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Archive for the ‘South Asia’ Category

Sadanand Dhume

India’s Faux Tea Party

By Sadanand Dhume

September 2, 2011, 5:04 pm

In today’s Wall Street Journal, I argue that anti-corruption protests in India last month indicate a welcome awakening of an apathetic middle class to public life, but a worrying disconnect from mainstream politics. I compare the protests—spearheaded by Anna Hazare, a 74-year-old activist whose 12-day hunger strike forced the government to agree to create a powerful new anti-corruption czar—with the Tea Party movement.

In both cases, a large chunk of the middle class has decided that politics as usual is not delivering the right policies. But while the Hazare movement holds itself above politics, the Tea Party has quickly turned itself into a force in the Republican Party and produced a clutch of prominent politicians including Michele Bachmann, Rand Paul, and Nikki Haley.

If the Tea Party had simply mocked politics as Hazare’s followers do, its members would have contented themselves with merely dressing up in revolutionary-era costume and threatening to re-enact George Washington’s famous crossing of the Delaware River unless Congress voted to lower taxes and balance the federal budget. No prizes for guessing which movement is more sustainable or likely to have a deeper long-term impact on policy.

On a related note, though few people doubt the Hazare movement’s noble intentions, its suggested solution shows how statist ideas continue to dominate Indian public life. Instead of focusing on reducing government control over business—the biggest source of corruption in public life—the movement wants to create a giant new body with sweeping powers. Only in India can you try and fight a problem created by an unwieldy bureaucracy by proposing a fresh layer of unwieldy bureaucracy.

Sadanand Dhume

A South China Sea Mystery

By Sadanand Dhume

September 1, 2011, 9:09 am

Did a Chinese warship confront an Indian one in international waters off the coast of Vietnam in July?

Yes, says the Financial Times in a story jointly datelined from Hanoi and New Delhi. No, say the Indian foreign and defense ministries in tersely worded statements. What the FT calls “the latest example of China’s naval assertiveness” is brushed off by India’s foreign ministry as a possible prank:

The Indian Naval vessel, INS Airavat, paid a friendly visit to Vietnam between 19 to 28 July 2011. On July 22, INS Airavat sailed from the Vietnamese port of Nha Trang towards Hai Phong, where it was to make a port call. At a distance of 45 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast in the South China Sea, it was contacted on open radio channel by a caller identifying himself as the “Chinese Navy” stating that “you are entering Chinese waters”. No ship or aircraft was visible from INS Airavat, which proceeded on her onward journey as scheduled.

While it’s hard to say what really happened, at least three things are clear. First, that if the Chinese did indeed confront the Indian warship, it would fit into a pattern of aggressive Chinese claims in the South China Sea, and face-offs with countries that contest those claims. Second, that India’s political leadership has every reason to tamp down such an event, for fear that in India’s brutally competitive TV news environment the story could quickly escalate to the level of a crisis. Third, that India has quietly reaffirmed its position on the South China Sea as being part of international waters freely navigable by ships of all nations.

Sadanand Dhume

Miss India Digs AEI

By Sadanand Dhume

August 30, 2011, 12:52 pm

It’s not every day that I’m mentioned in the same breath as a Miss Universe contestant, but the Washington Post and Wall Street Journal blogs both have stories today on an amusing kerfuffle involving Miss India Vasuki Sunkavalli and her apparent agreement with my views on everything from the size of India’s bureaucracy to the importance of India’s position on Syria at the United Nations Security Council.

You can read the Post’s version of the story here, and the Journal’s over here. To which I’ll only add that I wish Ms. Sunkavalli every success in the pageant, and hope that on her return from Brazil she’ll continue to be partial to the right ideas about South Asian politics, economics, and foreign policy.

The Indian government recently announced plans to set up a central foreign aid agency in the form of USAID or the UK’s DFID. Likely called the Indian Agency for Partnership in Development, it will manage over $11 billion in aid transfers to countries like Burma and Bangladesh over the next five to seven years.

It may seem strange that a country with more people in poverty than all of Sub-Saharan Africa now has an official apparatus to disburse development aid to other poor countries. Shouldn’t this money be used to fix social problems at home?

But that’s not the point of this agency. In fact, the announcement helps to prove something that the so-called “development community” still doesn’t understand: aid isn’t and has never really been about development.

Aid is a political and diplomatic tool, something that India wants to use to project more influence toward its poorer South Asian neighbors as well as other countries in Africa and Asia. This annoys the development experts in multi-national organizations and NGOs, who with the best of intentions, believe that aid money can catalyze actual development.

In a recent editorial, the Economist adopts this mentality, questioning India’s decision and noting that its money may be poured into “grand projects which fail—and encourage bad government.” It’s a fair point in that the money may indeed be used to fund big projects that eventually fail. And that these projects may encourage corruption and graft in the recipient countries. But that’s aid. It’s not a natural path to creating prosperity or any of the conditions needed for development, no matter how hard we try.

This also means that the parameters we use for judging the effectiveness of US foreign aid should be selected as carefully. It’s easy to dismiss aid when we try to look for non-existent development results. But perhaps there are more intangible political benefits?

It will be interesting to see where India takes its new agency in terms of its own charm offensive. Particularly intriguing will be how it competes with China’s now well-documented charm offensive across Asia and Africa. But if you’re looking forward to news of Indian aid programs bringing poor Nepalese and Sri Lankans out of poverty, don’t hold your breath.

It will likely be a few days before the facts surrounding Wednesday night’s bombings in Mumbai that killed at least 21 people and injured more than 100 become clear. The central question: will this be the proverbial last straw on the Indian camel’s back? The answer: it depends largely on who is blamed for the attacks, but for now the odds of India acting militarily appear slim.

