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Archive for the ‘Middle East’ Category

AQI making inroads … in Syria

By Daniel DePetris

February 16, 2012, 8:22 am

As the United States and its allies attempt to tighten the screws on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is eager to take advantage of the conflict.

Apart from a few mass casualty attacks on Iraqi Shia pilgrims, AQI has been largely absent from media coverage—at least compared to six years ago, when the terror group captured headlines nearly every day. Yet a degraded terrorist organization does not mean a defeated one, as Iraq’s Shia community can attest. Now it appears Al Qaeda’s associates in Iraq are trying to branch out into neighboring Syria, where the continuing conflict makes fertile ground for an Al Qaeda franchise.

According to several U.S. intelligence analysts who recently spoke to McClatchy, AQI commanders—with the blessing of Ayman al-Zawahiri himself—are making a desperate attempt to take advantage of Syria’s internal unrest by infiltrating the opposition and turning the conflict into another front in the global jihad.

Iraq’s deputy interior minister, Adnan al-Assadi, supported this claim with his own assessment in AFP. “We have intelligence information that a number of Iraqi jihadists went to Syria.”

All of these remarks, while not incontrovertible evidence, should nevertheless be taken seriously, for Al Qaeda continues to prove that it can be versatile and adaptive when backed into a corner. Just ask the interim leaders of Yemen and Libya, where the organization is either consolidating its control over territory (Yemen) or is seeking to influence the post-conflict transition (Libya).

With Ayman al-Zawahiri’s latest announcement of support for the anti-Assad opposition, we may very well be witnessing yet another attempt by Al Qaeda to exploit a significant chapter of Arab history for its own purposes.

Daniel R. DePetris is an intern in foreign and defense policy at AEI.

Earlier this month, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper told Congress that “Iranian officials” at the highest levels “are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States….” The next logical question is, “What is that hostile regime doing with the support of its trusted allies very close to our borders?”

Tomorrow morning, Senator Bob Menendez (D-New Jersey) will initiate an inquiry into Iran’s activities in Latin America at a 10a.m. hearing of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I am honored to have the opportunity to share my views on this troubling phenomenon and to make recommendations on an appropriate response. My observations are based on AEI’s ongoing project to monitor and expose Iran’s dramatic push into our neighborhood during the last seven years.

My testimony will review some startling findings about the clandestine network that Iran is building in Latin America with the support of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chávez, which represents a clear and present danger to U.S. security and interests. By aiding Iran’s evasion of international sanctions and search for uranium, Chávez and other regional despots are abetting Teheran’s rogue nuclear program. And wherever Iran goes, Hezbollah is not far behind. I will expose the growing presence of two terrorist networks—one a home-grown Venezuelan clan and another cultivated by a notorious agent of Iran’s Qods Force—that proselytize, fund-raise, recruit, and train operatives on behalf of Iran and Hezbollah in many countries in the Americas.

The dangerous activities of Iran and Hezbollah so near our borders demand a whole-of-government strategy, beginning with an inter-agency review to understand and assess the transnational, multifaceted nature of the problem; educate friendly governments; and insist on inspection of suspicious operations and military compounds. Our government must be prepared to implement effective measures—unilaterally and with willing partners—to disrupt and dismantle illicit operations and neutralize unacceptable threats.

I’ve just returned from Bahrain, the tiny island Arab kingdom in the Persian Gulf, which for 40 years has hosted a U.S. naval facility that, for more than 15 years, has also been the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters.

As Bahrain’s political unrest reaches a boiling point, the U.S. Fifth Fleet increasingly finds itself a symbolic hostage in a struggle. Sectarian grievances in Bahrain are long, and often legitimate. While the U.S. Navy does not involve itself in local politics, it nevertheless has become a symbol of the close generational relationship between the Bahraini monarchy and the White House.

Officially, there is no consensus among the opposition regarding the future of the U.S. presence. Mutual distrust is high, though. When visiting the United States, many opposition representatives reassure that they seek no change in the status of the U.S.-Bahraini relationship; Iranian news outlets have, however, cited some of the same figures saying the opposite.

The Bahraini uprising is not sponsored by Iran, but there is no doubt that the Iranian government will try to hijack it for Tehran’s own aims and will use its domination of the airwaves to incite the Bahraini public against the American naval presence. The widespread perception that Obama’s withdrawal is equivalent to defeat in Iraq underscores the belief that, with enough pressure, the Americans will flee.

The United States picks no side in the broader Sunni-Shi‘ite divide, although many diplomats and military officers retain bias against Shi‘ites, falsely assuming Arab Shi‘ites represent Iranian Fifth Columnists. This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy, as Shi‘ites, facing Western abandonment, feel they have no choice but to accept Iranian protection. Nothing did more to drive Iraqi Shi‘ites into Iranian hands than the support by career diplomats and General David Petraeus for re-Baathification.

Self-fulfilling prophecies cut both ways. As the opposition seeks to leverage American interests to their advantage, they say that the longer the United States sits on the fence in Bahrain, the less likely any new Bahraini government will be to acquiesce to the continuation of the U.S. military presence. Realistically, however, the United States will not turn against Bahrain’s ruling family. To do so would destabilize other Gulf Cooperation Council states, and demonstrate that there is no reward for the ruling family’s long friendship.

As the situation climaxes, both sides should consider the road not taken. Had successive U.S. administrations pressured more proactively for reform, the scenarios for American national security in Bahrain would not be so stark. At the same time, should the Bahraini Shi‘ite opposition commit to continue the American presence, they could repair more than three decades of stereotypes and mistrust in American policy circles.

The Washington Post reports that U.S. intelligence officials have concluded that Iran has “crossed a threshold” in its thinking that could lead it to carry out terrorist attacks against the American homeland:

An assessment by U.S. spy agencies concludes that Iran is prepared to launch terrorist attacks inside the United States, highlighting new risks as the Obama administration escalates pressure on Tehran to halt its alleged pursuit of an atomic bomb.

In congressional testimony Tuesday, U.S. intelligence officials indicated that Iran has crossed a threshold in its adversarial relationship with the United States. While Iran has long been linked to attacks on American targets overseas, U.S. officials said they see troubling significance in Tehran’s alleged role in a plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington last year.

U.S. officials said they have seen no intelligence to indicate that Iran is actively plotting attacks on U.S. soil. But Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. said the thwarted plot “shows that some Iranian officials — probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — have changed their calculus and are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States in response to real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime.”

