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Earlier this month, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper told Congress that “Iranian officials” at the highest levels “are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States….” The next logical question is, “What is that hostile regime doing with the support of its trusted allies very close to our borders?”

Tomorrow morning, Senator Bob Menendez (D-New Jersey) will initiate an inquiry into Iran’s activities in Latin America at a 10a.m. hearing of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I am honored to have the opportunity to share my views on this troubling phenomenon and to make recommendations on an appropriate response. My observations are based on AEI’s ongoing project to monitor and expose Iran’s dramatic push into our neighborhood during the last seven years.

My testimony will review some startling findings about the clandestine network that Iran is building in Latin America with the support of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chávez, which represents a clear and present danger to U.S. security and interests. By aiding Iran’s evasion of international sanctions and search for uranium, Chávez and other regional despots are abetting Teheran’s rogue nuclear program. And wherever Iran goes, Hezbollah is not far behind. I will expose the growing presence of two terrorist networks—one a home-grown Venezuelan clan and another cultivated by a notorious agent of Iran’s Qods Force—that proselytize, fund-raise, recruit, and train operatives on behalf of Iran and Hezbollah in many countries in the Americas.

The dangerous activities of Iran and Hezbollah so near our borders demand a whole-of-government strategy, beginning with an inter-agency review to understand and assess the transnational, multifaceted nature of the problem; educate friendly governments; and insist on inspection of suspicious operations and military compounds. Our government must be prepared to implement effective measures—unilaterally and with willing partners—to disrupt and dismantle illicit operations and neutralize unacceptable threats.

Followers of cancer-stricken strongman Hugo Chávez are stunned after nearly 3 million Venezuelans voted Sunday to select a unity candidate to compete in presidential elections scheduled for October. Venezuelan democrats are unified and optimistic today, but Chávez and his henchmen already have made their moves to hold on to power at all costs. If the opposition has any real hope of defeating Chavismo, they will have to be prepared for dirty tricks, provocations, and even a narco-coup in the months ahead.

Miranda Governor Henrique Capriles Radonski won the opposition primary with over 60 percent of the vote, after a spirited competition that included Zulia Governor Pablo Perez (29 percent) and civic leader Maria Corina Machado (3.5 percent). Though not quite 40 years old, Capriles is a seasoned and tough politician who enjoys great popularity even among the Chávista followers in his state of Miranda. Capriles campaigned frequently in the working class neighborhoods that form Chávez’s political base.

In his second-place effort, Perez carried the opposition’s message to the very poor voters that, until now, have literally been ignored by the old thinkers who have led the opposition for the last decade. With all of the candidates expected to close ranks around Capriles, the democratic opposition is united like never before and preparing for an eight-month campaign.

An invigorated opposition is more bad news for Chavismo in this volatile election year. Spiraling crime rates, energy shortages, food insecurity, and a shattered economy give the opposition its best chance ever of out-polling Chávez. If Chávez dies or falters significantly before the October election, his inner circle will have to face the unthinkable prospect of losing power and being held accountable for its abuses of power, corruption, and criminality.

In recent months, Chavista hard-liners have been maneuvering to ensure that they will never relinquish power. In January, Chávez surprised many by sidelining his popular foreign minister, Nicolas Maduro, and promoting former military comrade Diosdado Cabello to be head of the ruling socialist party and the National Assembly. Even more telling, General Henry Rangel Silva was named minister of defense last month, despite his notorious reputation as a drug-trafficking ally of the narco-guerrillas in neighboring Colombia.

Rangel Silva, former intelligence chief Hugo Carvajal, and Army General Cliver Alcala are among the many Chavista officials who have been sanctioned by U.S. authorities for their involvement in drug trafficking. Because they fear the relentless pursuit of U.S. authorities, they are determined to remain in power—even if that means scuttling or ignoring the results of elections this fall.

If the Chavistas were contemplating an electoral scenario once Chávez dies, they would have opted for keeping the more charismatic Maduro as a possible successor. The promotion of the bland but ruthless Cabello demonstrates that appealing to voters is far less important than reassuring the narco-generals who have quietly seized control of Venezuela. Although Cabello has yet to be cited by U.S. authorities as a narcotrafficker, he has amassed a vast fortune through official corruption. So, his corrupt military comrades are confident that he will thwart an opposition takeover by any means necessary.

The timing and tactics will depend on the pace of Chávez’s physical deterioration. The latest details conveyed to me by persons knowledgeable of his condition indicate that Chávez’s cancerous cell count has yet to be reduced after months of treatment, and he has developed another cancerous tumor in his colon that requires urgent surgery. His condition has worsened because he refuses routine care and examinations in order to maintain a public profile. Indeed, the hard-driving leader has turned to the use of cocaine to maintain his energy. As a result, there is a good chance that Chávez will not live long enough to appear on the October ballot.

In other words, the real test for candidate Capriles and the opposition may come sooner than they expect. Chávez and his followers have made clear by the appointment of Cabello and Rangel Silva that they have no intention of surrendering power. If they try to provoke a crisis or to cancel the elections, chaos may ensue. In that hour, the toughness of Capriles, the other opposition leaders, and Venezuelan civilian society will be severely tested.

Although the opposition is determined to keep its distance from Washington, the fact remains that they will require substantial international solidarity—particularly from Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Peru, Spain, the United States, and other countries—to hold Chávez’s cronies accountable. The opposition cannot wait until the chaos descends upon them to begin cultivating such support. And Washington has to wake up to the dangerous plotting of a narco-coup in Venezuela.

U.S. intelligence chief James Clapper on Tuesday publicly contradicted claims by Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chávez that he is cured of cancer, the first official U.S. statement on Chávez’s failing health.

General Clapper’s declarations, made during testimony before the U.S. Senate, breaks months of silence from the U.S. government on the subject of Chávez’s health and corroborates my assertions that Chávez is deceiving the Venezuelan people about his fatal condition.

I wrote in the Miami Herald on July 19, 2011, that doctors treating Chávez told him then that he had a 50 percent chance of living 18 months. That was seven months ago. I noted that:

With the ailing dictator off the political stage for at least two months, civic leaders can jump start a transition by laying out a constructive plan for addressing the country’s growing crises. This task is even more urgent, because regime insiders have begun to quietly mobilize their campaign team…

Since then, dozens of my sources with access to Chávez’s inner circle have confirmed my original appraisal about Chávez’s condition. Several publications have revealed additional details about his health. For example, Spain’s ABC newspaper reported on January 23:

The Venezuelan leader’s prostate cancer has metastasized into his bones, spinal cord, and colon, according to medical records accessed by ABC. Chávez should only expect between nine and twelve months of life if he insists on refusing adequate treatment for his cancer…

General Clapper revealed the U.S. government’s devastating assessment of Chávez’s health as part of the U.S. intelligence community’s formal annual report to Congress; he is scheduled to testify before the House of Representatives oversight panel on Thursday.

As I explained last November:

Chávez’s sobering prognosis is a dilemma for Caracas, where Chavista leaders are afraid that their fiercest followers will feel betrayed when they learn his claim to be”cancer-free” turns out to be a big lie…. Chávez wants his people to believe that he was “cured” months ago…. In fact, his physical deterioration is advancing faster than doctors had expected.