Ever since the horrific 2008 Mumbai attacks—in which Pakistani gunmen from Lashkar-e-Taiba killed 166 people and paralyzed life in India’s financial capital for three days—analysts have wondered how India would respond to the next provocation. According to conventional wisdom, the political costs of forbearance have been raised immeasurably, and evidence of Pakistani complicity in another attack would force India’s prime minister to eschew diplomacy for some form of military retribution, most likely a limited strike against terrorist training camps in Pakistan or Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. In a worst case scenario, this could escalate into a full-scale war between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.

For now, though, the question is moot. Indian officials have (wisely) refused to jump to conclusions about who may be behind the most recent bombings. Should they indeed be traced directly to Pakistan-based terrorists, particularly those seen to have close links with the country’s military spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, then the pressure on the Indian government to retaliate in some form will indeed be high. If, on the other hand, responsibility is claimed by a group such as the Indian Mujahideen, a home-grown terrorist group with looser links to Pakistan than the LET, then New Delhi may do what is has done in the past: restrict itself to ratcheting up diplomatic pressure on Islamabad. The relatively low level of casualties compared to previous terrorist attacks, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s impending visit to India next week, also make caution the most likely path.

In short, stay tuned and see who the Indian government blames for the attacks. That, more than anything else, will signal whether New Delhi feels inclined to respond differently from the past, or persist with a familiar combination of diplomatic pressure and military restraint.

Earlier today, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen publicly accused the Pakistani government of sanctioning the murder of Syed Saleem Shahzad, a prominent Pakistani journalist. “I have not seen anything to disabuse that the government knew about it,” Mullen said. Shahzad was found dead in a canal on the outskirts of Islamabad, beaten and tortured to death days after disappearing on May 29.

That Shahzad might have been killed by the Pakistan’s shadowy directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is not news. The ISI was found guilty in the court of public opinion upon the discovery of Shahzad’s body. The organization has a history of controlling journalists through intimidation and violence. Prior to his disappearance, Shahzad had warned multiple people that he had been receiving death threats from the ISI on account of his reporting. The fact that Shahzad died days after writing a story exposing embarrassing infiltrations of the Pakistani military by al Qaeda militants only strengthens the case. To crown it all, senior Obama administration officials, speaking anonymously, confirmed on Monday that intelligence existed to indicate that Shahzad’s murder had been ordered by senior ISI officials.

What makes this story significant is that an official as prominent as Mullen would go out of his way to confirm the ISI’s complicity in the murder just as the Obama administration is looking to repair ties with Pakistan. Relations between the two countries have been severely strained by the fallout of the May 2 raid that killed Osama bin Laden. The Pakistani military has been under unprecedented pressure at home and abroad since the raid, and the announcement may be an attempt by the United States to keep that pressure on. It remains to be seen whether such tactics will have the desired effect. What is certain, however, is that killing off journalists who are writing about uncomfortable truths such as the presence of militant sympathizers in the army will neither restore the army’s reputation, nor extirpate the militant rot in the inside.

Reza Nasim Jan is the Pakistan team leader for AEI’s Critical Threats Project. He is a co-author of the report “The Haqqanis in Kurram: The Regional Implications of a Growing Insurgency.”

In my column in Thursday’s Wall Street Journal Asia, I wade into a debate about whether India’s burgeoning population of billionaires, 55 individuals or families at last count, is something the country needs to worry about. Since last year, growing disquiet over corruption in public life has tarnished the reputation of some of India’s best known businessmen, and led to calls for India to “rein in its robber barons.” As the argument goes, something is wrong with the fact that India, with barely 2 percent of the world’s GDP (in dollar terms) houses nearly 7 percent of the world’s billionaires.

To begin with, worrying about “too many billionaires” in a land long defined by its poverty strikes me as somewhat absurd. More substantively, I argue that if corruption is the issue, then it’s excessive government interference in business that needs reining in.

India’s incipient anti-business rhetoric misdiagnoses both the problem and the solution. Unlike Suharto’s Indonesia or post-Soviet Russia, India’s business landscape is not dominated by classic crony capitalists, but by genuine businesses that need more than the right connections to thrive. And as shown by the dodgiest sectors of the economy—real estate and telecom—India’s trouble is not too much capitalism, but too much government control.

Going by the response thus far on Twitter, readers are divided on this issue, with many leaning toward a view that business is a large part of the problem in India. In a broader sense, the debate about billionaires cuts to the heart of different ways of viewing inequality, opportunity, and free enterprise. The long-term challenge for India remains getting more of its people to shed destructive ways of thinking about wealth that have almost become habit after decades of socialism.

It isn’t every day that something I write for the Wall Street Journal resurfaces in the pages of The Nation, a Pakistani broadsheet published in Lahore. But though the reprint keeps the core of my argument—that Pakistan’s military needs to submit to the principle of civilian control—it also makes several telling changes that show how sharply local sensitivities sometimes diverge from the mainstream narrative about the country in the international press.

The Nation’s version of my article omits a reference to Pakistan’s “rogue” nuclear program, and to how “Islamabad’s support for terrorism destabilizes the region and the world.” And in a nod to cultural red lines rather than geopolitical ones, it also drops a reference (quoting the author whose book I was reviewing) to whirling dervishes at a medieval Sufi shrine as “thousand-year-old hippies” and omits the word “grubby” in a reference to the country’s civilian politicians.

So what does this tempest in a teapot say about Pakistan? On the positive side, it points to an openness to debate about big issues that I’ve written about on this blog. On the negative side, running articles without permission is poor form, and sandpapering the views expressed in an opinion piece poorer still. Now if only The Nation would jettison its rogue book review program and join the global mainstream.

