equivalent of West Point and that U.S. officials feared bin Laden was being protected and would have been tipped off. Then he bizarrely compared the operation to the Chinese coming into the United States and killing a dissident who had been given political safe haven here. Then he said we should have done what we had in the case of Saddam Hussein (only to have Baier point out that Paul had opposed the Iraq war).

Newt Gingrich and Mitt Romney then stepped forward and skewered Paul. Gingrich called Paul’s answer “utterly irrational” and pointed out that “a Chinese dissident who comes here seeking freedom is not the same as a terrorist who goes to Pakistan seeking asylum.” Romney declared, “Of course you take out our enemies, wherever they are. These people declared war on us. They’ve killed Americans. We go anywhere they are, and we kill them.… (APPLAUSE) The right thing for Osama bin Laden was the bullet in the head that he received. That’s the right thing for people who kill American citizens.”

You can see the video of Paul’s rambling response here (the exchange starts at 7:28):



Here is the full unedited transcript, in all its glory:

BAIER: In a recent interview, Congressman Paul, with a Des Moines radio station you said you were against the operation that killed Osama bin Laden. You said the U.S. operation that took out the terrorist responsible for killing 3,000 people on American soil, quote, showed no respect for the rule of law, international law. So to be clear, you believe international law should have constrained us from tracking down and killing the man responsible for the most brazen attack on the U.S. since Pearl Harbor?

PAUL: Obviously no. And that’s what — I did not say that. What I — as a matter of fact, after 9/11 I voted for the authority to go after him. And my frustration was that we didn’t go after him. It took us ten years. We had him trapped at Tora Bora and I thought we should have trapped him there. I even introduced another resolution on the principle of market reprisal to keep our eye on target rather than getting involved in nation building.

BAIER: But no respect for international law was the question about the quote that you used in Des Moines.

PAUL: Well, you know, I can’t say — his colleague was in Pakistan, and we communicated, you know, with the government of Pakistan and they turned him over. And what I suggested there was that if we have no respect for the sovereignty of another nation that it will lead to disruption of that nation.

Here we have a nation that we are becoming constantly trying to kill people who we consider our enemies. At the same time we are giving the government of Pakistan billions of dollars. Now there’s a civil war going on, the people are mad at us but yet the government is getting money from us and I think it’s a deeply flawed policy.

But to not go after him — and if I voted for the authority, obviously I think it was proper. But once they waited ten years, I don’t see any reason why they couldn’t have done it like they did after Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. And that would have been a more proper way. If somebody in this country, say a Chinese dissident come over here, we wouldn’t endorse the idea, well, they can come over here and bomb us and do whatever. I’m just trying to suggest that respect for other nation’s sovereignty — and look at the chaos in Pakistan now. We are at war in Pakistan, but to say that I didn’t want him killed…

BAIER: No, I just quoted from your radio.

PAUL: I’m just suggesting that there are processes that if you could follow and that you should do it. There is proper procedures rather than digging bigger holes for ourselves. That’s what we have been doing in the Middle East, digging bigger and bigger holes for ourselves and it’s so hard for us to get out of that mess. And we have a long ways to go. We are still in Iraq and that’s getting worse and we are not leaving Afghanistan and the American people are sick and tired of it. 80 percent of the American people want us out of there. I am just suggesting that we work within the rule of law. Like only going to war when you declare the law, then we wouldn’t be…

BAIER: International law. I understand. I guess U.S. intelligence officials say they had documents recovered in the compound in Abbottabad that that shows that al Qaeda was planning other attacks, perhaps bigger than 9/11. I asked you in our debate in Sioux City on the topic of Iran about this. But on this topic, GOP nominee Ron Paul would be running far to the left of President Obama on the issue of tracking down and killing terrorists who want to attack the U.S.

PAUL: I would say that if you do your best and you can’t do anything, yes, we had the authority, we voted for it, you got it from the congress, you do it. I just didn’t think they had gone through the process enough to actually, you know, capture him in a different way. I mean, think about Saddam Hussein. We did that. We captured him. We tried him. I mean the government tried him and he got hung. What’s so terrible about this?  This whole idea that you can’t capture — just a minute. This whole idea you can’t capture people…

BAIER: but you voted against the war in Iraq.

PAUL: Adolf Eichmann was captured. He was given a trial. What is wrong with capturing people? Why didn’t we try to get some information from him? You know, we are accustomed to asking people questions, but all of a sudden gone, you know, that’s it. So I would say that there are different ways without trying to turn around and say, oh, for some reason this doesn’t mean he’s supporting America.

The Iowa caucuses are less than 14 days away and three new polls show Representative Ron Paul is the new frontrunner in the Hawkeye state—leading the GOP field in Iowa by anywhere from three to six points. Should Paul come out on top when the caucuses convene next month, Iowa Republicans will have given their endorsement to a presidential nominee who just yesterday announced that he opposes the killing of Osama bin Laden.

That’s right. ABC News reports:

Rep. Ron Paul… explained to a Iowa radio station why he would not have ordered the killing of Osama bin Laden. The answer seemed to catch Iowa radio host Simon Conway off guard; he asked Paul to repeat it.

Paul was unequivocal: “No, not the way it took place,” Paul said of the killing of bin Laden.

Why?

“It was absolutely not necessary and I think respect for the rule of law, international law—what if he’d been in a hotel in London?” Paul asked. “We wanted to keep it secret. Would we have sent the helicopters into London? Because they were afraid the information would get out. No you don’t want to do that.”

