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Archive for the ‘Middle East’ Category

USA Today reports:

Egypt’s state news agency said authorities have released a former Egyptian jihadist who returned home to clear a case of mistaken identity that confused him with a senior al-Qaeda leader.

The name of Mohammed Ibrahim Makkawi, who returned to Egypt from Pakistan on Wednesday, appears on the FBI list of most wanted terrorists as an alias for the senior al-Qaeda figure known as Saif al-Adel. He’s an Egyptian indicted by the United States for his alleged role in the Aug. 7, 1998, bombings of U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya that killed 224 people.

Makkawi was cleared on Thursday and freed by Egypt’s general prosecutor, who said Makkawi is not wanted, MENA said.

If this is in fact a case of mistaken identity, then someone must be breathing a sigh of relief in the Obama administration. After all, what exactly would they have done if Egypt had in fact arrested al Qaeda’s third in command?

If the real Saif al-Adel was located by U.S. intelligence in Pakistan, no doubt a Predator or Reaper drone would have been dispatched to vaporize him. We don’t capture high value terrorists alive any more. But what if a nation like Egypt arrested a high-value terrorist like al-Adel alive before we had a chance to kill him with a drone?

First, we’d have to actually get Egypt to hand him over. Considering how hard it has been to convince the Egyptians to allow American democracy workers to come home, getting them to hand over a high-value terrorist might have been a challenge.

But before we could demand his handover, we’d have to have somewhere to take him. The CIA black sites are closed and Guantanamo is not taking any new guests. As Vice Admiral William McRaven, head of U.S. Special Operations Command, has testified, the Obama administration has no clear plan for handling suspected terrorist leaders if they are caught alive outside a war zone. According to current U.S. policy, as described by McRaven, a terrorist like al-Adel would be taken to a U.S. Navy ship until he could be either tried in a U.S. court or transferred to the custody of an allied country. If neither option is feasible, McRaven told Congress last year, the prisoner is ultimately let go.

Presumably we would not let a terrorist like al-Adel go. In addition to his intelligence value, he is wanted for his role in the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, among other terrorist acts. Which raises a question: Would President Obama have ordered him Mirandized and sent to New York to stand trial in a civilian court? This would have been a nightmare for the president, re-igniting the fierce national debate that ensued when the administration tried to have KSM and his fellow 9/11 conspirators sent to New York to stand trial. That is the last thing Obama wants in an election year. Yet his role in a terrorist attack that killed so many Americans means it would be unacceptable to let the Egyptians keep him. The White House would have to take possession of him at some point and figure out what to do with him.

In other words, this case of mistaken identity has spared the administration from confronting the reality that, after three years in office, it is completely unprepared to handle the live capture of a high-value al Qaeda terrorist.

Was Moscow’s Syria veto good strategy?

By Daniel Vajdic

February 29, 2012, 10:12 am

A recent Moscow Times op-ed tries to explain Russia’s obstinate defense of the Assad regime in Syria. According to Peter Rutland of Wesleyan University and Nadiya Kravets of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, the Kremlin’s objectives extend beyond the “narrow self-interest of the Russian defense industry” and “its only warm-water naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus.” Here’s their argument:

From Moscow’s point of view, the Syrian veto makes perfect sense, given that a consistent goal of Russian diplomacy over the past decade has been the quest for recognition as a leading power.

By blocking the Syrian resolution, Moscow was simply sending a signal to the international community that it is a power that should be reckoned with — and one whose views must be taken into account. In the short term, Russia does not stand to gain anything specific from this action. But in the long term, it builds credibility for Russia as a leading power.

In one sense, the tactic has worked. Russia got the world’s attention at little or no cost to itself.

Hmmm. And how, exactly, will Russia assume its role as a “leading power” without any partners—let alone allies—in the Middle East? Its Syria policy has alienated nearly every country in the Arab world. There are even calls to boycott Russia’s already meager exports to the region. I’d hardly consider the Kremlin’s isolated support for Assad a cost-free strategy.

What does this headline mean to you? “U.S. Agencies See No Move by Iran to Build a Bomb.”

It has that “what, me worry?” Mad Magazine quality, but it comes from the New York Times, which is striving mightily to assure us that yes, Iran is developing a serious enrichment capacity; sure, they are stonewalling the IAEA; yup, they’re moving ahead quickly to conceal and accelerate what appears to be a military program, but nonetheless, there is, in the words of our estimable director of national intelligence, “no evidence that [Iran] had made a decision on making a concerted push to build a weapon.”

That may be. But who cares? If Iran can build a nuclear weapon, then do we really care whether it has? Once the requisite fissile materials and the design for a warhead and the preliminary testing (not necessarily requiring a detonation) have taken place, aren’t the two the same, plus or minus a couple of weeks?

In the eyes of the intelligence community, which believes it committed an act worthy of decades of self abnegation in “justifying” the Iraq war, the evidence that Iran is fashioning a weapon will be a mushroom cloud. Of course, this is par for the course for the IC, which missed a planned Indian detonation, a Pakistani detonation, the North Korean uranium enrichment program, 9/11 and… well, a lot of stuff. But dammit, they got Iraq wrong.

There should be a lesson in this. Caution must be a watchword, to be sure. But there’s another, more important lesson for Iran. Saddam Hussein was deposed in the end, not because he HAD a WMD program, but because he wanted the pieces in place to have one, and wanted the world to suspect he might. The fancy NYT calls that “strategic ambiguity” and their sources suspect that Iran might want it. Here’s the right answer for Iran: If you want us, the EU, the GCC, and Israel to THINK you have a weapon, they are going to act as if you have a weapon. And the consequences will be the same. Take no solace from the Times.

Iran has called Israel a “one bomb state,” meaning one nuclear bomb could effectively end the existence of the tiny, New Jersey-sized nation. Israel has a population of 7.8 million people. Some 42 percent of the population live in the Tel Aviv metro area. Over at io9, there was a story about a website called Nukemap, which, using Google Maps, allows you to see what would happen if different-sized nuclear weapons exploded over a particular city. This is what would happen if a 45 kiloton nuke, roughly the size of the kind of weapon Pakistan has, exploded in Tel Aviv :

Terrifying.

Is Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei a graduate of the Patrice Lumumba People’s Friendship University in Moscow? Did the KGB recruit Khamenei as a spy in the 1960’s? Is Soviet indoctrination and ideological training to blame for Khamenei’s hatred of the United States?