Chávez’s periodic public appearances—particularly his nine-hour address before the National Assembly earlier this month—are purposely orchestrated to sow doubts about his true condition and buy time for his co-conspirators to hang on to power as he falters and dies. Ironically, these public encounters are grueling physical challenges for Chávez, and doctors have told him that such public commitments complicate his treatment and recovery.

Many Venezuelans—perhaps most of Chávez’s supporters—have clung to the hope that he might be surviving his bout with his aggressive cancer. The formal testimony of retired U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General James Clapper, the current U.S. director of national intelligence, reveals what intelligence professionals tell President Obama about Chávez’s failing health.

Bipartisan concern over Iran’s creeping shadow in Latin America can be credited for the Obama administration’s decision Saturday to expel a Venezuelan diplomat caught on videotape urging purported hackers to break in to U.S. government websites. Last month, the Spanish-language network Univision aired an hour-long documentary on efforts by Iran and Hezbollah to carry their struggle into the United States’ neighborhood. The program included a videoclip of the Iranian ambassador and Venezuelan diplomat Livia Acosta plotting the cyberattack in 2008, when the two were assigned to their respective embassies in Mexico City. On Saturday, the State Department gave Acosta 72 hours to leave her post at Venezuela’s consulate in Miami.

Immediately after the airing of this expose, Democratic Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey, who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Western Hemisphere panel, and Republican Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida, who presides over the House Foreign Affairs Committee, promised vigorous inquiries into Iran’s activities close to our shores. In December, President Obama said that his administration takes Iran’s activities seriously and is monitoring them closely.

This action demonstrates that the State Department’s complacent posture will no longer sell on Capitol Hill.

Roger Noriega

Burying the Chávez legacy, soon

By Roger Noriega

December 5, 2011, 4:15 pm

Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chávez told a gathering of regional heads of government in Caracas on Saturday that, “Roger Noriega wants me to die.” That’s not quite true. Even less true is Chávez’s unbelievable assertion that four rounds of chemotherapy left him “without a single carcinogenic cell” in his body. Chávez is forced to make such an absurd claim—insulting the intelligence of 30 or so statesmen and 30 million Venezuelans—in a desperate effort to give his corrupt cronies an advantage as they try to hold things together after his impending death.

For the record, I have published on several occasions that the doctors who have been treating Chávez since June believe that his cancer—beginning in the prostate and spreading to his lymph glands, colon, and bones—is terminal. My initial comment on this subject was intended to alert the Venezuelan opposition of the plotting by regime insiders to hold on to power at all costs. “The opposition must get busy to persuade their nation that they offer a healthier vision than Chavismo’s cynical cronies,” I wrote in the Miami Herald in July.

A succession of reports leaked to the AEI Venezuela project from within Chávez’s medical team has confirmed the initial dire assessment. The most recent projection is that he will die before the October 2012 presidential elections.

Chávez’s decision to deceive his people is risky. Indeed, the people most likely to be fooled by his claims are his most fervent followers. So, when their leader eventually succumbs to his illness, his cronies will be left scrambling to hold on to their political base, which they have been lying to for a year. Ironically, Venezuela’s democratic opposition does not seem to be fooled by Chávez’s story, and they appear to be prepared for any contingency. If Chávez is on the ballot next October, an opposition candidate has a chance to beat him; if he is not, the democratic alternative’s prospects improve considerably.

Indeed, when Chávez falters, all bets are off. Once Chávez fades or dies, the military will wield unparalleled power in managing the ensuing chaos. And the military’s current leaders—several of whom have been branded narco-kingpins by U.S. authorities—cannot and will not run the risk of losing power. So, they can be expected to resort to any option—including scuttling the elections and violent repression—to maintain their safe haven. When that happens, Venezuela’s opposition will hope that military leaders loyal to the constitution (along with the world’s democrats) will stand with them.

If that sort of chaotic succession battle ensues, the reaction of the international community—particularly Washington—could be decisive. As a matter of fact, my primary objective in alerting the public to Chávez’s condition has been to awaken slumbering U.S. diplomats who have been sitting on the sidelines as Cubans, Russians, and Chinese fill the power vacuum in Venezuela and the rest of the region. In the coming year, the United States may have to play a legitimate role in insisting that all sides, particularly the regime and its destructive foreign backers, respect a constitutional transition. That means adhering to the current electoral timetable, holding a fair campaign monitored by independent observers, and respecting the results of the election. Although the current Latin America team in the State Department cannot be counted on to get this right, there is reason to hope that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will exert some leadership in the critical months ahead.

Of course, as Washington slumbers, other regional leaders may be called upon to rally a constructive regional response. Some of the men who heard Chávez lie about his immortality on Saturday may soon play a positive role in ensuring a healthy, peaceful transition after he passes. The rescue and rehabilitation of that South American country is in the interest of the entire region.

Regional leaders will find that Venezuela’s opposition is offering a positive alternative for the future. Five extraordinarily decent democrats—four of them in their thirties or early forties—who are competing for votes in a primary to produce a unity candidate next February. Outside observers should also remember that the opposition slate won a majority of the votes in National Assembly elections in September 2010. Moreover, Chávez has been forced to accept defeat when major constitutional reforms were rejected in 2007 and when opposition candidates won state governorships in 2008.

When Chávez dies, he will leave behind a wrecked economy and a polarized nation. If the United States and the international community wake up before it is too late and side with democracy, Venezuelans may soon begin the hard work of burying Chavez’s destructive legacy.

The urgent threat posed by the growing Iran/Hezbollah network in Latin America finally captured the attention of a national audience Tuesday evening as several GOP presidential candidates acknowledged the problem in an AEI-Heritage Foundation debate that aired on CNN. AEI’s Venezuela-Iran project has documented this growing problem.

Former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney declared that Hezbollah’s efforts throughout the region – abetted by Venezuela’s anti-American dictator Hugo Chávez – “poses a significant and imminent threat to the United States.”

Rick Santorum, the former Pennsylvania senator who has studied Hezbollah’s activities in the Hemisphere for years, warned that “militant socialists and radical Islamists are bonding.” In response to a question posed by AEI’s Marc Thiessen at the end of Tuesday’s two-hour debate, Santorum cited this phenomenon in Latin America as a neglected national security threat. He also faulted the Obama administration for coddling Chávez and other U.S. foes and for disrespecting U.S. allies, such as Colombia. “We have sent all the wrong signals to Central and South America,” said Santorum. “They need to know that we are in solidarity with them and want to build strong alliances” in the Americas.

Texas Governor Rick Perry was the first to raise the threat of Iran’s efforts, through its terrorist proxy Hezbollah, to expand its reach into Latin America.

Asked about Mexico’s anti-drug campaign, Perry pledged to do more to support that country. However, the ensuing discussion offered little recognition of the sacrifices being made by Mexico with uneven U.S. support. Instead, the candidates quickly turned to a predictable exchange on immigration, “amnesty,” and border security.

