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Those who have been paying attention to the Chen Guangcheng story awoke this morning to the welcome news that he had left the U.S. embassy of his own volition with guarantees from the Chinese government that he and his family would be safe. While it must have been somewhat difficult for U.S. authorities and Chen to believe Beijing was acting in good faith, such was the outcome Chen reportedly favored. To the extent that an activist in Communist China will never be allowed true freedom, this wasn’t a storybook ending. But it was perhaps the best that could be hoped for given Chen’s preference to remain in China.

Unfortunately, it turns out the story’s not over after all. There are now conflicting reports about just what it was that Chen wanted and whether he made his decision to leave the U.S. embassy under duress. The Washington Post reports:

Activists who had spoken with Chen said he had been told that his wife and children, who had been brought to the capital to be reunited with him, would be sent back to Shandong province and could be beaten to death if he did not exit the U.S. diplomatic compound.

Chen told The Associated Press that an unidentified American official conveyed the death threat to him. The State Department is denying the claim, though spokesperson Victoria Nuland did admit that “U.S. interlocutors did make clear that if Chen elected to stay in the embassy, Chinese officials had indicated to us that his family would be returned to Shandong, and they would lose their opportunity to negotiate for reunification.”

According to an activist friend of Chen’s, his wife convinced him to pursue a solution whereby he and his family would leave China together. Others have similarly suggested that Chen had changed his mind about staying in China.

Apparently, things went downhill quickly after Chen’s car ride from the embassy to the hospital where he is receiving medical treatment, with Chen telling friends of the threats to his family and conveying apprehension about his circumstances. After arriving at the hospital, Chen “soon found himself surrounded by Chinese plainclothes police, with no American diplomats in sight.” Chen told Britain’s Channel 4 from his hospital room, “Nobody from the (U.S.) embassy is here. I don’t understand why. They promised to be here.”

Bottom line: Someone’s lying about what went down in the embassy or shortly thereafter. Either a State Department official conveyed to Chen a Chinese death threat to his family or Chen, for reasons that don’t appear at all obvious, is making it up.

Still, two things are certain. First, the U.S. commitment—to remain “engaged with Mr. Chen and his family in the days, weeks, and years ahead” (Secretary of State Clinton’s words)—apparently ended once Chen was dropped off at the hospital and effectively delivered into the hands of the Chinese police state.

Second, with Clinton and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner descending on Beijing for the annual U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the State Department was eager to resolve the Chen question as rapidly as possible. Did haste lead to an even bigger crisis?

Well, this is troubling:

The U.S. government, which has tried a combination of engagement and sanctions in a fruitless effort to alter North Korea’s behavior, will not seek additional sanctions, U.S. officials said. Instead, Washington will push for stepped-up enforcement of existing U.N. resolutions, U.S. officials said.

“We have all the sanction authorities we need under existing U.N. resolutions and executive orders,” said an Obama administration official, who was not authorized to speak on the record.

In other words, the administration has no idea what to do in order to rein in North Korea. Very reassuring.

Also, this raises an obvious question: Why hadn’t Washington already been pushing for enforcement of existing U.N. resolutions? Very reassuring indeed.

Lost in all the hubbub surrounding North Korea’s missile test yesterday—don’t worry, we’ll get to that—was Kim Jong-un’s elevation to First Chairman of the National Defense Commission. The title is newly created—the very much dead Kim Jong-il will maintain the title of Chairman for eternity, thus continuing the country’s odd necrocratic system—but the role is not. Combined with his positions as First Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party (bestowed on him on Wednesday; his father remains the party’s General Secretary eternally) and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army, Kim the Current now holds all three posts through which Kim the Former ruled North Korea. At least officially, the succession process is complete.

Unofficially, young Kim is likely still consolidating support from the Workers’ Party and the military and working to ferret out the potentially (or actually) disloyal. Yesterday’s rocket launch should at least be partially understood in this light. Kim Jong-il had long been promising that 2012 would be the year North Korea became a strong and prosperous country. Kim Jong-un had to deliver. Testing missiles and nukes (stay tuned!) is one of the few means at his disposal to demonstrate national power (as presently constituted, North Korea will never be prosperous, and its leaders know it). It doesn’t matter that the rocket failed—in going ahead with the launch, Jong-un demonstrated commitment to his father’s “military first” policy and course for military modernization (I use the term loosely). He also demonstrated resolve in the face of widespread international approbation. This should all go over well in the insular North Korea and calm any elite concerns about unwanted change.

What have the United States and its allies learned from this? To paraphrase Pete Townshend: meet the new Kim, same as the old Kim. Unfortunately, given Washington’s track record over the past couple decades, there doesn’t seem to be much hope that we won’t get fooled again.