Iran has long used Hezbollah as a terrorist proxy. But as I noted here yesterday, a disturbing new article in Foreign Affairs by Seth Jones suggests another proxy with whom Iran might collaborate: al Qaeda.

Jones documents how Iran currently provides al Qaeda with its only safe haven out of reach of U.S. drones, and permits senior al Qaeda leaders to “fundraise, communicate with al Qaeda central in Pakistan and other affiliates, and funnel foreign fighters through Iran.” He notes that “Iran appears willing to expand its limited relationship with al Qaeda,” and that in response to a pre-emptive strike against its nuclear program, Tehran “could support an al Qaeda attack against the United States or one of its allies, although the regime would surely attempt to hide its role in any plotting.”

Clearly, Iran is attempting to deter American or Israeli military action by sending signals that it might respond with a terrorist attack on our soil. Yet if Iran is willing to blackmail America today with the threat of a terrorist attack, imagine the kind of blackmail the regime would be capable of once it obtains a nuclear weapon. And if Iran is already providing safe haven and limited support for al Qaeda today, before it possesses a nuclear deterrent, imagine the support Tehran would be willing to provide al Qaeda once it has the security of a nuclear umbrella.

There are clearly serious risks to action when it comes to Iran’s nuclear program—but the risks of inaction could prove far greater.

Sadanand Dhume

Expanding the American Kosher Deli

By Sadanand Dhume

January 31, 2012, 10:04 am

Yesterday marked the 20th anniversary of the establishment of full diplomatic relations between India and Israel.

The event was a watershed for both countries. For Israel—which also established ties with China the same year—it symbolized a decisive end to widespread isolation in Asia and the developing world. For India, whose socialism and non-alignment tilted it firmly toward the Palestinians for more than four decades, it marked a step toward a new kind of foreign policy: one marked less by anti-Western speechifying and abstract moralizing, and more by the pursuit of its own national interest.

Since then, the two countries have developed a curious relationship. On the one hand, India—at least under the left-leaning Congress Party—continues to pay (excessive) lip service to the Palestinian cause. On the other hand, Jerusalem has emerged as one of New Delhi’s most trusted partners on counter-terrorism, border security, and advanced weapons purchases. Agriculture is another large area of co-operation, indeed the only one both country’s officials tend to speak of expansively. (Almost everything I know about drip irrigation, I owe to Israeli diplomats expounding on the topic at length.)

For the United States, growing ties between India and Israel offer an opportunity. Step aside from a small and aging cohort of New Delhi intellectuals banging on about settlements and the right of return, and you find a deep admiration for the Jewish state among educated Indians. A strong India-Israel relationship binds India more closely with the democratic West. Perhaps it’s time to propose a Middle Eastern equivalent of the U.S.-India-Japan trilateral dialogue. There’s already a name for it: the American Kosher Deli.

Last March, when it was just turning spring in Washington, the visiting foreign minister of Morocco, Taieb Fassi Fihri, offered this caution about the changes that were sweeping through the Arab world: “the Arab spring is here,” he said, “but we are not sure that the summer—Arab summer” will follow. Maybe “we will go directly [in some places] to a dark winter, like . . in Iran in 1979.”

Already the climate in the Arab world has turned much colder and the skies are darker. Some people are now saying—with a kind of grim satisfaction—“we told you so.” But told us what? That these changes might lead to bad things and we should stop them? The notion of an “Arab spring” may have conveyed excessive optimism, but the notion of stopping it would be like trying to stop the tides. Regimes that depend on their people’s fear to survive cannot last once that wall of fear is broken, except by an even deeper descent into violence and terror.

The apparent stability of those dictatorships was illusory and their demise was inevitable. Moreover, the old order in the Arab world was not such a great thing, even by the standard of what’s good for the United States, much less for the people of those countries. What is to be lamented is that the preceding calm was not used to develop civil society organizations, political parties, and legal institutions to prepare the way for a more open political system. It is not an accident that Arabs who are now free to vote are voting in large numbers for Islamist political parties, the ones that had been best able to survive the repression of the dictators.

If the images of people risking their lives in the name of freedom inspired too much optimism, there is a danger now of too much pessimism. The process still has a long way to run before we will have any clear idea of the eventual outcome and, indeed, the outcomes are likely to differ widely from country to country. The term “Arab Awakening” or even “Arab Uprising” might better convey the sweep and uncertainty of what is happening.

Three years ago, when President Obama spoke at Cairo University, he was applauded for the mere announcement that he would discuss democracy and women’s rights, the only two of seven issues to be so welcomed. Even people who are critical of the United States often aspire to the values that we stand for. At a time when so much is in flux in the Arab world, it is important for the United States to speak up strongly in support of democracy, religious freedom, women’s rights, and the rule of law.

This blog is a part of an Enterprise symposium, “Egyptian Revolution: One Year Later.”

This week marks the one-year anniversary of the protests in Egypt. Since that time, NATO forces have intervened in Libya and the American military has largely withdrawn from Iraq. Foreign affairs have received little attention from both the Republican presidential candidates and pollsters alike. But the few polls released since the Egyptian protests show that events in Egypt and the Arab world have not altered Americans’ views on foreign intervention.

Americans are reluctant to intervene internationally. Only 15 percent said the United States should try to change dictatorships into democracies (November, CBS). When asked if the United States should use military force to stop governments from attacking their own citizens, equal numbers (39 percent) said the United States should and should not.

These views may explain why the military intervention in Libya is viewed so negatively. A plurality (49 percent) told CBS pollsters in November that the United States should have stayed out of military involvement in Libya. Only 37 percent said it was the right thing to do. Surprisingly, this feeling stretched across partisan divides.

At the same time, large numbers of Americans conclude that some threats warrant military intervention. When asked if the United States should initiate military action “if Iran continues with its nuclear research and is close to developing a nuclear weapon,” 54 percent agreed (November, CBS). Thirty-eight percent disagreed. Similarly, 65 percent think the United States should take military action against countries where terrorists are hiding. Twenty-two percent disapprove.

Part of the reason Americans remain reluctant to intervene internationally rests with the low priority they give to foreign affairs as a national concern. Pew Research Center notes that over the past five years, terrorism has dropped 11 points as a “top priority” for Congress and the president. Domestic affairs and the economy remain the national priority by a large margin. But Americans have not become isolationist in the wake of the Arab Spring. They remain willing to take action as necessary.

