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reaganOne of the recurring debates about the Obama presidency has been which past president he is most like. Possible analogies have ranged from Lincoln, FDR, and JFK (all of which the White House has encouraged), to LBJ, Nixon, and Carter (all of which the White House has resisted). Part of the appeal of analogies is that in just one word they can evoke such potent emotions and embody much of the argument, both as warnings from the past as well as promises for what might come. Every president would love to be “another Lincoln”; no president wants to be “another Carter.”

So it is understandable that once the dreaded “Carter” analogies started popping up with some consistency—and not just from Republicans but from liberal journalists and pundits as well—the White House wanted to push back. And how better to defeat Carter than with Reagan? As Dan Balz reports in yesterday’s Washington Post, the White House political team hopes to contend instead that Obama’s first term is actually analogous to President Reagan’s first term.

As politics goes, this is a clever try, if one can get past the irony of an administration simultaneously trying to dismantle the Reagan legacy while embracing the Reagan image. But as a matter of history, it is, well, dubious. However appealing it might be as rhetoric, the record tells a different story.

Balz himself points out some of the differences between Reagan’s first term and Obama’s first term.  Such as that, while both presidents faced high unemployment and economic stagnation heading into their midterm elections (in 1982 and 2010 respectively), Reagan’s policy centerpiece was a robust package of tax cuts, whereas Obama’s two measures of choice have been the massive spending increases of the stimulus package and the healthcare overhaul. Or that by 1983, the economy enjoyed a robust recovery, in both gross domestic product growth (hitting 7.2 percent by 1984, America’s highest annual growth rate of the last 50 years)and in household disposable income (more than 6 percent in 1984), whereas current Congressional Budget Office forecasts tell a much less promising story for 2011–2012.

Yet there are several other differences that Balz doesn’t mention. Among them:

• Inflation. The economic recession that Reagan inherited was bedeviled not only by low growth and high unemployment (as with today), but also by an inflation rate of 11.8 percent when Reagan was inaugurated in January 1981. In contrast, Obama faced an inflation rate of 0 percent at his inauguration (though fears of deflation were in the air). To tackle this crippling inflation, Reagan supported Federal Reserve chief Paul Volcker in hiking the federal funds rate to 20 percent, amid widespread criticism and resistance, especially from farmers and industry. This politically courageous monetary policy was as important as the tax cuts in eventually restoring growth.

• Congress. While Obama has enjoyed the luxury of his party’s dominance in both houses of Congress, Reagan faced a harder political landscape in his first two years. The Democrats controlled the House by 244–191, and in the Senate 53 Republicans constituted a slim GOP majority.

• National Security. Reagan believed that the Soviet threat needed to be countered more aggressively and made doing so a centerpiece of his first term. This saw international tensions increase—and fears of nuclear war further heightened the anxiety of an American public already suffering from the recession. While Obama also faces manifest international challenges, in public messaging his administration has devoted comparatively little attention to security issues such as the terrorist threat and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. If anything, they have sought to focus public attention and political capital almost exclusively on the domestic agenda.

• Leadership. Perhaps the most important dissimilarity is also the least tangible: an intuitive feel for the public mood and connection with the American people. Even some of Obama’s most ardent supporters worry that he has either lost this connection or possibly never had it. Reagan always had it, which accounted for much of his enduring appeal even in politically trying times.

The art of the presidency involves an intuitive balance between relating with the American people where they are, while also leading them where the nation needs to go. This was Reagan’s accomplishment in a nutshell. In contrast, Obama seems to have difficulty relating to the American people where they are, while on domestic policy he is trying to lead them where many don’t want to go.

Hence some of the recurring Carter comparisons. As John Judis has lamented, both Carter and Obama “failed to connect with large parts of the electorate” and struggled with “an inability to develop a politics that resonates with the public.” Of course, while this White House understandably wants to avoid the Carter analogy, things could be worse—such as the Michael Dukakis comparison.

Analogies aside, the Obama administration will ultimately be judged not by comparisons to past presidents, but in the near term by the American electorate, and in the long term by history itself. In this sense, one sign will be whether presidents in future decades want to be called “another Obama,” or not.

Image by Edalisse Hirst.

In the same vein as my previous post comparing President Obama and LBJ, Peter Baker of the New York Times has an excellent article in Sunday’s paper exploring the same analogy. Especially noteworthy are Baker’s quotes from renowned historians David Kennedy and Robert Caro, both of whom observe worrisome similarities between LBJ and the Obama White House’s current challenges.

According to the Baker story, Obama himself is mindful of the LBJ pitfalls:

By several accounts, that risk weighs on Mr. Obama these days. Mr. Kennedy was among a group of historians who had dinner with Mr. Obama at the White House earlier this summer where the president expressed concern that Afghanistan could yet hijack his presidency. Although Mr. Kennedy said he could not discuss the off-the-record conversation, others in the room said Mr. Obama acknowledged the L.B.J. risk.