It has long been clear that Ron Paul has nutty views when it comes to foreign policy. (In one presidential debate earlier this year, he explained that America had brought the 9/11 attacks upon itself.) But what is most surprising is that his objection to the killing of Osama bin Laden rests on his contention that our actions showed a lack of respect for “international law.” Not long ago, Paul was much more dismissive of international law. Back in 2002, he wrote in a column that “America must either remain a constitutional republic or submit to international law, because it cannot do both. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and the conflict between adhering to the rule of law and obeying globalist planners is now staring us in the face.” Now, he claims, international law constrains us from killing the man responsible for the most brazen attack our country since Pearl Harbor—and who was actively plotting another attack to match or exceed the magnitude of 9/11? Since when do libertarians believe that international law has the power to prevent a sovereign nation like the United States from defending itself against foreign aggressors?

Ron Paul is no conservative—indeed, his views on the war on terror put him on the far left of the political spectrum when it comes to national security. It would bring shame on the state of Iowa if the state’s Republicans made a man who opposes the killing of Osama bin Laden their choice for the president of the United States.

In a story on the pending departure of U.S. forces from Iraq, the New York Times yesterday referred to “al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the homegrown Qaeda affiliate in Iraq, which has some foreign members.” Boy, the folks at the Times are either really stubborn or really slow learners. Probably both.

Back in 2007, you may recall, opponents of the surge in Iraq—including the Times—worked overtime to spread the myth that al Qaeda in Iraq (aka Mesopotamia) was an Iraqi phenomenon independent of Osama bin Laden. They did so because, if al Qaeda in Iraq was bin Laden’s al Qaeda, then America could not accept defeat in Iraq—we had to win. But if they could convince Americans that we were not fighting bin Laden’s al Qaeda in Iraq, but rather some “homegrown” terror group, then America could pull out of Iraq and not undermine our efforts in the war on terror.

In July 2007, President Bush delivered an address in Charleston, South Carolina where he definitively put to this myth to rest. As Bush explained:

Al Qaeda in Iraq was founded by a Jordanian terrorist, not an Iraqi. His name was Abu Musab al Zarqawi.… In 2004, Zarqawi and his terrorist group formally joined al Qaeda, pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden, and he promised to “follow his orders in jihad.” Soon after, bin Laden publicly declared that Zarqawi was the “Prince of Al Qaeda in Iraq”—and instructed terrorists in Iraq to “listen to him and obey him.”…

Zarqawi was killed by U.S. forces in June 2006. He was replaced by another foreigner—an Egyptian named Abu Ayyub al-Masri. … He has collaborated with Zawahiri for more than two decades. And before 9/11, he spent time with al Qaeda in Afghanistan where he taught classes indoctrinating others in al Qaeda’s radical ideology….

According to our intelligence community, many of al Qaeda in Iraq’s other senior leaders are also foreign terrorists. They include a Syrian who is al Qaeda in Iraq’s emir in Baghdad, a Saudi who is al Qaeda in Iraq’s top spiritual and legal advisor, an Egyptian who fought in Afghanistan in the 1990s and who has met with Osama bin Laden, a Tunisian who we believe plays a key role in managing foreign fighters. Last month in Iraq, we killed a senior al Qaeda facilitator named Mehmet Yilmaz, a Turkish national who fought with al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and met with September the 11th mastermind Khalid Shaikh Muhammad, and other senior al Qaeda leaders. … Foreign terrorists also account for most of the suicide bombings in Iraq. Our military estimates that between 80 and 90 percent of suicide attacks in Iraq are carried out by foreign-born al Qaeda terrorists.

The Times wasn’t sold, declaring in their story the next day on Bush’s speech: “The Iraqi group is a homegrown Sunni Arab extremist group with some foreign operatives that has claimed a loose affiliation to Mr. bin Laden’s network, although the precise links are unclear.” Apparently, they are still at it. The Times editors should study these words President Bush delivered in Charleston carefully: “There’s a good reason they are called al Qaeda in Iraq: They are al Qaeda … in … Iraq.” Hopefully, Barack Obama has not given them a new lease on life with his precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces.

In the Washington Post this morning, I write about the pathetic state of the foreign policy discussion in last night’s presidential debate. The candidates spent just nine minutes of the two-hour discussion on national security—and most of that was spent arguing over how quickly America should withdraw from Afghanistan, and whether America brought the 9/11 attacks upon itself.

It is with this backdrop that Senator Marco Rubio takes the stage tonight at the Jesse Helms Center in Wingate, North Carolina, with a major address on “America’s Role in the World.” Rubio’s office released the following excerpts this morning. The only thing wrong with Rubio’s remarks is that they were not delivered on the debate stage last night—by any of the current candidates or by Rubio himself.

ON AMERICA’S ROLE IN THE WORLD

Fundamentally, I believe the world is a better place when the United States is strong and prosperous. I do not believe that America has the power or means to solve every issue in the world. But I do believe there are some critically important issues where America does have a meaningful role to play in resolving crises that are tied to our national interests.

If we refuse to play our rightful role and shrink from the world, America and the entire world will pay a terrible price. And it is our responsibility to clearly outline to the American people what our proper role in the world is and what American interests are at stake when we engage abroad …

Continue reading

(Peter Holden)

Former Vice President Dick Cheney said today at AEI that victory in the war on terror will be a gradual process without a defining victory moment.

“It’s not similar to what we think of as a conventional war,” Cheney said, adding it’s “not likely to be an ‘a-ha moment,’ say ‘it’s done.’”

“I think there is evidence out there that we’re making significant progress,” he said.

One of those milestones was killing Osama bin Laden, he said, noting that the Obama administration “didn’t just come in and all of a sudden they got bin Laden,” but worked off the policies and mechanisms put in place during the Bush years.

“They’ve been successful in part because of … what we’ve left them with,” he said.

Cheney was asked if he was surprised that bin Laden was found living in the relative open in Pakistan.

“I had no reason in my dealings with President [Pervez] Musharraf to question his commitment or the work he was doing with us,” he said. “He came to believe al Qaeda types threatened him and his regime as much as the United States.”

Cheney was speaking at his first Washington event since the publication of his memoir In My Time, which will debut at No. 1 on The New York Times’s best-seller list.

