The Enterprise Blog

Author Archive

Iran on the brink: By the (correct) numbers

By Maseh Zarif

May 1, 2012, 8:55 am

Dany noted in an extended Twitter conversation last week (on the question of whether Governor Romney’s advisers were right that Iran is on the brink of having a nuclear weapon) that the Iranian regime is on the brink of a nuclear weapons capability, citing figures for the amount of 20% enriched uranium it has produced at its declared facilities and the threshold amount required to convert that material into fuel for a nuclear weapon.

A commentator, Royal United Services Institute fellow Shashank Joshi, took issue with those figures, drawing invalid comparisons and accepting a debatable assumption as fact in the process.

There are two main issues here with Joshi’s post:

•    Anyone attempting to compare enriched uranium figures must avoid the apples-versus-oranges pitfall. Referencing either gas or solid form figures are both acceptable so long as there is consistency. The figure Dany correctly cited (73 kg) is the amount of 20% enriched uranium Iran had produced at its two enrichment facilities as of the February 2012 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report. The IAEA reports Iran’s stockpiles in terms of enriched uranium hexafluoride (the gaseous form spinning in centrifuges). This gas would need to be converted into a solid once further enriched to weapons-grade levels for use in a nuclear weapon; 1 kg of enriched uranium gas is equal to approximately 0.67 kg enriched uranium (solid). Hence, the 109.2 kg 20% enriched uranium gas reported by the IAEA is equivalent to about 73.1 kg 20% enriched uranium (109.2 x 0.67 = 73.1). Joshi erroneously implied that the figure Dany gave was incorrect because he was comparing a gas-based figure used by other analysts to the solid-based figure used by Dany and included in our assessment.

•    The exact amount of weapons-grade uranium Iran would need to build a nuclear weapon is dependent on numerous variables, but it is possible to accurately assess breakout capability by examining plausible lower- and higher-end thresholds for that amount. In writing that Dany’s reference to an 85 kg threshold of 20% enriched uranium for breakout “is clearly untenable,” Joshi dismisses the possibility that Iran could build a weapon with 15 kg of weapons-grade uranium (90%). The article that Joshi cites to support that conclusion actually concedes that the IAEA’s “significant quantity” threshold of 25 kg weapons-grade uranium “is not a perfect measure” and that it has been criticized for overestimating nuclear weapons fuel requirements. It is possible that Iran could build a weapon with a considerable explosive yield by converting 85 kg of 20% enriched uranium into 15 kg 90% weapons-grade uranium. This breakout can be achieved within months using the more-efficient interconnected cascades at the Fordow facility or within weeks if Iran uses the larger Natanz facility (details here). Our assessment includes estimates and timelines for both 15 kg and 25 kg requirements; however, Joshi only quotes the upper threshold timeline from the assessment and ignores the lower end in order to support his assertion.

The important thing to understand about the Iranian nuclear threat is that the regime has dramatically shortened the time it would need to produce fuel for an atomic weapon in the two-plus years that it has been enriching uranium at a higher level. It is on the brink because it can produce weapons-grade uranium—the most difficult component of a nuclear weapon to obtain—in short order.

And this is supposed to stop Iran?

By Maseh Zarif

November 17, 2011, 2:12 pm

The resolution coming out of the International Atomic Energy Agency meeting today following the release of a new report detailing Iran’s nuclear weapons activities is sure to embolden the Islamic Republic. According to the Associated Press:

Diplomats who spoke ahead of the meeting had said the United States and its allies were ready to push through a tough document, before ceding to Russian and Chinese pressure and accepting a watered-down version that allows Iran to continue ignoring international demands.

Those who view diplomacy as an end rather than a means may hail the resolution as a sign of “success through unity,” but in reality it demonstrates the staggering failure of the years-long diplomatic effort to isolate Iran and to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons capability, a threshold it is rapidly approaching.