Romney and Santorum appeared to have a greater command of Iran’s aggressive push into the region, but Perry deserves credit for raising the issue. Late last night, a “tweet” by Mexico’s ambassador to the United States, Arturo Sarukahn, took issue with several comments in which candidates suggested a rampant terrorist presence in Mexico. He cited a State Department counterterrorism report – despite the fact that U.S. diplomats routinely admit to knowing little if anything about this problem.

Fidel Castro’s vastly over-rated healthcare system may finally have achieved something noteworthy: killing Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chávez. According to an investigative report authored by Leonardo Coutinho and Duda Teixeira that appeared in Brazil’s premier newsmagazine Veja on Saturday (November 19), Cuban doctors at that country’s premier medical facility bungled the initial treatment of Chávez’s prostate cancer and may have rushed him to an early grave.

The Brazilian report, which quotes several of that country’s cancer specialists and urologists, delivers a damning assessment of the Cuban care:

[In July 2011] Chavez was hospitalized in Havana [at the Center for Medical and Surgical Research (CIMEQ)] to remove the prostate tumor. Surgery, not recommended for cases of neoplasia in this gland with metastasis, may have been a very serious medical error that accelerated the spread of cancer. A second surgery was carried out…. From that moment on, European physicians with imported equipment directed the therapy. The Cubans were relegated to the role of observers. [Emphasis added]

The Veja report cites Brazilian medical specialists to describe the substandard equipment and treatment at CIMEQ, a facility reserved for the dictatorship’s elite and dollar-paying tourists.

A second fatal decision was self-inflicted. Chávez must have known from the beginning that his cancer was terminal, because he opted to continue receiving treatment in Cuba in order to keep his country in the dark about his true condition. For example, Veja reveals for the first time that foreign minister Nicolas Maduro traveled to Brazil in early July to consult with that country’s leading oncologists at the Sîrio-Lebanese Hospital of São Paulo. Rather than transfer to that renowned Brazilian facility, where the current and previous presidents of Brazil have been treated for cancer, Chávez preferred to risk care in Cuba to keep his people from knowing the truth.

Will Sicko movie-maker Michael Moore return to Cuba to interview the miracle workers who gave Chávez the care he deserved? Now that’s a sequel worth seeing.

This post is part of an ongoing series preparing for the AEI/CNN/Heritage National Security & Foreign Policy GOP presidential debate on November 22. See the rest of the posts here.

Iran is using Venezuela as a platform to project its asymmetrical warfare into the Western Hemisphere and to sustain its illicit nuclear program. According to documents of the regime of anti-American radical Hugo Chávez, Iran has laundered about $30 billion through the Venezuelan economy to evade international sanctions.

Moreover, Iran is seeking to exploit uranium in Venezuela, Ecuador, and elsewhere in the region, with Chávez’s facilitation. It also is working through its terror proxy Hezbollah to cultivate a network of radicalized operatives in a dozen countries in the region, centered in Venezuela but making significant progress in Brazil and Colombia, among others. The recent plot fostered by Iran’s Qods Force to commit a terrorist bombing in the heart of Washington, D.C., is undeniable evidence of Tehran’s determination to strike against U.S. targets in the event of preemptive military action against its illegal nuclear program.

In addition to Iran, other U.S. enemies or rivals have constructed mutually beneficial alliances with the Chávez regime and are co-conspirators with his anti-U.S. project. China is moving quickly to displace Western oil companies from Venezuela’s oil industry. Russia has sold $9 billion in arms (including weapons that have been transshipped to terrorist groups) and is planning to build Chávez a nuclear power plant “for peaceful purposes,” as it did for Iran. Cuba has dispatched 30,000 personnel to Venezuela, with many embedded in Chávez’s internal security apparatus. Narcotraffickers operate with the full complicity of the Chávez regime, converting Venezuela into a hub for smuggling cocaine to North America and Europe and wreaking havoc in Colombia, Central America, and Mexico.

The United States is pursuing a passive policy toward Chávez, choosing not to engage these security challenges for fear of generating a bilateral confrontation with his regime. Unfortunately, the White House has failed to learn the lesson that Chávez has continued on his dangerous path aided by our silence. Our enemies read U.S. indifference as a green light to join Chávez’s conspiracy, and our friends believe that we do not know or do not care what is happening in Latin America.

The next U.S. president will have to deal with the “toxic waste” left behind by the cancer-ridden Chávez, whom doctors expect to succumb prior to the Venezuelan election or early in his next term. Democratic opposition candidates each would represent a more constructive relationship with Venezuela’s traditional U.S. partner, but Chávez’s inner circle is plotting to hold on to power at all costs.

Will the United States continue to sit on the sidelines or, worse yet, signal to Chavistas that we will tolerate unconstitutional maneuvering by their collapsing regime? Will U.S. agencies be prepared to help democratic partners neutralize the Iranian and Hezbollah threat? The next president may have time to use effective diplomacy, effective sanctions, law enforcement, and other means to ensure that Chávez’s anti-Americanism axis does not continue to pose a grave and growing threat to U.S. interests and values.

Ortega loses! (Wait a second…)

By Margaret McCarthy

November 8, 2011, 5:10 pm

This headline should make you look twice for two reasons. The first, of course, being that President Ortega did not actually lose the Nicaraguan elections last Sunday. He won his third term as president by a landslide, according to the numbers posted on La Prensa.

The second reason this headline is ridiculous is that the kind of credibility which a leader who is elected in Ortega’s fashion should lose has not been lost. In October 2009, a Corte Suprema ruling—by the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) dominated court—decreed that the constitutional limitations restricting an individual to two terms as president, as well as outlawing consecutive presidential terms, was unconstitutional. (Subsequently, Ortega ignored the legislature’s outcry that the supreme court did not have the authority to overturn such a provision, and in a related ruling in January 2010, Ortega extended some of the FSLN judges’ terms on the court, which effectively stacked the court in his favor). Ortega was elected Sunday for his third term, and will hold this post consecutive to his second.

Reports are currently being issued about complaints of government intimidation at the polls, OAS and EU election observers being kept out of polling stations, and the subsequent non-acceptance of the election results by the opposition and independent observers. The seemingly buoyant argument that Ortega has helped the poor in Nicaragua and this is how he won the election (Nicaragua is the second poorest country in the hemisphere next to Haiti) falls flat when one explores the widespread discontent with Ortega’s rule, as well as the unsustainable nature of funds for improvement projects (the Ortega-Chavez partnership).

What should be lost to Ortega, more than simple EU reports of inadequate elections and U.S. State Department press briefings highlighting election irregularities, is his ability to conduct business in Latin America in this way. As much as the “words will never hurt me” refrain is true on the preschool playground, it is also true in this case of international diplomacy. Consider diplomatic sanctions, from the limitation of bilateral relations to limitation of Nicaragua’s rights as a member of the OAS or UN until election irregularities can be addressed. Deal with Nicaragua’s economic (ALBA) link to Venezuela under the IMF framework.

The fact that none of this is likely to be considered is just one additional way in which Ortega has won an election widely recognized as fraudulent and undemocratic.