Follow the Leader: Obama’s Drawdown Echoes across ISAF

By Richard Cleary

June 29, 2011, 10:05 am

In the advance to President Obama’s Afghan speech, one of the worst fears of observers was that a drawdown of American troops would open the door for other NATO members to withdraw troops as well. As my colleague Gary Schmitt wrote:

Given how little support there is among most of our allies’ populations for being in Afghanistan, it will be impossible for them to not react with deep reductions of their own—multiplying the problem of having too few (or, at best, just enough) troops in theater.

These fears were well-grounded. Although Germany has been more circumspect regarding any troop reductions in Afghanistan since Obama’s address, France responded immediately with cuts of its own. France will reduce its 4,000-troop contingent along the same timeline- and in the same proportions- as the United States. And, now it appears that the United Kingdom may accelerate its withdrawal from Afghanistan, bringing home an additional 500 troops (beyond the promised 426 by the end of 2012).  If Germany and other nations follow suit, more strains will be placed on an already overstretched ISAF.

The arrangement of ISAF, with national forces deployed in quantity to specific areas, gives drawdowns a local complexion. British troops, for example, are found principally in Helmand Province, the site of some of the hardest fighting during the Afghan War. Helmand has benefited from an increased troop presence and a sustained campaign to defeat the Taliban. Still, while the fate of Helmand is far from determined, the effect of the British drawdown will be mitigated by the significant American (and, to a lesser degree, Danish and Georgian) presence in the province.

Meanwhile, French troops operate principally in two areas: Kapisa Province and the Surobi district of Kabul Province. Kapisa, adjacent to Kabul, has been important in establishing the security of the Afghan capital, and was a recipient of additional troops in the early 2009 surge after a period of unrest. Surobi, situated along the highway between Kabul and Jalalabad, has long been considered a vital geopolitical cog.

It appears now that the French will meet their drawdown numbers by removing troops from Surobi (Kapisa is more contested and has seen a number of ISAF casualties this year). But even Surobi has not always been as tranquil as it is today. In one of the more infamous incidents of the war, French paratroopers were ambushed after replacing Italian troops who had “pacified” the area through bribes to local militants—and who had failed to inform the French of this practice. The August 2008 ambush was followed by a campaign to secure the area, reaching a tenuous local peace. It may well be that Afghan security forces are now able to take over for the French in Surobi, but it is an uncertain proposition in a strategic district.

As problematic as British and French troop reductions may be, a drawdown of the German contribution would be riskier still. Germany, charged with overseeing Regional Command North from Mazar-e Sharif, has witnessed a spate of violence and upheaval since 2008. Although the lifting of Bundeswehr restrictions on engagement and a bolstered American presence in the region have succeeded in shifting momentum in ISAF’s favor, the situation remains uneasy and undecided. Should Germany follow France’s (and by extension America’s) lead in reducing its presence, these gains would be jeopardized.

Last Thursday, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen characterized President Obama’s drawdown as undertaking an “acceptable level of risk.” But beyond the risk of withdrawing American troops lies the prospect for a more dramatic and widespread drawdown across ISAF. In this way, the future of the Afghan War may rest with the chancelleries of Europe.

Cross-posted from the Center for Defense Studies

Yesterday, National Journal blasted around a report from their Marc Ambinder announcing that “Petraeus would endorse 30,000 troops home by end of 2012.” It’s rare to see such a transparent effort to box in a commander with a leak so obviously sourced not to military but to political sources. Sure enough, later that day news agencies reported that the president would be announcing a decision on how many surge troops to drawdown on Wednesday. And yes, he would be announcing just what Petraeus supposedly “would endorse.”

Needless to say, Petraeus WILL endorse whatever his boss says. But is that what the Pentagon recommended to the president? Not according to what we have been hearing, and not according to this piece in today’s LA Times. Indeed, it is abundantly clear that the decision on how and when to bring troops home is completely political, bearing no relationship whatsoever to the military plan to prevail in Afghanistan. Rather, let’s call this Obama’s political plan to succeed in 2012.

When the president first announced the surge into Afghanistan in 2009, he also announced the arbitrary July 2011 deadline to bring some home. But criticism of that nakedly political deadline (what did July have to do with anything? It was nowhere to be found in any military plan presented to Obama) was muted in favor of the justly deserved praise to order the surge in the first place. It wasn’t an easy decision, harder still for a president so tied to the left wing of his party.

Now, however, Obama is faced with a declining economy and an angry base. When they voted for the anti-Bush, they didn’t expect us to still be in Iraq, surged into Afghanistan, and aiding a NATO fight in Libya. On the right, where Obama has derived solid support for a strong national security policy, there is a growing disenchantment with war (and with American global leadership—about which read here, here, here and here). Worried in 2009 about 2012 reelection prospects, he and his political advisers are now more worried.

And what of the military realities? There are some in the White House and Pentagon who have been advocating a counter-terrorism only strategy in Afghanistan. These CT advocates have never made the case for stabilizing Afghanistan and ensuring it will not become a safe haven for al Qaeda et al. But that’s not their aim. Theirs is a philosophical hostility to counterinsurgency despite its obvious successes in Iraq and yes, in Afghanistan. They aren’t the commanders in the field, who did not recommend this drawdown. Like Vice President Biden, senior Afghanistan adviser General Douglas Lute, and the president’s political inner circle, who are apparently among the prime agitators for a more rapid withdrawal, they simply wish us to be out regardless of the strategy laid out by Petraeus.