The Persian blogosphere is boiling over with speculations about Khamenei’s alleged Soviet connections.

The affair started Wednesday, as Iranian bloggers discovered Russia Today’s February 5, 2010 report on the 50th anniversary of the People’s Friendship University in Moscow, in which Khamenei is mentioned among the university’s “most notable graduates.” A claim also appears on Russia Today’s website, although the reference is made to “Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khomeini,” an obvious mistake. Subsequently, Iranian bloggers identified other Russian sources making the very same claim: The November 25, 2003 issue of Kommersant presents Khamenei as a People’s Friendship University graduate.

Khamenei’s official biography does not make any reference to the People’s Friendship University. This may reflect the truth and Khamenei may not have received any education in the Soviet Union. However, should Khamenei be a People’s Friendship University graduate, he has very strong motives to keep it a secret: Admitting university studies in the “Godless” Soviet Union would not only deal a serious blow to Khamenei’s shaky religious credentials, it would also expose Khamenei to allegations of being recruited by the KGB in the 1960’s, as so many Lumumba grads were.

It is not easy to assess the claims about Khamenei’s past, particularly because the Russian sources do not mention the year of his graduation, which leaves us at the mercy of less reliable sources.

According to Khamenei’s official biography, he travelled to Iraq in 1957 to study at the Theological Seminary in Najaf. Since the People’s Friendship University was first established in 1960, the young Khamenei could not have used his journey to Iraq as a cover for his studies in the Soviet Union. But according to his official biography, Khamenei spent a “clandestine life” in Tehran in the year 1345 [March 21, 1966 – March 21, 1967] after which he was arrested by the police and imprisoned. Did the 28-year-old Khamenei spend a year living a clandestine life in Moscow rather than in Tehran? Was Khamenei arrested because Iran’s pre-revolution secret service, the SAVAK, had found out about Khamenei’s visit to Moscow?

SAVAK documents published by Iran’s Liberation Army (founded in Paris after the 1979 revolution by General Bahram Aryana) may provide other interesting insights into Khamenei’s alleged Soviet connection, but this author has not yet had the opportunity to study those files.

Khamenei may or may not have been a graduate of the People’s Friendship University in Moscow; and he may or may not have been recruited by the KGB in the 1960’s. What no one can deny is that fact that the Islamic Republic, which prides itself in pursuing an independent foreign policy based on the principle of “Neither East, Nor West – Islamic Republic,” has in reality always tilted more towards East. It can also not be denied that under Khamenei’s leadership, the diplomatically isolated Iran has become more and more dependent on Russia and China. Historians will judge if degeneration of Iran into a Russian/Chinese protectorate is by Khamenei’s design … or due to the general incompetence of the Islamic Republic’s leaders.

AQI making inroads … in Syria

By Daniel DePetris

February 16, 2012, 8:22 am

As the United States and its allies attempt to tighten the screws on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is eager to take advantage of the conflict.

Apart from a few mass casualty attacks on Iraqi Shia pilgrims, AQI has been largely absent from media coverage—at least compared to six years ago, when the terror group captured headlines nearly every day. Yet a degraded terrorist organization does not mean a defeated one, as Iraq’s Shia community can attest. Now it appears Al Qaeda’s associates in Iraq are trying to branch out into neighboring Syria, where the continuing conflict makes fertile ground for an Al Qaeda franchise.

According to several U.S. intelligence analysts who recently spoke to McClatchy, AQI commanders—with the blessing of Ayman al-Zawahiri himself—are making a desperate attempt to take advantage of Syria’s internal unrest by infiltrating the opposition and turning the conflict into another front in the global jihad.

Iraq’s deputy interior minister, Adnan al-Assadi, supported this claim with his own assessment in AFP. “We have intelligence information that a number of Iraqi jihadists went to Syria.”

All of these remarks, while not incontrovertible evidence, should nevertheless be taken seriously, for Al Qaeda continues to prove that it can be versatile and adaptive when backed into a corner. Just ask the interim leaders of Yemen and Libya, where the organization is either consolidating its control over territory (Yemen) or is seeking to influence the post-conflict transition (Libya).

With Ayman al-Zawahiri’s latest announcement of support for the anti-Assad opposition, we may very well be witnessing yet another attempt by Al Qaeda to exploit a significant chapter of Arab history for its own purposes.

Daniel R. DePetris is an intern in foreign and defense policy at AEI.

Earlier this month, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper told Congress that “Iranian officials” at the highest levels “are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States….” The next logical question is, “What is that hostile regime doing with the support of its trusted allies very close to our borders?”

Tomorrow morning, Senator Bob Menendez (D-New Jersey) will initiate an inquiry into Iran’s activities in Latin America at a 10a.m. hearing of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I am honored to have the opportunity to share my views on this troubling phenomenon and to make recommendations on an appropriate response. My observations are based on AEI’s ongoing project to monitor and expose Iran’s dramatic push into our neighborhood during the last seven years.

My testimony will review some startling findings about the clandestine network that Iran is building in Latin America with the support of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chávez, which represents a clear and present danger to U.S. security and interests. By aiding Iran’s evasion of international sanctions and search for uranium, Chávez and other regional despots are abetting Teheran’s rogue nuclear program. And wherever Iran goes, Hezbollah is not far behind. I will expose the growing presence of two terrorist networks—one a home-grown Venezuelan clan and another cultivated by a notorious agent of Iran’s Qods Force—that proselytize, fund-raise, recruit, and train operatives on behalf of Iran and Hezbollah in many countries in the Americas.

The dangerous activities of Iran and Hezbollah so near our borders demand a whole-of-government strategy, beginning with an inter-agency review to understand and assess the transnational, multifaceted nature of the problem; educate friendly governments; and insist on inspection of suspicious operations and military compounds. Our government must be prepared to implement effective measures—unilaterally and with willing partners—to disrupt and dismantle illicit operations and neutralize unacceptable threats.

I’ve just returned from Bahrain, the tiny island Arab kingdom in the Persian Gulf, which for 40 years has hosted a U.S. naval facility that, for more than 15 years, has also been the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters.

As Bahrain’s political unrest reaches a boiling point, the U.S. Fifth Fleet increasingly finds itself a symbolic hostage in a struggle. Sectarian grievances in Bahrain are long, and often legitimate. While the U.S. Navy does not involve itself in local politics, it nevertheless has become a symbol of the close generational relationship between the Bahraini monarchy and the White House.