Qods Force plot foreshadowed by official rhetoric

By Will Fulton

October 12, 2011, 2:16 pm

The foiled attempt by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to stage a brazen terrorist attack against a Saudi target on U.S. soil should come as little surprise if one considers the recent rhetoric of Iran’s military leadership. As AEI Resident Fellow Ali Alfoneh notes in his piece published yesterday on CNN, IRGC-QF commander Qassem Soleimani—sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury for his involvement in the assassination plot, his third such designation—has alluded to his organization’s desire to expand its operations as recently as May 22, 2011: “Today, Iran’s victory or defeat is no longer decided in Mehran or Khorramshahr. Our boundaries have expanded and we must witness victory in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.” On April 19, 2011, the official organ of the IRGC, Sobh-e Sadeq, warned Saudi Arabia that “they must certainly pay a very high price” for their deployment of troops in Bahrain. One day later, former commander of the IRGC and current military adviser to Iran’s supreme leader Yahya Rahim Safavi further warned Saudi Arabia of potential retaliation for its military action in Bahrain. These bellicose remarks were each made during the period in which Manssor Arbabsiar and IRGC-QF deputy Abdul Reza Shahlai began planning their terrorist attack. While the fantastical details of an operation that FBI Director Robert Mueller said “reads like the pages of a Hollywood script” may raise questions about the feasibility of the plot’s success, the aggressive rhetoric emanating from the upper echelons of the IRGC signals the organization’s desire and intent to implement such an attack.

Will Fulton is a Critical Threats Project analyst at the American Enterprise Institute.

Startling revelations by Attorney General Eric Holder on Tuesday that Iran’s Quds Force plotted murderous attacks in the heart of Washington, D.C., should shred the conventional wisdom that Tehran and its terrorist proxies would never risk a strike on American soil. Iran is clearly prepared to carry their fight, quite literally, to our doorstep. What are we prepared to do?

An AEI project scrutinizing Iran’s dangerous nexus with Venezuela’s anti-U.S. regime has been sounding the alarm about Iran’s growing operational capabilities in Latin America for many months. Until now, senior U.S. security officials and diplomats have deliberately minimized reports of provocative activities by Iran’s Quds Force and Hezbollah—despite the fact that they are taking place right under our noses with the enthusiastic, open support of the Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chávez and acolytes in Ecuador and Bolivia. Perhaps now U.S. officials will take steps to assess and respond to this grave and growing threat.

Just last week, my colleague Jose Cardenas and I issued an AEI report entitled, “The Mounting Hezbollah Threat in Latin America,” that made the following key points:

1.         With Iran’s direct support, at least two parallel yet collaborative terrorist networks are growing at an alarming rate in Latin America. One is operated by Hezbollah and aided by its collaborators in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and the other is managed by the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

2.         These terrorist networks are sharing their terrorist experiences and techniques with Mexican drug cartels along the U.S. border and have established deep relations with other transnational criminal organizations.

3.         These two networks encompass more than eighty operatives in at least twelve countries throughout the region (with the greatest areas of focus being Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, and Chile).

As the AEI report concluded:

U.S. and other government authorities have identified and sanctioned some of the leaders of these networks, and US law enforcement agencies—led by the Drug Enforcement Administration—have made great efforts to assess and confront this threat by building cases against foreign officials and sanctioning commercial entities that provide support to this criminal terror organization.

However, this dangerous network requires a whole-government strategy, beginning with an inter-agency review to understand and assess the transnational, multifaceted nature of the problem; educate friendly governments; and implement effective measures unilaterally and with willing partners to disrupt and dismantle their operations.

In today’s Washington Post, I write about the need for a debate devoted exclusively to foreign policy, and suggest some national security questions every candidate should have to answer before voters go to the polls. I asked a number of leading conservative national security thinkers what they would ask the candidates if given the chance. Here are some additional questions they suggested:

•         Your views on balancing the budget are very clear. Yet the U.S. military faces an unprecedented challenge: 1) continuing current operations in the war against al Qaeda, 2) resetting a force suffering from a decade of constant combat, and 3) investing in systems that will help us deal with the growing power of China. Which of these are you willing to reduce or sacrifice to meet your fiscal goals?

•         There is considerable discussion because of cuts to defense spending that we should “bring the troops home” from various overseas bases. Is that something you favor? If so, where would you draw down, and why? If not, why not?

•         Since the end of the Cold War, the grand strategy of the United States has been in effect, to paraphrase President Bush’s words, to create a balance of power in the world that favors freedom. However, when the bipartisan review commission led by Stephen Hadley and William Perry examined the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review, they noted that this strategy was in jeopardy because, among other things, the military budget was inadequate for “recapitalizing” the services that had been living largely off the Reagan-era build up. If elected, would you either change American grand strategy to fit the defense budget? Or, would you reverse defense cuts in order to sustain that grand strategy?

•         Most experts agree that the greatest limiting factor in strengthening American cyber defenses is a lack of clear policy guidance to employ the offensive capabilities we already possess. How would you create a national consensus on what we want, and will allow, the government to do in cyber space?

•         How would you exercise civilian control over the military? When would you overrule a general?

•         Under what conditions would you employ U.S. forces abroad?

•         What is your view of the United Nations’ role in the world?

•         How has President Obama failed our allies? Give three examples.

•         What will you do to complete and preserve the victories in Iraq and Afghanistan? Is victory the proper objective in Afghanistan? If so, what would victory look like? And what is your vision for the residual (post-2014) American footprint in Afghanistan?

•         What would you do about the two biggest dangers that remain in the greater Middle East: Pakistan and Iran, one already with nukes and the other on the verge?

•         Should the United States have done more when the people of Iran rose up against their own government, only to be massacred in the streets? If so, what would you have done?

•         Syria is massacring its own people. What would you do about Syria?

•         How would you deal with countries in the Middle East that don’t share our values or form of government, but yet are partners in other areas?

•         Is the Israeli-Palestinian dispute the central issue in the Middle East?

•         Should it matter in our policies in the Middle East that Israel is a democracy?

•         What is your position on extending FISA authorities for terrorist surveillance, which are due to expire?

•         Will you commit to keeping in place the guidelines that make the FBI an intelligence-gathering agency, and not simply a law enforcement agency?

•         What authority do you favor on intelligence gathering from, and interrogation and detention of, unlawful combatants?

•         Russia today occupies parts of Georgia, and Russian democracy and civil liberties continue to move in the wrong direction. Do you agree or disagree with the premises of Obama’s “reset”? Can Russia be a real partner for the United States and how would you engage Moscow?

•         What is your view of nation building? Should we do it, and if so, how can we do it better?

•         Do you support continuing the U.S. embargo in Cuba, and what would you do to increase pressure for Democratic change in Havana?

•         Mexico’s current president has waged a frontal war against drug traffickers that has sparked turf wars among the narco-traffickers costing 35,000 lives in the last five years. What can we do to reassure Mexicans so that they choose a new president next year who will keep up the anti-drug offensive?