Michael Mazza

North Korea, prison state

By Michael Mazza

April 12, 2012, 10:32 am

On Tuesday, the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea released an important report, titled The Hidden Gulag, which serves as a potent reminder of the nature of the Pyongyang regime. North Korea maintains a terrifying gulag system, in which as many as 200,000 people are imprisoned. From the executive summary:

Part Two describes the phenomena of repression associated with the North Korean kwan-li-so political penal labor colonies where scores of thousands of political prisoners – along with up to three generations of members of their families – are banished, deported, imprisoned without any judicial process, and subjected to slave labor for mostly lifetime sentences in mining, logging or various agricultural enterprises operating within a half-dozen sprawling encampments, enclosed in barbed wires and electrified fences, mostly in the north and north central mountains of North Korea. The report describes who the political prisoners are: real, suspected or imagined wrong-doers and wrong-thinkers, or persons with wrong-knowledge and/or wrong-associations who have been deemed to be irremediably counter-revolutionary and pre-emptively purged from North Korean society.

This part also provides an overview of the prison-labor camp system: the guilt-by-association collective punishment, forced disappearances and incommunicado detention without trial, systemic and severe mistreatment, induced malnutrition, slave labor and exorbitant rates of deaths in detention, informants and intra-prisoner hostilities, executions and other extreme punishments, sexual relations, “marriage” and prison camp “schools,” the sexual exploitation of women prisoners, prisoner releases, the economic role of the forced labor camps, and the complete removed from any protection of law, along with arbitrary and extra-judicial nature of the systems.

Read the rest here, if you can stomach it.

Dany, the best one-sentence summary of this ridiculousness that I’ve seen was written yesterday (kudos to Josh Rogin, emphasis mine):

Some lawmakers were skeptical that the administration was not punishing the North Koreans for their upcoming missile launch by withholding the food aid, but Lavoy insisted the two issues were not linked, even though they were announced in the same Feb. 29 statement and negotiated at the same time with the same officials.

And as amusing/troubling as this entire farce is, the thing that scared me most yesterday was this line from Victoria Nuland (emphasis mine):

We don’t have confidence in their good faith. If they want to restore our confidence in their good faith, they can cancel the plans to launch this satellite.

I’m sorry, the Obama administration had confidence in Pyongyang’s good faith before last week’s rocket launch announcement? Where did that confidence come from?

Was it the spring 2009 nuclear test that gave the White House the warm-and-fuzzies? Maybe it was the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel the following year? Or the brazen artillery attack later in 2010 that killed both South Korean marines and civilians?

Perhaps the State Department finds reassuring the regular impugning of President Lee Myung-bak (“a matchless fool, worst traitor, ultra-right fascist dictator, confrontation maniac, and human scum who is fated to die before his time”)? Maybe the worsening human rights crisis since Kim Jong-il’s death tells the administration something different than it tells the rest of us?

All of the above have happened since Obama assumed the presidency. For goodness’s sake, North Korea won’t even reveal new leader Kim Jong-un’s age. What in God’s name has given the president or anybody else in his administration confidence in Pyongyang’s good faith?

Today marks the second anniversary of the sinking of the Cheonan, during which 46 South Korean sailors lost their lives at the hands of a North Korean mini-submarine. The anniversary serves as a potent reminder of the odious nature of the Kim regime. It should also remind Seoul, Washington, and the rest of the international community that when a regime with little regard for human life pays no consequence for murder, it will kill again—as the North did when it launched an artillery attack on Yeonpyeong island later that year; indeed, as it does every day in its 200,000-prisoner gulag system.

President Obama’s visit to the DMZ on Sunday was meant to signal to Pyongyang America’s serious concerns about its behavior; his meeting with U.S. troops stationed along the 38th parallel, emphasizing his role as commander-in-chief along the world’s most heavily armed border, should be applauded. The president’s remarks about the North, while standing beside President Lee Myung-bak, were appropriately critical. And yet, from what I’ve seen, the allies have yet to provide North Korea with any reason to cancel its recently announced satellite-launch-cum-ballistic-missile-test and stick to the “Leap Day agreement” of last month. Sure, Washington will hold back the promised food aid, but if the nutritional assistance were truly crucial, Kim wouldn’t have launched this latest round of high jinks in the first place. And yes, South Korea and Japan have threatened to shoot the missile down, but only if it enters their airspace. That’s just not good enough.

The United States, South Korea, Japan, and Australia should announce that they will pool their resources to track the rocket’s flight and shoot it out of the sky; the allies should be prepared to follow through on that threat when Pyongyang goes ahead with the launch. The North will throw a fit and threaten war, but they would do the same in response to a Security Council Presidential Statement, which is what followed the 2009 satellite launch.