Earlier today, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen publicly accused the Pakistani government of sanctioning the murder of Syed Saleem Shahzad, a prominent Pakistani journalist. “I have not seen anything to disabuse that the government knew about it,” Mullen said. Shahzad was found dead in a canal on the outskirts of Islamabad, beaten and tortured to death days after disappearing on May 29.

That Shahzad might have been killed by the Pakistan’s shadowy directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is not news. The ISI was found guilty in the court of public opinion upon the discovery of Shahzad’s body. The organization has a history of controlling journalists through intimidation and violence. Prior to his disappearance, Shahzad had warned multiple people that he had been receiving death threats from the ISI on account of his reporting. The fact that Shahzad died days after writing a story exposing embarrassing infiltrations of the Pakistani military by al Qaeda militants only strengthens the case. To crown it all, senior Obama administration officials, speaking anonymously, confirmed on Monday that intelligence existed to indicate that Shahzad’s murder had been ordered by senior ISI officials.

What makes this story significant is that an official as prominent as Mullen would go out of his way to confirm the ISI’s complicity in the murder just as the Obama administration is looking to repair ties with Pakistan. Relations between the two countries have been severely strained by the fallout of the May 2 raid that killed Osama bin Laden. The Pakistani military has been under unprecedented pressure at home and abroad since the raid, and the announcement may be an attempt by the United States to keep that pressure on. It remains to be seen whether such tactics will have the desired effect. What is certain, however, is that killing off journalists who are writing about uncomfortable truths such as the presence of militant sympathizers in the army will neither restore the army’s reputation, nor extirpate the militant rot in the inside.

Reza Nasim Jan is the Pakistan team leader for AEI’s Critical Threats Project. He is a co-author of the report “The Haqqanis in Kurram: The Regional Implications of a Growing Insurgency.”

Osama bin Laden, Head of Marketing, Urges Name Change

By Alex Della Rocchetta

June 24, 2011, 4:40 pm

Osama bin Laden—a terrorist CEO, selling holy war on behalf of a corporation suffering a drop in market share? For the intelligence analysts mining the data seized from the terror chief’s compound in Abbottabad, likening bin Laden to a public relations director may not be too far from the truth.

According to a handwritten letter recovered during the U.S. raid that killed him, the al Qaeda No. 1 lamented that the terrorist group was afflicted by an image management quandary. Indeed, this dilemma reportedly led bin Laden to consider transforming the organization’s brand in order to conduct a strategic public relations offensive against the West, who he considered to be winning the PR fight.

Specifically, the undated letter reveals bin Laden’s concerns over increasingly negative connotations being associated with his terror group’s name. The 9/11 mastermind believed that the bad rap was largely the result of al Qaeda killing too many Muslims in Iraq, thought to be “bad for business,” which allegedly prompted him to consider renaming the group. Bin Laden furthermore argued that the habitual shortening of the terrorist group’s full name (al Qaeda al Jihad meaning “The Base of Holy War”) to just al Qaeda had allowed the West to “claim deceptively that they are not at war with Islam.” In fact, in President Obama’s speech on Afghanistan on Wednesday, he referred to bin Laden’s concerns that al Qaeda had “failed in its effort to portray America as a nation at war with Islam, thereby draining more widespread support.”

However, rather than justify bin Laden’s written admission of al Qaeda’s decline in widespread support as a reason to disengage from the region, the United States and its allies must remain vigilant in their efforts to ensure that Afghanistan and Pakistan will not become a safe haven for al Qaeda. With the formal announcement that bin Laden’s former deputy Ayman al Zawahiri has been appointed as the organization’s new No. 1, it would be a grave mistake to underestimate the threat Zawahiri’s al Qaeda will pose to U.S. national security.

Though top executives in al Qaeda may have been deposed and the group’s popularity metrics are down, there is nothing like a lack of direct “competition” for AQ’s stock to rebound.

According to a May 2 USA Today/Gallup poll, 54 percent of Americans felt that Osama bin Laden’s death would make the United States safer from terrorism. As the House Homeland Security subcommittee hears testimony on terrorist safe havens in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, recent developments in those three countries are a reminder that the terrorist threat is far from eliminated.

News emerged Monday that the Pakistani military is planning to launch a long-awaited campaign against militants in North Waziristan, the stomping ground for a dangerous mix of terrorist groups that target U.S. forces in Afghanistan as well as the American homeland. In Yemen, escalating fighting between the government and powerful tribes has created conditions ripe for an outbreak of protracted civil war. Such an outcome would allow al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula—a key contender for leadership of the al Qaeda network post-Osama bin Laden—to further expand its safe havens and freely plan attacks against the United States. And the FBI announced yesterday that it is looking into the case of a reported Somali-American al Shabaab suicide bomber who was involved in a plot killing two African Union soldiers Monday in Mogadishu, Somalia. With its sight set on joining the global jihad, al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab also poses a threat to U.S. national security.

The post-bin Laden world is still a dangerous one, and the war on terror is not over. The United States needs to remain vigilant in its efforts to keep Americans and its allies safe in the homeland and abroad.

Katherine Faley is a research analyst at AEI’s Critical Threats Project.

According to a statement from the Pentagon, the United States is in the process of pulling out some of its troops inside Pakistan, many of whom are deployed as trainers to the Pakistani military, following an in-writing request from the Pakistan Army. Islamabad has asked for a scaling back of more than 200 American troops currently deployed inside Pakistan.

The request was initially made in the aftermath of the so-called “Raymond Davis affair,” when a CIA contractor shot and killed two Pakistanis in Lahore in late January. The Pakistani military, in a display of its indignation, asked the United States to pare down its Special Forces training program assisting the paramilitary Pakistani Frontier Corps (FC). The army, still reeling from the fallout and embarrassment of the bin Laden raid, is probably pursuing the request to show its displeasure at the unilateral U.S. action deep inside Pakistan.

