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Archive for the ‘South Asia’ Category

Sadanand Dhume

India’s Iran folly

By Sadanand Dhume

February 13, 2012, 11:26 am

Today’s bombing of an Israeli diplomat’s car in New Delhi is sure to raise international scrutiny on India’s problematic ties with Iran. According to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Iran was behind the bombing outside the heavily guarded Israeli embassy—a stone’s throw from Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s house—that injured the Israeli defense attache’s wife. If proven, the attack will cast a shadow on U.S.-India relations as well.

Even before the most recent incident, U.S.-India relations appeared to be heading toward a train wreck. At any rate, the odds ratcheted up last week as New Delhi signaled its determination to offer Tehran a lifeline as it battles U.S. and European sanctions. India intends to sidestep the sanctions by using a combination of rupees and barter to pay for Iranian oil imports. And on Thursday, adding insult to Western injury, India’s commerce secretary announced that a trade delegation would soon head to Iran to explore fresh opportunities as other countries retreat from its toxic economy.

While India lacks the capacity to single-handedly prop up Iran, its actions nonetheless send exactly the wrong message at a delicate moment in the international community’s effort to thwart Tehran’s rogue nuclear program. India recently overtook China as the world’s largest importer of Iranian oil. And the mullahs’ propaganda machine has quickly exploited supportive noises emanating from New Delhi to argue that they are not as isolated as they seem.

To be fair, as I pointed out in my most recent WSJ column, India has genuine reasons to seek friendly relations with Iran—chiefly oil, access to Central Asia, and a common stake in preventing a Pakistan-backed Taliban comeback in Afghanistan.

But by thumbing their noses at Washington in the face of its most pressing security challenge, the mandarins who run Indian foreign policy risk destroying goodwill painstakingly built over a decade by well-wishers of the relationship in both countries. The long term costs for India of a West that’s suspicious rather than enthusiastic about its rise are inestimably greater than the short term benefits of playing footsie with Iran.

Some well regarded Indian strategic thinkers argue that India should act as a bridge between the United States and Iran. But if this hasn’t happened over the past 10 years, it’s hardly realistic to pursue it in the midst of the current crisis. Instead of mistakenly believing that it can paper over differences with Washington, or (somewhat fantastically) get the entire Western world to suddenly see the revolutionary regime in Tehran in a kinder light, India should arrange for alternative oil supplies and join the international community in putting the squeeze on Iran. For its part, the Obama administration needs to make it clear that this—unlike disagreements over fighter aircraft purchases or commercial access for U.S. firms to India’s nuclear market—is much more serious than a mere spat between friends.

For India, the Iranian threat doesn’t rise to the level of Pakistan. Nonetheless, a nuclear-weapons-free Middle East, and one less country in the world bankrolling revolutionary Islamist terrorism, are both self-evidently in India’s interest. Reviving an old image of itself as a nation invariably at odds with the West despite ostensibly professing the same values is decidedly not. This is true regardless of who turns out to be behind today’s attack in New Delhi.

During an online question and answer session on Monday, President Obama “exposed” a covert action program when, for the first time, he acknowledged the existence of the CIA’s drone campaign against al Qaeda. The drone program is, of course, an “open secret” in Washington. U.S. officials routinely discuss it on deep background, and Obama has referred to it obliquely in the past. But this was the first time an American president had openly acknowledged that the United States was using unmanned drones to kill al Qaeda terrorists.

The president made his remarks in the context of defending the program against charges from critics on the left that it has led to the deaths of a large number of civilians. “Drones have not caused a huge number of civilian casualties,” the president declared. “There’s a perception that we’re just sending a whole bunch of strikes willy-nilly. This is a targeted, focused effort at people who are on a list of active terrorists who are trying to go in and harm Americans … It is important for everybody to understand that this thing is kept on a tight leash.”

He added that, far from a source of tension with countries where strikes occur (he judiciously avoided mentioning Pakistan by name), relations would be further frayed if drones were not available to go after al Qaeda and the United States had to use manned missions to kill the terrorists instead. “We have to be judicious in how we use drones,” the president said, “but we have to understand that probably our ability … to limit our incursions into somebody else’s territory is enhanced by the fact that we are able to pinpoint-strike an al Qaeda operative in a place where the capacity of that military in that country may not be able to get them.”

At almost the same time the president spoke, eleven terrorists, including four local commanders, are reported to have been killed in a U.S. drone airstrike in a southern Yemeni province where al Qaeda’s affiliate controls significant ground. And earlier this month, the United States resumed drone strikes in Pakistan after a nearly two month pause following an American air strike in November that killed two dozen Pakistani troops. According to the Long War Journal, this was the longest pause in strikes since the program was ramped up in the summer of 2008 by President George W. Bush. Here is LWJ’s list of the pauses in drone attacks:

Number of days between Predator/Reaper strikes in Pakistan since August 2008, eight days or greater

2011:

•    33 days, Nov. 16 to Dec. 19

•    11 days, Nov. 3 to Nov. 15

•    11 days, Oct. 15 to Oct. 27

•    12 days, Sept. 30 to Oct. 13

•    11 days, Sept. 11 to Sept. 23

•    17 days, Aug. 22 to Sept. 11

•    9 days, May 23 to June 3

•    19 days, April 21 to May 6

•    25 days, March 17 to April 13

•    14 days, Feb. 21 to March 8

•    27 days, Jan. 23 to Feb. 20

2010:

•    9 days, Dec. 17 to Dec. 27

•    19 days, July 25 to Aug. 14

•    15 days, June 29 to July 15

•    12 days, May 28 to June 10

•    12 days, March 30 to April 12

•    10 days, Feb. 24 to March 8

•    11 days, Feb. 2 to Feb. 14

2009:

•    19 days, Nov. 18 to Dec. 8

•    13 days, Sept. 30 to Oct. 14

•    9 days, Sept. 14 to Sept. 24

•    10 days, Aug. 27 to Sept. 7

•    8 days, Aug. 11 to Aug. 20

•    9 days, June 23 to July 3

•    28 days, May 16 to June 14

•    9 days, April 19 to April 29

•    10 days, April 8 to April 19

•    9 days, March 15 to March 25

•    11 days, March 1 to March 12

•    12 days, Feb. 16 to March 1

•    21 days, Jan. 23 to Feb. 14

•    20 days, Jan. 2 to Jan. 23

2008:

•    11 days, Nov. 29 to Dec. 11

•    13 days, Sept. 17 to Oct. 1

Sadanand Dhume

Expanding the American Kosher Deli

By Sadanand Dhume

January 31, 2012, 10:04 am

Yesterday marked the 20th anniversary of the establishment of full diplomatic relations between India and Israel.

The event was a watershed for both countries. For Israel—which also established ties with China the same year—it symbolized a decisive end to widespread isolation in Asia and the developing world. For India, whose socialism and non-alignment tilted it firmly toward the Palestinians for more than four decades, it marked a step toward a new kind of foreign policy: one marked less by anti-Western speechifying and abstract moralizing, and more by the pursuit of its own national interest.

Since then, the two countries have developed a curious relationship. On the one hand, India—at least under the left-leaning Congress Party—continues to pay (excessive) lip service to the Palestinian cause. On the other hand, Jerusalem has emerged as one of New Delhi’s most trusted partners on counter-terrorism, border security, and advanced weapons purchases. Agriculture is another large area of co-operation, indeed the only one both country’s officials tend to speak of expansively. (Almost everything I know about drip irrigation, I owe to Israeli diplomats expounding on the topic at length.)

For the United States, growing ties between India and Israel offer an opportunity. Step aside from a small and aging cohort of New Delhi intellectuals banging on about settlements and the right of return, and you find a deep admiration for the Jewish state among educated Indians. A strong India-Israel relationship binds India more closely with the democratic West. Perhaps it’s time to propose a Middle Eastern equivalent of the U.S.-India-Japan trilateral dialogue. There’s already a name for it: the American Kosher Deli.

Sadanand Dhume

Reassessing Manmohan Singh

By Sadanand Dhume

January 13, 2012, 10:20 am

Most world leaders, or at any rate the well-known ones, have an international reputation that can be summarized in a single sentence. Scruffy madman in search of a bomb: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Mediterranean media magnate with a glad eye: Silvio Berlusconi. Former general turned Southeast Asian democrat: Indonesia’s Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

Ever since taking office in 2004, India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has been the beneficiary of this intellectual shorthand. Most people outside India know him simply as the Oxford-educated economist who, as finance minister, helped unshackle the economy by launching economic reforms.

It may be time to revisit that assessment, I argue in my most recent column for the Wall Street Journal.

Singh earned his reputation in the early 1990s, when he piloted India’s way out of a foreign exchange crisis and set the course for two decades of impressive growth. But those achievements notwithstanding, his record as prime minister has been underwhelming.

In India and abroad, a new consensus about the prime minister is forming. The Economist bemoans the country’s policy paralysis. Former Chief Economic Advisor Shankar Acharya accuses the government of carrying out virtually no significant economic reforms since coming to power. Prominent economic commentator Niranjan Rajadhyaksha warns that GDP growth next year may fall to a ten-year low.

For Singh, long beloved of Indian and foreign journalists alike, this reassessment must come as a shock. But there’s only one way to reverse it—to go back to the bold policies of the early 1990s that earned him his reputation in the first place.

Pakistan appears agog over the possibility that the army is about to depose the elected government of President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani.

In recent months, Gilani has adopted an unusually (for Pakistan) outspoken stance toward the country’s most powerful institution. Last month, Gilani called the army a “state within a state.” Then, on the heels of a visit to China by army chief General Ashfaq Kayani, Gilani told People’s Daily Online that both Kayani and Inter-Services Intelligence chief General Shuja Pasha had acted unconstitutionally by making submissions to a Supreme Court inquiry into the so-called memogate scandal that has pitted the army against the elected government. Gilani has also replaced the top official in the defense ministry, a former general, with a (gasp!) female bureaucrat.

Nonetheless, talk of a possible coup is almost certainly overblown.

First, the army still hasn’t recovered from the last coup—General Pervez Musharraf’s in 1999. Unable to fix the country’s myriad economic and social problems, the generals even began to lose what they value most: the army’s place as the most respected institution in Pakistan.

Second, why murder a man who is about to commit suicide? The Zardari/Gilani dispensation is already in a confrontation with the Supreme Court over memogate and a stalled corruption investigation. Much of the media has turned against the elected government, and the odds of it coming back to power in elections due next year appear slim.

Third, coups are so, well, 20th century. The generals can maintain their grip on national security, an outsize share of the budget, and influence over the media without dirtying their hands. Or they can quietly encourage the courts to dismiss the government and force early elections. Either way, for now at least, the generals will likely continue to operate from the shadows.

Sadanand Dhume

What next for Pakistan’s army?

By Sadanand Dhume

November 29, 2011, 9:14 am

As Afghans and Pakistanis trade charges over the circumstances that led to the death of 24 Pakistani soldiers on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border Saturday, once again the Pakistani army finds itself under scrutiny. Afghan and Western officials say Afghan troops called in the air strike that killed the Pakistanis in self-defense, after coming under fire. The Pakistani version of events, by contrast, suggests that the soldiers were attacked in their sleep without provocation. NATO officials have promised a full investigation.