The international community will instead probably choose to greet a rocket launch next month with verbal condemnations, but no one should expect such reprimands to dissuade North Korea from following its usual provocative and too-often-deadly pattern. Nor should this come as a surprise: growing up, our mothers all taught us that “sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me.” Apparently, the Kims learned that lesson as well. If we want to break the Kim regime of its bad habits—habits which we have long been encouraging, if unintentionally—we need to throw out our old playbook. Sorry, Mom, but it’s time for sticks and stones.

Earlier today, I argued that the United States should take forcible action in response to North Korea’s upcoming satellite launch. There are two additional reasons for doing so, which I did not highlight in my first post.

We have long known that North Korea desires an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking the United States. North Korea has been making slow but steady progress towards that goal; though previous long-range missile launches have been failures, they have shown improvements, and the North Koreans have learned from those tests. Striking the new missile prior to launch or shooting it down in flight will deny the North Koreans an opportunity to learn if their missile technology is improving and slow their progress towards an effective ICBM.

Secondly, and more importantly, U.S. military action might sow discord within Pyongyang. The decision to launch a satellite has been partly if not primarily driven by domestic concerns. The late Kim Jong-il had long promised that 2012 would be the year North Korea would become a prosperous country, and large celebrations are expected to mark next month’s centenary of the birth of Kim Il-sung, new leader Kim Jong-un’s grandfather and the founder of North Korea. The New York Times’s Choe Sang-hun writes that Kim Jong-un “must now pull off the national celebrations with appropriate pomp while using them to help consolidate his grip on power.” And as North Korea specialist Koh Yu-hwan told Choe, “Kim Jong-un doesn’t have much to show his people, except launching a satellite.”

If the United States responds militarily to the planned rocket launch, it will demonstrate to those around Kim that he cannot act without fear of consequence as his father could. As I wrote previously, it will help prevent “young Kim from establishing his bona fides as the new strongman in Pyongyang.” And given that the launch will likely result in the withholding of recently promised U.S. food aid, the new leader may face heightened civil discontent as well.

If, in the long term, the United States has an interest in a unified Korea under Seoul’s democratic leadership, then Washington must take steps to weaken Kim now. True, allowing Kim to further consolidate his rule may buy us short-term stability (I use the term loosely). But we’ve been watching that movie for the past few decades and we haven’t been enjoying it. Isn’t it time to change the DVD?

In a less-than-shocking turn of events, North Korea has announced that it will launch a satellite into orbit next month. This launch, as with the last satellite launch, will amount to a ballistic missile test; United Nations Security Council resolutions have banned such launches. Better yet, Pyongyang has said it will launch the missile southward—potentially over South Korean territory. Such a move would be highly provocative, to say the least.

Put simply, this test cannot be permitted, especially as it comes in the immediate wake of the (poorly considered) U.S. deal with the North: food aid in return for a number of North Korean concessions including a moratorium on long-range missile tests. The United States has already called “on North Korea to adhere to its international obligations, including all relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions.” Such admonishments are unlikely to be convincing.

Rather, if the United States wishes for North Korea to take it seriously—if Pyongyang is ever to take seriously the accords it agrees to—then Washington must demonstrate a seriousness of purpose that has too often been lacking. In this regard, President Obama has two options. He can order that U.S. forces strike the missile on the launch pad or, somewhat less provokingly, order that missile defense assets shoot it down after launch.

Some, of course, will argue that an American resort to military means so early in Kim Jong-un’s rule will irreparably sour a potentially more productive relationship than that with Kim Jong-il. But it is Kim who has broken faith only two weeks after the first U.S.-DPRK bilateral agreement. The relationship soured the moment Pyongyang announced the satellite launch.

Others will say that U.S. military action will enhance North Korea’s drive for nuclear weapons and make a spring nuclear test more likely. But the 2006 and 2009 nuclear tests followed U.N. Security Council condemnations of earlier missile tests. In other words, North Korea’s bar for conducting nuclear tests is already set fairly low. (Maybe we should just ignore the missile launch, chalk it up to Kim being Kim?)

Finally, some will counter that use of force is needlessly escalatory. But escalation is precisely what is needed. Unless the United States responds decisively to Kim Jong-un’s first provocation as the leader of North Korea, it will have reason to expect more of the same in the coming years.

It is perhaps fitting that Xi Jinping, China’s current vice president and likely next paramount leader, is in Washington on Valentine’s Day for meetings with President Obama and Vice President Biden. It’s an opportunity for Washington and Beijing to rekindle (or maybe simply kindle?) the romance in what is clearly a loveless marriage. While the two depend on each other to maintain a certain comfortable standard of living, the relationship is otherwise devoid of mutual affection. China is constantly using the silent treatment to punish the United States for some perceived offense or another. The United States, meanwhile, snipes at China over annoying habits that Beijing has no intention of modifying—like holding the value of its currency artificially low or throwing dissidents in jail. When the jilted lovers do speak, they either talk past each other or take their fights to very public fora—like the United Nations Security Council. The kids (South Korea, Japan, and other Asian countries) are increasingly worried about a messy divorce.