This story appeared the same day as Admiral Mullen expressed his growing concern at Afghanistan’s deterioration, and as worrisome hints appeared of tensions between the U.S. military, which needs more forces to accomplish the mission, and the Obama administration, which is reluctant to commit any more troops to a war that has dwindling public support.

If this White House keeps a file drawer titled “We Know We Have a Problem When…,” then surely a New York Times article comparing Obama to LBJ, and Afghanistan to Vietnam, deserves its own folder. (So do Jim Hoagland columns citing world leaders wondering if Obama is “weak,” which hardly inspire confidence about his ability to maintain European support for the Afghanistan mission.) The political risk for this White House is for the LBJ analogy to become conventional wisdom. The policy risks are that they make the wrong decisions in trying to avoid LBJ’s mistakes, and precipitously pull back from Afghanistan in order to focus on passing a questionable domestic agenda.

But just as historical analogies can be illustrative, they can also easily become overdetermined. An LBJ-type failure is by no means inevitable. Going back to his campaign, Obama has shown a remarkable resilience, and an ability to learn and adapt. If so, the way to avoid an LBJ-style fate is to resist the temptation to promote fiscally reckless domestic programs, to show consistent and honest leadership with the American people on the strategic importance of the Afghanistan mission, and to provide the military with the support they need to win.

William Inboden is senior vice president of the Legatum Institute.

Almost ten months after President Obama’s election, his administration’s favored historical analogies are pretty clear. The Obama team really likes to draw implicit and explicit comparisons between Obama and past presidents Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt, with an occasional nod to John F. Kennedy if they are feeling stylish. And they really, really want to avoid comparisons with Jimmy Carter. But recent trends suggest another historical analogy from 44 years ago: Lyndon Baines Johnson.

No doubt this is a comparison that the Obama team would like to avoid as well. But if they don’t make a profound change of direction, doing so may become difficult. Consider these parallels between LBJ and Obama’s elections and each one’s first year post-inauguration:

Electoral: Both won decisive electoral college victories as well as solid, bicameral congressional majorities, and both attracted significant crossover support from independent and Republican voters.

The Other Party: Both initially faced a demoralized and almost comically disorganized Republican Party with no standard-bearer and little effective opposition.

Rhetoric: Both rhetorically heralded a new era of possibility and supposedly bipartisan consensus; both invoked religious themes that implicitly claimed divine sanction for their domestic policies (e.g. LBJ’s declaration that “these are the most hopeful times since Christ was born in Bethlehem,” or Obama’s assertion on healthcare that “we are God’s partners in matters of life and death”).

Bill Moyers: Seriously. Both LBJ and Obama had Bill Moyers to flack for them, in the former case as LBJ’s campaign strategist and press secretary, and in the latter case by comparing Obama to both JFK and Lincoln in the pages of Rolling Stone.

Domestic Policy: Both LBJ and Obama immediately pursued massive—and massively expensive—programs of wealth redistribution and new domestic entitlements. For LBJ these were the “Great Society” welfare programs; for Obama the economic stimulus package and the healthcare overhaul.

Foreign Policy: Both inherited complicated counter-insurgency wars in far-away lands (Vietnam and Afghanistan); both pursued troop escalations in these wars.

LBJ in the ensuing years presided over a slow motion train wreck on the domestic and foreign policy fronts. The domestic “consensus” he inherited devolved into urban riots, angry backlash, and a painfully divided nation. Some of this public backlash lamentably came against his civil rights initiatives, in which LBJ’s display of moral principle and political sacrifice merits history’s praise. But many of the domestic divisions and resentments arose from his welfare state entitlement programs and economic re-engineering. These domestic tensions and LBJ’s plummeting political capital eventually eroded his ability to develop a coherent strategy or maintain public support for the war in Vietnam. Moreover, financial constraints from his domestic spending, and political resistance from his party’s left-wing, prevented LBJ from committing sufficient resources to make victory possible in Vietnam.  He eventually lost the Democratic Party over Vietnam, lost the country’s center over his domestic policies, and then lost any chance for re-election.

Few analogies are precise fits, including this one. LBJ, the “Master of the Senate,” had much more initial legislative success in getting Congress to pass his Great Society programs, in contrast with the Obama administration’s current foundering on healthcare. Additionally, the Afghanistan war is not Vietnam, and for all of LBJ’s mistakes in Vietnam, the Obama administration thus far is admirably pursuing a sound strategy in Afghanistan (and I have written as much here), in a war of arguably more strategic importance than Vietnam was.