While we wait for the truth to emerge, one thing is certain: U.S.-Pakistan relations—already rocky following the raid in May that killed Osama bin Laden in the garrison town of Abbottabad—have sunk to another low, one of many this year. Pakistan has asked the United States to completely evacuate an air base in remote Balochistan province used for drone strikes against militant targets. It has also shuttered NATO supply routes into Afghanistan, which account for about half of all coalition cargo. (But down from more than 70 percent two years ago.)

In my WSJ column last week, spurred by the resignation of Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States under murky circumstances, I wrote that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is headed toward being less expansive and more transactional. In an age of television, public opinion in both countries reflects deep mutual suspicions. Only 12 percent of Pakistanis hold a favorable opinion of the United States, the second lowest such figure in the world. According to Rasmussen Reports, 40 percent of Americans regard Pakistan as an enemy.

On November 30 we’ll host a panel discussion at AEI to discuss the situation in Pakistan and what it means for the United States. Our focus will be on the Pakistani army, the country’s most powerful institution by a long measure. If the United States and Pakistan are to avoid the recurrence of incidents like this weekend’s, their armies will need to work out clearer ways of communicating along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. At the same time, if Pakistan’s fledgling democracy is to have a chance of flowering, its generals will have to give up their virtual monopoly on their country’s policies toward Afghanistan and India, and also develop a keener appreciation for the idea of civil supremacy than they have managed thus far.

In a speech to the Australian parliament yesterday, President Obama delivered a powerful message of America’s commitment to the region:

This is the future we seek in the Asia Pacific—security, prosperity, and dignity for all. That’s what we stand for. That’s who we are. That’s the future we will pursue, in partnership with allies and friends, and with every element of American power. So let there be no doubt: In the Asia Pacific in the 21st century, the United States of America is all in…. We will allocate the resources necessary to maintain our strong military presence in this region. We will preserve our unique ability to project power and deter threats to peace. We will keep our commitments… Our enduring interests in the region demand our enduring presence in the region. The United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay.

But when it comes to the Middle East and South Asia, he had a very different message:

In just a few weeks… the last American troops will leave Iraq and our war there will be over. In Afghanistan, we’ve begun … a responsible transition—so Afghans can take responsibility for their future and so coalition forces can begin to draw down…. So make no mistake, the tide of war is receding, and America is looking ahead to the future that we must build. From Europe to the Americas, we’ve strengthened alliances and partnerships. At home, we’re investing in the sources of our long-term economic strength—the education of our children, the training of our workers, the infrastructure that fuels commerce, the science and the research that leads to new breakthroughs. We’ve made hard decisions to cut our deficit and put our fiscal house in order—and we will continue to do more. … Our new focus on this region reflects a fundamental truth—the United States has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation.

So when it comes to the Pacific, America is “all in,” “here to stay,” and will pursue a future of “security, prosperity, and dignity for all” with “every element of American power.” But when it comes to Iraq and Afghanistan, “American troops will leave” and the United States is “looking ahead to the future we must build” by shifting our focus to Europe, the Americas, domestic challenges, and—yes—the Pacific. The message to the people of the Middle East and South Asia could not be clearer—or more troubling.

Sadanand Dhume

Romney v. Gingrich on Pakistan

By Sadanand Dhume

November 15, 2011, 2:38 pm

How do Republican frontrunners Mitt Romney and Newt Gingrich view Pakistan, a country mentioned a staggering 55 times in Saturday night’s debate in South Carolina?

As on most issues, Gingrich came across as the more pugnacious of the two. He pointed out early on that Pakistan offers sanctuary to anti-U.S. Taliban fighters. He criticized Islamabad for having “hid Bin Laden for at least six years in a military city within a mile of their national defense university.” He pulled no punches on the question of continued U.S. aid: “I think that’s a pretty good idea to start at zero and sometimes stay there.”

If Gingrich’s red meat responses seemed designed to appeal to the gallery, then Romney’s appeared better tailored for policy wonks. To begin with, the former Massachusetts governor showed greater familiarity with detail. “Pakistan is not a country like other countries, with a strong political center,” he said. “This is, instead, a nation which is close to being a failed state.”

Romney pointed out that Pakistan houses competing power centers and that the United States ought to “work with our friends in that country to get them to do some of the things we can’t do ourselves.” He would continue the current policy of going after militants on Pakistani soil with drone strikes, but balked at the idea of using ground troops. Even talking about it in a debate would be “highly incendiary.”

At the same time, Romney tried to strike a muscular note. “One of the things we have to do is have understanding with the various power bases within the country that they’re gonna have to allow us, or they themselves go after the Taliban and Haqqani network to make sure they do not destabilize Afghanistan, particularly as we’re pulling our troops out.”

Interestingly enough, these contrasting approaches cleave closely to how Americans view Pakistan. According to a Rasmussen Reports poll released last month, 40 percent of Americans view Pakistan as an enemy while a nearly identical 39 percent see it as somewhere in between an enemy and an ally. My hunch: we’ll see more of the Gingrich/Romney contrast when Pakistan likely comes up again at the November 22 AEI/Heritage national security debate on CNN.

The raid in May on Osama bin Laden’s compound in the Pakistani garrison town of Abbottabad has brought intense focus on Washington’s policy toward Islamabad. Since then, the weight of informed opinion—in influential op-eds, think tank reports, and magazine articles—has coalesced around a consensus: the current policy has failed.

Ostensibly, since 2004 Pakistan has been a major non-NATO ally of the United States, a status it shares with such stalwart friends as Israel, Japan, and Australia.

In 2009, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, also known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act, boosted aid to Pakistan by $1.5 billion a year through 2013. These blandishments were meant to encourage Islamabad to co-operate with Washington in fighting terrorism.