So what do these numbers mean? They don’t mean failure for sure.  But they do mean that gains made in the south of Afghanistan will be harder to maintain and that needed operations in the east will go forward more slowly. If we are able to prevail, it will be with more deaths and more casualties. It will also mean a harder slog recruiting Afghans to our side (because they will question our commitment all the more), an almost certain race for the exits among our allies (see Gary Schmitt’s fine piece on same here) and a crisis of confidence in the United States in Islamabad and Kabul. For those who believe Afghan troops will quickly and easily fill the gap, see Fred and and Kim Kagan’s take from this morning on that question.

Is the president’s decision a disaster? No. Is it a disgrace? In that it is so totally delinked from the commanders, somewhat. But the character of the president’s decision making, his cynical manipulation of the roll out, and his willingness to put his own political prospects above all represent a new low.

Sadanand Dhume

India’s Conservative Vacuum

By Sadanand Dhume

June 17, 2011, 10:10 am

In my Wall Street Journal column today, I argue that India’s leading opposition party, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) needs to move beyond identity politics and transform itself into a modern conservative party:

The BJP’s tough line against terrorism, its commitment to a strong defense and its espousal of pride in India’s Hindu culture are all within the bounds of a responsible Indian conservatism. But to enter the global mainstream the party needs to grow up and become a responsible voice for limited government, market-based solutions to India’s myriad problems and pragmatic foreign policy. As long as it continues to be limited by a narrow focus on identity politics, and as long as it pursues policies based on opportunism rather than on principle, the BJP will fail both India and itself.

The continued dominance of socialist ideas in India’s political life, and the BJP’s failure to emerge as a rational alternative to the left-leaning Congress Party—an Indian version of the Republicans, the Tories, Australia’s Liberals, or Israel’s Likud—is a theme I’ve visited before.

In the past, I’ve argued that the party ought to take advantage of a court ruling on a dispute over a holy site claimed by both Hindus and Muslims in the temple town of Ayodhya, the issue that brought the BJP to national prominence in the 1990s, to craft a forward-looking agenda that appeals to the country’s burgeoning middle class. (Congress focuses its populist message on the rural poor.) I’ve also made the case that Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi, the leader most popular with the party rank and file, should eschew his prime ministerial ambitions on account of Hindu-Muslim riots that took place on his watch in 2002. Elsewhere though, I’ve praised Modi’s economic management.

Of course, whether the BJP edges toward mainstream conservatism is only one of a broader set of questions with profound implications for India, and by extension Asia and the world. Can India fully jettison the legacy of Nehruvian socialism and fulfill the aspirations of its 1.1 billion people? Or will a reflexive fear of business among intellectual elites, and a sentimental attachment to the culture of non-alignment among foreign policy elites, hobble both economic development and the quest for greater global responsibility?

The Washington Post reports that visiting Mongolian President Tsakhia Elbegdorj has some advice for President Obama: Act a little more like Genghis Khan.

“It is tough, but Mongolia was the biggest power in the world, and we had the same responsibility,” said Elbegdorj, who is to meet with President Obama at the White House on Thursday to pitch his country as a stable, pro-American democracy deserving of more attention….

The United States, like Mongolia in its heyday, “has a responsibility to help those who are trying to follow in its steps,” Elbegdorj said in an interview in a felt-lined tent outside his official residence in the Mongolian capital … “Do you think we just went to places and killed?” Elbegdorj said. “No.” Mongolia, he said, used its muscle to keep trade along the Silk Road flowing and to enforce a written law. And “when there was a killer, or in today’s expression, a terrorist nation,” he said, “we were God’s will to make them peaceful … When there was a poor nation, we helped them.”

And, Elbegdorj added, pay attention to your real friends (like Mongolia, hint, hint). Noting that Mongolia had sent troops to support U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Mongolian leader took a not-so-veiled swipe at Pakistan:

“Maybe if we caused problems, if we hid bin Laden or atom bombs, America would pay more attention,” joked Elbegdorj, sipping from a coffee mug decorated with an American flag and the words “Washington, D.C.”

Mongolians are deeply pro-American and refer to the United States as their “Third Neighbor” (in addition to their physical neighbors Russia and China). They want to build stronger ties with Washington. President Bush became the first American president to visit Mongolia in 2005, (I had the pleasure of working on his address to the Mongolian parliament). But since then, the Post reports:

Efforts to secure a free-trade agreement have gone nowhere, and U.S. investment in Mongolia is tiny, despite the country’s bountiful natural resources and a big push by other countries, particularly China and Canada, to join what looks set to be a minerals-driven economic boom. The World Bank in a recent report described Mongolia’s prospects for growth as “excellent.”

As Michael Auslin points out, the United States has real opportunities to build strategic and commercial ties with Mongolia. Obama would be wise to pursue them.

 

Today’s New York Times has a story about General Ashfaq Kayani, Pakistan’s army chief, coming under pressure to step down from subordinates humiliated by last month’s successful American raid on Osama bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound. The story speculates about a possible “colonels’ coup” to replace Kayani, which is described as unlikely but not “out of the question.”

While many things in Pakistan aren’t “out of the question,” if history teaches us anything it’s that the odds of junior officers seizing control of the army, and effectively the country, are extremely slim. Simply put, when it comes to chain of command, the Pakistani army has no history of emulating its cousins in Africa, Latin America, or the Mediterranean.

Three previous army chiefs—military dictators Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, and Pervez Musharraf—were forced to step down in part because they had lost the confidence of the powerful corps commanders, a group of about a dozen top generals that defers to the chief but nonetheless operates in a largely consensual manner. Ayub and Yahya both lost wars against India, in 1965 and 1971 respectively. (Though in strictly military terms the 1965 war was a stalemate, the Pakistani army viewed it as a defeat.) Musharraf was eased out after a protest movement by lawyers—amplified by a feisty media that Musharraf himself had fostered—made him so unpopular that the army began to lose face as an institution for backing him.