The move is a bad one for all involved. The most direct beneficiary of the training program is the Pakistani military itself. U.S. Special Forces trainers are there at the invitation of Pakistan and have done much over the past several years to help train and equip the FC.

Considered for years to be a backwater deployment, the FC lacked funding, attention, training, equipment, and professionalism and, as a result, was frequently bested in battles with the Taliban. Today, the FC is a strikingly more competent organization, and American training, funding, and equipping has had a positive role to play in that transformation. Shrinking the training program will deprive the FC of the mentorship it needs, and Pakistani officers of the relationships they could be developing with their American counterparts. The U.S., too, will suffer from the decreased soldier-to-soldier contact and trust building opportunities that the program encourages.

At the strategic level, the move does not augur well for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and is evidence that the strategic partners have not yet made it through the rough patches. The recent trip by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen were meant to help put the relationship back on track and to begin, slowly but surely, re-establishing trust between the two countries. There is much work yet to be done, and the Pakistani call to shrink a program that it ultimately benefits most from is not going to make the task any easier.

Reza Nasim Jan is the Pakistan team leader for the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute. He is a co-author of the new report “The Haqqanis in Kurram: The Regional Implications of a Growing Insurgency.”

A number of new organizations have picked up on my comments at yesterday’s AEI panel describing how Khalid Sheikh Mohammed had figured out the limits of how long waterboarding could be applied, and mocked his interrogators by counting off the seconds. The Miami Herald has a story here, and Politico has one here.

One minor correction: I said during the panel that KSM “held out his arm” when he ticked off the seconds. In fact, his arm was restrained when he did it. Here is the exact story, as I reported it in my book Courting Disaster, with the quote from a senior CIA official describing what KSM did:

Those familiar with the CIA’s interrogations say there is no way we could have gotten KSM to talk without waterboarding. Former Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell has said, “No. You can say that absolutely. He would not have talked to us in a hundred years. Tough guy. Absolutely committed. He had this mental image of himself as a warrior and a martyr. No way he would talk to us.” A high-ranking CIA official told me, “Everyone will tell you, even people opposed to the program, that [KSM] was not going to talk otherwise. I mean, this was one tough mother. He would get waterboarded and they would watch his fingers because he’d figured out how long it was going to last, and he’d just count on his hands how long he had to hold out. I mean, that is tough. For a psychotic, you’ve got to give the guy his props. And he was going to break by Starsky and Hutch interrogation techniques?”

The Miami Herald story repeats the assertion that “KSM was waterboarded 183 times” and quotes me as claiming it was only five sessions. In fact, as I pointed out yesterday on the Enterprise Blog, it is KSM himself who told the International Committee of the Red Cross that he only went through five waterboarding sessions. Of course, the terrorists are trained to lie about their treatment—but they generally lie to exaggerate what they went through, not downplay it.

In his speech on the Senate floor last week disputing the importance of CIA interrogations in the operation that got Osama bin Laden (which was the subject of a lively AEI panel discussion this afternoon—view the video here) Senator John McCain referred to “Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was waterboarded 183 times.”

This figure has appeared in hundreds of news stories, and is accepted as fact. But it is demonstrably wrong. KSM was not waterboarded 183 times. My source for this information? KSM himself.

After 14 CIA detainees were transferred to Guantanamo Bay in September 2006, the International Committee of the Red Cross was given access to them for the first time. ICRC representatives interviewed the detainees about their treatment, and prepared a confidential report for the CIA detailing what the detainees told them. Of course, the report leaked to the press soon thereafter (confirming the wisdom of the CIA’s decision not to grant the ICRC access to the high-value detainees earlier).

In it, KSM describes his waterboarding sessions. And based on their conversations with him, the ICRC reports that:

The procedure was applied during five different sessions during the first month of interrogation in his third place of detention.

Another terrorist, Abu Zubaydah, also described waterboarding. It has been endlessly repeated in the press that Zubaydah was waterboarded 83 times. But this is not what Zubaydah told the ICRC. He told them:

The suffocation procedure was applied during five sessions of ill-treatment that took place during an approximately one-week intense session of interrogation allegedly in Afghanistan in 2002. During each session, apart from one, the suffocation technique was applied once or twice; on one occasion it was applied three times.

Big difference. You can read the full report here.

So what accounts for the discrepancy? The 183 and 83 figures come from the CIA inspector general’s report, but they refer not to the number of waterboarding sessions, or even the number of applications during each session. They refer to the number of splashes of water. During each application, which could last no more than 40 seconds and usually lasted much less, there could be several dozen splashes. To say KSM was waterboarded 183 times is the equivalent of walking out into a rainstorm and getting hit by 10,000 rain drops, and saying that you were in 10,000 rainstorms.

This is just one of the many falsehoods about CIA interrogations that have taken hold in the popular imagination and are repeated as fact by many in the press, and even by U.S. senators who should know better. I discuss other misleading assertions that Senator McCain made in his speech in my Washington Post column this week.

But there is one thing McCain said with which I wholeheartedly agree. In the debate over how CIA interrogations were conducted, McCain declared, “much [is] at stake for America’s security and reputation. Each side should make its own case, but do so without making up its own facts.”

Former Attorney General Michael Mukasey continued his ongoing debate with Senator John McCain (R-Arizona) over the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, questioning at AEI today how the United States is going to best exploit the “huge” cache of materials found at Osama bin Laden’s compound without being able to interrogate with such methods.

Mukasey and McCain have been going back and forth in the opinion pages over whether enhanced interrogation led to the discovery of bin Laden’s Pakistan location.

Mukasey, who served in the latter part of George W. Bush’s second term, said that three people were waterboarded, one of them Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and that in questioning afterward disclosed a nickname used by the courier who ultimately led the way to bin Laden.

“Was there a memo in the file beforehand containing that name?” he asked. “Yes.” But that alone was not considered significant enough to act, and when it became apparent that KSM was “covering for him,” Mukasey said, the pieces fell into place.