Though Pakistani authorities have at times helped round up wanted al Qaeda leaders from their soil, their overall record has been disappointing. Of particular concern to the United States: continued Pakistani support for the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, and other militants who regularly use safe havens in Pakistan to attack U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

Stepped up attacks by Haqqani Network insurgents in recent months, including an audacious assault in September on the U.S. embassy in Kabul, have added urgency to long-standing misgivings about Pakistani intentions. The country’s powerful army has long used jihadist groups to assert influence in Afghanistan and bleed India in the disputed territory of Kashmir.

One possible response to what is colloquially known as Pakistan’s double game—fighting some terrorists while helping others—is to move from a strategy of engagement to one of containment. This would place less emphasis on carrots such as aid and advanced equipment. Instead, it would rely more on sticks such as targeted sanctions against military officers involved in aiding America’s enemies, and more unilateral Abbottabad-style raids against high value targets. (Keep in mind that Al Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri and the Taliban’s Mullah Omar are believed to live in Pakistan.)

The main idea: target Pakistan’s recalcitrant military while sparing its civilian population and continuing to strengthen Pakistan’s fledgling democracy. Whether it will be implemented, and how Pakistan will respond, will be one of the most important decisions the president will have to make in South Asia.

This item first appeared on CNN’s security clearance blog.

Daniel Rothschild

Is Pakistan really a ‘cautionary tale’ in overpopulation?

By Daniel Rothschild

November 2, 2011, 1:10 pm

On this morning’s Morning Edition, Steve Inskeep filed a story from Karachi, Pakistan, which he called “a cautionary tale about living in a world with more than 7 billion people.” The implication was that Karachi was some kind of post-apocalyptic hellhole overrun by teeming masses.

Inskeep is heavy on anecdote (largely coming from his guide, who lost a development when  political winds changed) but light on statistics, so it helps to build the story out.

Pakistan’s GDP has increased by about six-fold over the last 30 years, from $28.1 billion in 1981 to $175.8 billion in 2010, while its population has more than doubled. In other words, per capita GDP has trebled, from around $337 per person to around $1,000. Not shabby, though it would probably do better with a freer economy; the World Bank Doing Business Rankings rate Pakistan as the 105th worst country for doing business, and corruption is high and property rights shaky. But this hardly seems like a “cautionary tale.”

But wait: aren’t developing cities being flooded by poor rural migrants? To be sure, Pakistan is becoming highly urbanized; in 1951 only about 17.4 percent of the country’s population was urban, a figure that jumped to 32.5 percent by 1998. And Karachi is now the world’s 12th largest city, some 60 times the size it was in 1947.

But here’s where Inskeep gets it wrong. Karachi may be a city that’s “scrambling to keep the lights on,” but that’s because its booming economy is outpacing the ability of local government to build infrastructure. This makes for something that’s messy and certainly not orderly (like New York?) but that represents a very good thing. What Inskeep sees is growth, a city getting more affluent as it gets more people.

Every country that went from poverty to affluence had to “scramble to keep the lights on” (or keep infectious disease and violence at bay) in its rapidly growing conurbations. Manchester, England grew from 135,000 to 399,000 souls between 1821 and 1861. Growth and urbanization are messy. But Inskeep is wrong that, as population increases, “some people, some cities, and some nations will surely come out winners” while others will be losers. That’s just so much neo-Malthusian claptrap.

AEI Debate Prep: Wanted: A real U.S. strategy for Pakistan

By Reza Jan

October 28, 2011, 1:50 pm

This post is part of an ongoing series preparing for the AEI/CNN/Heritage National Security & Foreign Policy GOP presidential debate on November 22nd. See the rest of the posts here.

Much as the Republican candidates (and, indeed, their incumbent opponent) might desire to wish away the problem of Pakistan, how to deal with the enigmatic nuclear state is likely to be one of their more enduring foreign policy burdens. At the core of the matter are these questions: What are American interests in Pakistan and what are the best means by which to pursue them?

For ten years, the war in Afghanistan has encouraged American presidents to interact with Pakistan with a purely “Af-Pak” mentality. The truth is that Pakistan is, in and of itself, far more important than the war in Afghanistan, or the Haqqani network, or any other single issue that seems to dominate domestic news cycles. Hackneyed but true, Pakistan is a country with a fast-growing nuclear arsenal, 180 million people on the wrong side of a radicalization trend, a hemorrhaging economy, and a safe haven for some of the world’s most virulent regional and international terrorist organizations. The U.S. has enormous interest in ensuring that Pakistan does not fail as a state.

Helping a successful, responsible Pakistani state emerge will go a long way towards neutering many of the dangers emanating from Pakistan, but the result is heavily predicated on whether the United States acknowledges what is in the interests of Pakistan. This means understanding that the welfare and aspirations of Pakistan’s people are of greater importance than the convenience of primarily interacting with, and therefore empowering, Pakistan’s military establishment, or throwing money at Pakistan’s venal political class. The United States might start by suffering through the difficulty of building relationships with facets of the state that seek to bring benefits to the whole rather than the corporatist interests of the few.

At the risk of showing too much cheek, any serious candidate will recognize that a return to the “Presslerism” of the nineties is entirely counterproductive. As cathartic as it may be to cut all ties with Pakistan each time revelations of its intransigence in Afghanistan come to the fore, doing so solves none of the vexations laid out above. At worst, it would compound those problems by diluting America’s ability to influence them. One novel proposal might be, as others have suggested, to employ targeted sanctions against those individuals, soldiers or otherwise, with irrefutable ties to terrorist groups, rather than to impose conditions that would weaken the entire military or impoverish a population with no control over its foreign policy agenda.