What does this mean for Kayani? There’s no question that his reputation, and that of the army, has taken a battering over the past six weeks. The bin Laden raid was followed by an audacious assault by Islamist militants on PNS Mehran, a naval base in Karachi, and the murder of a prominent Pakistani journalist, Saleem Shahzad, allegedly by agents from the army’s intelligence wing, Inter-Services Intelligence. (The ISI denies killing Shahzad.) Many of Pakistan’s most prominent journalists and writers are publicly blaming the army for bringing the country to its present pass. Some accuse it of being inept (Abbottabad, PNS Mehran), others of being malignant as well (the Shahzad murder).

That said, there’s no evidence that Kayani has outlived his welcome with the corps commanders, much less that Pakistan’s famously sturdy chain of command is about to break down. It’s quite possible that in the coming weeks public opprobrium turns Kayani into a burden the corps commanders no longer want to carry. But if the past tells us anything, it’s that Pakistan’s army chiefs are deposed by fellow generals, not by angry young colonels.

Danielle Pletka

Lobbying for Terrorists

By Danielle Pletka

June 15, 2011, 2:24 pm

The Hill reported on Sunday that the U.S.-designated terrorist group the Mujahedin e Khalq (aka the People’s Mujahedin of Iran, aka the National Council of Resistance) has acquired lobbying help from Democratic powerhouse Akin Gump to support its removal from the State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization list.

To be fair to Akin Gump, plenty of GOPers have taken up cudgels for the MEK, though the direct cash payoff to them is less clear.

The MEK has for years lobbied aggressively via a myriad of front groups to be taken off the terrorism list. Shrewd lobbyists, they have moved well beyond their street corner and airports campaign (“support Iran’s starving children”) to “grassroots” organizations and hired guns. And I get why they don’t want to be on the terrorism list; it comes with a spate of sanctions and restrictions that are odious to most groups no matter their intentions. But what of their partisans? Do they know the MEK? If not, check out Michael Rubin’s piece on the MEK or this FBI report from 2004, the list of murdered Americans, the money laundering, the cult-like behavior, the … terrorism. Is it all a lie? Has the MEK seen the light? Or is this a way of trying to oust the foul regime in Tehran?

If this is an enemy/enemy/friend thing, let’s consider whether we wish to replace the creepy, Islamist, dictatorial mullahs with the creepy, Islamist, dictatorial cult. Seems a bad trade to me. The United States should be supporting democracy in Iran, not a one-for-one swap among murderers and thugs.

And here’s another question: Where’s the FBI and the Justice Department? A terrorist group is lobbying in the United States. It’s paying top political fixers to make its case. It’s paying speaking fees to former government officials. Where’s the money from? How’s it being transferred? And would it be okay for Hezbollah to do this? Al Qaeda?

Both the Associated Press and the New York Times are reporting that Pakistan’s intelligence service has arrested a number of Pakistanis who were helping the CIA monitor Osama bin Laden’s house in Abbottabad. This comes on the heels of reports that American intelligence, in an effort to create a more cooperative relationship with Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agency, provided ISI overhead photographs of two bomb-making factories inside Pakistan which the Americans asked Pakistani authorities to raid. When the raids took place, however, both sites have been cleared, strongly suggesting that elements within ISI had tipped the bomb-making terrorists off.
 
In the world of intelligence, such actions are a virtual declaration of war. Cooperating intelligence agencies do not burn another agency’s assets and they obviously don’t provide the enemy with a heads-up on operations. But of course it’s always been a myth that the ISI was in some form of cooperative relationship with American intelligence. At its best, the relationship was on occasion of mutual benefit—but only occasionally and never based on the long-term goal of tackling the vast network of terrorists and insurgents given safe haven in Pakistani territory. And this is not going to change, because ISI is led and manned by individuals who are in accord with the Islamist vision and who still believe that a stable Afghanistan will inevitably become a strategic asset to Pakistan’s enemy, India. Until the Pakistani government shuts ISI doors for good and, in its place, creates an intelligence service that is distinct from the Pakistani army, none of this behavior will change. For more than three decades, the CIA has been ardently convinced that it could develop a true liaison relationship with ISI. And it’s been a fool’s errand for that same three decades.

Former Utah governor Jon Huntsman won’t be at tonight’s GOP debate, and he’s finding still other ways to distinguish himself from the GOP crowd. In an interview on CNN’s State of the Union Sunday, Huntsman declared that he wants a faster pullout from Afghanistan:

When you look at Afghanistan, can we hang out until 2014 and beyond? You can, if you’re willing to pay another quarter of a trillion dollars to do so.… If it isn’t in our direct national security interest and if there isn’t a logical exit strategy and if we don’t know what the cost is going to be in terms of money and human lives, then I think you have to say it’s probably time we re-evaluate this. My hunch is the American people want to be out of there as quickly as we can get it done.

For a candidate running, in part, on his foreign policy experience, this shameless pandering to isolationist sentiment is sad. Unfortunately, Huntsman is tapping into growing sentiment for withdrawal in some corners of the GOP. As I pointed out here recently, a resolution calling for an accelerated Afghan withdrawal on a fixed timetable recently failed in the House by just 11 votes — and drew the support of 26 Republicans. Meanwhile, a recent Washington Post/ABC News poll found that 59 percent of Republicans favor withdrawing a substantial number of troops this summer (compared to 89 percent of Democrats and 72 percent of Independents).