Iran, IRGC Managing Fine Under Sanctions

By Maseh Zarif

May 12, 2011, 11:12 am

UN sanctions have created some difficulties for Iran’s ability to export arms and procure illicit materials, but the regime’s use of front companies and other deceptive trade practices allow it to work around restrictions, according to a new UN report cited by the Wall Street Journal. The report notes that some countries are keeping a watchful eye on ports used by Iranian companies. Despite the increased awareness on the part of some countries, however, businesses set up by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continue to procure military items and export conventional weapons. Syria, Iran’s conduit for weapons shipments to the terrorist organization Hezbollah, received the majority of illegal arms shipments reported to the UN. “It is likely that other transfers took place undetected and that other illicit shipments were identified but not reported,” the report concludes.

This latest assessment demonstrates the limitations of sanctions as a policy tool. Getting them on the books is one thing, but the real challenge, one that has yet to be overcome, lies on the enforcement side. In the wake of the Arab Spring, Iran’s leadership continues to arm proxies, to import materiel for its weapons programs, and to reaffirm its unyielding stance on the nuclear issue.

Al Qaeda Network Lives on after bin Laden

By Maseh Zarif

May 2, 2011, 11:40 am

The United States and the rest of the world are better off with Osama bin Laden dead. This welcome development in the effort to defeat militant Islamism is a testament to the sacrifice and bravery of countless numbers of American men and women who work to keep the United States and our allies safe.

The successful mission that killed bin Laden, however, does not necessarily spell defeat for the al Qaeda network. Al Qaeda’s evolution since 9/11 has resulted in the rise of largely independent franchises that pose a serious threat. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), for instance, has an established leadership core in Yemen that has coordinated multiple attacks on the United States in the last few years. Indeed, amid the unrest in Yemen that has allowed AQAP to operate more freely, U.S. signals intelligence picked up on information that pointed to a possible AQAP attack on the United States, beyond the chatter that is typically picked up.

Within Pakistan, the al Qaeda network’s capacity to coordinate attacks is not confined to a single compound in Abbottabad. On Friday, I wrote about the al Qaeda cell detained by German authorities who described the three operatives as posing a concrete, immediate threat. The leader of that cell had traveled to Waziristan, Pakistan, for training and coordination and reportedly took orders from al Qaeda leaders there. As this case demonstrated, the broader al Qaeda network’s safe havens, not individual leaders like bin Laden, serve as the most important asset for terrorists who pose a threat to the West.

In short: justice has been rightly meted out, but the fight goes on.

Maseh Zarif is research manager for AEI’s Critical Threats Project.

Iranians Steadily Enriching Uranium

By Maseh Zarif

February 15, 2011, 2:43 pm

In January, Secretary Clinton told an audience in the United Arab Emirates that Iran’s nuclear program has experienced “technological problems that have made [Iran] slow down its timetables.” Iranian officials acknowledged last year that a software program disrupted the operation of a limited number of centrifuge machines at the Natanz enrichment facility. Yesterday’s Washington Post interview with the head of the UN’s atomic energy watchdog, however, warrants a second-look:

Q: How badly was Iran’s centrifuge program affected by the [Stuxnet cyber] worm from 2009?
A: Iran is somehow producing uranium enriched to 3.5 percent and 20 percent. They are producing it steadily, constantly.

Q: The amount of enriched uranium has not been affected?
A: The production is very steady.

Yukiya Amano’s comments are a sober reminder that tactical successes in disrupting Iran’s nuclear progress remain fleeting, and that such efforts cannot substitute for a strategy to deal with the Iranian nuclear threat. See AEI’s IranTracker for more on Iran, and keep an eye out for a forthcoming AEI report on the challenges of containing a nuclear Iran.

Image by Wikemedia Commons.