•         The United States has ceded its leadership in this hemisphere to Castro acolyte Hugo Chavez, who is an ally of Iran, Hezbollah, and narco-traffickers in our own neighborhood. As Fidel fades and Chavez struggles with cancer and reelection, how do we put freedom on the march and defend our security interests?

In the Washington Post this morning, I write about the pathetic state of the foreign policy discussion in last night’s presidential debate. The candidates spent just nine minutes of the two-hour discussion on national security—and most of that was spent arguing over how quickly America should withdraw from Afghanistan, and whether America brought the 9/11 attacks upon itself.

It is with this backdrop that Senator Marco Rubio takes the stage tonight at the Jesse Helms Center in Wingate, North Carolina, with a major address on “America’s Role in the World.” Rubio’s office released the following excerpts this morning. The only thing wrong with Rubio’s remarks is that they were not delivered on the debate stage last night—by any of the current candidates or by Rubio himself.

ON AMERICA’S ROLE IN THE WORLD

Fundamentally, I believe the world is a better place when the United States is strong and prosperous. I do not believe that America has the power or means to solve every issue in the world. But I do believe there are some critically important issues where America does have a meaningful role to play in resolving crises that are tied to our national interests.

If we refuse to play our rightful role and shrink from the world, America and the entire world will pay a terrible price. And it is our responsibility to clearly outline to the American people what our proper role in the world is and what American interests are at stake when we engage abroad …

Continue reading

A secret document unveiled this morning by an opposition Venezuelan congressman discloses the extraordinarily risky decision by Venezuela’s ailing dictator Hugo Chávez to transfer all of Venezuela’s $29 billion in gold and cash reserves from Swiss, British, and U.S. banks to accounts in China and Russia. Such an unprecedented move could destroy international confidence in Venezuela, wipe out citizens’ savings, and suffocate an already faltering economy.

That the regime would take such an unusually dangerous move shows that Chávez’s cronies are worried that he may lose his bout with cancer and they may have to cede power. Evidently, they are more concerned with their own fate than for the well-being of the Venezuelan people. It is not too late to halt this plan, if the people can be rallied to oppose the looting of the nation’s savings. This is an opportunity for democratic politicians to show they can lead their nation out of the mess created by 12 years of Chavismo.

Any responsible person would accept that Venezuela’s international reserves should not be moved until the people understand how this decision will impact their lives, jobs, and savings. According to experts I have consulted, every Venezuelan will suffer if these funds are moved to less reliable banks. Venezuela’s currency may be devalued, shortages of imported goods will worsen, and companies that rely on foreign exchange will be strangled. Of course, the very poorest people, who Chávez claims to champion, will perhaps suffer the most. Like the rest of the country, they are being abandoned by cynical individuals who covet wealth and power that happens to belong to someone else.

It is clear that Chávez’s men want access to Venezuela’s $29 billion in gold and cash because they are worried about losing power. The fact that this decision was manufactured in secret during Chávez’s stay in Cuba shows that Castro and Chávez’s cronies want to preserve their access to Venezuela’s riches. Patriotic members of the military should be concerned that they are left without a future and options while Castro and Chávez’s inner circle protect their selfish interests.

This precipitous decision to take Venezuela’s international reserves out of secure accounts in Europe and the United States and to move them to China and Russia will likely lead global capital markets to conclude that Venezuela is not a reliable country. Venezuela will no longer have the “international reserves” that are required to sustain any modern economy. The ability of the state-owned oil company, PDVSA, and the republic to generate capital and attract investment will be seriously affected. And, placing these precious reserves in banks belonging to Venezuela’s biggest creditors in China and Russia may suit Chávez’s friends in those countries, but it is an unacceptable risk for the Venezuelan people.

Why notoriously corrupt leaders would want to get their hands on billions in gold is not a very complicated question. However, it is important to note that one of the reasons cited explicitly by Chávez’s decision document is the possibility that Venezuelan funds or dollar-denominated transactions could be frozen by the United States. Surely, Chávez’s advisors know that U.S. laws allow such sanctions only in the case of narcostates, sponsors of terrorism, or mass murderers. We know that Chávez’s brother has pledged an armed struggle to keep power and his army chief has said he would never accept the election of an opposition president next December 2012. But, are Chávez’s would-be successors planning Qaddafi- or Assad-style massacres? If they would go that far, why would they even run the risk of holding a campaign and elections?

The idea that Chávistas would resort to brutal repression or would cancel next year’s presidential elections is unthinkable to many. But, just yesterday, few would have imagined that Chávez and his cronies would have risked the country’s economy and people for his own political advantage and selfish personal interests. If Chávez succeeds in treating the country’s international reserves as a petty cash box or pension fund for his inner circle, Venezuela’s fate will be forfeited to another generation of dangerous leaders.

 

Last month, chairman of the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen; chairman of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Rep. Connie Mack; and subcommittee member Rep. David Rivera sent a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton calling attention to a paper trail suggesting cooperation among Venezuela, Argentina, and Iran, and to their shared interest in obtaining nuclear technology. Former National Security Council official Jose Cardenas reveals the State Department’s dismissive response in a piece this week.

Rather than make the slightest effort to connect the dots on what these hostile regimes might be up to under our noses, the State Department rushed to quash the inquiry, saying in a July 27 reply, “We have no reason to believe that Venezuela serves as an interlocutor with between Iran and Argentina on nuclear issues, nor that Argentina is granting Iran access to its nuclear technology.”

Here is some of the evidence (which was provided to the State Department) that stirred Congress’s interest: A document obtained from the Venezuelan regime bears the signature of Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chávez authorizing a secret payment last year of $250 million to Argentina for suspicious projects carried out alongside Iran. Another secret memorandum recounts a conversation in which Argentine official Julio DeVido offers Venezuelan Vice President Elias Jaua nuclear cooperation, and a third document substantiates Caracas’s close cooperation with Tehran “in the field of nuclear technology.”

The foregoing evidence was met with indifference at the State Department. One would think from its swift and sweeping response that State knows all that there is to know about Venezuela. Unfortunately, that is hardly the case. In congressional testimony last month, senior State Department officials minimized Hezbollah’s activities in the Americas and asserted that a suspicious Caracas-to-Tehran airline route was inactive. By tapping my sources in the region, I have been able to substantiate the activities of dozens of Hezbollah contacts and widespread recruiting, training, and fund-raising activities in the region, abetted by Venezuelan officials and by a notorious Iranian cleric, Mohsen Rabbani. It took me all of two minutes to confirm that the Caracas-to-Tehran flight departs every other Saturday from Chávez’s private hangar, as it has for years; there’s a reason the flight has been dubbed AeroTerror by Brazilian investigators.

Perhaps the State Department’s Latin America team is content to be in the dark when it comes to the threat of Venezuela’s alliance with Iran. But it is very serious, indeed, for the department to withhold facts from an inquisitive U.S. Congress about the breadth and depth of those dangerous liaisons.

• What is the true nature of the Argentina-Iran-Venezuela cooperation, and why have these programs been carried out in secret?
• What, if any, projects have been carried out in Venezuela to justify a $250 million payment to Argentina?
• Have Argentine authorities accounted for the payment of about $250 million? If not, where is this money today?
• Have Argentine nuclear experts had any contact with or provided any information, technology, or material to Venezuela or Iran since 1992?