It is with the Sino-American relationship in such a state of turmoil that Xi Jinping arrives in the United States. And, in all seriousness, his visit is important; relationships between leaders can affect the course their countries chart together—or apart. For example, George W. Bush’s positive relationship with Junichiro Koizumi helped the U.S.-Japan alliance reach new heights. On the other hand, President Obama’s sour relationship with Benjamin Netanyahu exacerbates tensions that stem from divergent U.S. and Israeli policy positions. So it is important that America’s leaders get to know their future Chinese counterparts.

Unfortunately, friendliness at the top—or lack thereof—will not make or break a constructive Sino-American relationship. As my colleague Dan Blumenthal argues, “the limitations of one-on-one diplomacy mean that real strategy is needed to tie the ends of policy with the means of the relationship.” If the Obama administration cannot construct an effective strategy for dealing with China, then President Obama and Vice President Biden’s relationships with Xi Jinping will not much affect things one way or the other. But strategy-making is a difficult art and one that all presidential administrations struggle to master.

In the meantime, Obama and Biden can get things off on the right foot with Xi—by being honest and clear about both where U.S.-Chinese interests converge and where they differ. This won’t make for warm and fuzzy feelings, but it will set realistic expectations about what shape the bilateral relationship can take. Romance, unfortunately, will just have to wait for another day.

The Washington Post ran an interesting article over the weekend on Tsai Eng Meng, Taiwan’s third-richest man and an avid supporter of the island’s unification with mainland China (on whose market Tsai depends for 90 percent of his profits). “Tsai says he can’t wait” for that day, according to the Post. “Whether you like it or not, unification is going to happen sooner or later,” Tsai said. “I really hope I can see that.” While such enthusiasm for unification with the authoritarian mainland may be surprising to Americans and is certainly not in tune with public opinion in Taiwan, it is not entirely out of the ordinary either: last September (the latest month for which statistics are available), 1.4 percent of Taiwan’s population favored unification as soon as possible and 10.6 percent favored unification eventually.

What is disturbing is Tsai’s willingness to serve as an apologist for Beijing:

China “is very democratic in lots of places. Lots of things are not what people outside think,” he said, adding that it is “‘constantly moving forward” while “Taiwan progresses very slowly.”

Elections, he said, are fine, but economics should come first: “Most of us don’t want to become some sort of chairman or president … From the standpoint of ordinary people, the most important thing is to eat a little better, sleep a little better, and be a little happier.”

But particularly shocking, if not outright despicable, are Tsai’s views on the Tiananmen Square massacre:

Tsai said he, too, used to fear China’s ruling Communist Party and didn’t want to risk doing business on the mainland, but that changed after the 1989 military assault on student protesters in Tiananmen Square. While the crackdown outraged most in Taiwan, Tsai said he was struck by footage of a lone protester standing in front of a People’s Liberation Army tank. The fact that the man wasn’t killed, he said, showed that reports of a massacre were not true: “I realized that not that many people could really have died.”

While Tiananmen convinced much of the world of the true nature of China’s communist regime, it confoundedly disabused Tsai of his previous beliefs about Beijing. Of course, hundreds of protesters were, in fact, killed in the crackdown and the fate of the “tank man,” as he has come to be called, is a mystery—though odds are that he is not living in freedom, if he is living at all.

One wonders if the irony of these comments is lost on Tsai. Disturbing as his remarks are, in Taiwan he is free to make them. On the mainland, Tiananmen is a taboo topic, one which most Chinese are simply too fearful to discuss openly. And that’s why so many of Taiwan’s people are thankful for the freedoms that their government protects—even if Tsai Eng Meng is not.

Predictions that the human rights situation in North Korea would worsen—inconceivable as that may sound—in the wake of Kim Jong-il’s death are being borne out, if the following report is accurate:

Daily NK learned from a source from North Hamkyung Province on January 10th, “The authorities are handing down at least six months in a labor-training camp to anybody who didn’t participate in the organized gatherings during the mourning period, or who did participate but didn’t cry and didn’t seem genuine.”

Furthermore, the source added that people who are accused of circulating rumors criticizing the country’s 3rd generation dynastic system are also being sent to re-education camps or being banished with their families to remote rural areas…

The source even revealed that public trials are being employed without regard for the frigid weather to judge people who attempted to leave North Korea during the mourning period, either to defect or to smuggle, as well as those discovered using mobile phones to make calls out.