Officially, there is no consensus among the opposition regarding the future of the U.S. presence. Mutual distrust is high, though. When visiting the United States, many opposition representatives reassure that they seek no change in the status of the U.S.-Bahraini relationship; Iranian news outlets have, however, cited some of the same figures saying the opposite.

The Bahraini uprising is not sponsored by Iran, but there is no doubt that the Iranian government will try to hijack it for Tehran’s own aims and will use its domination of the airwaves to incite the Bahraini public against the American naval presence. The widespread perception that Obama’s withdrawal is equivalent to defeat in Iraq underscores the belief that, with enough pressure, the Americans will flee.

The United States picks no side in the broader Sunni-Shi‘ite divide, although many diplomats and military officers retain bias against Shi‘ites, falsely assuming Arab Shi‘ites represent Iranian Fifth Columnists. This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy, as Shi‘ites, facing Western abandonment, feel they have no choice but to accept Iranian protection. Nothing did more to drive Iraqi Shi‘ites into Iranian hands than the support by career diplomats and General David Petraeus for re-Baathification.

Self-fulfilling prophecies cut both ways. As the opposition seeks to leverage American interests to their advantage, they say that the longer the United States sits on the fence in Bahrain, the less likely any new Bahraini government will be to acquiesce to the continuation of the U.S. military presence. Realistically, however, the United States will not turn against Bahrain’s ruling family. To do so would destabilize other Gulf Cooperation Council states, and demonstrate that there is no reward for the ruling family’s long friendship.

As the situation climaxes, both sides should consider the road not taken. Had successive U.S. administrations pressured more proactively for reform, the scenarios for American national security in Bahrain would not be so stark. At the same time, should the Bahraini Shi‘ite opposition commit to continue the American presence, they could repair more than three decades of stereotypes and mistrust in American policy circles.

The Washington Post reports that U.S. intelligence officials have concluded that Iran has “crossed a threshold” in its thinking that could lead it to carry out terrorist attacks against the American homeland:

An assessment by U.S. spy agencies concludes that Iran is prepared to launch terrorist attacks inside the United States, highlighting new risks as the Obama administration escalates pressure on Tehran to halt its alleged pursuit of an atomic bomb.

In congressional testimony Tuesday, U.S. intelligence officials indicated that Iran has crossed a threshold in its adversarial relationship with the United States. While Iran has long been linked to attacks on American targets overseas, U.S. officials said they see troubling significance in Tehran’s alleged role in a plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington last year.

U.S. officials said they have seen no intelligence to indicate that Iran is actively plotting attacks on U.S. soil. But Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. said the thwarted plot “shows that some Iranian officials — probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — have changed their calculus and are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States in response to real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime.”

Iran has long used Hezbollah as a terrorist proxy. But as I noted here yesterday, a disturbing new article in Foreign Affairs by Seth Jones suggests another proxy with whom Iran might collaborate: al Qaeda.

Jones documents how Iran currently provides al Qaeda with its only safe haven out of reach of U.S. drones, and permits senior al Qaeda leaders to “fundraise, communicate with al Qaeda central in Pakistan and other affiliates, and funnel foreign fighters through Iran.” He notes that “Iran appears willing to expand its limited relationship with al Qaeda,” and that in response to a pre-emptive strike against its nuclear program, Tehran “could support an al Qaeda attack against the United States or one of its allies, although the regime would surely attempt to hide its role in any plotting.”

Clearly, Iran is attempting to deter American or Israeli military action by sending signals that it might respond with a terrorist attack on our soil. Yet if Iran is willing to blackmail America today with the threat of a terrorist attack, imagine the kind of blackmail the regime would be capable of once it obtains a nuclear weapon. And if Iran is already providing safe haven and limited support for al Qaeda today, before it possesses a nuclear deterrent, imagine the support Tehran would be willing to provide al Qaeda once it has the security of a nuclear umbrella.

There are clearly serious risks to action when it comes to Iran’s nuclear program—but the risks of inaction could prove far greater.

Sadanand Dhume

Expanding the American Kosher Deli

By Sadanand Dhume

January 31, 2012, 10:04 am

Yesterday marked the 20th anniversary of the establishment of full diplomatic relations between India and Israel.

The event was a watershed for both countries. For Israel—which also established ties with China the same year—it symbolized a decisive end to widespread isolation in Asia and the developing world. For India, whose socialism and non-alignment tilted it firmly toward the Palestinians for more than four decades, it marked a step toward a new kind of foreign policy: one marked less by anti-Western speechifying and abstract moralizing, and more by the pursuit of its own national interest.

Since then, the two countries have developed a curious relationship. On the one hand, India—at least under the left-leaning Congress Party—continues to pay (excessive) lip service to the Palestinian cause. On the other hand, Jerusalem has emerged as one of New Delhi’s most trusted partners on counter-terrorism, border security, and advanced weapons purchases. Agriculture is another large area of co-operation, indeed the only one both country’s officials tend to speak of expansively. (Almost everything I know about drip irrigation, I owe to Israeli diplomats expounding on the topic at length.)

For the United States, growing ties between India and Israel offer an opportunity. Step aside from a small and aging cohort of New Delhi intellectuals banging on about settlements and the right of return, and you find a deep admiration for the Jewish state among educated Indians. A strong India-Israel relationship binds India more closely with the democratic West. Perhaps it’s time to propose a Middle Eastern equivalent of the U.S.-India-Japan trilateral dialogue. There’s already a name for it: the American Kosher Deli.

Last March, when it was just turning spring in Washington, the visiting foreign minister of Morocco, Taieb Fassi Fihri, offered this caution about the changes that were sweeping through the Arab world: “the Arab spring is here,” he said, “but we are not sure that the summer—Arab summer” will follow. Maybe “we will go directly [in some places] to a dark winter, like . . in Iran in 1979.”

Already the climate in the Arab world has turned much colder and the skies are darker. Some people are now saying—with a kind of grim satisfaction—“we told you so.” But told us what? That these changes might lead to bad things and we should stop them? The notion of an “Arab spring” may have conveyed excessive optimism, but the notion of stopping it would be like trying to stop the tides. Regimes that depend on their people’s fear to survive cannot last once that wall of fear is broken, except by an even deeper descent into violence and terror.