“The techniques to which he was subjected were not in violation of the law at the time,” the former attorney general said, including torture statutes.

The “real current issue,” Mukasey said, is “what do we have in place now to exploit a trove of material that we got from bin Laden’s residence?”

He lauded the fact that a drone strike wasn’t used against the compound, which would have “obliterated” a “huge” stash of information. But Mukasey stressed that the stash “will lead to people” who will have information, and “we don’t have anything in place” to get all of that information.

“We need a detention policy as well,” Mukasey said.

The panel is still going on live, including Mukasey, AEI’s Marc Thiessen, former Acting General Counsel of the CIA John Rizzo, Elisa Massimino of Human Rights First, and Benjamin Wittes from the Brookings Institution. Watch the livestream and share your thoughts here.

(Department of Defense)

Inevitably, many in the media pounced on the killing of bin Laden as justification for pulling out of Afghanistan and treating the struggle against jihadi terrorism as a policing operation.

Eugene Robinson, writing in yesterday’s Washington Post (“Now that he’s dead, let’s end bin Laden’s grip on us”), argues that “it’s hard to overstate the significance of bin Laden’s killing.” But Robinson does just that: “Years from now, I believe, we will look back and say the elimination of Osama bin Laden changed everything.”

To Robinson, bin Laden was the reason Al Qaeda still looked to attack the United States, using his charisma and couriers to shape Al Qaeda strategy. Younger leaders are far more interested in attacking domestic targets. Bin Laden also caused the United States to react recklessly, stretching our military thin and precipitating paranoia among the American populace. Now, a relieved Robinson believes, we can all think more clearly, and reconsider our mission in Afghanistan.

The Boston Globe editorial board takes a similar stance, urging an end to the idea of a global war on terror now that OBL is gone. To them, terrorism is merely a “tactical threat to be met with aggressive policing.” The most effective way, says the Globe, to remove the threat of terrorism is to support the Arab Spring rebellions. Terrorist groups that don’t attack America should be left for local governments to fight.

This argument, predicated on the notion that without bin Laden, international terrorism will flounder and shift its focus from America, is flawed on a number of levels.

First of all, history shows that terrorist sanctuaries, either in supportive countries or lawless regions, are extremely important to terrorist groups (Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, AQAP in Yemen, PLO in Lebanon, Al-Shabaab in Somalia). Policing and intelligence-sharing with local governments is simply not an adequate solution, especially when local governments are too weak or sympathetic to combat the groups operating from their territory.

Second, as Fred and Kim Kagan explain in The Weekly Standard, OBL’s death has no effect on our mission in Afghanistan, our troop levels, or for our timetable. “George W. Bush sent forces into Afghanistan not to kill bin Laden, but to oust al Qaeda from its safe haven there, defeat that organization, and create political conditions that would preclude its return to Afghanistan.” In other words, we will not look back at Operation Geronimo as the event that changed everything. The conditions in Afghanistan have not changed, and a chaotic Afghanistan would undoubtedly serve as a fertile home for terrorist groups to find shelter and adherents, including groups fleeing Pakistan if a government crackdown ever comes.

Third, Al Qaeda is not the only group promoting global Jihad. As AEI’s Ahmad Majidyar pointed out, the Afghan Taliban’s leadership is not a local nationalist movement, but is a terrorist group with a global agenda. “If the American occupiers and their allies think that the martyrdom of Sheikh Osama bin Laden, peace be upon him, will weaken the authority and morale of the mujahedin in Afghanistan or in other occupied Islamic countries, this will be their big mistake,” read the official Taliban statement on OBL’s death, “The Islamic Emirate believes that the martyrdom of Sheikh Osama bin Laden, peace be upon him, will give new life to the ongoing jihad against the occupiers at this critical juncture. The jihadist movement will become stronger.” Pakistani Taliban, or TTP, has targeted the United States in increasingly brazen attacks as well. They attacked NATO convoys in 2008, killed U.S. soldiers in February 2010, attacked the Peshawar U.S. Consulate in April of the same year, and claimed responsibility for the failed Times Square car bomb a year ago.

Terrorism is a global problem. It takes more than policing and intelligence sharing, especially when many governments whose help we need are less than eager to provide it. Terrorist groups flock to failed states, and threaten to bring down governments and disrupt trade in the Middle East and Africa. Bin Laden’s death changed none of that, and it is revealing that commentators would use Osama’s demise as a pretense to push for the end of a war they have been uncomfortable with from the beginning.

With the killing of Osama bin Laden, there have been many news stories reporting that individuals within the White House and on Capitol Hill want to use his death as “cover” to begin an even more substantial drawdown in Afghanistan this July than commanders in the field are recommending. Whatever the strategic logic is that leads from the one to the other is of course left totally opaque—suggesting, in the final analysis, that these calls for troop reductions are really about domestic politics, declining poll numbers for the war here at home, and the initial soundings associated with the upcoming presidential campaign season.

But before we rush off to cut troop numbers precipitously, two points are worth considering. The first is that, even as things stand now, we have too few boots on the ground in Afghanistan to conduct a full-scale counterinsurgency. This is a point I have covered before but is picked up most recently in a piece by Washington Institute for Near East Policy fellow Dan Green in Armed Forces Journal, “Getting it Right: 10 Problems with the Afghan Campaign.” The first problem Green identifies is that there are “not enough troops” as is:

The dominant narrative of Afghanistan in Washington, D.C., is that there are enough troops to undertake a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign. However, the difference between the rhetoric of troop increases and the reality is still quite stark. Many areas of the country have sufficient troops to undertake a population protection strategy whereas others are COIN-lite and some have few, if any troops at all. This rationing of the war, where some areas receive a great deal of attention and others are economies of force, will prove insufficient to prevail against the Taliban. The Key Terrain District (KTD) program wherein coalition operations are focused in more than 80 districts represents this reduction of expectations. Each KTD is supposed to have a synchronized delivery of population-protection, good governance and reconstruction/development efforts. We are already not meeting these reduced expectations, and as we squeeze the insurgency in some areas with a counterinsurgency approach it is manifesting itself in others where sufficient resources are absent. It is an open secret in Kabul that senior ISAF leaders want more troops. President Obama’s authorization of an additional 1,400 U.S. Marines in January was further evidence that there aren’t enough troops to undertake the tasks required under a population-centric campaign and that his support for 30,000 troops was insufficient.