This blog is a part of an Enterprise symposium, “Egyptian Revolution: One Year Later.

Michael Rubin

Twittering Turkey talk

By Michael Rubin

January 18, 2012, 2:30 pm

Over at his twitter feed, Namik Tan, Turkey’s ambassador to the United States, has been on a roll condemning Texas Governor Rick Perry for his criticisms of Turkey. Yet, while Ambassador Tan has chastised Governor Perry for his own inaccuracies, Tan may want to look in a mirror:

Namik Tan: “Criticism of Turkey at #GOP debate was ill advised. Turkey is a secular democracy, NATO member and staunch U.S. ally.”

Reality:

(1)    The Pew Global Altitudes Survey finds Turkey to be the most anti-American country surveyed. Hardly a staunch ally.

(2)    Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has called secularism “a big fat lie” and has worked to promote Islamism.

Namik Tan: I hope this episode leads to a better informed foreign policy debate, where allies are treated with respect not disdain.

Reality:

(1)    Well, beyond his government’s anti-American incitement (for example, its endorsement of the anti-American polemic “Valley of the Wolves”), while ambassador to Israel, Tan also described Israel as an ally. Here’s what Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had to say about that.

Turkey’s politics are chaotic. Namik Tan is closer to President Abdullah Gül than Prime Minister Erdoğan, and so may feel at these moments that he has to prove himself with self-righteous chest-thumping. Nevertheless, perhaps it is time for the Turkish embassy to stop treating its audience with disdain and to instead recognize that Turkey can only coast on its reputation as an ally for so long before reality catches up in the public perception.

Michael Rubin

Was Perry wrong on Turkey?

By Michael Rubin

January 17, 2012, 12:07 pm

Governor Rick Perry is catching flack for calling Turkey’s leadership “Islamic terrorists.” While I would not go so far as Governor Perry, had he simply called Prime Minister Erdoğan an enabler for Islamic terrorists, he would be 100 percent correct.

I’ve previous charted Turkey’s path from ally to adversary. But here are a couple factoids which Perry might know, but many journalists and analysts may not:

Prime Minister Erdoğan endorsed an Al Qaeda financier.

Turkey also helped supply Al Qaeda in Iraq.

Erdoğan had repeatedly embraced Hamas and acted to supply it.

Under Erdoğan’s watch, the murder rate of women in Turkey has increased 1,400 percent.

Under Turkey’s Islamist government, press freedom has plummeted.

Governor Perry may not have broad foreign policy expertise, but sometimes it’s useful to call a toad a toad, or at least a supporter of toads.

When Iran threatened last month to close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States and Europe adopted sanctions that largely halted Iranian oil exports, there was a plethora of commentary that pointed in the direction that any closing would be short-lived, if at all. Such assessments are based on the fact that U.S. naval and air power is vastly superior to anything the Iranians can put into action.

But note the recent interview with Rear Admiral James Murdoch in Defense News. Murdoch, who oversees the development and acquisition of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships, gives a brutally honest assessment of the current state of the Navy’s 14 mine countermeasure ships: they are old, parts are hard to find, and the reliability of the mine-killer system they use “is not what I would like. The fleet’s very unhappy with it”—the “fleet” in this instance being the Fifth Fleet, which is based in Bahrain and would have responsibility for keeping the Persian Gulf clear of mines. To help address these problems, the Navy has on “urgent” order new sonar equipment and newer, British-built, mine “neutralization” systems but, with the exception of one of the latter, nothing is now in place.

Arguably, the picture being painted by most analysts of a potential conflict in the Gulf is a bit too rosy. From the Iranians’ experience in the “tanker wars” of the 1980s, they believe they learned that their strategy was sound but the military tools they had on hand to implement it were insufficient. As a result, they have spent considerable time and effort acquiring large numbers of modern mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, road-mobile launchers, and fast patrol boats; they have also deployed mini-submarines and exercised “swarming” targets in the Gulf with large numbers of missile-carrying small vessels. In brief, Iran has developed a maritime “guerrilla” force in the Persian Gulf that may not be as easily dispensed with as is sometimes suggested. While there is little doubt that the U.S. military would prevail in any conflict, the cost for doing so might be higher than expected.

Yesterday, Fereydoun Abbasi Davani, Iran Atomic Energy Organization director, complained about Iranian nuclear scientists who are not willing to participate in Iran’s nuclear program, fearing to compromise their “international contacts.” Abbasi Davani even likened the scientists with “deserters” during the war with Iraq.

Earlier today, Iran’s nuclear scientists got another reason to hesitate before contributing to the controversial nuclear program: Mostafa Ahmadi-Roshan, commerce director at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, was assassinated in Tehran as a motorcyclist attached a magnetic bomb on the 32-year-old nuclear scientist’s vehicle, killing Ahmadi-Roshan and wounding two unnamed passengers in the car.

According to Safar-Ali Baratlou, Tehran province security head, the assassination of Ahmadi-Roshan followed the same method as earlier attempts on the lives of Iran’s nuclear scientists. Fereydoun Abbasi Davani, and Majid Shahriari were targeted in a similar way on November 29, 2010. Abbasi Davani survived and was subsequently appointed Iran Atomic Energy Organization director, while Shahriari died in the hospital. Masoud Ali-Mohammadi, another nuclear scientist, was killed by a remote-controlled bomb as he was leaving home for work on January 10, 2010.

No one has claimed responsibility for the assassination, but First Vice President Mohammad-Reza Rahimi has accused “agents of arrogance [the United States] and [its] dependent powers,” and “agents of the Zionist regime” of perpetrating the attack. During today’s parliamentary session, members of the Majles chanted “Death to America,” “Death to Israel,” and “Death to the Hypocrite [reference to the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization]” in response to the assassination. In contrast, Iranian authorities have systematically denied Israeli involvement in acts of sabotage against the Revolutionary Guards’ missile base in Western Tehran, which led to a huge blast in November 2011.

Systematic assassination of nuclear scientists and acts of sabotage against the Revolutionary Guards’ facilities may retard Iran’s nuclear program, but more importantly it communicates a clear message to the leaders of the Islamic Republic and the Iranian population alike: The government of the Islamic Republic, which boasts of its desire to wipe Israel off the map, is not even capable of guaranteeing the security of Iran’s nuclear scientists on the streets of Tehran, or securing the missile bases of the Revolutionary Guards, let alone annihilating Israel. If the leaders of the Islamic Republic understand this message, the Iranian scientists would not have died in vain. If not, the Islamic Republic is to blame for yet another victim in Tehran.