Yet there are worrisome signs this week that at a crucial juncture, Obama is rapidly losing public support for the war in Afghanistan. And he and his administration, beleaguered by the domestic backlash against their ill-conceived healthcare agenda, seem now unable or unwilling to do the hard work of bolstering the American people’s wavering commitment to the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. 

By trying to do it all at once—pursuing a budget-busting, grandiose domestic agenda along with an unpopular counter-insurgency war—LBJ unduly divided his nation, squandered his singular political inheritance, and failed in his major initiatives.

President Obama needs to avoid falling into the same sad scenario. Yet ignoring the minority party while pursuing a divisive domestic spending and healthcare agenda, in part at the expense of maintaining public support for a vital counter-insurgency war, is not a promising way to go. As my former colleague Peter Feaver has pointed out, the Obama team might even be wrestling with the temptation of trying to do Afghanistan-with-less (less troops and less money), perhaps to avoid a domestic fight with their left flank and to preserve political capital for Obama’s ambitious domestic agenda. That could point towards an LBJ-esque path of not losing Afghanistan on his watch, but also hurt the odds of winning it on his watch.  LBJ offers some poignant lessons in presidential leadership—lessons about what not to do.

William Inboden is senior vice president of the Legatum Institute.

In a day when stands on principle are both too rare and sorely needed, Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona is being subjected to a White House intimidation campaign for doing just that. Senator Kyl has called for a halt to any further expenditures under the Obama administration’s $787 billion economic stimulus program, on the sensible grounds that the federal dollars spent thus far have produced little positive effect and further spending will only deepen an already staggering deficit.

Taking a page out of the Chicago machine-politics playbook, the Obama administration has responded by having four of its cabinet secretaries contact the Arizona state government and threaten to cancel planned projects in Arizona. So for all of the administration’s rhetoric about “post-partisanship” and the “politics of civility,” it seems this White House is lamentably quick to resort to crude tactics reminiscent of the Cook County patronage machine.

But we’re not in Cook County anymore. And especially when the stakes for the entire nation are this high, the debate should be grounded in prudence and constitutional principle, not in machine politics and patronage. Now as a native Arizonan (though currently living in London), I can attest that my home state has produced its share (okay, way more than its share) of crooked and shady politicians. Yet some of our nation’s finest political leaders are also from Arizona, whether they be Senator Kyl, Senator McCain, or the patron saint of American conservatism Barry Goldwater.

Often ahead of his time, in 1960 Goldwater wrote in The Conscience of a Conservative some words that Senator Kyl would no doubt appreciate:

If I should later be attacked for neglecting my constituents’ ‘interests,’ I shall reply that I was informed their main interest is liberty and that in that cause I am doing the very best I can.

William Inboden is senior vice president of the Legatum Institute.

The news here in London this week is consumed with the recent spike in British army casualties in Afghanistan, including eight deaths over the weekend and a total of 15 in the last two weeks. For a war-weary British public, these casualties further diminish already tenuous support for the NATO mission in Afghanistan. But the real scandal is the fact that many of these casualties result from the troops being woefully ill-equipped. It seems that Gordon Brown’s government has consistently turned down the Royal Army’s multiple requests for transport helicopters, armored Humvees and more troops, leaving the current forces stretched thin in their deployments and vulnerable in aging Land Rovers that offer no protection against IED attacks. John Burns noted in this typically insightful article how the dreadfully anemic UK defense budget (just 2.5 percent of GDP) fails to match the UK’s security commitments.

But it is not as if Gordon Brown’s government is unwilling to spend money—just not where it is needed. This is a problem not of limited revenues but of wrongheaded priorities. The current UK budget spends £307 billion on various domestic social welfare and health programs, but barely more than one tenth of that (£37 billion) on defense. The new proposed budget is no improvement, keeping defense spending at essentially the same level while increasing social programs by another £32 billion—financed, as my colleague Ryan Streeter has shown, by unprecedented borrowing and an increase in the top income tax rate to 50 percent.

As for the British army, Max Hastings’ column today on the Afghanistan crucible puts it well:

Soldiers are robust about casualties, even the painful losses of recent days. ‘Risking our lives is what we get paid for—sometimes we must expect to lose them,’ as one put it to me at the weekend.

But it is another matter to be obliged to shed blood because ministers grudge mere cash for equipment, helicopters, and troop numbers—and to feel that the Ministry of Defence has been entrusted to third-rate politicians.

The Brown government’s failure to keep faith with its own armed forces reflects not just budget allocations but a fundamentally flawed philosophy of government. Brown seems to think that government’s purpose is to redistribute wealth and protect citizens from the risks of the free market, rather than to protect liberty and the nation itself. This folly costs not just money in inefficient and misplaced domestic spending, but the lives of some of Britain’s finest citizens—those deployed in the nation’s defense. What Britain needs now is a government worthy of its military.

William Inboden is senior vice president of the Legatum Institute.


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