The apparent stability of those dictatorships was illusory and their demise was inevitable. Moreover, the old order in the Arab world was not such a great thing, even by the standard of what’s good for the United States, much less for the people of those countries. What is to be lamented is that the preceding calm was not used to develop civil society organizations, political parties, and legal institutions to prepare the way for a more open political system. It is not an accident that Arabs who are now free to vote are voting in large numbers for Islamist political parties, the ones that had been best able to survive the repression of the dictators.

If the images of people risking their lives in the name of freedom inspired too much optimism, there is a danger now of too much pessimism. The process still has a long way to run before we will have any clear idea of the eventual outcome and, indeed, the outcomes are likely to differ widely from country to country. The term “Arab Awakening” or even “Arab Uprising” might better convey the sweep and uncertainty of what is happening.

Three years ago, when President Obama spoke at Cairo University, he was applauded for the mere announcement that he would discuss democracy and women’s rights, the only two of seven issues to be so welcomed. Even people who are critical of the United States often aspire to the values that we stand for. At a time when so much is in flux in the Arab world, it is important for the United States to speak up strongly in support of democracy, religious freedom, women’s rights, and the rule of law.

This blog is a part of an Enterprise symposium, “Egyptian Revolution: One Year Later.”

This week marks the one-year anniversary of the protests in Egypt. Since that time, NATO forces have intervened in Libya and the American military has largely withdrawn from Iraq. Foreign affairs have received little attention from both the Republican presidential candidates and pollsters alike. But the few polls released since the Egyptian protests show that events in Egypt and the Arab world have not altered Americans’ views on foreign intervention.

Americans are reluctant to intervene internationally. Only 15 percent said the United States should try to change dictatorships into democracies (November, CBS). When asked if the United States should use military force to stop governments from attacking their own citizens, equal numbers (39 percent) said the United States should and should not.

These views may explain why the military intervention in Libya is viewed so negatively. A plurality (49 percent) told CBS pollsters in November that the United States should have stayed out of military involvement in Libya. Only 37 percent said it was the right thing to do. Surprisingly, this feeling stretched across partisan divides.

At the same time, large numbers of Americans conclude that some threats warrant military intervention. When asked if the United States should initiate military action “if Iran continues with its nuclear research and is close to developing a nuclear weapon,” 54 percent agreed (November, CBS). Thirty-eight percent disagreed. Similarly, 65 percent think the United States should take military action against countries where terrorists are hiding. Twenty-two percent disapprove.

Part of the reason Americans remain reluctant to intervene internationally rests with the low priority they give to foreign affairs as a national concern. Pew Research Center notes that over the past five years, terrorism has dropped 11 points as a “top priority” for Congress and the president. Domestic affairs and the economy remain the national priority by a large margin. But Americans have not become isolationist in the wake of the Arab Spring. They remain willing to take action as necessary.

This blog is a part of an Enterprise symposium, “Egyptian Revolution: One Year Later.

Michael Rubin

Twittering Turkey talk

By Michael Rubin

January 18, 2012, 2:30 pm

Over at his twitter feed, Namik Tan, Turkey’s ambassador to the United States, has been on a roll condemning Texas Governor Rick Perry for his criticisms of Turkey. Yet, while Ambassador Tan has chastised Governor Perry for his own inaccuracies, Tan may want to look in a mirror:

Namik Tan: “Criticism of Turkey at #GOP debate was ill advised. Turkey is a secular democracy, NATO member and staunch U.S. ally.”

Reality:

(1)    The Pew Global Altitudes Survey finds Turkey to be the most anti-American country surveyed. Hardly a staunch ally.

(2)    Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has called secularism “a big fat lie” and has worked to promote Islamism.

Namik Tan: I hope this episode leads to a better informed foreign policy debate, where allies are treated with respect not disdain.

Reality:

(1)    Well, beyond his government’s anti-American incitement (for example, its endorsement of the anti-American polemic “Valley of the Wolves”), while ambassador to Israel, Tan also described Israel as an ally. Here’s what Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had to say about that.

Turkey’s politics are chaotic. Namik Tan is closer to President Abdullah Gül than Prime Minister Erdoğan, and so may feel at these moments that he has to prove himself with self-righteous chest-thumping. Nevertheless, perhaps it is time for the Turkish embassy to stop treating its audience with disdain and to instead recognize that Turkey can only coast on its reputation as an ally for so long before reality catches up in the public perception.

Michael Rubin

Was Perry wrong on Turkey?

By Michael Rubin

January 17, 2012, 12:07 pm

Governor Rick Perry is catching flack for calling Turkey’s leadership “Islamic terrorists.” While I would not go so far as Governor Perry, had he simply called Prime Minister Erdoğan an enabler for Islamic terrorists, he would be 100 percent correct.

I’ve previous charted Turkey’s path from ally to adversary. But here are a couple factoids which Perry might know, but many journalists and analysts may not:

Prime Minister Erdoğan endorsed an Al Qaeda financier.

Turkey also helped supply Al Qaeda in Iraq.

Erdoğan had repeatedly embraced Hamas and acted to supply it.

Under Erdoğan’s watch, the murder rate of women in Turkey has increased 1,400 percent.

Under Turkey’s Islamist government, press freedom has plummeted.

Governor Perry may not have broad foreign policy expertise, but sometimes it’s useful to call a toad a toad, or at least a supporter of toads.

When Iran threatened last month to close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States and Europe adopted sanctions that largely halted Iranian oil exports, there was a plethora of commentary that pointed in the direction that any closing would be short-lived, if at all. Such assessments are based on the fact that U.S. naval and air power is vastly superior to anything the Iranians can put into action.

But note the recent interview with Rear Admiral James Murdoch in Defense News. Murdoch, who oversees the development and acquisition of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships, gives a brutally honest assessment of the current state of the Navy’s 14 mine countermeasure ships: they are old, parts are hard to find, and the reliability of the mine-killer system they use “is not what I would like. The fleet’s very unhappy with it”—the “fleet” in this instance being the Fifth Fleet, which is based in Bahrain and would have responsibility for keeping the Persian Gulf clear of mines. To help address these problems, the Navy has on “urgent” order new sonar equipment and newer, British-built, mine “neutralization” systems but, with the exception of one of the latter, nothing is now in place.