Dany has an important piece in USA Today explaining why the United States got out of Iraq too soon. She writes:

[T]he future of Iraq, which seemed clear after our post-surge military victory, was again rendered uncertain by the premature departure of American forces. Institutions like the military were not fully formed, territorial disputes were not resolved, and key questions relating to oil were up in the air. In such circumstances, opposing groups move to maximize their own power for the inevitable struggle.

As if to underscore her point, the same day her piece came out al Qaeda publicly took credit for the wave of bombings that ripped through markets, cafes, and government buildings in Baghdad last week and killed 69 people—the first major terrorist attacks following the U.S. departure. It was a clear statement to the Iraqi people and the world that, while the United States may have retreated from Iraq, al Qaeda has not.

In a statement, the Islamic State of Iraq (al Qaeda’s political front) called the bombings a “series of special invasions … to support the weak Sunnis in the prisons of the apostates and to retaliate for the captives who were executed by the Safavid [Persian or Iranian] government” of Prime Minister Maliki.

This renewed al Qaeda violence is an ominous sign. During the surge, Sunnis abandoned the insurgency in droves, turned on al Qaeda, and joined with America to drive the terrorists out of the sanctuaries they had established in Anbar and other regions. After the surge succeeded in achieving these goals, the continued U.S. military presence—and the security umbrella it provided—allowed Sunnis to make peace with the new political order in Iraq. Now that the Obama administration has withdrawn all U.S. forces and the security umbrella they provided, our Sunni allies are in a vulnerable position. The Maliki government is taking advantage of the U.S. withdrawal to launch a sectarian crackdown on its Sunni opposition—and with its attacks last week it is clear that al Qaeda is positioning itself to benefit from this confluence of events.

Just as al Qaeda’s repression drove the Sunni tribes into America’s arms in 2006, Maliki’s repression could drive them back into al Qaeda’s arms in 2012. We could see a revival of the insurgency and a return to the sectarian bloodshed that American troops quelled at such great cost—and al Qaeda will then use the ensuing chaos to re-establish the safe havens we took from them five years ago. If that happens, then Obama’s decision to reject his commanders’ advice and withdraw all U.S. forces will go from a disaster to a debacle.

While the folks at Think Progress deny the growing links between Iran and al Qaeda, more evidence of the terror network’s collaboration with the regime in Tehran emerged just before Christmas when the State and Treasury Departments put out a bounty for an al Qaeda leader operating in Iran under a secret agreement with Iran.

As I pointed out earlier this month, Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil was designated by the Treasury Department earlier this year as the leader of an al Qaeda network operating in Iran with the help and protection of the Iranian regime. Now, Josh Rogin at The Cable reports that the U.S. government has offered $10 million through the Rewards for Justice program for information leading to the death or capture of Khalil (a.k.a. Yasin al-Suri):

According to two U.S. officials who briefed reporters today, [Suri] stands at the center of the link between the Iranian government and al Qaeda… “From his sanctuary inside Iran, he has moved terrorist recruits through Iran to al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He has also arranged for the release of al Qaeda operatives from Iranian prisons and their transfer to Pakistan. And he has funneled significant amounts of money through Iran to AQ leadership in Afghanistan and Iraq,” said Robert A. Hartung, assistant director for threat investigations and analysis at State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security…. “We have reliable information indicating that there is an agreement between the Iranian government and this al Qaeda network [led by Suri],” said Eytan Fisch, Treasury’s assistant director of terrorism and financial intelligence.

This is the second time in the past six months that the Obama administration has taken action to highlight the links between al Qaeda and Iran. And it comes on the heels of a federal court ruling earlier this month which found that Iran was responsible for the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that the bombings would not have been possible without “direct assistance” from Tehran. “The government of Iran,” Judge John D. Bates wrote in his 45-page decision, “aided, abetted, and conspired with Hezbollah, Osama Bin Laden, and al Qaeda to launch large-scale bombing attacks against the United States by utilizing the sophisticated delivery mechanism of powerful suicide truck bombs…. Prior to their meetings with Iranian officials and agents Bin Laden and al Qaeda did not possess the technical expertise required to carry out the embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.”

Considering the fact that the Shiite regime in Tehran and the Sunni terrorist network have already collaborated to attack the United States, their growing cooperation is an ominous sign. If Iran was willing to give al Qaeda the means to destroy two American embassies, what kind of assistance might a nuclear Iran be willing to provide them?

Yemen’s Spring: It’s still a mess

By Katherine Zimmerman

December 23, 2011, 10:25 am

The Arab Spring in Yemen has yet to deliver democracy and may have left the country worse for the wear, especially in the short term. Yes, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh finally signed a transition deal on November 23. And yes, Yemen’s opposition parties have gained some power in the new government. There is also a recognition that popular grievances voiced for years by southerners, among others, are legitimate and need to be addressed. A new Yemeni constitution—yet to be drafted—could institutionalize the observance of basic rights. Further, a newly established military committee took action to demilitarize the country’s cities and to move military assets out of civilian areas.

A deeper look at the situation, however, should reveal how shallow these successes run. The transition deal, pushed forward by Gulf states (except Qatar) and backed by the international community, rings hollow despite some potential for bringing long-term stability. Saleh has yet to abdicate full presidential authority to his deputy. He must do so today, a full 30 days after the signing ceremony. The Saleh regime, including his family members, remains deeply entrenched in the Yemeni government. The shuffling of political figures in the government—including opposition members—does not truly establish a new democratic government. Diplomats can point to the much-lauded transition deal as progress in Yemen, but on-the-ground conditions in the country contradict that progress.

Yemen’s multitude of problems has only been exacerbated by months of unrest. The UN now predicts that 4 million people in Yemen will require significant humanitarian assistance in 2012 and that humanitarian conditions will continue to deteriorate over the course of the next year. This dire prediction rests atop a rapid depletion of natural resources in the country, especially oil and water, and high levels of unemployment. The Yemeni state itself has been severely weakened and there are areas completely outside of the state’s control. These include parts of north Yemen that had quietly been carved off by al Houthi rebels over the past ten months and territory in south Yemen that was seized by al Qaeda-linked militants. Al Qaeda’s franchise in Yemen, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, now has a much larger safe haven in the country than it did at the start of 2011.