The second point about cutting back on American forces is that our allies in Afghanistan will be taking their cues from what the administration decides. Given how little support there is among most of our allies’ populations for being in Afghanistan, it will be impossible for them to not react with deep reductions of their own—multiplying the problem of having too few (or, at best, just enough) troops in theater. As The Telegraph is reporting, David Cameron, the British prime minister, is already pushing to start bringing U.K. troops home in conjunction with Obama’s timeline of July. Cameron is doing so despite his defense chiefs arguing that a reduction in the force density of troops in central Helmand, where the Brits are deployed, will put in jeopardy their counterinsurgency efforts. And I can say from my own discussions in other allied capitals, each is looking to see what the administration does in July and what it announces for the future as a signal for what they in turn will do. In short, if the administration is not careful about its decision on troop reductions, it could well instigate a mass rush to the door, undermining the very hard-fought progress that has been made in Afghanistan over the past year. What a waste of resources, effort and, most of all, lives that will be.

As I pointed out here the other day, WikiLeaks almost blew the operation that killed Osama bin Laden when it released a classified Defense Department file on Abu Faraj al-Libi—one of several CIA detainees who helped lead the agency to Osama bin Laden’s courier—which showed that the CIA was on the trail of the courier, and had made the connection between the courier, bin Laden, and the city of Abbottabad. Had al Qaeda read this file before the raid, they could have whisked bin Laden to safety. Fortunately, they did not.

In a normal world, the CIA officials who uncovered the intelligence that helped us get to Osama bin Laden would receive medals. In the Obama administration, they have been given subpoenas, and are under threat of prosecution by the Holder Justice Department.

Meanwhile, the man who gave away that intelligence and nearly blew the bin Laden operation—Julian Assange—appears to be under no threat whatsoever of prosecution by the Holder Justice Department. And this week in London, Assange received a medal, when he was awarded the Sydney Peace Prize. UPI reports:

An Australian group has awarded WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange the Sydney Peace Prize, hailing him as a brave champion of human rights …

“For 14 years we’ve awarded the Sydney Peace Prize, but only on three occasions in 14 years have made an exception to the rule and awarded a gold medal for ‘exceptional courage in pursuit of human rights,’” foundation chief Stuart Rees said at the ceremony at the Frontline Club.

“By challenging centuries-old practices of government secrecy and by championing people’s right to know, WikiLeaks and Julian Assange have created the potential for a new order in journalism and in the free flow of information.

“Instead of demonizing an Australian citizen who has broken no law, the Australian government must stop shoring up Washington’s efforts to behave like a totalitarian state. The treatment of alleged whistle-blower [U.S. Army Pvt.] Bradley Manning confirms a U.S. administration at odds with their commitment to universal human rights and intent on militaristic bullying.”

You can see a report on the award ceremony here from Australia’s ABC News.

Assange has indeed broken the law—specifically the Espionage Act. It is time for the Holder Justice Department to lift the threat of prosecution from the CIA interrogators who led us to bin Laden, and focus its attention on a real threat to national security: Julian Assange.

Two weeks ago, WikiLeaks released its so-called “Gitmo Files”—hundreds of pages of classified documents detailing intelligence that captured terrorists provided the United States. As I point out in this morning’s Washington Post, the documents WikiLeaks made public included a file on Abu Faraj al-Libi, one of several CIA detainees who helped lead the agency to Osama bin Laden’s courier. While it garnered little attention at the time, the Abu Faraj document WikiLeaks exposed contained explosive information that could very well have tipped off al Qaeda that the CIA was closing in on bin Laden.

The document says that Abu Faraj “reported on al-Qai’da’s methods for choosing and employing couriers, as well as preferred communications means” and described him as the “communications gateway” between bin Laden and his operatives in Pakistan. It states that “in July 2003, [Abu Faraj] received a letter from UBL’s designated courier” (to whom he referred by a false name, Abd al-Khaliq Jan) in which “UBL stated [Abu Faraj] would be the official messenger between UBL and others in Pakistan.” It continues that “in mid-April 2005, [Abu Faraj] began arranging for a store front to be used as a meeting place and drop point for messages he wanted to exchange” with bin Laden’s courier.

But the most damaging disclosure was this: in order to carry out his new responsibilities, “in mid-2003, [Abu Faraj] moved his family to Abbottabad, PK, and worked between Abbottabad and Peshawar” up until his arrest in 2005. In other words, the WikiLeaks document exposed the fact that CIA detainees had linked bin Laden’s courier to Abbottabad, the city where bin Laden was killed one week ago.

If al Qaeda leaders had read this classified document before Navy SEALs reached bin Laden’s compound, the results could have been disastrous. The terrorists would have been alerted to the fact that the CIA was on the trail of bin Laden’s principal courier, and had made the connection between the courier, bin Laden, and Abbottabad, which could have blown the entire bin Laden operation.

Was it a mere coincidence that the bin Laden raid took place almost a week to the day after the release of the WikiLeaks documents? Or did U.S. officials move in to get bin Laden before al Qaeda had time to figure out that that the CIA had learned about the Abbottabad connection?

One thing is clear: WikiLeaks remains a menace to U.S. national security. Yet despite promises to take action to stop the group’s serial disclosures, the Obama administration has done virtually nothing to shut down WikiLeaks or bring its leaders to justice. It is far past time for the Obama administration to indict, arrest, and try Julian Assange. His unlawful dissemination of classified materials may have almost cost us Osama bin Laden. For this disclosure alone, Assange should be put away for life.