Arguably, the picture being painted by most analysts of a potential conflict in the Gulf is a bit too rosy. From the Iranians’ experience in the “tanker wars” of the 1980s, they believe they learned that their strategy was sound but the military tools they had on hand to implement it were insufficient. As a result, they have spent considerable time and effort acquiring large numbers of modern mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, road-mobile launchers, and fast patrol boats; they have also deployed mini-submarines and exercised “swarming” targets in the Gulf with large numbers of missile-carrying small vessels. In brief, Iran has developed a maritime “guerrilla” force in the Persian Gulf that may not be as easily dispensed with as is sometimes suggested. While there is little doubt that the U.S. military would prevail in any conflict, the cost for doing so might be higher than expected.

Yesterday, Fereydoun Abbasi Davani, Iran Atomic Energy Organization director, complained about Iranian nuclear scientists who are not willing to participate in Iran’s nuclear program, fearing to compromise their “international contacts.” Abbasi Davani even likened the scientists with “deserters” during the war with Iraq.

Earlier today, Iran’s nuclear scientists got another reason to hesitate before contributing to the controversial nuclear program: Mostafa Ahmadi-Roshan, commerce director at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, was assassinated in Tehran as a motorcyclist attached a magnetic bomb on the 32-year-old nuclear scientist’s vehicle, killing Ahmadi-Roshan and wounding two unnamed passengers in the car.

According to Safar-Ali Baratlou, Tehran province security head, the assassination of Ahmadi-Roshan followed the same method as earlier attempts on the lives of Iran’s nuclear scientists. Fereydoun Abbasi Davani, and Majid Shahriari were targeted in a similar way on November 29, 2010. Abbasi Davani survived and was subsequently appointed Iran Atomic Energy Organization director, while Shahriari died in the hospital. Masoud Ali-Mohammadi, another nuclear scientist, was killed by a remote-controlled bomb as he was leaving home for work on January 10, 2010.

No one has claimed responsibility for the assassination, but First Vice President Mohammad-Reza Rahimi has accused “agents of arrogance [the United States] and [its] dependent powers,” and “agents of the Zionist regime” of perpetrating the attack. During today’s parliamentary session, members of the Majles chanted “Death to America,” “Death to Israel,” and “Death to the Hypocrite [reference to the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization]” in response to the assassination. In contrast, Iranian authorities have systematically denied Israeli involvement in acts of sabotage against the Revolutionary Guards’ missile base in Western Tehran, which led to a huge blast in November 2011.

Systematic assassination of nuclear scientists and acts of sabotage against the Revolutionary Guards’ facilities may retard Iran’s nuclear program, but more importantly it communicates a clear message to the leaders of the Islamic Republic and the Iranian population alike: The government of the Islamic Republic, which boasts of its desire to wipe Israel off the map, is not even capable of guaranteeing the security of Iran’s nuclear scientists on the streets of Tehran, or securing the missile bases of the Revolutionary Guards, let alone annihilating Israel. If the leaders of the Islamic Republic understand this message, the Iranian scientists would not have died in vain. If not, the Islamic Republic is to blame for yet another victim in Tehran.

Dany has an important piece in USA Today explaining why the United States got out of Iraq too soon. She writes:

[T]he future of Iraq, which seemed clear after our post-surge military victory, was again rendered uncertain by the premature departure of American forces. Institutions like the military were not fully formed, territorial disputes were not resolved, and key questions relating to oil were up in the air. In such circumstances, opposing groups move to maximize their own power for the inevitable struggle.

As if to underscore her point, the same day her piece came out al Qaeda publicly took credit for the wave of bombings that ripped through markets, cafes, and government buildings in Baghdad last week and killed 69 people—the first major terrorist attacks following the U.S. departure. It was a clear statement to the Iraqi people and the world that, while the United States may have retreated from Iraq, al Qaeda has not.

In a statement, the Islamic State of Iraq (al Qaeda’s political front) called the bombings a “series of special invasions … to support the weak Sunnis in the prisons of the apostates and to retaliate for the captives who were executed by the Safavid [Persian or Iranian] government” of Prime Minister Maliki.

This renewed al Qaeda violence is an ominous sign. During the surge, Sunnis abandoned the insurgency in droves, turned on al Qaeda, and joined with America to drive the terrorists out of the sanctuaries they had established in Anbar and other regions. After the surge succeeded in achieving these goals, the continued U.S. military presence—and the security umbrella it provided—allowed Sunnis to make peace with the new political order in Iraq. Now that the Obama administration has withdrawn all U.S. forces and the security umbrella they provided, our Sunni allies are in a vulnerable position. The Maliki government is taking advantage of the U.S. withdrawal to launch a sectarian crackdown on its Sunni opposition—and with its attacks last week it is clear that al Qaeda is positioning itself to benefit from this confluence of events.

Just as al Qaeda’s repression drove the Sunni tribes into America’s arms in 2006, Maliki’s repression could drive them back into al Qaeda’s arms in 2012. We could see a revival of the insurgency and a return to the sectarian bloodshed that American troops quelled at such great cost—and al Qaeda will then use the ensuing chaos to re-establish the safe havens we took from them five years ago. If that happens, then Obama’s decision to reject his commanders’ advice and withdraw all U.S. forces will go from a disaster to a debacle.

While the folks at Think Progress deny the growing links between Iran and al Qaeda, more evidence of the terror network’s collaboration with the regime in Tehran emerged just before Christmas when the State and Treasury Departments put out a bounty for an al Qaeda leader operating in Iran under a secret agreement with Iran.

As I pointed out earlier this month, Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil was designated by the Treasury Department earlier this year as the leader of an al Qaeda network operating in Iran with the help and protection of the Iranian regime. Now, Josh Rogin at The Cable reports that the U.S. government has offered $10 million through the Rewards for Justice program for information leading to the death or capture of Khalil (a.k.a. Yasin al-Suri):

According to two U.S. officials who briefed reporters today, [Suri] stands at the center of the link between the Iranian government and al Qaeda… “From his sanctuary inside Iran, he has moved terrorist recruits through Iran to al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He has also arranged for the release of al Qaeda operatives from Iranian prisons and their transfer to Pakistan. And he has funneled significant amounts of money through Iran to AQ leadership in Afghanistan and Iraq,” said Robert A. Hartung, assistant director for threat investigations and analysis at State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security…. “We have reliable information indicating that there is an agreement between the Iranian government and this al Qaeda network [led by Suri],” said Eytan Fisch, Treasury’s assistant director of terrorism and financial intelligence.