What is unambiguous is that U.S. interests in Pakistan are broader than the narrow basis on which interactions currently take place, and that improving the relationship will take more engagement and nuance rather than less. A too-large chunk of America’s foreign policy woes are contingent on how well its leaders (candidates and incumbent alike) understand, and choose to address, these stark realities. At its simplest, all candidates, President Obama included, must be able to explain how they plan on moving beyond a Pakistan “strategy” that is reliant on drone strikes and trying (and failing) to pay off the Pakistanis to do what they don’t want to.

This post is part of an ongoing series preparing for the AEI/CNN/Heritage National Security & Foreign Policy GOP presidential debate on November 22nd. See the rest of the posts here.

An unfortunate aspect of national discourse on Afghanistan—with its emphasis on withdrawal dates and body counts—has been a loss of focus on how South Asia fits more broadly into the wider Asian region and beyond. This means measuring U.S. actions in South Asia against two broader yardsticks: their impact on the spread of radical Islam and on hegemonic Chinese ambitions in Asia.

This is not to suggest that we should not care about Afghanistan and Pakistan for their own sake. The twin goals of ensuring that Afghanistan does not once again become a haven for al Qaeda and that Pakistan does not allow its nuclear weapons to slip into jihadist hands, remain pressing. But these aren’t the only reasons for a strong and enduring U.S. presence in the region.

Sending the kind of signal in Afghanistan that is being sent in Iraq with the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops will only strengthen the hands of those who wish America ill. For radical Islamists from the Palestinian territories to the southern Philippines it will be interpreted simply: “Our side is winning.” For China and its grab bag of despotic allies, it will confirm a longed-for narrative of American decline. In India, rapidly emerging as a global economic power, it will strengthen the hands of those who would like New Delhi to keep its distance from Washington’s embrace.

In short, success in Afghanistan is about much more than Afghanistan. It’s an obvious point, but sometimes the most obvious things bear repeating

Sadanand Dhume

India, Israel, and prejudice

By Sadanand Dhume

October 26, 2011, 9:19 am

Over at the Guardian’s aptly named Comment is Free blog, Kapil Komireddi, a freelance writer, makes a provocative argument: that a burgeoning friendship between India and Israel is “deepened by prejudice,” by which he means a shared antipathy toward Islam. It’s a point worth addressing, not least because Komireddi appears to be responding, at least in part, to my WSJ column earlier this month, in which I described the two democracies as natural allies. Komireddi calls my piece “a hysterical philippic.”

It’s best left to readers to decide whose tone is even and whose is somewhat over-the-top, but let me begin by accepting that Komireddi’s central concern contains a grain of truth. Some Indians and Israelis do indeed view their partnership in terms of a shared Islamic enemy. Such sentiment is encountered easily enough on the Internet, particularly in its most fevered anti-Muslim reaches. Ten years ago, the New York Times ran a story about an anti-Muslim website run by militant Hindus and hosted by followers of Rabbi Meir Kahane.

Anecdotal evidence from Twitter suggests that a large proportion of Indians who share my pro-Israel views—albeit by no means all of them—may be fairly classified as Hindu nationalists. Finally, Komireddi’s worry that “an alliance against Islamic extremism must not become an excuse for far right parties to fan anti-Muslim sentiment” is entirely valid. Though I’d add that it also shouldn’t provide an excuse for far left parties to imagine the ghost of Islamophobia lurking in every shadow.

Now for our disagreements. To begin with, it’s sloppy—not to mention inaccurate—to assume that an argument for closer India-Israel ties is naturally rooted in a Hindu-nationalist perspective. As evidence for this, Komireddi cherry picks one sentence from my column: “Both India and Israel represent ancient civilizations whose land carries a special spiritual significance for most of its people.”

While this is certainly part of my argument, a shared consciousness of belonging to an ancient people can, and ought to, encompass Indians and Israelis of all ideological stripes. One can disagree with the BJP (or indeed with Likud) on foreign, economic, and social policy, and still believe that the idea of antiquity, for want of a better term, creates an element of common ground. Moreover, it’s only one among several factors that I list, including trade and defense ties, a shared threat from radical Islam, the English language, and respect for pluralism. Finally, Komireddi manages to skip the part where I explicitly state that “despite what conspiracy theorists may say, neither country has a quarrel with Islam.”

Fortunately, in India itself the leftist view of Israel—obsessed with settlements and resentful of the country’s economic success—lacks traction, except among some Muslim political elites and a doctrinaire intelligentsia increasingly out of step with the rest of the country. As Komireddi’s article points out, an Israeli foreign ministry survey two years ago found India (along with the United States) to be the most pro-Israel country in the world. Ordinary Indians admire Israel for its pluck, self-reliance, and its refusal to be cowed by decades of jihadist violence. This doesn’t make them bigots, and to suggest otherwise is absurd.

India stands up to China

By Sadanand Dhume and Julissa Milligan

October 21, 2011, 10:26 am

In a welcome show of assertiveness, India is standing up to Chinese pressure in Southeast Asia, as well as closer to home.

A series of recent events underscore this message. During meetings with Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang earlier this month, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reiterated plans for the state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Company to begin joint oil exploration with Vietnam in a contested block of the South China Sea claimed by both Vietnam and China. During Myanmar President Thein Sein’s visit to New Delhi last weekend, India extended a $500 million credit line to Myanmar for infrastructure-development projects. This announcement is likely to increase Chinese heartburn caused by Myanmar’s abrupt decision to halt a $3.6 billion Chinese dam construction project on the Irrawaddy River in late August. In September the Indian foreign ministry called for China to halt infrastructure and development-related projects in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, which India regards as part of its territory. Reinforcing the message on borders, PM Singh visited the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh twice this summer, underscoring Indian sovereignty over territory that the Chinese call southern Tibet.