Congress should be commended for raising these questions, and it must be as determined to get the facts as the State Department is to evade them.

Iran’s offer to cooperate with Argentina in the investigation of the 1994 bombing of the Jewish Community Center (AMIA) in Buenos Aires is shocking, in light of Tehran’s apparent complicity in that attack. Alberto Nisman, the independent prosecutor in the terrorism case, reacted to the offer by challenging Tehran to surrender the Iranian officials who organized the bombing. By contrast, the rather obsequious reaction of Argentina’s foreign minister, Hector Timmerman, raises troubling questions about the true nature of the relationship between the Ahmadinejad and Kirchner governments.

Monday marked the 17th anniversary of the car-bombing, which leveled the AMIA center in the heart of Argentina’s capital, killing 85 people; two years earlier, a few blocks away, the Israeli embassy was destroyed in another attack, which claimed 29 lives. Argentine and U.S. authorities have concluded that both bombings were the work of a Hezbollah cell coordinated and supported by the Iranian embassy. Iranian officials posted in Buenos Aires at the time, including Mohsen Rabbani, and Tehran’s current defense minister Ahmad Vahidi, have Interpol warrants pending against them for the crime. The prosecutor Nisman has theorized that the attacks were related to a decision by then President Carlos Saul Menem to terminate Argentina’s cooperation with Iran’s nuclear program around 1992.

That troubling story will not go away. Just last week, U.S. congressional leaders asked the Department of State to investigate whether Iran and Argentina have renewed nuclear cooperation in a deal brokered and paid for by Venezuela. Their July 15 letter cited “reports that in 2007 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad allegedly asked [Venezuelan leader] Hugo Chávez to intercede with President Nestor Kirchner to change Argentine policy to allow Iran access to Argentine technology” to aid Iran’s “nuclear program.”  The letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, sent by the chairman of the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen; chairman of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Rep. Connie Mack; and subcommittee member, Rep. David Rivera, referred to Venezuelan documents that are now in the hands of the State Department.

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Danielle Pletka

What about Chavez?

By Danielle Pletka

June 29, 2011, 11:36 am

Over at Foxnews.com, my colleague Roger Noriega has his take on events in Venezuela. He previews a possible descent into chaos — a battle royal between Chavistas, narco-generals, Cuban drones, and, we hope, democrats. Thus far, those democrats appear to be in scant evidence as Chavez’s short sojourn in Cuban hospital (aaah, the healthcare!) turns into an extended drama.

But there are other democrats silent, including the notably reticent Obama administration. The United States has a keen interest in Venezuela, not just because it is the source of 10 percent of our oil imports and because it is a source of deadly instability to our south, but also because Iran has established an important beachhead in the country that threatens the hemisphere and our territory in ways that Tehran cannot from the Middle East. Perhaps Obama will say something at his presser today. Perhaps we are really doing something to aide Chavez’s opposition. Somehow, on both counts, I doubt it.

(UN Photo/Marco Castro)

The U.S. government’s decision to sanction Venezuela’s state-run oil company, PDVSA (Petroleos de Venezuela, SA), is the first formal acknowledgment by Washington of Hugo Chávez’s critical support for the nuclear-terrorist regime in Iran. The significance of today’s announcement reaches well beyond the several targeted measures. It represents a powerful message to the financial markets, the banking community, and legitimate businesses in the United States and elsewhere that transactions with PDVSA or the government of Venezuela are very risky business.

Starting today, the Venezuelan people will begin to see the dire consequences of Chávez’s liaisons with bandit regimes, terrorists, and drug traffickers. And, as the depth and breadth of Chávez’s alliance with Iran is exposed, the world will know that the regime in Caracas has become an indispensable co-conspirator with Iran’s terror network and illegal nuclear program.

Since 2009, AEI’s Venezuela-Iran project has revealed the extent of PDVSA’s involvement in suspicious transactions, particularly the sale of gasoline to Iran in violation of the spirit and the letter of U.S. law and UN resolutions. For far too long, U.S. diplomats and others have claimed ignorance as an excuse for inaction. By today’s action, that provocative policy of willful neglect may have come to an end.

AEI will continue to work with Congress, U.S. law enforcement, and other willing prosecutors to expose and confront this dangerous “caudillo-mullah” axis.

Among the other activities that must be investigated fully and sanctioned urgently are:

—Iran’s mining of uranium and other strategic minerals in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and elsewhere.
—Iran’s use of the Venezuelan banking system to circumvent UN sanctions and to project its network into key neighboring countries, such as Brazil.
—Chávez’s material support for a sprawling Hezbollah terrorist network for drug-trafficking, fund-raising, recruitment, training, and operations in the Americas.
—The presence of Iranian military installations, weapons, and other equipment in Venezuelan territory.

Above all, the decision by the administration to sanction PDVSA’s illicit behavior is a tribute to the tenacity of congressional leaders who have demanded action that the administration hold Chávez’s lawless regime accountable. These measures demonstrate the critical role that law enforcement agencies will play in undermining this growing threat.

The impending departure of Arturo Valenzuela as assistant secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere provides Secretary of State Hillary Clinton with an opportunity to name a more creative “operator” to jumpstart an urgent review of the mounting challenges to U.S. interests in the Americas:

— A policy of trying to ignore the threat of Chavismo in Venezuela and beyond has sent a signal that the United States is indifferent to the glaring fact that his regime is a co-conspirator with Iran, Middle Eastern terrorists, and narcotraffickers.

— China has been emboldened by U.S. passivity, crossing red lines to sell weapons to the Chávez regime (with some apparently bound for Middle Eastern friends) and to underwrite Iranian uranium exploration in Venezuela.

— It has been virtually ignored that China is gradually replacing the United States as a customer for Venezuelan oil, with exports to the United States dipping from well over 2 million barrels per day of Venezuelan crude a decade ago to well under 1 million today. In the meantime, China’s imports have skyrocketed.

— Mexico’s President Felipe Calderón was forced to confront President Obama at a visit to Washington as promised U.S. anti-drug aid had slowed to a trickle and the U.S. ambassador’s meddling undermined Calderón’s strategy to get Mexican security forces to work as a team.

— Haitians are entering a second year since the cataclysmic earthquake, with reconstruction efforts grinding to a halt.

— The Organization of American States is brain-dead, unable to respond to a wave of corrupt, authoritarian Hugo Chávez cronies in Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Argentina.

— Two trade agreements (with Colombia and Panama) have been jumpstarted by congressional Republicans but face an uncertain future unless President Obama is prepared to round up Democratic votes.

The list of challenges has grown under Valenzuela, who will return to Georgetown University after a two-year leave of absence. Although he is widely regarded as a decent, thoughtful expert with exceptional personal relationships with the region’s leaders, many observers sensed that Valenzuela’s heart was not in the job. His nonchalant handling of sharp questions at recent House and Senate oversight hearings (over the administration’s handling of Cuba and Venezuela) left observers from across the political spectrum wondering if he even wanted the post.