All this stems from a failure of leadership on the part of the president. Obama has failed to rally the country behind his policies in Afghanistan, which understandably leads even Americans who are inclined to support the war effort to believe that Obama is not fully committed. And if the commander in chief is not committed, they reason, the effort cannot succeed — and it is wrong to risk the lives of young Americans for a failed cause. The fact is, the momentum in Afghanistan has shifted in our favor, and Obama could report on substantial progress on the ground if he so chose — but thus far he has not so chosen. Which opens the door for candidates like Huntsman to demagogue the issue.

Danielle Pletka

Obama’s Failure on Syria

By Danielle Pletka

June 13, 2011, 4:54 pm

News today is that Syrian elite forces took back the northern town of Jisr al Shughour with a heavy show of firepower, including helicopters. The town is reportedly emptied, with refugees pouring into Turkey and others too afraid to step outside. There are now several thousand Syrian refugees in Turkey, signalling that Turkey, at least, has doubled down on its decision to turn on Bashar el Assad after a short but disgraceful pro-Assad interval.

But while the New York Times reports that the Syrian “government appears to have abandoned all pretense of trying to offer democratic change to calm an angry public,” the Obama administration has yet to give any teeth to the president’s May dictum that Assad may choose to lead a transition to democracy “or get out of the way.” The president has said nothing in weeks, and though Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has called the government attacks on the Syrian people “horrific, revolting,” she too has made clear that the administration is not planning on doing … anything. Rather, she says hopefully, the Arabs aretrying to, behind the scenes, get the government to stop. And they believe that that at the time is the best way to go forward. So we listen very closely to what people in the neighborhood, in the region say.” Aaaaah. That will work well. We listened to the Arabs when they said “Qadhafi must go.” We will listen when they say “Assad must stay.”

Subcontracting foreign policy to the Arab League is not good policy at the best of times, but when it comes to the future of the Middle East, it’s almost insane. Saudi Arabia, which now dominates the League, has been little more than a force for instability in the Muslim world—a sponsor of the Islamism that feeds al Qaeda, and an unstable dictatorship in its own right. Don’t get me wrong: I too advocated that Qadhafi must go, but the motives of the Saudi king were slightly less than pure. (Qadhafi paid to have him assassinated.)

If Obama, for whatever reason, was brave enough to call for Qadhafi’s ouster, and finally, to call for Yemeni President Saleh to step down, one might once again ask where the heck he is on Syria. This is the no brainer. We can argue that Libya is not a vital national interest; we can argue that Saleh was cooperating in the war on terror; but what can we say for Assad? A murderer. A sponsor of terrorism. A vicious dictator. He has brutalized Syria, had a hand in the assassination of Lebanon’s former prime minister, funneled weapons to Hezbollah and Hamas, worked with al Qaeda affiliates, and, finally, he has a nuclear weapons program. This is Iran’s main proxy in the Middle East; Assad’s ouster will be a huge blow to Tehran. But the U.S. ambassador is still in Syria?

What to do? First, not hide behind the Brits and the French at the U.N. Security Council and get a resolution condemning Assad. Second, ratchet up the sanctions on Syrian officials and start publicizing Assad’s bank accounts. Third, get the president of the United States out of the sad corner he has painted himself into and say Assad is finished. Fourth, figure out who in the opposition to talk to and get all of them into Clinton’s office at State. Fifth, work with the opposition to nail down a transition plan for post-Assad. Do it all publicly.

No one elected the Arab League to run American foreign policy. We know the president doesn’t know what to do, doesn’t want to be forward leaning, and hopes it all goes away in time for him to be re-elected. But now is the time to lead. And if he doesn’t want to, perhaps he should “get out of the way” and let someone else do it. By all accounts, Clinton is eager for a more aggressive posture on Syria.

Mumbai Terror Trial Reveals Intimate ISI-LeT Relationship

By Alex Della Rocchetta

June 10, 2011, 12:25 pm

For the families of the more than 160 people killed in the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, there will be no justice coming from the Windy City.

After two days of deliberation, Chicago businessman Tahawwur Rana was acquitted Thursday on charges that he played a role in organizing the 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai, carried out by the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terror network. While the jury ultimately found Rana not guilty in relation to the Mumbai attacks, the businessman was convicted on two charges of providing material support to terrorist organizations and plotting an attack on a Danish newspaper that published controversial caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad.

In the lead-up to the widely publicized trial, many anticipated that details about the role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency in the terror attacks would be exposed. While allegations of a close relationship between the ISI and LeT are nothing new, testimony by David Coleman Headley, a co-conspirator of Mr. Rana’s who had pleaded guilty to terrorism charges, gave further insight into the breadth and complexity of the LeT as well as al Qaeda. Continue reading

In my Wall Street Journal column Friday, I make the case for continued U.S. assistance to Pakistan despite its lack of popularity with most Americans.

My argument has three prongs. First, the United States has no choice but to remain engaged with Islamabad. Pakistan’s nukes, location, and terrorism problem make it “too big to fail.” This may seem unfair, but it’s also true.

Second, that though progress has been spotty, and anti-American sentiment in Pakistan remains rampant, in some important respects the country is better off today than when the United States seriously re-engaged with it in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. In a nutshell, today’s Pakistan has more democracy, a more robust media, and a genuine national debate about the wisdom of fostering jihadist groups. This gives U.S. policy makers something to work with.

Finally, over the long haul, engagement with the United States strengthens Pakistani civil society, the scores of brave activists, journalists, and intellectuals who fight every day for a country free of the overbearing power of both clerics and generals.