The next few months are critical and, like much of the rest of the region, in Yemen the outcome is completely up in the air. The potential to affect the United States is high, but the White House has evinced indifference. The Middle East was so 2011.

Just days after U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq, a series of attacks in Baghdad have raised doubts about the security of the country, while political upheaval threatens to undermine its government. AEI’s vice president for foreign and defense policy studies, Danielle Pletka, shared some questions with U.S. Senator John McCain, ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, regarding President Barack Obama’s decision to draw down all U.S. troops from Iraq, and the Iranian challenge in the region. This is the second of a two-part interview. (Part one can be found here.)

How do you think President Obama’s decision to depart Iraq will affect our ability to counter the Iranian challenge in the region?

It will only make that challenge harder. We have diminished our influence in Iraq, and the worst elements of the Iranian regime are now seeking to fill that vacuum. Polls consistently show that Iraqis resent the Iranian government’s meddling in their internal affairs and have no desire for Iran to dominate their country. But as we have seen in the past, if Iraqis feel they do not have a strong counterweight to Iran’s ruthless and violent activities, they will make what they feel are the necessary accommodations to survive. I fear that dynamic has only been exacerbated by the full withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. Furthermore, the president’s announcement of a premature drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, which our military commanders have said was more aggressive than they had wanted, only adds to the perception that U.S. power is weakening and withdrawing in the broader Middle East. The resulting dynamic will only embolden the Iranian regime and diminish our ability to effectively counter its destabilizing actions.

Do you believe there will be repercussions in Afghanistan from the decision to depart Iraq?

Absolutely. Afghans have told me how unsettled they are about the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. They have told me that there is a perception in Afghanistan that if the United States is willing to pull all of its troops out of Iraq, then surely it will do the same in Afghanistan. If I were President Karzai, or another Afghan leader, I would have second thoughts about any promises and commitments made by this administration to keep U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014. I think it only reinforces President Karzai’s instincts to hedge his bets on the United States and to search for the support he needs for his country from nearby neighbors that are far less friendly to U.S. interests. I also think the withdrawal from Iraq is a source of encouragement for our enemies in Afghanistan. It can only add to their belief that, if they just hang on and keep fighting, eventually U.S. forces will leave.

Many critics of the war stress the costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom in blood and treasure. You understand all too well the heavy cost of war, the toll on families, the sacrifice of our troops. How can we judge whether the war was worth the cost?

The war in Iraq has already accomplished worthy goals. Our troops removed one of the most horrific dictators in history—a man who started regional wars, had a history of developing destabilizing weapons, tortured and oppressed the Iraqi people for decades, and murdered hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. The world is a better place now that the Saddam Hussein regime is gone, and our troops and their families can rightfully be proud in that accomplishment.

The greater question is what kind of country will Iraq ultimately become, and the prospect of a decent outcome has now been placed at unnecessary risk because of the full withdrawal of U.S. troops. I fear that General Jack Keane is right when he said, “We won the war in Iraq, and we are now losing the peace.” All the gains we have achieved in Iraq are now at risk, and the enormous expenditure of blood and treasure that those gains entailed are now in jeopardy of being viewed by history as sacrifices made in vain.

Just days after U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq, a series of attacks in Baghdad have raised doubts about the security of the country, while political upheaval threatens to undermine its government. AEI’s vice president for foreign and defense policy studies, Danielle Pletka, shared some questions with U.S. Senator John McCain, ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, regarding President Barack Obama’s decision to draw down all U.S. troops from Iraq, and the Iranian challenge in the region. This is the first of a two-part interview.

Last week, after President Obama heralded the departure of all U.S. troops from Iraq, you said: “I believe that history will judge this president’s leadership with the scorn and disdain it deserves.”  What should President Obama have done in Iraq, and how might different actions have affected the course of events on the ground?

I do not believe the president ever brought the full weight of his office to bear in pushing for a residual presence of U.S. forces in Iraq. For the past five years, the president has been completely consistent about his position on Iraq. As a U.S. senator, he was adamantly opposed to the war, he said repeatedly that the surge was a mistake and a failure, and he constantly pledged to withdraw all U.S. troops at the earliest possible date. So perhaps it should not have come as a surprise that he has now done exactly what he said he would do all along. Perhaps it should also not come as a surprise that the White House is now putting out glossy literature proclaiming that the president has fulfilled his campaign promise to withdraw from Iraq. That is the larger political context in which the events of the past year have unfolded, and it is impossible to divorce the final outcome from it.

Had the president wanted to keep troops in Iraq, as both U.S. and Iraqi military commanders recommended, he would have pushed earlier and more directly for what was in our national security interest, rather than adopting the hands-off approach that left our diplomatic and military leaders in Iraq unable to begin an effective negotiation, let alone conclude one. I spoke with all of the leaders of Iraq’s major political blocs during repeated visits to the country, and all of them said privately that some presence of U.S. troops should remain in the country. But when Iraqi leaders asked the United States how many troops it wanted to keep in Iraq, and what tasks those troops might perform, the White House dragged its feet in giving them an answer. The key Iraqi political blocs gathered together in August and publicly asked to open negotiations, and again the White House response was characterized by delay. The final number they provided to the Iraqis was too low for any Iraqi politician to want to take the political risk to support it.

The reason given for why the negotiations failed was the unwillingness of the Iraqis to grant our troops the necessary legal privileges and immunities. But that was a symptom of the larger problem: the president’s unwillingness or failure to exercise the immense influence that the United States possessed in Iraq. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has said that she and the other authors of the 2008 Security Agreement always understood that it would need to be renegotiated to keep an effective presence of U.S. troops in Iraq. That could have been done. With stronger and more determined presidential leadership, we could have shaped the private understandings of Iraq’s leaders about the necessity of a residual presence of U.S. forces into a public consensus to do what was necessary to achieve it. That would not have been a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty. That would have been effective leadership.

There’s been a lot of Monday morning quarterbacking going on in the wake of last week’s casing of the colors in Baghdad and the subsequent political upheaval in Iraq. Some have suggested that accusations against Sunni Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi and the warrant for his arrest prove that we have done little more than facilitate the transition from a Sunni dictator to a Shiite in Iraq. What’s your take?