According to professional friends, Valenzuela was appalled that he had to wrestle over policy with NSC staffer Dan Restrepo, whom he considered a neophyte with sharp elbows. Valenzuela was consigned to putting out fires, and senior career foreign service officers say that his left-of-center instincts cost him the confidence of his pragmatic boss on the 7th floor.

President Obama does not have a deep bench of “politicals” on Latin America issues, and it is likely that the administration will opt for a career foreign service officer to try to stop the slide in U.S. influence in the region.

One possible candidate favored by old hands on Capitol Hill is William R. Brownfield, who has a reputation among Latin America observers as a clever, fearless, and effective bureaucrat. Brownfield also has earned the favor of Secretary Clinton, who appointed him to State’s senior counterdrug and law enforcement post. Some wonder if he would cede a multi-billion dollar budget to return to a regional bureau, but most conclude that he will go where Clinton needs him most.

Last week President Obama raised eyebrows, including even at the Washington Post editorial page, with this endorsement of expanded offshore oil drilling—in Brazil—along with an eagerness for Brazil to export more oil to the United States. As the incredulous Post asked:

WHEN WAS the last time an American president stood before an audience in a foreign country and announced that he looked forward to importing more of its oil? Answer: Just over a week ago, when President Obama joined political and business leaders in Brasilia in hailing the fact that their newly discovered offshore petroleum reserves might be twice as large as those in the United States. Americans “want to help with technology and support to develop these oil reserves safely, and when you’re ready to start selling, we want to be one of your best customers,” Mr. Obama said.

One of the clichés of the energy conversation that no one bothers to check is that Brazil “got off oil” through its aggressive push for ethanol and flex-fuel vehicles. In fact, Brazil made a political decision back in the 1970s that it did not wish to be vulnerable to the price shocks that the various Middle Eastern crises delivered to its economy, as it was much more dependent on foreign oil back then than the United States was. In 1980, Brazil imported 77 percent of its oil. Today, Brazil imports 0.0 percent of its oil needs.

Has it replaced oil with something else? Hardly. As Figure 1 shows, Brazilian oil production has increased 876 percent since 1980, and oil consumption has increased 119 percent. Brazil is now self-sufficient in oil on account of its aggressive exploration and development policies. As Figure 2 shows, Brazil has gone from supplying only 23 percent of its oil needs to having a slight production surplus in 2009. With more large offshore discoveries, Brazil is now well positioned to become an oil-exporting nation.

To be sure, while Brazil’s pursuit of ethanol and other measures reduced the total amount of oil it needs, to say that Brazil “got off oil” is completely wrong. And the next question is: Why can’t the United States do something like this?

Mexican President Felipe Calderón will meet with President Obama today in Washington at a time of tension between the two governments and between the two countries. President Calderón has expressed his frustration with our relations in recent days, using unusually harsh criticism of our ambassador and of our sluggish anti-drug support. To be sure, this is a time for frank discussion—not just between two leaders, but between two societies. And that dialogue should start with a simple recognition that we are both indispensable allies in a war that threatens both of us.

Commentators and journalists on U.S. television frequently refer to violence “spilling over from Mexico,” as if sealing the border would fix the problem, along with the illegal immigration. However, according to the U.S. Department of Justice, the biggest organized threat in this country today is the drug trafficking organizations based in Mexico, which use U.S. gangs to market illegal drugs and terrorize anyone who gets in the way of their deadly trade. The fact is, Mexico is fighting the other end of the same beast that threatens the health and security of every American.

The costs on both sides of the border are staggering. The law enforcement offensive launched by Calderón has touched off violent turf wars that have claimed 30,000 lives in the last several years; the vast majority of the dead were complicit in the drug trade, but the lives of innocent Mexicans, police personnel, and soldiers have been lost, too. And, let’s not forget that 20,000 Americans die every year due to the abuse of illicit drugs.

Mexicans point out that the demand for cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana in the United States is the root of this evil. And Americans expect that law enforcement south of the border should be more effective in stopping the flow of these illegal products. But we can avoid falling into the trap of futile finger-pointing by accepting that this is a shared challenge, and meeting it is a shared responsibility.

The stakes are extraordinarily high, in terms of our shared economic future and our common security. Not even the most skeptical U.S. critic of Mexico would want to see a country with which we share a 2,000-mile border—as well as the closest cultural, familial, and commercial ties—devolve into chaos. And Mexicans who expect more help from the United States surely recognize that they will pay the highest price if they fail to sustain Calderón’s campaign to modernize Mexico by strengthening the rule of law through building professional police and effective courts. Reverting to a “truce” with these violent, diabolical gangs will exact a high price from both countries.

What Mexicans need most of all, apart from specialized technical support and law enforcement cooperation, is solidarity.  They need to know that the superpower on their border stands with them and has “skin in the game.” President Obama and his cabinet officers have repeated this often enough, and he has team of professionals at the Department of Homeland Security who get it. Clearly, material support must be delivered with a greater sense of urgency. However, there is no substitute for solid political support—not just for Calderón, but for his successor (who will be chosen next year) and for the people and institutions of Mexico who are bearing the brunt of the battle.

Republicans need to step up to this responsibility, as well. Conservative leaders who were at the forefront of supporting Colombia a decade ago (which helped convert that country from a problem to an ally in the global drug fight) are virtually silent when it comes to helping Mexico. Some may be more comfortable criticizing, perhaps playing to an anxious base that is comfortable thinking of this as a foreign problem. The least these conservatives in Congress can offer is sufficient, effective funding for our anti-drug aid. What will make a remarkable difference are explicit commitments to sustained political support for Mexico, recognizing that our neighbors have been carrying more than their share of the burden in this drug fight. This is more than an opportunity for bipartisan leadership. It is a problem that demands such a commitment.

Why is such solidarity with an ally in a war so difficult to muster? The answer to that question is deeply rooted in the 19th century. Going back a bit further, we find a genuine solution: “Love thy neighbor.”

Image by Pete Souza.

pletka-missilesGood news on international cooperation from Moscow this morning: Russia will help Venezuela build its first nuclear plant. In light of revelations from AEI’s Roger Noriega about Venezuela’s secret cooperation with Iran, this is troubling indeed. And there’s more. News agency Ria Novosti reports that Russia may sell the S-300 missiles it had planned to sell to Tehran to Venezuela instead. One wonders why Chavez needs the S-300, except possibly for the same reasons the Iranians had hoped to secure the advanced air defense systems. But there’s another question: having canceled the deal with Iran, are the Russians merely searching for a reasonable cutout to make the deal nonetheless? Venezuela has become a vital beachhead for Iran, and Chavez and Ahmadinejad are tight (Chavez is headed to Iran right now for yet another visit). One might reasonably suspect that any weaponry headed for Caracas could easily find its way to Tehran.

Image by Broken Sphere/Wikimedia Commons.

Roger Noriega

Waterloo for Lt. Col. Chavez?