This is the second time in the past six months that the Obama administration has taken action to highlight the links between al Qaeda and Iran. And it comes on the heels of a federal court ruling earlier this month which found that Iran was responsible for the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that the bombings would not have been possible without “direct assistance” from Tehran. “The government of Iran,” Judge John D. Bates wrote in his 45-page decision, “aided, abetted, and conspired with Hezbollah, Osama Bin Laden, and al Qaeda to launch large-scale bombing attacks against the United States by utilizing the sophisticated delivery mechanism of powerful suicide truck bombs…. Prior to their meetings with Iranian officials and agents Bin Laden and al Qaeda did not possess the technical expertise required to carry out the embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.”

Considering the fact that the Shiite regime in Tehran and the Sunni terrorist network have already collaborated to attack the United States, their growing cooperation is an ominous sign. If Iran was willing to give al Qaeda the means to destroy two American embassies, what kind of assistance might a nuclear Iran be willing to provide them?

Yemen’s Spring: It’s still a mess

By Katherine Zimmerman

December 23, 2011, 10:25 am

The Arab Spring in Yemen has yet to deliver democracy and may have left the country worse for the wear, especially in the short term. Yes, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh finally signed a transition deal on November 23. And yes, Yemen’s opposition parties have gained some power in the new government. There is also a recognition that popular grievances voiced for years by southerners, among others, are legitimate and need to be addressed. A new Yemeni constitution—yet to be drafted—could institutionalize the observance of basic rights. Further, a newly established military committee took action to demilitarize the country’s cities and to move military assets out of civilian areas.

A deeper look at the situation, however, should reveal how shallow these successes run. The transition deal, pushed forward by Gulf states (except Qatar) and backed by the international community, rings hollow despite some potential for bringing long-term stability. Saleh has yet to abdicate full presidential authority to his deputy. He must do so today, a full 30 days after the signing ceremony. The Saleh regime, including his family members, remains deeply entrenched in the Yemeni government. The shuffling of political figures in the government—including opposition members—does not truly establish a new democratic government. Diplomats can point to the much-lauded transition deal as progress in Yemen, but on-the-ground conditions in the country contradict that progress.

Yemen’s multitude of problems has only been exacerbated by months of unrest. The UN now predicts that 4 million people in Yemen will require significant humanitarian assistance in 2012 and that humanitarian conditions will continue to deteriorate over the course of the next year. This dire prediction rests atop a rapid depletion of natural resources in the country, especially oil and water, and high levels of unemployment. The Yemeni state itself has been severely weakened and there are areas completely outside of the state’s control. These include parts of north Yemen that had quietly been carved off by al Houthi rebels over the past ten months and territory in south Yemen that was seized by al Qaeda-linked militants. Al Qaeda’s franchise in Yemen, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, now has a much larger safe haven in the country than it did at the start of 2011.

The next few months are critical and, like much of the rest of the region, in Yemen the outcome is completely up in the air. The potential to affect the United States is high, but the White House has evinced indifference. The Middle East was so 2011.

Just days after U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq, a series of attacks in Baghdad have raised doubts about the security of the country, while political upheaval threatens to undermine its government. AEI’s vice president for foreign and defense policy studies, Danielle Pletka, shared some questions with U.S. Senator John McCain, ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, regarding President Barack Obama’s decision to draw down all U.S. troops from Iraq, and the Iranian challenge in the region. This is the second of a two-part interview. (Part one can be found here.)

How do you think President Obama’s decision to depart Iraq will affect our ability to counter the Iranian challenge in the region?

It will only make that challenge harder. We have diminished our influence in Iraq, and the worst elements of the Iranian regime are now seeking to fill that vacuum. Polls consistently show that Iraqis resent the Iranian government’s meddling in their internal affairs and have no desire for Iran to dominate their country. But as we have seen in the past, if Iraqis feel they do not have a strong counterweight to Iran’s ruthless and violent activities, they will make what they feel are the necessary accommodations to survive. I fear that dynamic has only been exacerbated by the full withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. Furthermore, the president’s announcement of a premature drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, which our military commanders have said was more aggressive than they had wanted, only adds to the perception that U.S. power is weakening and withdrawing in the broader Middle East. The resulting dynamic will only embolden the Iranian regime and diminish our ability to effectively counter its destabilizing actions.

Do you believe there will be repercussions in Afghanistan from the decision to depart Iraq?

Absolutely. Afghans have told me how unsettled they are about the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. They have told me that there is a perception in Afghanistan that if the United States is willing to pull all of its troops out of Iraq, then surely it will do the same in Afghanistan. If I were President Karzai, or another Afghan leader, I would have second thoughts about any promises and commitments made by this administration to keep U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014. I think it only reinforces President Karzai’s instincts to hedge his bets on the United States and to search for the support he needs for his country from nearby neighbors that are far less friendly to U.S. interests. I also think the withdrawal from Iraq is a source of encouragement for our enemies in Afghanistan. It can only add to their belief that, if they just hang on and keep fighting, eventually U.S. forces will leave.

Many critics of the war stress the costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom in blood and treasure. You understand all too well the heavy cost of war, the toll on families, the sacrifice of our troops. How can we judge whether the war was worth the cost?

The war in Iraq has already accomplished worthy goals. Our troops removed one of the most horrific dictators in history—a man who started regional wars, had a history of developing destabilizing weapons, tortured and oppressed the Iraqi people for decades, and murdered hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. The world is a better place now that the Saddam Hussein regime is gone, and our troops and their families can rightfully be proud in that accomplishment.

The greater question is what kind of country will Iraq ultimately become, and the prospect of a decent outcome has now been placed at unnecessary risk because of the full withdrawal of U.S. troops. I fear that General Jack Keane is right when he said, “We won the war in Iraq, and we are now losing the peace.” All the gains we have achieved in Iraq are now at risk, and the enormous expenditure of blood and treasure that those gains entailed are now in jeopardy of being viewed by history as sacrifices made in vain.

Just days after U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq, a series of attacks in Baghdad have raised doubts about the security of the country, while political upheaval threatens to undermine its government. AEI’s vice president for foreign and defense policy studies, Danielle Pletka, shared some questions with U.S. Senator John McCain, ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, regarding President Barack Obama’s decision to draw down all U.S. troops from Iraq, and the Iranian challenge in the region. This is the first of a two-part interview.