Much of the international community has been calling for stability on the Korean peninsula. Well, this is what stability looks like in the North. I can’t wait to see what comes next.

Michael Mazza

The luminary and the lowlife

By Michael Mazza

December 19, 2011, 3:29 pm

This weekend the world lost one luminary and one lowlife; one man who worked to better the lives of his countrymen and one who bettered his own life on the backs of the suffering masses; one who achieved greatness in spite of his all-too-human weaknesses and one who submitted to his basest human instincts with regard for no one but himself. While Kim Jong-il’s death sadly threatens to overshadow the passing of Vaclav Havel, it can also help us to better appreciate what a loss Havel’s death represents. As Marc makes clear, history will remember these two leaders in quite different ways, but it is perhaps fitting that the two will be linked in death. For it reminds us that without villains, there is no need for heroes.

And heroes like Vaclav Havel are important. They inspire the silent to speak up. They inspire the passive to act. They push us to be better than the sum of our parts. I take heart that somewhere in North Korea, somebody has gotten their hands on a copy of Charter 77 and that he (or she) has just seen that the mighty do in fact fall. If some brave soul decides that now is the time to stand up, to push for real change, hopefully Havel will inspire Americans, too, to stand by his side.

Last night, the White House released the following statement:

“We are closely monitoring reports that Kim Jong Il is dead. The President has been notified, and we are in close touch with our allies in South Korea and Japan. We remain committed to stability on the Korean peninsula, and to the freedom and security of our allies.”

Although it may be difficult to know exactly what is happening inside North Korea, one would think Washington would at least want to try to shape events. Kim Jong-il’s death is scary because it has suddenly introduced a lot of uncertainty into Northeast Asia. But his death may also be the best opportunity in years to free North Korea from malign tyrranical rule.

Yet the White House statement reeks of timidity and strongly suggests the president is adopting a wait-and-see approach. That’s a shame. Until now, the North Korean game has been one where gains have been too often measured in inches instead of yards. If there’s ever a time for a long bomb, if there’s ever a time to dig deep into the playbook for a flea flicker or a double pass, this is it.

Michael Mazza

Ding dong the witch is dead

By Michael Mazza

December 19, 2011, 8:53 am

Kim Jong-il is dead. What happens next is anyone’s guess. Possible scenarios (not necessarily all mutually exclusive) include the following:

•    Kim Jong-un, Jong-il’s youngest son, steps quickly and easily into his father’s shoes. All goes swimmingly.

•    Kim Jong-il adviser Jang Song-taek acts as regent to the younger Kim and rules effectively while Jong-un continues to hone his chops in Pyongyang.

•    North Korea launches artillery attacks against the South.

•    North Korea tests a nuclear device.

•    Factional infighting will prevent any individual or group from exercising effective control.

•    Kim Jong-il’s death was not natural as reported. Kim Jong-un and other members of the Kim family may be next on the hit-list.

•    The additional uncertainty caused by Kim’s death drives segments of an already hungry, malnourished population over the edge. North Koreans head for the Chinese border in droves.

I could go on, but the point is that nobody really knows precisely what is happening in Pyongyang nor what will happen next. North Korea is more or less a black box and has been so for decades. We could all be in for a wild ride.

While last night’s debate offered Americans an opportunity to learn more about the Republican candidates’ grasp of and views on foreign policy issues, there were a number of important questions that weren’t asked. Here are a few of those questions:

—China’s rise presents both economic opportunities and challenges to U.S. national security interests. How would you craft a policy that takes advantage of the opportunities while countering the challenges?

—The United States has a unique but important relationship with Taiwan, a democracy and long-time friend. While we don’t afford Taiwan official diplomatic recognition and it is not a treaty ally, the Taiwan Relations Act does require the United States to ensure the island can defend itself. If China were to attempt to unify Taiwan with the mainland by force, would stopping that effort be worth spending American blood and treasure?

—Unlike Iran, North Korea already has nuclear weapons. Seemingly confident in their deterrent value, North Korean armed forces twice struck South Korea at will last year—the first time sinking a naval vessel and the second time launching artillery attacks that killed both civilians and military personnel. The next time North Korea carries out such an attack, would you support a South Korean decision to retaliate? Would you commit U.S. forces to the effort?

—Last year’s Nobel Peace Prize winner, Liu Xiaobo, is currently locked up in a Chinese prison for promoting liberal reform in China. Sadly, he is just one of thousands (if not millions) of victims of human rights violations in that country. As president, what steps would you take to protect reformers, dissidents, and religious practitioners in China and elsewhere in Asia?

