
A new study from the Federal Reserve banks of Atlanta and Boston, “Why Did So Many People Make So Many Ex Post Bad Decisions? The Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis,” argues that the housing collapse and financial crisis wasn’t caused by the greatest grift of all time:
The dominant explanation claims that well-informed mortgage insiders used the securitization process to take advantage of uninformed outsiders. The typical narrative follows a loan from a mortgage broker through a series of Wall Street intermediaries to an ultimate investor.
1. According to this story, deceit starts with a mortgage broker, who convinces a borrower to take out a mortgage that initially appears affordable.
2. Unbeknownst to the borrower, the interest rate on the mortgage will reset to a higher level after a few years, and the higher monthly payment will force the borrower into default.
3. The broker knows that the mortgage is hard wired to explode but does not care, because the securitization process means that he will be passing this mortgage on to someone else.
4. An investment banker buys the loan for inclusion in a mortgage-backed security. In constructing this instrument, the banker intentionally uses newfangled, excessively complex financial engineering so that the investor cannot figure out the problematic nature of the loan. The investment banker knows that the investor is likely to lose money but he does not care, because it is not his money.
5. When the loan explodes, the borrower loses his home and the investor loses his money. But the intermediaries who collected substantial fees to set up the deal have no “skin in the game” and therefore suffer no losses.
This insider/outsider interpretation of the crisis motivated an Academy Award-winning documentary, appropriately titled Inside Job. It has also motivated policies designed to prevent a future crisis, including requirements that mortgage lenders retain some skin in the game for certain mortgages in the future. … We argue that the facts refute the popular story that the crisis resulted from finance industry insiders deceiving uninformed mortgage borrowers and investors.
Indeed, the study points out a dozen inconvenient facts for the “Inside Job” crowd:
Fact 1: Resets of adjustable-rate mortgages did not cause the foreclosure crisis.
Fact 2: No mortgage was “designed to fail.”
Fact 3: There was little innovation in mortgage markets in the 2000s.
Fact 4: Government policy toward the mortgage market did not change much from 1990 to 2005.
Fact 5: The originate-to-distribute model was not new.
Fact 6: MBSs, CDOs, and other “complex financial products” had been widely used for decades.
Fact 7: Mortgage investors had lots of information.
Fact 8: Investors understood the risks.
Fact 9: Investors were optimistic about house prices.
Fact 10: Mortgage market insiders were the biggest losers.
Fact 11: Mortgage market outsiders were the biggest winners.
Fact 12: Top-rated bonds backed by mortgages did not turn out to be “toxic.” Top-rated bonds in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) did.
The authors have a far more boring explanation for the housing crisis than a group of insider sharpies taking advantage of ill-informed outsiders. It was simply the Mother of All Manias: “The bursting of a massive and unsustainable price bubble in the U.S. housing market caused the financial crisis. Both borrowers and lenders believed that house prices would continue rising. Borrowers were eager to purchase homes and investors wanted more exposure to the housing market. The securitization process merely facilitated these transactions.”
OK, then, what initially caused the bubble to inflate? The authors offer a number of possibilities:
– Too much cheap money from the Fed.
– A savings glut among developing countries pushed U.S. interest rates lower and thereby pushed U.S. housing prices higher.
– The bursting of the tech bubble made low-risk real estate a more attractive option for investors.
– Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: They were major players in the lending boom of the 2000s, even if much of this lending occurred outside of their traditional guarantee business. Specifically, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac indirectly invested heavily in risky mortgages by buying AAA tranches of subprime and Alt-A mortgage-backed securities and holding these securities in their retained portfolios.
But in the end, the authors admit, economics doesn’t have a good understanding of why bubbles happen. So rather than try and prevent their occurrence, it is better to make the system more resilient to them. Here is what they advise:
1. Stress test financial institutions so at any given time they can withstand a 20 percent decline in house prices without any liquidity problems. It is important to consider such scenarios even when they appear remote. For example, just because house prices have already fallen 20 percent does not mean they cannot fall another 20 percent.
2. Stress test consumers. Financial experts recommend families practice a “financial fire drill,” which asks how they would get by if one income-earner lost a job, they should also game a situation in which falling house prices prevent the family from selling their house for more than they owe on their mortgage.
3. Mortgage disclosure forms need to “inform borrowers that there is a chance that the house they are buying will soon be worth substantially less than the outstanding balance on the mortgage.” But none of the new ones being proposed by the new consumer finance regulator do.




