These decisions display India’s unwillingness to succumb to Chinese military and diplomatic pressure in the region. China balked when India and Vietnam announced joint oil exploration plans earlier this summer, declaring the plan “illegal.” The People’s Daily, mouthpiece of the Communist Party, warned both countries to be cautious of jeopardizing their economic relationship with China over “small interests in the South China Sea.”

In late July, an Indian ship returning from Hanoi was reportedly harassed by the Chinese navy. The Indian foreign ministry let the Chinese off the hook but simultaneously reaffirmed the view that the South China Sea comprises freely navigable international waters, refuting Chinese claims to the contrary. The Chinese government denied the incident.

This display of firmness is a welcome sign that India will not submit to China’s unreasonable demands in Asia. Ahead of next month’s East Asia Summit, it ought to bolster the confidence of smaller countries in the region that are also facing growing Chinese pressure.

Sadanand Dhume

The Ashkenazim of India

By Sadanand Dhume

October 20, 2011, 2:59 pm

Over at The American, Lazar Berman has a fascinating story about the high proportion of Jewish Nobel Prize winners in the sciences, a subject that has also been written about by AEI’s Charles Murray. In passing, Berman mentions how, relative to its population of 1.1 billion people, India has produced few Nobelists—between six and eight depending on how you count.

In itself, this is hardly surprising for a poor country yet to achieve universal literacy. Drill down further, however, and you come upon an obscure factoid mentioned by the historian Patrick French in his book India: A Portrait. Three of the four Indians or persons of Indian origin who have won a science Nobel come from a community said to number under 2 million people—Brahmins from Tamil Nadu. They include C. V. Raman (physics, 1930), Subrahmanyan Chandrasekar (physics, 1983), and Venkatraman Ramakrishnan (chemistry, 2009). The odd man out: Punjab-born Hargobind Khorana, who won a Nobel for medicine in 1968. The tiny Tamil Brahmin community also accounts for Viswanathan Anand, India’s only world chess champion, and the mathematical genius Srinivasa Ramanujan.

Needless to say, there are perfectly reasonable non-genetic explanations that can explain this peculiar preponderance. For one, Brahmin priests have a tradition of literacy that goes back to antiquity. For much of recorded history, they more or less monopolized traditional education, which gave them, and their descendants, a big leg up when Indians took to modern education under the British. But this still doesn’t explain why only Tamil Brahmins, and not their Bengali, Maharashtrian, or Uttar Pradesh counterparts, stand out in this manner.

In India, public discussion of this subject is more or less verboten. Caste is a touchy subject, and any such debate would likely devolve quickly into an exercise in caste chauvinism and name calling. Nonetheless, maybe it’s time for scientists to study the over-achieving Tamil Brahmin community with a view towards determining how much of its success in math, music, and science can be credited to nurture and how much to nature. Until then, it’s intriguing to think of Tamil Brahmins as the Ashkenazim of India.

How to Create More Jobs in South Asia: Less Government

By Julissa Milligan

September 30, 2011, 4:54 pm

A recent World Bank report on South Asia finds that the most significant constraints to business growth in South Asia are poor government policies. Of the top 15 “severe” constraints surveyed firms listed, eight involved dealing with the government. Political instability topped the list, followed by corruption, tax administration, customs laws, government policy uncertainty, macro instability, the courts system, and labor regulations. The World Bank estimates that labor regulations alone cost India 2.8 million new jobs between 1997 and 2007.

Policy-related constraints were more severe for firms operating in the formal sector and for those in urban areas. This comes as no surprise; the informal sector operates outside of government regulation, and institutional capacity to enforce laws in the rural areas is much lower. However, policies not conducive to business growth are particularly harmful in formal, urban employment because these sectors provide the best jobs. The Bank found that jobs in the formal sector lead to the greatest increase in productivity and the biggest gains in poverty reduction. Moreover, jobs in urban areas are growing more quickly than jobs in rural areas and employment growth in urban areas is more likely to involve the switch from farm to more productive non-farm labor.

Over the past ten years, South Asia created an average of 800,000 new jobs per month and absorbed a growing labor force at increasing productivity levels. However, with the working-age population burgeoning, the region must accommodate 1 million to 1.2 million new entrants per month over the next two decades at rising productivity levels to maintain high levels of growth and a strong poverty reduction rate, according to the World Bank—a 25 to 50 percent increase over current job creation levels. Addressing the damaging constraints the region’s governments place on businesses is a necessary first step.

Sadanand Dhume

Terrorism Is Back in India

By Sadanand Dhume

September 7, 2011, 11:05 am

Today’s bomb blast at the Delhi High Court, which has killed 11 people and injured 76, marks a grim return to a familiar past for India.

For more than two years after the horrific 2008 Mumbai attacks, India enjoyed a relative lull in terrorist violence thanks to stepped up diplomacy, policing, and intelligence gathering. But this year, an older pattern of terrorism—blasts in major Indian cities every few months—appears to have returned. The Delhi attack, caused by a briefcase bomb left by a crowded gate, comes only two months after the still unexplained July bombings in Mumbai that killed 26 people.

If the Pakistan-based terrorist group Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, which has claimed responsibility, turns out to be behind the blast—Indian officials are not pointing any fingers yet—it will immediately set back ongoing talks between New Delhi and Islamabad.

Thus far Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has been able to pursue normalization of relations with Pakistan, one of the central objectives of his administration, despite Islamabad’s lack of progress in prosecuting the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. But with Singh’s popularity reeling under the onslaught of widespread anti-corruption protests, he will find it difficult to ignore accusations that his government has put his own dovish inclinations above its responsibility of protecting Indian citizens.

The Indian media is also sure to use the tenth anniversary of 9/11 to highlight the differences between the effective U.S. response to Islamist terrorism and India’s flailing efforts. But regardless of who turns out to be behind the blast, the odds of a military response by India are extremely slim. In terms of both loss of life and symbolic value, today’s attack does not rise to the threshold that would require.