Norman J. Ornstein

Man About Town

By Norman J. Ornstein

May 9, 2011, 1:20 pm

The treasure trove of information coming from Osama bin Laden’s sanctuary has a new, embarrassing revelation: it turns out that bin Laden did not stay entirely as a recluse inside the compound. He made regular visits to Abbadabad’s strip club, the Abbadabing.

Step back from the bellicose statements issued by the Pakistani army and foreign ministry after the killing of Osama bin Laden, and the eruption of prayers and stray protests on behalf of the slain terrorist, and you’ll find an outpouring of thoughtful analysis by some of the country’s leading public intellectuals.

In an essay in the New Republic, reprinted in the delightfully named Goatmilk blog, my former colleague Ahmed Rashid sums up the lesson that ought to be learned:

What Pakistanis desperately need is a new narrative by their leaders—a narrative that does not blame the evergreen troika of India, the United States, and Israel for all of the country’s ills, that breaks the old habit of blaming outsiders and instead looks at itself more honestly and more transparently. Pakistanis as a nation seem incapable of self-analysis, of apportioning blame according to logic and reason rather than emotion.

In Dawn, the country’s leading English newspaper, Cyril Almeida, one of the few non-Muslims of any prominence in Pakistan, strikes a similar note:

Where do we go from here as a country?

As long as national security and foreign policy remain in the hands of a cabal of generals—unaccountable and untouchable, a law unto themselves, and in thrall to their own irrational logic—what future can this country have? Surely, not much of a future.

And here’s Pervez Hoodbhoy, perhaps the country’s most outspoken critic of radical Islam.

Bin Laden’s death should be regarded as a transformational moment by Pakistan and its military. It is time to dispense with the Musharraf-era cat and mouse games. We must repudiate the current policy of verbally condemning jihadism—and actually fighting it in some places—but secretly supporting it in other places. Until the establishment firmly resolves that it shall not support armed and violent non-state actors of any persuasion— including the Lashkar-e-Taiba—Pakistan will remain in interminable conflict both with itself and with the world.

Ayesha Siddiqa, whose Military Inc. is the definitive work on the army’s vast business interests, weighs in with a typically pugnacious op-ed:

It is the first time after 1972 that the civilian government has an opportunity to question the unlimited powers of the defence establishment….The fact is that if the political forces won’t do it now, they may never get another opportunity again.

For my money, Pakistan’s beleaguered English-speaking elites are among the bravest people in the subcontinent, willing to speak truth to power, whether military or clerical, in a land where this can carry deadly consequences.

And though it would be foolish to exaggerate their influence—the salons of Lahore and Karachi have little sway over either the masses or the generals—they nonetheless offer a glimmer of hope for the country’s future. President Obama should not squander this opportunity to press for real change in Pakistan along the lines that the most thoughtful voices in that country suggest.

After the “general leadership of al Qaeda” confirmed the death of its leader Osama bin Laden earlier today, the Afghan Taliban also released a statement on its Pashto website, offering condolences to bin Laden’s family and followers and vowing revenge against the United States. The statement warned that his death would only strengthen jihad in Afghanistan as well as in other “occupied” Muslim countries. Below is an excerpt from the statement:

May Allah the Great accept his martyrdom, and with the blessing of his Jihad and martyrdom, rescue the Muslim community from the current crisis… He sincerely and courageously partnered with the Afghans in the war against the Soviet invasion. The Islamic community will always be proud of sacrifices he rendered in this path. In addition, Sheikh Osama bin Laden, peace be upon him, was a strong defender of Muslims’ first Qiblah [the direction Muslims must face when praying], the al-Aqsa Mosque, and the occupied Palestine. He was a relentless fighter against the Crusaders and Zionist occupations throughout the world… If the American occupiers and their allies think that the martyrdom of Sheikh Osama bin Laden, peace be upon him, will weaken the authority and morale of the mujahedin in Afghanistan or in other occupied Islamic countries, this will be their big mistake… The Islamic Emirate believes that the martyrdom of Sheikh Osama bin Laden, peace be upon him, will give new life to the ongoing jihad against the occupiers at this critical juncture. The jihadist movement will become stronger.

The statement by the Taliban’s leadership council discredits the myth by the critics of the Afghan war that the Taliban is a nationalist resistance movement focused only on Afghanistan, and not a terrorist organization with a global agenda. The statement endorses bin Laden’s terrorist campaign worldwide. It also indicates that the Taliban will not distance itself from al Qaeda after bin Laden’s death. As Mullah Zaeef, the Taliban’s former ambassador to Islamabad, told the BBC Persian on Monday that the Taliban has an “ideological connection” with al Qaeda which will not end with bin Laden’s demise.

On Wednesday, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said bin Laden’s death could help convince the Taliban to cut ties with al Qaeda and reach a political settlement in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s statement, however, shows the group has no such intention. It will be a huge mistake if the United States and NATO allies use bin Laden’s death as a pretext to scale down the fight against the Taliban and withdraw troops from Afghanistan prematurely. Diplomatic efforts with the Taliban leadership will not work until the group is defeated militarily.

It is a little-known fact that the U.S. government continues to employ waterboarding. But we don’t waterboard terrorists anymore; we only waterboard … Navy SEALs.

Today, President Obama travelled to Fort Campbell, Kentucky to meet with some of those waterboarding victims. CNN reports:

President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe Biden met privately Friday afternoon with members of the military team responsible for conducting the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound.

White House Press Secretary Jay Carney confirmed that Obama and Biden spoke with “special operators” involved in the mission.

The president and vice president met with members of Navy SEAL Team 6 at Fort Campbell—home to the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the group that operated the helicopters used in the raid.

Obama and Biden thanked the commandos and were briefed on the operation by the unit members who conducted it, according to a White House official.