The attention dedicated to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran last night was understandable and appropriate. But whoever the next American president is, he or she will have to deal with the questions above once in office. Americans should have some idea how the candidates would handle these challenges before deciding how to cast their votes.

This post is part of an ongoing series preparing for the AEI/CNN/Heritage National Security & Foreign Policy GOP presidential debate on November 22. See the rest of the posts here.

While the United States has more or less effectively taken advantage of the opportunities afforded by China’s rise (namely, by expanding the countries’ economic relationship), its record on addressing the challenges posed by that rise is shakier. These challenges, of course, are great and threaten to directly impinge on U.S. national security interests. Here are, perhaps, the top four national security challenges that China poses:

  1. China’s military modernization is enabling it to challenge the American military’s unimpeded access to Asia’s maritime and air commons and to directly threaten U.S. territory in the Pacific. It is similarly threatening access to the cyber and space commons.
  2. The People’s Liberation Army likewise poses growing coercive threats to U.S. allies and partners, such as Japan and Taiwan, and other friendly countries in the region. It is intentionally stirring up trouble in the South China Sea in hopes of eventually settling territorial disputes on its own terms. China, in short, increasingly threatens the long peace that has held in Asia for the past three decades.
  3. Beijing is growing and modernizing its strategic weapons arsenal and developing its nuclear doctrine, both in an opaque manner. The transparency necessary for assuring stable mutual deterrence is disturbingly lacking.
  4. China is making the world safe for autocracies, like North Korea and Iran, by maintaining or deepening economic ties with those states amid their international isolation (thus, in a way, subsidizing their nuclear weapons programs) and by exercising its veto threat on the United Nations Security Council to water down potentially effective resolutions. Beijing similarly makes efforts to stifle freedom in countries that are already democratic. In so doing, the People’s Republic is impeding the spread of liberal democracy, the proliferation of which is a key U.S. interest.

The challenges that the United States faces in dealing with China—whether of direct concern to U.S. national security or not—are of course much more numerous and include gross human rights violations, unfair trading practices, serious and widespread environmental degradation, active and harmful espionage, arms proliferation, and energetic efforts to alter long-standing international norms. It is the president’s charge to address all of these challenges while at the same time nourishing the dynamic economic ties that benefit both countries.

Yet disturbingly, with continued economic troubles both at home and abroad, the ongoing and perhaps more pressing threats of terrorism and failing states, and a smaller defense budget (and thus a smaller military), the next U.S. presidential administration may well find this task—one at which the United States cannot afford to fail—more difficult than ever.

Marc Thiessen commented here this morning on Bret Stephens’s Tuesday column about China’s “Underground Great Wall” (see my post from yesterday). Marc notes that China is not the only country digging underground nuclear facilities, with Iran and North Korea also engaged in extensive tunneling, and lists two reasons that these countries do so: “to hide their growing arsenals from Western satellite surveillance” and to keep “their nuclear programs out of reach of our weapons.” To negate the advantages gained by tunneling, Marc calls for the U.S. to develop earth penetrating nuclear weapons.

Writing for The Diplomat last month, Jeffrey Lewis and Elbridge Colby made a similar case:

Getting at Kim means putting at risk North Korea’s growing number of hard and deeply buried targets. North Korea has sought to preserve its leadership and other valued assets, such as its nuclear and missile forces, by constructing underground facilities ranging from relatively shallow ‘cut and cover’ facilities to complexes buried beneath hundreds of meters of hard rock. Although most of these facilities can be threatened with conventional earth penetrators, a few may be too deep for conventional options, especially those where Kim himself might plan to hide. For the near future, only nuclear weapons could hold such targets at risk.

Read the rest here.

The must-read China story of the day—and, I predict, of the week—is Bret Stephens’s column in today’s Wall Street Journal. Stephens reports on the research that Phil Karber is conducting at Georgetown University’s Asian Arms Control Project. Karber has been looking into China’s nuclear arsenal and what has come to be called the “Underground Great Wall,” three thousand miles of tunnels dug by the PLA’s Second Artillery Corps, which is responsible for the country’s strategic weapons.

The whole piece is worth reading, but here’s the key passage:

The extent of the tunneling was also hard to square with the supposedly small size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, which is commonly believed to be in the range of 240-400 warheads. “So they’ve built 10 miles of tunnel for every warhead?” Mr. Karber recalls asking himself. “That doesn’t make sense; it’s kind of overkill.”

That thought prompted Mr. Karber to take a closer look at Western estimates of China’s arsenal. In the late 1960s, the U.S. military projected that China would be able to field 435 warheads by 1973. A straight-line extrapolation based on that assumption would suggest that China would have somewhere in the order of 3,000 warheads today. In 1984 the Defense Intelligence Agency estimated that China would have 818 warheads by 1994 and more than 1,000 today. More recent reports in the Chinese media put the figure somewhere between 2,350 and 3,500, with an average annual warhead production of 200 over the last decade. By contrast, estimates by the Natural Resources Defense Council suggest that China’s arsenal peaked by about 1980 and has been more-or-less flat ever since.