Sadanand Dhume

India’s Faux Tea Party

By Sadanand Dhume

September 2, 2011, 5:04 pm

In today’s Wall Street Journal, I argue that anti-corruption protests in India last month indicate a welcome awakening of an apathetic middle class to public life, but a worrying disconnect from mainstream politics. I compare the protests—spearheaded by Anna Hazare, a 74-year-old activist whose 12-day hunger strike forced the government to agree to create a powerful new anti-corruption czar—with the Tea Party movement.

In both cases, a large chunk of the middle class has decided that politics as usual is not delivering the right policies. But while the Hazare movement holds itself above politics, the Tea Party has quickly turned itself into a force in the Republican Party and produced a clutch of prominent politicians including Michele Bachmann, Rand Paul, and Nikki Haley.

If the Tea Party had simply mocked politics as Hazare’s followers do, its members would have contented themselves with merely dressing up in revolutionary-era costume and threatening to re-enact George Washington’s famous crossing of the Delaware River unless Congress voted to lower taxes and balance the federal budget. No prizes for guessing which movement is more sustainable or likely to have a deeper long-term impact on policy.

On a related note, though few people doubt the Hazare movement’s noble intentions, its suggested solution shows how statist ideas continue to dominate Indian public life. Instead of focusing on reducing government control over business—the biggest source of corruption in public life—the movement wants to create a giant new body with sweeping powers. Only in India can you try and fight a problem created by an unwieldy bureaucracy by proposing a fresh layer of unwieldy bureaucracy.

Sadanand Dhume

A South China Sea Mystery

By Sadanand Dhume

September 1, 2011, 9:09 am

Did a Chinese warship confront an Indian one in international waters off the coast of Vietnam in July?

Yes, says the Financial Times in a story jointly datelined from Hanoi and New Delhi. No, say the Indian foreign and defense ministries in tersely worded statements. What the FT calls “the latest example of China’s naval assertiveness” is brushed off by India’s foreign ministry as a possible prank:

The Indian Naval vessel, INS Airavat, paid a friendly visit to Vietnam between 19 to 28 July 2011. On July 22, INS Airavat sailed from the Vietnamese port of Nha Trang towards Hai Phong, where it was to make a port call. At a distance of 45 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast in the South China Sea, it was contacted on open radio channel by a caller identifying himself as the “Chinese Navy” stating that “you are entering Chinese waters”. No ship or aircraft was visible from INS Airavat, which proceeded on her onward journey as scheduled.

While it’s hard to say what really happened, at least three things are clear. First, that if the Chinese did indeed confront the Indian warship, it would fit into a pattern of aggressive Chinese claims in the South China Sea, and face-offs with countries that contest those claims. Second, that India’s political leadership has every reason to tamp down such an event, for fear that in India’s brutally competitive TV news environment the story could quickly escalate to the level of a crisis. Third, that India has quietly reaffirmed its position on the South China Sea as being part of international waters freely navigable by ships of all nations.

Sadanand Dhume

Miss India Digs AEI

By Sadanand Dhume

August 30, 2011, 12:52 pm

It’s not every day that I’m mentioned in the same breath as a Miss Universe contestant, but the Washington Post and Wall Street Journal blogs both have stories today on an amusing kerfuffle involving Miss India Vasuki Sunkavalli and her apparent agreement with my views on everything from the size of India’s bureaucracy to the importance of India’s position on Syria at the United Nations Security Council.

You can read the Post’s version of the story here, and the Journal’s over here. To which I’ll only add that I wish Ms. Sunkavalli every success in the pageant, and hope that on her return from Brazil she’ll continue to be partial to the right ideas about South Asian politics, economics, and foreign policy.

The Indian government recently announced plans to set up a central foreign aid agency in the form of USAID or the UK’s DFID. Likely called the Indian Agency for Partnership in Development, it will manage over $11 billion in aid transfers to countries like Burma and Bangladesh over the next five to seven years.

It may seem strange that a country with more people in poverty than all of Sub-Saharan Africa now has an official apparatus to disburse development aid to other poor countries. Shouldn’t this money be used to fix social problems at home?

But that’s not the point of this agency. In fact, the announcement helps to prove something that the so-called “development community” still doesn’t understand: aid isn’t and has never really been about development.

Aid is a political and diplomatic tool, something that India wants to use to project more influence toward its poorer South Asian neighbors as well as other countries in Africa and Asia. This annoys the development experts in multi-national organizations and NGOs, who with the best of intentions, believe that aid money can catalyze actual development.

In a recent editorial, the Economist adopts this mentality, questioning India’s decision and noting that its money may be poured into “grand projects which fail—and encourage bad government.” It’s a fair point in that the money may indeed be used to fund big projects that eventually fail. And that these projects may encourage corruption and graft in the recipient countries. But that’s aid. It’s not a natural path to creating prosperity or any of the conditions needed for development, no matter how hard we try.

This also means that the parameters we use for judging the effectiveness of US foreign aid should be selected as carefully. It’s easy to dismiss aid when we try to look for non-existent development results. But perhaps there are more intangible political benefits?

It will be interesting to see where India takes its new agency in terms of its own charm offensive. Particularly intriguing will be how it competes with China’s now well-documented charm offensive across Asia and Africa. But if you’re looking forward to news of Indian aid programs bringing poor Nepalese and Sri Lankans out of poverty, don’t hold your breath.

It will likely be a few days before the facts surrounding Wednesday night’s bombings in Mumbai that killed at least 21 people and injured more than 100 become clear. The central question: will this be the proverbial last straw on the Indian camel’s back? The answer: it depends largely on who is blamed for the attacks, but for now the odds of India acting militarily appear slim.