It’s hard to point to Pakistan as a shining example of U.S. foreign policy success in South Asia; but it seems pretty obvious that the nuclear-armed nation would be even more troubled and less stable without an American presence.

Michael Auslin

Visible Demographics

By Michael Auslin

June 2, 2011, 9:24 am

JAKARTA, INDONESIA—My colleague Nick Eberstadt is well-known for his work on global demographic trends and I’ve heard him numerous times talking about differing demographic rates around the world. There’s nothing, however, like seeing it first hand. While my main impression of India was simply the astounding number of people everywhere I went, the sharp distinction between aging and youthful societies only came into focus for me upon reaching Indonesia after briefly stopping in Japan.

As one of the most rapidly aging nations on earth, Japan’s median age is 45 years, and 22 percent of the population is over 65 years of age. Japan is also the country with greatest number of centenarians. When I’m in Tokyo, I don’t notice the absence of young people as much as I’m keenly aware of how many senior citizens are present. There are young school-age children running around, and lots of families, but they are heavily outnumbered by older people in stores, on the subway, walking along the street. It’s not that Japan isn’t vibrant, but it definitely seems weighed down by the age of so many of its citizens.

Of Indonesia’s 245 million people, on the other hand, just 6 percent are above 65 years of age (Nick, how is that possible?) and the median age is just 28 years. Indonesian policy makers I’ve talked to refer to this as the age bonus that will keep their labor pool competitive for the next 20 years. They see it as a crucial element in increasing Indonesia’s economic growth to China-style levels. Critics I’ve talked with, however, caution that youth isn’t everything: Indonesia is weighed down by restrictive labor laws and the need to further improve the country’s educational system, especially in getting more Indonesian students to study abroad for graduate degrees.

That may be, but walking around Jakarta is almost shocking in comparison to Japan. Adolescents and young adults are simply everywhere. They jam the malls and restaurants, hang out in the public squares, fill the buses. One strains to see grey hair, and usually succeeds only when a large family group is present. The prevalence of youth gives a sort of pulsating directionless energy to Jakarta, a city of 9 million people. On a Sunday afternoon stroll around Batavia, Jakarta’s old Dutch colonial part, it seems only the under-20 crowd is present among the several thousand persons milling about, watching public street performances, or visiting museums. It is a type of society Japan can but dimly remember, and one which even China will soon begin to forget. As for India and Indonesia, however, they will desperately need to get richer before demographic trends begin to catch up with them, as well.

Sadanand Dhume

Death of a Journalist

By Sadanand Dhume

May 31, 2011, 5:35 pm

I never met Saleem Shahzad, but like many Pakistan watchers I’ve followed his work for years. Shahzad, Pakistan correspondent for the online daily Asia Times, was what you might call a journalist’s journalist, a reporter other reporters kept track of for his frequent scoops about terrorism and other security matters in Pakistan.

Last week, Shahzad filed his last big story, which claimed that al Qaeda carried out the dramatic May 22 assault on a Pakistani naval base in Karachi after the navy failed to release officers arrested on suspicion of links with the terrorist organization. Shahzad went missing Sunday in Islamabad on his way to a television talk show to discuss the story.

Pakistan has received a lot of bad press of late, much of it justified. But buried beneath the bad news is the simple fact that the country houses some of the bravest journalists in the world. Saleem Shahzad was one of them. Here’s what the Guardian, the Wall Street Journal, and Asia Times have to say about his disappearance and death.

Perhaps whoever killed Shahzad was trying to intimidate a remarkably lively press. But if the Pakistani journalists I know are any indication, Shahzad’s killing is likely to have the opposite effect by amplifying calls for the country’s intelligence agencies and assorted jihadists alike to stop targeting journalists simply doing their jobs.

Two weeks ago a video appeared on the Internet purportedly showing demonstrators in the Syrian city of Hama burning the Iranian, Russian, and Chinese flags.

Last Friday, according to Reuters, protesters in the Syrian city of Albu Kamal on the Iraqi border burned pictures of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, apparently angry over Nasrallah’s speech in Beirut last week praising Syrian President Bashar al Assad.

The two young Iraqis who have been blogging for years at Iraq the Model are understandably delighted:

For decades we watched protesters in the Middle East burn the flags of America, the UK and Israel, as these countries were believed to represent the “enemies of the people.” For the first time, we see protesters burn the flags of Iran, Russia and Hezbollah for a change! Are we witnessing a moment of redefining the “enemies of the people” in the Middle East?  The first video shows protesters in Syria burning the Iranian and Russian flags. The second video shows a protester holding a handwritten sign written in Russian and Arabic addressed to the Russian leadership saying that the Syrian people want their freedom. In the third one, Hezbollah flags are set ablaze in Syria as protesters chanted No to Iran, No to Hezbollah!

Thanks to the blackout that the Assad regime has imposed on news out of Syria, it is impossible to know whether these are representative of sentiment among Syrian protesters or simply isolated incidents. However, they do show that people in Syria notice who is with them and who is against them. They are probably wondering now, as Iranian protesters chanted two years ago, “Obama, Are You With Us or With Them”?

Michael Mazza

China Thumbs Its Nose

By Michael Mazza

May 27, 2011, 5:38 pm

Air China must be offering specials this month on flights to Beijing from rogue states. Over the past 10 days, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il (his third time in the past year), and Burmese President Thein Sein have all visited China. (Is it fair to include Pakistan in a list of rogue states? It may be – my colleague Apoorva Shah has recently explained why Pakistan and North Korea have more in common than you might think). All three are countries with challenging, if not antagonistic, relationships with the United States. All are countries which Washington is trying to pressure, isolate, or otherwise punish. And all engage in some activities (in the case of Pyongyang, lots of activities), which are severely detrimental to U.S. national security interests.