In other words, our understanding of Chinese nuclear doctrine, the assumptions underlying American nuclear force posture, and the assumptions underlying the Obama administration’s arms control efforts could all be very, very wrong.

Read the rest of the piece here (subscription required). For a lengthier discussion of China’s evolving nuclear doctrine, check out the essay that Dan Blumenthal and I co-authored for the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center earlier this year.

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta had an op-ed in yesterday’s Yomiuri Shimbun, in which he comments on the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance and on the United States’ role in Asia. He gets it exactly right when he asserts that when it comes to our relationship with Japan, shared values are at least as important as shared security concerns. He writes:

On the eve of my first visit to Japan as United States Secretary of Defense, I’ve had the opportunity to reflect on the enduring nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance that has been the cornerstone of stability and security in the Asia Pacific region for more than 50 years. Our partnership is based on more than just shared security and economic interests—its true strength comes from the common values our two peoples hold dear, a belief in democratic ideals, and the rule of law.

Somewhat troubling, however, is Panetta’s description of America’s goals vis-à-vis the challenges the alliance faces in Asia:

These include North Korea, which continues to engage in reckless and provocative behavior and is developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, which pose a threat not just to Japan, but to the entire region. China is rapidly modernizing its military, but with a troubling lack of transparency, coupled with increasingly assertive activity in the East and South China Seas. Together, the U.S. and Japan will work to bring North Korea back to the Six Party Talks, and encourage China to play a responsible role in the international community.

While Panetta at least describes the desired (if idealistic) outcome of Washington’s China Policy—a “responsible” Beijing—he fails to do so for North Korea. This passage is striking, and perhaps unintentionally revealing, because the goal it ascribes to America and Japan’s North Korea policy is a return to the Six Party Talks. Not denuclearization. Not an end to Pyongyang’s murderous acts of war. Not the return of kidnapped Japanese citizens. Just talks.

That a return to the Six Party Talks is precisely what North Korea wants should give the Obama administration pause. (Nick Eberstadt explained earlier this year what Pyongyang desires out of renewed negotiations). But, hey, if that’s our only goal, well, at least it’ll be easy to achieve.

For an alternative approach to North Korea—one that hasn’t, unlike the Six Party Talks, proven itself a repeated failure over the last decade—see my recent Asian Outlook on the subject.

Those of us wary of China’s rise often argue that were Beijing to ever dominate Asia, it would impede political liberalization in the region. Its efforts to stifle liberalism in far-flung Norway should dispel any doubts that it will do so closer to home if given the opportunity.

Last year Liu Xiaobo, an imprisoned Chinese dissident, won the Nobel Peace Prize. The Nobel Foundation is, of course, an independent, non-governmental organization over whose decisions the Norwegian government has no control. But no matter: Beijing froze ties with Norway and has recently rebuffed Norwegian efforts to normalize relations:

The two sides have been communicating recently through Norwegian newspaper Dagens Næringsliv (DN) … Chinese authorities have been blaming the Norwegian government for the award that embarrassed and angered them, even though the Norwegian Nobel Committee operates independently of the government and Parliament.

[Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr] Støre launched the latest round of diplomatic overtures by publishing a lengthy commentary in DN last week and telling the paper that he and his government colleagues have taken China’s anger seriously and “understand” that the Chinese are upset. He made no apology, since the government can’t take responsibility for the Nobel Committee’s decisions…

Now the Chinese seem most angry over the Norwegian government’s expressions of support for the Peace Prize to Liu, not just that the Nobel Committee made the award … Now they have written to DN that “… current Sino-Norwegian relations (are) in difficulty because the Norwegian Nobel Committee granted last year’s … Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese criminal serving (a) jail term in China, and the Norwegian Government supported this wrong decision. This constitutes contempt for China’s internal affairs, thus causing great damage to … bilateral relations.”

The “official” response claimed that China “attaches great importance to the relations between China and Norway and has made great efforts to develop the relation.” Now, however, “we expect that the Norwegian side will make tangible efforts to restore and develop the bilateral relations.”

Whatever “tangible efforts” Beijing may have in mind, Norway, a long established democracy and U.S. ally to boot, can withstand such pressure. But a developing democracy in Asia, dependent on Chinese trade and within reach of its growing military power, may find it more difficult to do so, especially if U.S. forces are one day less prominent in the region.