It is too soon to tell what the nature of Iraq’s political system will be. Prime Minister Maliki has consolidated an immense amount of power in his hands over the past three years. He has not implemented the Irbil Agreement on power-sharing and political inclusivity, and as the events of the past several days show, he is wielding power in an increasingly authoritarian manner. Furthermore, I do not think it is merely a coincidence that the prime minister made these moves on the day that the last U.S. troops left the country. And the fact that he did so immediately after returning from meetings in the Oval Office makes the U.S. government appear complicit.

Despite the recent crisis, however, Iraq still possesses a democratic system. It still has the democratic laws and procedures for Iraq’s elected leaders to hold the Prime Minister accountable or, in the extreme, to bring a vote of no-confidence against his government. I believe a majority of Iraqis want their country to remain democratic and want their leaders to be accountable for their actions. It will be up to Iraq’s leaders to resolve this political crisis, and we must hope that they can and will do so peacefully through the political process. It will be up the United States to use what influence we still have left to support the Iraqi people and their elected representatives in a way that strengthens the integrity, inclusivity, and effectiveness of Iraq’s democratic institutions.

The hyperbole used to characterize supporters of the war in Iraq suggests that we wanted troops to stay in Iraq “forever,” that any departure would have been “too soon”; the corollary to that is that Iranian domination of Iraq is and was inevitable. When would have been the right time to leave Iraq? Or are people asking the wrong question? What would a long-term strategic partnership with Iraq have looked like?

Had U.S. and Iraqi leaders agreed to keep an effective presence of U.S. troops in Iraq, it would have been up to our respective democratic governments to determine how long they would have remained there. But the tasks that U.S. troops would have been in Iraq to perform—assisting the Iraqi Security Forces in increasing their capability to protect their airspace, to gather and fuse intelligence, and to improve their counterterrorism operations, among other missions—would not have taken forever to accomplish.

Perhaps the greatest benefit of all was the stabilizing influence that our force presence had on Iraq’s politics. The surge succeeded in ending large-scale sectarian violence and thereby opening up greater space for Iraq’s leaders to work to resolve their differences through politics, not violence. Iraqis have accomplished a great deal in that regard, but as the current crisis makes clear, they still have not resolved some of their greatest political disputes, and Iraq’s democratic institutions remain fragile. Had U.S. troops remained in the country, it would have provided added reassurance to all of Iraq’s factions that the political process was the best avenue for resolving their differences. Furthermore, it would have ensured that the United States continued to possess substantial influence to support Iraqis in reinforcing their country’s democratic development. The Obama administration did not adequately and effectively use that influence over the past three years, and now they have left Iraq in a way and at a time that has exacerbated the lingering mistrust among Iraqis. We had an important window to help Iraqis further lock in their democratic institutions and habits of behavior, at least through their next election. Had we kept some U.S. troops in Iraq, it could have been a critical part of a broader political strategy to strengthen all of the positive trends made possible by the surge.

As I have said repeatedly, the American people are not opposed to keeping U.S. troops overseas, as we have for decades in places like Germany and South Korea—so long as our troops are not taking heavy casualties for no discernible reason and with no prospect of success. That was no longer the case in Iraq. So I think Americans would have supported a presence of U.S. troops in Iraq, but that would have required the president to build support for it and explain why such a troop presence was in our national security interest.

Study: Why did Europe leave the Middle East behind? Islam

By James Pethokoukis

December 22, 2011, 12:01 pm

Germany and Egypt both have populations of roughly 81 million people. But German GDP is nearly 20x higher. Why is that? Well, according to a new study, the difference is Islam and its historical rejection of complex financial instruments and systems:

By almost any available economic measure, the Middle East, China, and India were ahead of Europe one thousand years ago. Their science and technology were more advanced than in Europe, their trade flowed in higher volumes and over longer distances, and they employed more complicated financial instruments to facilitate trade. Yet as early as the 17th century Western Europe was clearly on a path to dominate much of the rest of the world economically, technologically, and militarily – eventually colonising much of the world’s land mass. Western Europe and its offshoots have dominated the world economy for centuries, and it has only been in recent decades that China and India have begun to catch up. What happened? How did such a relatively poor and unpopulated area become the world’s dominant economic force? Why didn’t economic growth occur in the rest of the world like it did in Western Europe? …

A satisfying explanation must account for some of the general features that precipitated the divergence in economic growth between Western Europe and the Middle East in the last seven centuries. Studying specific cases, however, can point us in the direction of general causes. In a recent study, I argue that studying the history of interest restrictions in Islam and Christianity is particularly useful – such laws were ubiquitous throughout much of the history of both religions, but they were eventually disbanded only in Christianity.

On the one hand, the interaction between the rise of secular authority and vast European trade networks supported further economic developments such as complex financial instruments, impersonal exchange, and the corporate form. On the other hand, the constraints faced in the Islamic world discouraged such a path – or at least, a greater shock was necessary to undermine the political and religious relationship than in Christendom. Instead, less economically beneficial institutions, such as the waqf and smaller, personal exchange networks persisted for centuries in the Islamic world.

After a post I did earlier this week on Congress caving on Central Bank of Iran sanctions, I got a grumpy call from my buds at AIPAC. No, they had not “sided with the Obama administration” as I claimed, except in the case of a couple of technical changes to the Menendez-Kirk amendment and one substantial change. But, my AIPACer added, they had helped beat back even more substantial changes the White House wanted that would have gutted the amendment even further.

Well, I’ll say I’m half sorry. Three of the changes that the administration was looking for were beaten back,  (see their proposal here),  particularly a change that would have created a category for countries that the president would claim had “closely cooperated” with U.S. sanctions on Iran (ie, in Obama’s eyes, everyone); another change that would have stricken the application of sanctions on foreign banks transacting business with the Central Bank of Iran; and finally a change that would have whittled down penalties from “financial transactions” with the CBI to financial transactions relating only to the sale or purchase of petroleum or related products. There were another few changes that were also rejected, relating to timing, that were no big deal either way.

What was the new White House language that I called a cave? Changing the amendment from a strict U.S. ban on all banks enjoying a correspondent relationship with the Central Bank of Iran to a ban or “strict conditions,” whatever the heck that means. I stand by my original criticism of that “fix” to the language: it will have the effect of gutting the provision.

Here’s how AIPAC sees it: The president has basically ignored the 2010 sanctions legislation he signed into law. If legislation forced his hand on CBI, he would have ignored that too. (Ah, the law… so flexible.) But now the president will feel duty-bound to do something about the CBI because AIPAC and the Congress cooperated so nicely on the CBI amendment. Uh huh. Good luck with that.