These visits have been fruitful for each of the foreign leaders. Pakistan secured the emergency delivery of 50 JF-17 fighter jets; the original two-year timeline has been sped up to six months (see AEI Resident Fellow Dan Blumenthal’s great WSJ article on this).

Though Kim Jong-Il reportedly failed to secure the Chinese investments he was hoping for, he did receive a warm welcome. Indeed, the official Chinese news agency reported that “Chinese President Hu Jintao said”—and with a straight face, no less!—“China was glad to see the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) gives top priority to improving people’s lives.” According to the BBC, “Chinese state television showed Mr. Kim being embraced and kissed by the Chinese president…The warmth of coverage of his visit, and the flattery of official comments by China, gave Mr. Kim much-needed political support, analysts said.”

Lastly, during Thein Sein’s visit, China and Burma “upgraded their relationship to strategic partnership and inked economic agreements.”

While the specific reasons behind China’s relationship with each of these three states differ, Beijing nurtures all three in an effort both to complicate the international environment for the United States and to pursue a predominance of influence (and eventually power) in the Asia-Pacific.

The timing and quick succession of these three visits is also indicative of growing Chinese bravado. China is, for all intents and purposes, thumbing its nose at the United States, and it is doing so confident that Washington will not respond. Its confidence is apparently well-placed. While Beijing does not let Washington cast a passing glance at Taiwan without throwing a fit, Washington refuses to return the favor when Beijing praises murderers and supplies “emergency” jets to the country that safely harbored Osama Bin Laden for the past half decade. This is, to put it lightly, unfortunate. Washington’s silence only assures that China (and others) will continue to impinge upon American national security interests whenever and wherever they can.

According to a statement from the Pentagon, the United States is in the process of pulling out some of its troops inside Pakistan, many of whom are deployed as trainers to the Pakistani military, following an in-writing request from the Pakistan Army. Islamabad has asked for a scaling back of more than 200 American troops currently deployed inside Pakistan.

The request was initially made in the aftermath of the so-called “Raymond Davis affair,” when a CIA contractor shot and killed two Pakistanis in Lahore in late January. The Pakistani military, in a display of its indignation, asked the United States to pare down its Special Forces training program assisting the paramilitary Pakistani Frontier Corps (FC). The army, still reeling from the fallout and embarrassment of the bin Laden raid, is probably pursuing the request to show its displeasure at the unilateral U.S. action deep inside Pakistan.

The move is a bad one for all involved. The most direct beneficiary of the training program is the Pakistani military itself. U.S. Special Forces trainers are there at the invitation of Pakistan and have done much over the past several years to help train and equip the FC.

Considered for years to be a backwater deployment, the FC lacked funding, attention, training, equipment, and professionalism and, as a result, was frequently bested in battles with the Taliban. Today, the FC is a strikingly more competent organization, and American training, funding, and equipping has had a positive role to play in that transformation. Shrinking the training program will deprive the FC of the mentorship it needs, and Pakistani officers of the relationships they could be developing with their American counterparts. The U.S., too, will suffer from the decreased soldier-to-soldier contact and trust building opportunities that the program encourages.

At the strategic level, the move does not augur well for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and is evidence that the strategic partners have not yet made it through the rough patches. The recent trip by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen were meant to help put the relationship back on track and to begin, slowly but surely, re-establishing trust between the two countries. There is much work yet to be done, and the Pakistani call to shrink a program that it ultimately benefits most from is not going to make the task any easier.

Reza Nasim Jan is the Pakistan team leader for the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute. He is a co-author of the new report “The Haqqanis in Kurram: The Regional Implications of a Growing Insurgency.”

Sadanand Dhume

Pakistan’s ISI on Trial

By Sadanand Dhume

May 26, 2011, 10:20 am

It has been a bad week for Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment. In a high-profile trial in Chicago, confessed Pakistani-American terrorist David Headley has revealed that his handler in the army’s Inter-Services Intelligence chose a Jewish center as part of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and plotted against a Danish newspaper that published cartoons of the prophet Mohammed.

Headley’s claims of direct ISI involvement in attacks that killed more than 160 people, including six Americans, could not come at a worse time for an intelligence agency already under the scanner for failing to detect Osama bin Laden’s safe house in the Pakistani garrison town of Abbottabad. Though the ISI’s ties with Lashkar-e-Taiba, the terrorist group behind the attacks, is hardly news, Headley’s testimony, if true, provides a damning insider’s account of how those ties work in practice.

At the same time, Pakistan is grappling with the aftermath of Sunday’s audacious attack by local Taliban on a naval base that killed ten people and destroyed two expensive P-3C Orion surveillance aircraft. Though the popular response in Pakistan has included rallying behind the army and, predictably enough, blaming America for the attack, some of Pakistan’s more thoughtful commentators are raising questions similar to those raised after the Abbottabad raid. In the Express Tribune, columnist Aqil Shah says the attacks shatter myths about the military’s ability to safeguard Pakistan. Says Shah: “Rather than blaming others for its own failures, the military should start doing its actual job for once. And managing real estate, hounding journalists and propping up political alliances is not really a part of it.”

It remains to be seen how Pakistan responds to growing evidence that it needs to rethink its priorities by abandoning adventurism outside its borders and focusing instead on improving its sclerotic economy. (Pakistan’s GDP grew by 2.7 percent last year, about a third as fast as neighboring India’s.) But the events of this month—Abbottabad, PNS Mehran, and the Headley trial—add up to a pattern that even the blindest general ought to be able to recognize.


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