No word on whether the president asked members of the unit whether they thought waterboarding was torture. He most likely would not have liked the answer. CNN also reports:

Obama awarded a Presidential Unit Citation to the units involved in the mission, the official said. The citation is the highest such honor that can be given to a military unit.

It is a well-deserved honor. Let’s see if the president does the same for the CIA interrogators who got the intelligence that made last Sunday’s raid possible.

John Brennan, President Obama’s counterterrorism coordinator, told ABC television on Tuesday that Pakistan had launched an internal investigation to determine whether any individuals within the government or intelligence service (ISI) were involved in sheltering Osama bin Laden in that country’s military heartland. Brennan said he was certain that the “Pakistani officials want to get to the bottom of this, and we’re working closely with them to help them in this investigation.” Pakistan, he emphasized, was a “strong counterterrorism partner.”

Continue reading

A press release just now from the FBI is warning that al Qaeda’s most famous recently deceased has morphed into malware that is attacking computers:

The FBI today warns computer users to exercise caution when they receive e-mails that purport to show photos or videos of Usama bin Laden’s recent death. This content could be a virus that could damage your computer. … The Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) urges computer users to not open unsolicited (spam) e-mails, including clicking links contained within those messages. Even if the sender is familiar, the public should exercise due diligence.

What was that Time story today about al Qaeda facing a possible cash crunch now that their No. 1 pitchman is fish food? “From the desk of Barrister al-Zawahiri. Your assistance is needed. Could you help us with a loan? For you to be a party to the transaction, you must have holdings at an Abbottabad bank of $100,000 or more…”

Sadanand Dhume

What Next for Pakistan?

By Sadanand Dhume

May 3, 2011, 3:58 pm

In tomorrow’s Wall Street Journal, I argue that the United States should not waste this opportunity to demand real reform from Pakistan’s most important institutions: the army and its infamous intelligence wing, Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI. And there’s no better time than now to convince ordinary Pakistanis that their men in khaki aren’t worth the cost:

Almost since the nation was carved out as a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India in 1947, the army has dominated Pakistan’s national life. Though it employs barely 600,000 of Pakistan’s 170 million citizens, it uses ginned-up fears about India to consume around one-fourth of the national budget each year, more than twice as much as education and health care combined. Generals have ruled Pakistan directly for 34 of its 64 years. For most of the rest, they have exercised more power—especially over foreign and strategic policy—than their ostensible civilian masters.

What does Pakistan have to show for this? The less said about the army’s prowess in battle the better. Its wars with India have either ended in stalemates or defeats. Meanwhile, militant Islamist groups spawned by the ISI from the 1980s onward, albeit initially with U.S. blessing in Afghanistan, have spun out of control. Since 2009, Islamists have killed more than 3,000 Pakistanis. Over the past two decades, they’ve caused even more mayhem in India.

Perhaps most important, the army’s longstanding love affair with jihadist groups ranging from al Qaeda to the India-centric Lashkar-e-Taiba have tarred Pakistan’s reputation. According to Gallup, more than three-quarters of Americans hold a negative view of Pakistan; for neighboring India it’s one in five. That bin Laden was found in a $1 million mansion in an army garrison town will only increase global suspicion.

For more on Pakistan and the impact of bin Laden’s death on the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, check out our panel discussion here at AEI Thursday.

Today’s hearing on “The Threat to the U.S. Homeland Emanating from Pakistan” hosted by the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence is very timely, given Osama bin Laden’s death and the debate over the way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As many of my AEI colleagues have argued, bin Laden’s demise will not put an end to the al Qaeda threat, although it is a significant achievement in the war on terror. Frederick Kagan, the director of AEI’s Critical Threats Project, is testifying at this hearing now. Here are some highlights.

The impact of Osama bin Laden’s death:

The death of Osama bin Laden is highly unlikely to mark a turning point in the conflict between the United States and its allies on the one hand and militant Islamism epitomized by al Qaeda on the other… But al Qaeda itself, to say nothing of the numerous franchises and affiliated movements sharing common goals with it, will not be defeated by the death of a single leader, even its founder and figurehead. Nor is it clear that its operational capabilities even in Pakistan will be seriously degraded with bin Laden’s passing–available information suggests that he abandoned day-to-day operational control over the moment long ago, and the organization has survived the deaths of many senior leaders more actively involved in its activities.

U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan:

The current American and NATO strategy in Afghanistan is designed to degrade the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and HiG within Afghanistan and to demonstrate beyond question that those groups will be unable to direct the course of events in Afghanistan even after Western forces hand over security responsibilities to the Afghan government and are significantly reduced in number. Demonstrating that those groups will fail will compel anyone in Pakistan who believes supporting them as proxies to be a plausible strategy for securing Pakistan’s interests to re-evaluate that approach fundamentally. The challenge for American strategy toward Pakistan will be finding ways to accompany progress against Islamist proxies in Afghanistan with efforts to help Pakistan’s ruling elite come to consensus on the overall dangers that Islamist groups within Pakistan pose and on the need to accept the costs and risks of combating and defeating them within Pakistan itself.

In conclusion:

The worst thing we could do now would be to take bin Laden’s death or the progress made to date in Afghanistan as an excuse to withdraw forces prematurely, thereby easing the pressure on militant Islamist groups in Afghanistan just as we would otherwise approach the point of maximum pressure on them and those who support them. Now is the time to reinforce success by exercising patience in Afghanistan and allowing the strategy designed to persuade everyone in Afghanistan and in Pakistan that the militant Islamists in Afghanistan will fail to continue to work.

The full text of Frederick Kagan’s testimony is available, and please register for the AEI event “The Death of Bin Laden and the Future of Pakistan” this Thursday.


The American Enterprise Institute takes no institutional positions on policy advocacy or political campaigns. The views expressed on The Enterprise Blog represent those of the individual writers.

AEI