In a story on the pending departure of U.S. forces from Iraq, the New York Times yesterday referred to “al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the homegrown Qaeda affiliate in Iraq, which has some foreign members.” Boy, the folks at the Times are either really stubborn or really slow learners. Probably both.

Back in 2007, you may recall, opponents of the surge in Iraq—including the Times—worked overtime to spread the myth that al Qaeda in Iraq (aka Mesopotamia) was an Iraqi phenomenon independent of Osama bin Laden. They did so because, if al Qaeda in Iraq was bin Laden’s al Qaeda, then America could not accept defeat in Iraq—we had to win. But if they could convince Americans that we were not fighting bin Laden’s al Qaeda in Iraq, but rather some “homegrown” terror group, then America could pull out of Iraq and not undermine our efforts in the war on terror.

In July 2007, President Bush delivered an address in Charleston, South Carolina where he definitively put to this myth to rest. As Bush explained:

Al Qaeda in Iraq was founded by a Jordanian terrorist, not an Iraqi. His name was Abu Musab al Zarqawi.… In 2004, Zarqawi and his terrorist group formally joined al Qaeda, pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden, and he promised to “follow his orders in jihad.” Soon after, bin Laden publicly declared that Zarqawi was the “Prince of Al Qaeda in Iraq”—and instructed terrorists in Iraq to “listen to him and obey him.”…

Zarqawi was killed by U.S. forces in June 2006. He was replaced by another foreigner—an Egyptian named Abu Ayyub al-Masri. … He has collaborated with Zawahiri for more than two decades. And before 9/11, he spent time with al Qaeda in Afghanistan where he taught classes indoctrinating others in al Qaeda’s radical ideology….

According to our intelligence community, many of al Qaeda in Iraq’s other senior leaders are also foreign terrorists. They include a Syrian who is al Qaeda in Iraq’s emir in Baghdad, a Saudi who is al Qaeda in Iraq’s top spiritual and legal advisor, an Egyptian who fought in Afghanistan in the 1990s and who has met with Osama bin Laden, a Tunisian who we believe plays a key role in managing foreign fighters. Last month in Iraq, we killed a senior al Qaeda facilitator named Mehmet Yilmaz, a Turkish national who fought with al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and met with September the 11th mastermind Khalid Shaikh Muhammad, and other senior al Qaeda leaders. … Foreign terrorists also account for most of the suicide bombings in Iraq. Our military estimates that between 80 and 90 percent of suicide attacks in Iraq are carried out by foreign-born al Qaeda terrorists.

The Times wasn’t sold, declaring in their story the next day on Bush’s speech: “The Iraqi group is a homegrown Sunni Arab extremist group with some foreign operatives that has claimed a loose affiliation to Mr. bin Laden’s network, although the precise links are unclear.” Apparently, they are still at it. The Times editors should study these words President Bush delivered in Charleston carefully: “There’s a good reason they are called al Qaeda in Iraq: They are al Qaeda … in … Iraq.” Hopefully, Barack Obama has not given them a new lease on life with his precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces.

Jonah Goldberg

Marx was wrong about history

By Jonah Goldberg

December 13, 2011, 1:04 pm

It’s “first as tragedy, second as Farsi.” From Fars, an Iranian news service:

Obama Begs Iran to Give Him Back His Toy Plane

TEHRAN (FNA)- US President Obama is hoping that the Iranian government is in a Christmas mood because he has asked Tehran to send him his Christmas present back.

We are still wondering how he shamelessly asked Tehran to give the US back the stealth drone which had violated the Iranian airspace for espionage.

“We have asked for it back. We’ll see how the Iranians respond,” Obama said following a meeting at the White House with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

Hill conferees filed the National Defense Authorization bill last night, which means the conference agreed upon final language. The bill has enjoyed its share of controversy over a detainee provision, but another viciously fought battle included a provision to sanction the Central Bank of Iran. You remember the Central Bank? The one the Obama administration was first going to sanction, then decided not to sanction? Senators Menendez and Kirk took every administration objection, wrapped it up into a fine amendment that would allow time to balance oil markets, work with our allies, and ensure that the CBI sanctions hit the intended target. They accommodated administration concerns, worked closely with State and Treasury on language, and then watched as Obama officials reneged on the deal and lobbied to defeat the amendment. Such was the disgust of the Democrat-controlled Senate for the president’s negotiating tactics, that the amendment passed 100-0. (Check out Menendez’s slap down of State’s Wendy Sherman and Treasury’s David Cohen here.)

Having failed to move the Senate, the administration took aim at the conference committee now meeting, working aggressively to water down CBI sanctions. Their changes, detailed by The Cable’s Josh Rogin here and here, do little more than parrot the language of CISADA, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act that passed in 2010, the provisions of which have been exercised once (against Belarus, that well-known Iran enabler) by Barack Obama.

In other words, instead of having to “prohibit” foreign banks that transact business with the CBI from dealing with the U.S. financial sector, the president would need only “impose strict conditions on” such dealings.  But what would constitute “strict conditions”? Defining this would be entirely at the administration’s discretion. Are there not already “strict conditions” on foreign bank dealings with the U.S. financial sector? Does Treasury let anyone do it? Of course not. Money launderers, drug traffickers, and all other manner of bad actors are already prohibited to have such dealings. So arguably under the administration-proposed language absolutely no additional action would be required of the administration. (Here, I disagree with Rogin’s piece today downplaying the scope of the changes.)

I hear some of the amendment’s supporters battled valiantly in conference to preserve the stricter language. They lost, and have gracefully been out claiming victory notwithstanding. Better still, I understand from House and Senate staff that part of the reason they lost is that the AIPAC, the nation’s largest pro-Israel lobbying group, sided with the administration and reassured members they were “fine” with the changes. (I’d be happy to be contradicted.)

Want the preceding three paras in short?

– Bipartisan Congress resolved to sanction Central Bank of Iran and its foreign business partners.

– Obama administration resolved not to sanction Central Bank of Iran or its foreign business partners.

– Largest lobbyist for the U.S.-Israel relationship resolved to join with Obama.

– Welcome to Washington.

 

I can never figure out why people want to write about things they haven’t read. Wait, let me amend that. I can never figure out why people who wish to be taken seriously write about things they haven’t read. Here’s an especially fragrant post entitled “Ignore the Hawks” from our compatriots over at CATO@Liberty.