Last week, after President Obama heralded the departure of all U.S. troops from Iraq, you said: “I believe that history will judge this president’s leadership with the scorn and disdain it deserves.”  What should President Obama have done in Iraq, and how might different actions have affected the course of events on the ground?

I do not believe the president ever brought the full weight of his office to bear in pushing for a residual presence of U.S. forces in Iraq. For the past five years, the president has been completely consistent about his position on Iraq. As a U.S. senator, he was adamantly opposed to the war, he said repeatedly that the surge was a mistake and a failure, and he constantly pledged to withdraw all U.S. troops at the earliest possible date. So perhaps it should not have come as a surprise that he has now done exactly what he said he would do all along. Perhaps it should also not come as a surprise that the White House is now putting out glossy literature proclaiming that the president has fulfilled his campaign promise to withdraw from Iraq. That is the larger political context in which the events of the past year have unfolded, and it is impossible to divorce the final outcome from it.

Had the president wanted to keep troops in Iraq, as both U.S. and Iraqi military commanders recommended, he would have pushed earlier and more directly for what was in our national security interest, rather than adopting the hands-off approach that left our diplomatic and military leaders in Iraq unable to begin an effective negotiation, let alone conclude one. I spoke with all of the leaders of Iraq’s major political blocs during repeated visits to the country, and all of them said privately that some presence of U.S. troops should remain in the country. But when Iraqi leaders asked the United States how many troops it wanted to keep in Iraq, and what tasks those troops might perform, the White House dragged its feet in giving them an answer. The key Iraqi political blocs gathered together in August and publicly asked to open negotiations, and again the White House response was characterized by delay. The final number they provided to the Iraqis was too low for any Iraqi politician to want to take the political risk to support it.

The reason given for why the negotiations failed was the unwillingness of the Iraqis to grant our troops the necessary legal privileges and immunities. But that was a symptom of the larger problem: the president’s unwillingness or failure to exercise the immense influence that the United States possessed in Iraq. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has said that she and the other authors of the 2008 Security Agreement always understood that it would need to be renegotiated to keep an effective presence of U.S. troops in Iraq. That could have been done. With stronger and more determined presidential leadership, we could have shaped the private understandings of Iraq’s leaders about the necessity of a residual presence of U.S. forces into a public consensus to do what was necessary to achieve it. That would not have been a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty. That would have been effective leadership.

There’s been a lot of Monday morning quarterbacking going on in the wake of last week’s casing of the colors in Baghdad and the subsequent political upheaval in Iraq. Some have suggested that accusations against Sunni Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi and the warrant for his arrest prove that we have done little more than facilitate the transition from a Sunni dictator to a Shiite in Iraq. What’s your take?

It is too soon to tell what the nature of Iraq’s political system will be. Prime Minister Maliki has consolidated an immense amount of power in his hands over the past three years. He has not implemented the Irbil Agreement on power-sharing and political inclusivity, and as the events of the past several days show, he is wielding power in an increasingly authoritarian manner. Furthermore, I do not think it is merely a coincidence that the prime minister made these moves on the day that the last U.S. troops left the country. And the fact that he did so immediately after returning from meetings in the Oval Office makes the U.S. government appear complicit.

Despite the recent crisis, however, Iraq still possesses a democratic system. It still has the democratic laws and procedures for Iraq’s elected leaders to hold the Prime Minister accountable or, in the extreme, to bring a vote of no-confidence against his government. I believe a majority of Iraqis want their country to remain democratic and want their leaders to be accountable for their actions. It will be up to Iraq’s leaders to resolve this political crisis, and we must hope that they can and will do so peacefully through the political process. It will be up the United States to use what influence we still have left to support the Iraqi people and their elected representatives in a way that strengthens the integrity, inclusivity, and effectiveness of Iraq’s democratic institutions.

The hyperbole used to characterize supporters of the war in Iraq suggests that we wanted troops to stay in Iraq “forever,” that any departure would have been “too soon”; the corollary to that is that Iranian domination of Iraq is and was inevitable. When would have been the right time to leave Iraq? Or are people asking the wrong question? What would a long-term strategic partnership with Iraq have looked like?

Had U.S. and Iraqi leaders agreed to keep an effective presence of U.S. troops in Iraq, it would have been up to our respective democratic governments to determine how long they would have remained there. But the tasks that U.S. troops would have been in Iraq to perform—assisting the Iraqi Security Forces in increasing their capability to protect their airspace, to gather and fuse intelligence, and to improve their counterterrorism operations, among other missions—would not have taken forever to accomplish.

Perhaps the greatest benefit of all was the stabilizing influence that our force presence had on Iraq’s politics. The surge succeeded in ending large-scale sectarian violence and thereby opening up greater space for Iraq’s leaders to work to resolve their differences through politics, not violence. Iraqis have accomplished a great deal in that regard, but as the current crisis makes clear, they still have not resolved some of their greatest political disputes, and Iraq’s democratic institutions remain fragile. Had U.S. troops remained in the country, it would have provided added reassurance to all of Iraq’s factions that the political process was the best avenue for resolving their differences. Furthermore, it would have ensured that the United States continued to possess substantial influence to support Iraqis in reinforcing their country’s democratic development. The Obama administration did not adequately and effectively use that influence over the past three years, and now they have left Iraq in a way and at a time that has exacerbated the lingering mistrust among Iraqis. We had an important window to help Iraqis further lock in their democratic institutions and habits of behavior, at least through their next election. Had we kept some U.S. troops in Iraq, it could have been a critical part of a broader political strategy to strengthen all of the positive trends made possible by the surge.

As I have said repeatedly, the American people are not opposed to keeping U.S. troops overseas, as we have for decades in places like Germany and South Korea—so long as our troops are not taking heavy casualties for no discernible reason and with no prospect of success. That was no longer the case in Iraq. So I think Americans would have supported a presence of U.S. troops in Iraq, but that would have required the president to build support for it and explain why such a troop presence was in our national security interest.