By Roger Noriega

September 27, 2010, 12:52 pm

chavez-dignifiedVenezuela’s democratic opposition leaders say that they have scored a stunning victory in yesterday’s national assembly elections, with their slate of candidates winning a slight majority of the popular votes cast. Because Venezuelan caudillo Hugo Chavez rigged the rules, the opposition’s majority vote would translate into only about 64 of the 165 assembly seats. But that would leave Chavez with no more than 101 seats—less than the super-majority he needs to force through major reforms.

Now comes the crucial test for the opposition, as they mobilize to demand an honest count and “fair” apportionment of the assembly.

Last night’s results left the bombastic Chavez speechless. He skipped his traditional post-election rally from the presidential palace’s “Balcony of the People” because he literally had nothing to say. His handlers gave him draft remarks for four possible scenarios, but none of them anticipated the major defeat in which Chavez failed to win the two-thirds majority.

Chavez is a master of bouncing back from defeat. No doubt, he is huddling with advisors now, deciding whether to risk a showdown by denying the opposition the symbolic majority in the popular vote or by claiming to have won the requisite 110 seats that will allow him to maintain a rubberstamp legislature. The first test will be whether he can bully his cadre of key supporters to back him in such a provocative course. If so, he will have no trouble rallying his supporters to the streets to try to impose phony results. However, they will be met by an ascendant and emboldened opposition that can credibly claim, “We are the majority.”

Chavez may decide that the wiser course of action is to fudge the popular vote count, stealing a narrow majority for his slate of candidates but acknowledging that he has failed to win the two-thirds of the assembly. There is precedent for this sort of response. In the case of recent electoral setbacks, Chavez stole sufficient votes to give himself a “moral victory” and to claim that he is a “democrat.” Then, he recovers by denying his opponents any effective power. For example, in 2008, after conceding the loss of the mayor’s office in Caracas and several key governorships, Chavez proceeded to strip those posts of all resources and power.

What’s an electoral toss-up in Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela? Tails, he wins; heads, you lose.

Moreover, months ago, Chavez laid the legal groundwork for moving more power to “communal councils,” giving him the option of bleeding power from a troublesome national assembly under the guise of empowering the masses.

However, there is no denying that the “Movement for Democratic Unity” has won a significant political victory that only a few enthusiastic backers might have predicted weeks ago. By refusing to boycott the process, the movement’ s leaders put their faith in the Venezuelan people ahead of their fears about Chavez’s electoral shenanigans. And, by proposing a unified national slate of candidates, they denied Chavez the opportunity to split the opposition vote.

Of course, by renewing some confidence in the electoral process, the democratic opposition has raised the stakes for Chavez in the upcoming 2012 presidential votes. One can hope that the opposition will stay unified as he pulls out all the stops to win reelection.

Although U.S. policy makers will take some solace that the opposition has flourished despite being abandoned by Washington, an electoral setback for Chavez does not necessarily spell instant relief for our security interests. Wishful thinking might suggest that Chavez’s trouble at home might clip his wings and force him to retreat from his international adventurism. However, it is just as likely that he will be forced to solidify his ties to the ruthless regimes in Iran, Cuba, China, and Russia that specialize in holding on to power.

At the very least, the U.S. national security establishment must pay greater attention to these growing, troubling relationships and begin to fashion an effective strategy for defending our interests. That is a process that U.S. foreign policy makers can no longer boycott.

Image by Bernardo Londoy.

chavezIt doesn’t take a rocket scientist to know why Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez would want a nuclear bomb. Although most observers would dismiss the notion of Chavez building such a weapon, a man who used to help build them for the United States didn’t think the idea was so crazy.

Last Friday, the FBI revealed the arrest and indictment of two U.S. citizens accused of plotting to help Venezuela obtain a nuclear bomb. Accused nuclear scientist Pedro Leonardo Mascheroni, who was convinced that he was talking to a representative of the Chavez regime (rather than an FBI undercover agent), offers the following rationale for such a dangerous program:

A deterrence against the U.S. based on conventional weapons is highly inadequate … Venezuela cannot develop deterrence against a U.S. invasion using conventional weapons … The only option for Venezuela is to develop nuclear deterrence … Venezuela would show the world that [it] is a mature nuclear power able to deter a superpower … What we do when we are in Venezuela … is our business, not that of the U.S. government.

Chavez could not have said it better himself.

The U.S. federal indictment continues:

Defendant MASCHERONI discussed how in his program Venezuela would build and test nuclear bombs in secret and would have two nuclear reactors—one open, above ground reactor used for producing nuclear energy and the other, a secret underground nuclear reactor used for producing and enriching plutonium. In his program, Venezuela would build an above-ground micro-fusion facility for developing energy, and an underground micro-fission facility where Venezuela would conduct undetectable tests of ‘micro bombs.’

Justice Department officials have stated that there is no evidence that the Venezuelan government obtained any of the sensitive technology offered by Mascheroni and his co-indicted spouse. However, those who are paying attention to the extraordinarily tight and secretive ties between Chavez and troublesome regimes in Iran, Cuba, Russia, and China might wonder if Mascheroni’s vision is being implemented by a band of rogues at work in the Western Hemisphere while Washington sleeps.

One can hope that the FBI is not the only U.S. agency with its guard up when it comes to Chavez and the bomb.

Image by Agência Brasil.

colombiaMichael Shifter, president of Inter-American Dialogue, has an interesting piece in today’s Washington Post on Colombia’s rapprochement with Venezuela. Among the choice bits:

U.S. relations with Colombia—Washington’s major Latin American ally over the past decade—may be on the verge of some important changes… Although the United States has been Colombia’s closest ally in fighting rebels and drugs, for Colombia the relationship often resulted in isolation from neighbors… Colombians are tired of often-futile visits to Washington aimed at convincing U.S. lawmakers that they should back the trade deal… For Colombia, it seems, as increasingly for the rest of Latin America, it is time to move on in the world.

Shifter is making the case that there is a foreign policy imperative for passing the pending free trade agreement (FTA) with Colombia. The United States has asked a great deal of Colombia, but has blocked an agreement that would be mutually beneficial and is a top priority of the Colombian government. To justify this blockage, initiated by House Democrats in 2008, there has been a prolonged period in which U.S. leaders have criticized Colombian policies without offering any list of specifics that might be redressed.

The argument that FTAs can play an important diplomatic role is not new. It was put forward by Senator John McCain in his presidential run in 2008, for example. But the Obama administration has been slow to embrace it. That reluctance may have been overcome this summer, however. Last month, David Wessel of the Wall Street Journal described a potential turning point in the context of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS):

The attempt to revive the South Korea deal began several weeks ago in a late-afternoon conversation between the president and his chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel. The president was looking for ways to shore up U.S. backing for South Korea after North Korea’s new aggressiveness, had promised to increase U.S. exports and wanted to reinforce U.S. economic ties to Asia. Mr. Emanuel saw the South Korea deal as addressing all three objectives.

A key question, then, is whether the logic supporting the KORUS push will be extended around the world. House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-Maryland) has already argued that it should. Shifter’s article provides the specific reasoning in the Latin American context.

Image by edithbruck


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