Iran’s Parliament Seeking to Restrain Ahmadinejad

By Maseh Zarif

November 23, 2010, 2:32 pm

mahmoudOn Monday, the Wall Street Journal reported that Iran’s conservative-majority parliament was seeking to pressure and restrain Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. These types of tensions within Iran’s conservative elite have been evident throughout 2010. The divisions within the regime’s ruling elite, however, have been confined to matters of Iran’s domestic policies and bureaucratic competition. The key issues that matter to Americans—Iran’s developing nuclear program and its support for terrorism—have not been subject to open debate among the regime’s leadership. Rather, these issues continue to provide a common rallying point for senior Iranian officials and figures: ideological opposition to the United States and Western interests. See the Critical Threats Project’s IranTracker for more on this topic.

Maseh Zarif is a research manager for the Critical Threats Project at AEI.

Image by Jose Cruz.

Iranian officials have used the Israeli navy’s raid on a Gaza-bound flotilla to rally a flurry of rhetorical attacks against Israel. Iran’s Supreme Leader Seyyed Ali Khamene’i called Israel a “bloodthirsty, disrespectful and idiotic regime,” while its president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad claimed to have knowledge of an impending Israeli operation in Gaza, warning Israel “that if this time you commit a crime against any place, against Gaza, the storm of regional nations’ fury will uproot you.” Former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force chief and current Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi warned that “Israel switched on the countdown to its downfall by its brutal attack on the Freedom Flotilla.” The tone and topic of these statements are not unprecedented for key Iranian figures, who often employ such rhetoric to divert attention from Iran’s domestic shortcomings and to obscure the regime’s intransigence on a variety of issues. It is not surprising that Iranian officials are again utilizing this strategy, considering the extent to which the standing of the Islamic Republic has deteriorated on multiple fronts over the past year.

Iran had a declared stockpile of low enriched uranium (LEU) totaling just over 1,800 pounds according to the June 2009 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran’s nuclear program. The new June 2010 IAEA report states that Iran now possesses over 5,300 pounds of declared LEU—enough to fuel two nuclear bombs if converted to highly enriched uranium (HEU). Last year the IAEA assessed that Iran had enriched its known LEU stockpile to civilian-purpose levels below 5 percent. The latest report notes that Iran has told the IAEA that it successfully enriched a small batch of uranium to a level of 19.75 percent, which, if true, increases the likelihood that Iran can successfully convert uranium to weapons-grade fuel (enriching uranium to a level of 19.75 percent consumes 85 to 90 percent of the work required to produce weapons-grade fuel).

Moreover, Iran “declined to discuss” issues the IAEA has continuously raised about potential military dimensions to its nuclear program, even as the United States, United Kingdom, and France revealed in September 2009 that Iran had built a covert uranium enrichment facility that appeared to be inappropriate for civilian use but suitable for a weapons program. Iran has carried out these nuclear activities as a member of the United Nations (UN) and signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), ignoring repeated United Nations Security Council calls to adhere to IAEA oversight standards required by the NPT. The fact that Iran has made progress towards developing a nuclear weapons capability thus represents a significant blow to international institutions like the NPT and Security Council.

Iran’s already abysmal human rights record has also further degenerated as regime authorities killed dozens of their fellow citizens during the post-election unrest, detained hundreds of non-violent journalists, artists, and human rights activists, executed more citizens in 2009 than any other country except for China, increased media censorship, and moved to crush any legitimate opposition to the regime. A recently released annual report from the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) assessed that since last June, “human rights and religious freedom conditions in Iran have regressed to a point not seen since the early days of the Islamic revolution.” Its Qods Force operatives continue to “provide material support to terrorist or militant groups such as: Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Taliban, and Iraqi Shia groups.” Iran will likely maintain its distinction as the foremost state sponsor of terror when the State Department releases its annual report on the issue this year.

Khamene’i will address the Friday prayers audience in Tehran tomorrow for the first time since last June, when he declared Ahmadinejad’s re-election legitimate. His sermon will likely devote a significant amount of time to denouncing Israel and its role in the flotilla incident, and conspicuously avoid answering for Iran’s own record over the last year.

Maseh Zarif is a research manager for the Critical Threats Project at AEI.


The American Enterprise Institute takes no institutional positions on policy advocacy or political campaigns. The views expressed on The Enterprise Blog represent those of the individual writers.

AEI