Ever since the horrific 2008 Mumbai attacks—in which Pakistani gunmen from Lashkar-e-Taiba killed 166 people and paralyzed life in India’s financial capital for three days—analysts have wondered how India would respond to the next provocation. According to conventional wisdom, the political costs of forbearance have been raised immeasurably, and evidence of Pakistani complicity in another attack would force India’s prime minister to eschew diplomacy for some form of military retribution, most likely a limited strike against terrorist training camps in Pakistan or Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. In a worst case scenario, this could escalate into a full-scale war between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.

For now, though, the question is moot. Indian officials have (wisely) refused to jump to conclusions about who may be behind the most recent bombings. Should they indeed be traced directly to Pakistan-based terrorists, particularly those seen to have close links with the country’s military spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, then the pressure on the Indian government to retaliate in some form will indeed be high. If, on the other hand, responsibility is claimed by a group such as the Indian Mujahideen, a home-grown terrorist group with looser links to Pakistan than the LET, then New Delhi may do what is has done in the past: restrict itself to ratcheting up diplomatic pressure on Islamabad. The relatively low level of casualties compared to previous terrorist attacks, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s impending visit to India next week, also make caution the most likely path.

In short, stay tuned and see who the Indian government blames for the attacks. That, more than anything else, will signal whether New Delhi feels inclined to respond differently from the past, or persist with a familiar combination of diplomatic pressure and military restraint.

Earlier today, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen publicly accused the Pakistani government of sanctioning the murder of Syed Saleem Shahzad, a prominent Pakistani journalist. “I have not seen anything to disabuse that the government knew about it,” Mullen said. Shahzad was found dead in a canal on the outskirts of Islamabad, beaten and tortured to death days after disappearing on May 29.

That Shahzad might have been killed by the Pakistan’s shadowy directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is not news. The ISI was found guilty in the court of public opinion upon the discovery of Shahzad’s body. The organization has a history of controlling journalists through intimidation and violence. Prior to his disappearance, Shahzad had warned multiple people that he had been receiving death threats from the ISI on account of his reporting. The fact that Shahzad died days after writing a story exposing embarrassing infiltrations of the Pakistani military by al Qaeda militants only strengthens the case. To crown it all, senior Obama administration officials, speaking anonymously, confirmed on Monday that intelligence existed to indicate that Shahzad’s murder had been ordered by senior ISI officials.

What makes this story significant is that an official as prominent as Mullen would go out of his way to confirm the ISI’s complicity in the murder just as the Obama administration is looking to repair ties with Pakistan. Relations between the two countries have been severely strained by the fallout of the May 2 raid that killed Osama bin Laden. The Pakistani military has been under unprecedented pressure at home and abroad since the raid, and the announcement may be an attempt by the United States to keep that pressure on. It remains to be seen whether such tactics will have the desired effect. What is certain, however, is that killing off journalists who are writing about uncomfortable truths such as the presence of militant sympathizers in the army will neither restore the army’s reputation, nor extirpate the militant rot in the inside.

Reza Nasim Jan is the Pakistan team leader for AEI’s Critical Threats Project. He is a co-author of the report “The Haqqanis in Kurram: The Regional Implications of a Growing Insurgency.”

In my column in Thursday’s Wall Street Journal Asia, I wade into a debate about whether India’s burgeoning population of billionaires, 55 individuals or families at last count, is something the country needs to worry about. Since last year, growing disquiet over corruption in public life has tarnished the reputation of some of India’s best known businessmen, and led to calls for India to “rein in its robber barons.” As the argument goes, something is wrong with the fact that India, with barely 2 percent of the world’s GDP (in dollar terms) houses nearly 7 percent of the world’s billionaires.

To begin with, worrying about “too many billionaires” in a land long defined by its poverty strikes me as somewhat absurd. More substantively, I argue that if corruption is the issue, then it’s excessive government interference in business that needs reining in.

India’s incipient anti-business rhetoric misdiagnoses both the problem and the solution. Unlike Suharto’s Indonesia or post-Soviet Russia, India’s business landscape is not dominated by classic crony capitalists, but by genuine businesses that need more than the right connections to thrive. And as shown by the dodgiest sectors of the economy—real estate and telecom—India’s trouble is not too much capitalism, but too much government control.

Going by the response thus far on Twitter, readers are divided on this issue, with many leaning toward a view that business is a large part of the problem in India. In a broader sense, the debate about billionaires cuts to the heart of different ways of viewing inequality, opportunity, and free enterprise. The long-term challenge for India remains getting more of its people to shed destructive ways of thinking about wealth that have almost become habit after decades of socialism.

It isn’t every day that something I write for the Wall Street Journal resurfaces in the pages of The Nation, a Pakistani broadsheet published in Lahore. But though the reprint keeps the core of my argument—that Pakistan’s military needs to submit to the principle of civilian control—it also makes several telling changes that show how sharply local sensitivities sometimes diverge from the mainstream narrative about the country in the international press.

The Nation’s version of my article omits a reference to Pakistan’s “rogue” nuclear program, and to how “Islamabad’s support for terrorism destabilizes the region and the world.” And in a nod to cultural red lines rather than geopolitical ones, it also drops a reference (quoting the author whose book I was reviewing) to whirling dervishes at a medieval Sufi shrine as “thousand-year-old hippies” and omits the word “grubby” in a reference to the country’s civilian politicians.

So what does this tempest in a teapot say about Pakistan? On the positive side, it points to an openness to debate about big issues that I’ve written about on this blog. On the negative side, running articles without permission is poor form, and sandpapering the views expressed in an opinion piece poorer still. Now if only The Nation would jettison its rogue book review program and join the global mainstream.


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