Germany and Egypt both have populations of roughly 81 million people. But German GDP is nearly 20x higher. Why is that? Well, according to a new study, the difference is Islam and its historical rejection of complex financial instruments and systems:

By almost any available economic measure, the Middle East, China, and India were ahead of Europe one thousand years ago. Their science and technology were more advanced than in Europe, their trade flowed in higher volumes and over longer distances, and they employed more complicated financial instruments to facilitate trade. Yet as early as the 17th century Western Europe was clearly on a path to dominate much of the rest of the world economically, technologically, and militarily – eventually colonising much of the world’s land mass. Western Europe and its offshoots have dominated the world economy for centuries, and it has only been in recent decades that China and India have begun to catch up. What happened? How did such a relatively poor and unpopulated area become the world’s dominant economic force? Why didn’t economic growth occur in the rest of the world like it did in Western Europe? …

A satisfying explanation must account for some of the general features that precipitated the divergence in economic growth between Western Europe and the Middle East in the last seven centuries. Studying specific cases, however, can point us in the direction of general causes. In a recent study, I argue that studying the history of interest restrictions in Islam and Christianity is particularly useful – such laws were ubiquitous throughout much of the history of both religions, but they were eventually disbanded only in Christianity.

On the one hand, the interaction between the rise of secular authority and vast European trade networks supported further economic developments such as complex financial instruments, impersonal exchange, and the corporate form. On the other hand, the constraints faced in the Islamic world discouraged such a path – or at least, a greater shock was necessary to undermine the political and religious relationship than in Christendom. Instead, less economically beneficial institutions, such as the waqf and smaller, personal exchange networks persisted for centuries in the Islamic world.

After a post I did earlier this week on Congress caving on Central Bank of Iran sanctions, I got a grumpy call from my buds at AIPAC. No, they had not “sided with the Obama administration” as I claimed, except in the case of a couple of technical changes to the Menendez-Kirk amendment and one substantial change. But, my AIPACer added, they had helped beat back even more substantial changes the White House wanted that would have gutted the amendment even further.

Well, I’ll say I’m half sorry. Three of the changes that the administration was looking for were beaten back,  (see their proposal here),  particularly a change that would have created a category for countries that the president would claim had “closely cooperated” with U.S. sanctions on Iran (ie, in Obama’s eyes, everyone); another change that would have stricken the application of sanctions on foreign banks transacting business with the Central Bank of Iran; and finally a change that would have whittled down penalties from “financial transactions” with the CBI to financial transactions relating only to the sale or purchase of petroleum or related products. There were another few changes that were also rejected, relating to timing, that were no big deal either way.

What was the new White House language that I called a cave? Changing the amendment from a strict U.S. ban on all banks enjoying a correspondent relationship with the Central Bank of Iran to a ban or “strict conditions,” whatever the heck that means. I stand by my original criticism of that “fix” to the language: it will have the effect of gutting the provision.

Here’s how AIPAC sees it: The president has basically ignored the 2010 sanctions legislation he signed into law. If legislation forced his hand on CBI, he would have ignored that too. (Ah, the law… so flexible.) But now the president will feel duty-bound to do something about the CBI because AIPAC and the Congress cooperated so nicely on the CBI amendment. Uh huh. Good luck with that.

In a story on the pending departure of U.S. forces from Iraq, the New York Times yesterday referred to “al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the homegrown Qaeda affiliate in Iraq, which has some foreign members.” Boy, the folks at the Times are either really stubborn or really slow learners. Probably both.

Back in 2007, you may recall, opponents of the surge in Iraq—including the Times—worked overtime to spread the myth that al Qaeda in Iraq (aka Mesopotamia) was an Iraqi phenomenon independent of Osama bin Laden. They did so because, if al Qaeda in Iraq was bin Laden’s al Qaeda, then America could not accept defeat in Iraq—we had to win. But if they could convince Americans that we were not fighting bin Laden’s al Qaeda in Iraq, but rather some “homegrown” terror group, then America could pull out of Iraq and not undermine our efforts in the war on terror.

In July 2007, President Bush delivered an address in Charleston, South Carolina where he definitively put to this myth to rest. As Bush explained:

Al Qaeda in Iraq was founded by a Jordanian terrorist, not an Iraqi. His name was Abu Musab al Zarqawi.… In 2004, Zarqawi and his terrorist group formally joined al Qaeda, pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden, and he promised to “follow his orders in jihad.” Soon after, bin Laden publicly declared that Zarqawi was the “Prince of Al Qaeda in Iraq”—and instructed terrorists in Iraq to “listen to him and obey him.”…

Zarqawi was killed by U.S. forces in June 2006. He was replaced by another foreigner—an Egyptian named Abu Ayyub al-Masri. … He has collaborated with Zawahiri for more than two decades. And before 9/11, he spent time with al Qaeda in Afghanistan where he taught classes indoctrinating others in al Qaeda’s radical ideology….

According to our intelligence community, many of al Qaeda in Iraq’s other senior leaders are also foreign terrorists. They include a Syrian who is al Qaeda in Iraq’s emir in Baghdad, a Saudi who is al Qaeda in Iraq’s top spiritual and legal advisor, an Egyptian who fought in Afghanistan in the 1990s and who has met with Osama bin Laden, a Tunisian who we believe plays a key role in managing foreign fighters. Last month in Iraq, we killed a senior al Qaeda facilitator named Mehmet Yilmaz, a Turkish national who fought with al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and met with September the 11th mastermind Khalid Shaikh Muhammad, and other senior al Qaeda leaders. … Foreign terrorists also account for most of the suicide bombings in Iraq. Our military estimates that between 80 and 90 percent of suicide attacks in Iraq are carried out by foreign-born al Qaeda terrorists.

The Times wasn’t sold, declaring in their story the next day on Bush’s speech: “The Iraqi group is a homegrown Sunni Arab extremist group with some foreign operatives that has claimed a loose affiliation to Mr. bin Laden’s network, although the precise links are unclear.” Apparently, they are still at it. The Times editors should study these words President Bush delivered in Charleston carefully: “There’s a good reason they are called al Qaeda in Iraq: They are al Qaeda … in … Iraq.” Hopefully, Barack Obama has not given them a new lease on life with his precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces.

Jonah Goldberg

Marx was wrong about history

By Jonah Goldberg

December 13, 2011, 1:04 pm

It’s “first as tragedy, second as Farsi.” From Fars, an Iranian news service:

Obama Begs Iran to Give Him Back His Toy Plane

TEHRAN (FNA)- US President Obama is hoping that the Iranian government is in a Christmas mood because he has asked Tehran to send him his Christmas present back.

We are still wondering how he shamelessly asked Tehran to give the US back the stealth drone which had violated the Iranian airspace for espionage.

“We have asked for it back. We’ll see how the Iranians respond,” Obama said following a meeting at the White House with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.


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