A recent report that I coauthored with my colleagues Tom Donnelly and Maseh Zarif has occasioned a mini-storm of cant, most of it from the far Left (and its echo chambers in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps). The report, Containing and Deterring a Nuclear Iran, is a thorough examination of the notion that containment will be a manageable affair, and takes no position on whether a military strike is a good idea, or whether containment itself should be the strategy the world embraces once Iran gets the bomb.

But enough of the report. After all, why read it (57 pages!), when you can nimbly move on to… the Iraq War (I suggested “Saddam’s entire Ba’athist government should be replaced”) and new certitudes about when Iran will acquire a nuclear weapon. After all, the non-profit (um, what are we?) Arms Control Association says “a nuclear armed Iran is still not imminent.”

So again, in the interest of comity among, er, non-profits, allow me to quibble.

•    Experts, including inside the Obama administration, agree that should Iran wish to do so, it will have enough fissile material and the know-how to assemble a nuclear weapon within a year. Those who argue it is neither imminent nor inevitable predicate that argument solely upon Iran’s intention to build a weapon. If that’s the case, then it would be more intellectually honest to suggest that Iran may not itself decide to build such a weapon within a year. Can’t disagree with that.

•    If there are those who wish to take the pro-Baathist line, be my guest.

•    I did repeatedly argue for the ouster of Saddam Hussein and I would do it again. PS, I also argue for the ouster of Bashar el Assad, in case any of you want to mention that. PPS, I’d also like to see the regime in Iran replaced.

Really, read the report. Learn something, and then comment on its actual contents. AEI always welcomes serious debate.

The speed at which Turkey is changing under its Islamist prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is astounding. While many Western diplomats praise Erdoğan’s handling of the economy and supposed democratic reforms, they ignore Erdoğan’s agenda to transform Turkish culture and society. This is reflected in the purge of women from the state bureaucracy and the increase of domestic violence as, perhaps, the prime minister’s supporters figure out that they can conduct honor crimes with impunity. According to the Turkish justice minister, the murder rate of women has increased 1,400 percent between 2002—the year Erdoğan’s Islamist party took over—and 2009. Now it seems that Erdoğan’s government is moving against modern science. According to Hürriyet, Turkey’s internet censors have now turned on Charles Darwin:

A website explaining Darwin’s evolution theory is blocked for children based on new internet filters, daily Hürriyet reported. The website is inaccessible for users applying a “Children Profile” to their connection, a filter designed for underaged users in accord with the new internet regulations activated by the Turkish government. The censor reportedly keeps children away from evolution theory, but allows access to websites on creation.

President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton have described Turkey as a model. It certainly is. But rather than a model for the future, Erdoğan seems determined to take Turkey headlong into the past.

This morning, ABC aired a Barbara Walters interview with Syrian “dictator by accident” Bashar el Assad, whom she found to be “not like Qadhafi.” (Crazy does come in different flavors, Barbara.) After an airy tour around Damascus, where Walters found that “life goes on,” she took off her tour guide outfit to grill Assad gently about his reign of terror.

Assad’s was a pathetic performance, Arab dictator 101. Apparently, the military killings are not his doing: “They are not my forces, they are military forces belonging to the government. There was no command to kill or be brutal.” The United Nations accusations about heinous crimes against the Syrian people prompted this question: “Who said that the United Nations is a credible institution?” The specifics elicited the usual demand to “send out the documents and the concrete evidences that you have.”

Asked about the murder of Syrian singer Ibrahim Kashoush, Assad claimed never to have heard of him. Here are the images of Kashoush’s death, if you can stomach them.

Helpfully, Assad affirmed that, “When I feel that the public support declined, I won’t be here,” going on to explain that “No government in the world kill its people [sic] unless it’s led by crazy person.” True.

After Assad closed with an embarrassing giggle after being asked whether he feels guilty, I turned to Charlie Rose’s 2010 interview with Assad for a reminder of how seriously the media elite and Obama administration took this SOB. Here’s Rose’s opener: “ I am not the only American who has been here recently. Senator John Kerry, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was here on Saturday and recently as well. Is something happening in the relationship between Syria and the United States?”

Enjoy the whole thing here. Ugh.

Over at the National Interest, Walter Russell Mead writes on Vice President Biden’s just-completed visit to Iraq, where he presided at a ceremony handing Camp Victory back to Iraqis. In a post titled “Mission Sort of Accomplished in Iraq” Mead reflects on the fact that a “new and at least somewhat democratic country has emerged out of the ashes of despotism and the chaos of civil war”—an achievement, he notes, that Biden himself believed would never come. He recalls “all the panicky declarations by leading politicians and prominent ex-officials that the war was lost, utterly lost, and we had no choice but to make an inglorious run for the exits” and suggests that President Obama and Vice President Biden owe President Bush a word of thanks for the surge as the troops come home.

It is a good suggestion. But rather than a word of thanks, I think President Bush would probably prefer that Obama and Biden not squander the victory he handed them in Iraq. While the surge did save Iraq from being utterly lost, all that sacrifice will be for naught if Iraq ends up an Iranian client state—which is where the country is likely headed with the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces in a few weeks’ time. Mead notes that he “would have preferred a new Status of Forces agreement that would have kept a larger U.S. presence in Iraq for a longer time, but this is a decision that the sovereign government of Iraq has the right to make for itself. The United States is not an imperial power in the old style; when our allies ask us to leave, we go.”

Yes, except the reason the Iraqis asked us to go is because they saw we were already headed for the exits. The Obama administration dramatically reduced the number of troops it was planning to keep in country—from the 14-18,000 the U.S. military had requested to just the 3-4,000 the White House approved. What incentive did Iraqi leaders have to take the political risk of pushing a SOF agreement—with its controversial immunity provisions—though parliament when it is clear that the Obama administration was heading for the exits? If the United States is leaving and Iran is staying, it makes no sense to get in bed with America.

Mead quotes an interview with the Wall Street Journal, in which Biden declares, “The real way people gain influence other than through force is having an influence on the institutions, the formation of the institutions, and the function of the institutions.” Imagine how that logic would have worked if we had withdrawn all of our forces from the Korean Peninsula shortly after hostilities died. Without a robust American military presence to deter them, the North would have infiltrated and devoured the South from within. The only way America can have “an influence on institutions” in Iraq is to prevent Iran from infiltrating and co-opting those institutions. If Iran moves in as America moves out, the mission in Iraq will not be “sort of” accomplished—it will be lost.


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