China’s autocracy makes it hostile to liberalism’s proliferation. Much to the chagrin of IR realists, evidence continues to mount that the nature of China’s regime really does matter when it comes to Beijing’s external relations.

While media attention is understandably concentrated this week on the Iranian terrorist plot, the White House—at least for today—is rightly focusing on South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s visit to Washington. Yesterday, Lee attended a lunch co-hosted by Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden, and today he will be feted with an Oval Office meeting with the president, the opportunity to speak to a joint meeting of Congress, and a state dinner at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Although Seoul and Washington have had their differences over the years, such treatment is reserved for America’s closest allies. The speedy movement through Congress of the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement—passed yesterday, with bipartisan support, to coincide with Lee’s visit—provides further proof of the relationship’s importance.

Indeed, the long-delayed FTA will be viewed as the “big win” for this visit, and rightly so. But the most important conversations that Lee holds with his American counterpart may well be about North Korea.

Pyongyang continues to puzzle South Korean and American strategists alike. A nuclear North Korea is deemed unacceptable by both nations, yet efforts at denuclearization have been utterly unsuccessful. Both countries are intent on stopping future North Korean provocations, yet seem to believe they have limited options for doing so. Seoul and Washington share a long-term interest in peaceful unification of the peninsula under Seoul’s leadership, yet they lack a strategy for bringing about that outcome.

In this month’s AEI Asian Outlook, I put forth suggestions for constructing a new allied strategy for dealing with North Korea. I propose a two-track strategy, which I argue can achieve all of Washington and Seoul’s primary goals with respect to the North. As I write, “Track One is a coercive military strategy designed to alter North Korean behavior in the short term. Track Two is a long-term effort aimed at eventually bringing down the Kim Jong Il regime in a way that facilitates a successful and ideally peaceful reunification.”

North Korea has been literally getting away with murder for far too long (not to mention proliferation, counterfeiting, and crimes against humanity), and efforts to alter Pyongyang’s behavior have failed. With a third nuclear test potentially in the works, the movement of North Korean forces closer to the maritime border with the South, and U.S. PACOM commander Admiral Willard warning of further provocations, it’s clear that a new direction in strategy is sorely needed. Sooner rather than later.

Michael Mazza

Baby Steps Towards an Asian NATO

By Michael Mazza

September 30, 2011, 11:12 am

In our recent report on an Asian alliance structure for the 21st century—principally authored by my colleague Dan Blumenthal—we argued that in order to balance against China’s rising power, the United States should work towards a more tightly knit grouping of allies in Asia. We attempted to preempt the conventional counter-argument—that “the allies would never choose sides between the United States and China”—by pointing to the military modernization that is happening across the board in Asia: countries in East, Southeast, and South Asia are all fielding new, more modern capabilities in response to China’s own build-up. As we wrote, it looks to us as if “the allies have made a choice without being asked: they are balancing against China’s power.”

Writing for Foreign Policy, James Traub took issue with this conclusion:

The “Asian Alliances” report warns that “Asia’s future demands nothing less” than a new “shared strategic concept.” The web of Cold War alliances should give way to a military partnership among the United States, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and others that would require a major increase in military spending and in military and intelligence cooperation. “[A]ny would-be aggressor” would be made to understand “that targeting one ally means invoking the ire of the rest.” It’s hard to believe that these states would agree to join such an explicitly anti-Chinese coalition. There’s also the danger that China would react by concluding that time was no longer on its side, thus turning the coalition into a devastatingly self-fulfilling prophecy.

While Traub’s concern is a reasonable one, evidence suggests that such a coalition is slowly beginning to form, even without direct U.S. participation. Today’s Wall Street Journal reports on a recent meeting of Japanese and Southeast Asian defense officials:

The relationship between Japan and the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has “matured from dialogues to one where Japan plays a more specific cooperative role” on a range of regional security issues, Japanese Vice Minister of Defense Kimito Nakae said Thursday in Tokyo, the day after meeting with senior defense officials from the 10 Asean nations.

Mr. Nakae was speaking at the opening of a seminar on common security issues held the day after the annual defense meeting. Attended by representatives of Japan and Asean countries … the seminar this year prominently featured maritime issues…

Bolstering the possibility of establishing a wider multilateral strategic framework, Mr. Nakae said resolving the maritime problem requires stronger cooperation from Japan, the U.S., and others.

China’s growing naval confidence was the primary subject discussed by a panel of regional security experts during the session on “efforts to strengthen maritime security in the region.”…

Earlier this week, Japan and the Philippines tightened military and security ties, elevating the bilateral relationship to a “strategic partnership” in a joint statement signed by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and Philippine President Benigno Aquino III in Tokyo.

In short, countries in Asia find themselves more and more worried about China’s rise and its increasingly aggressive behavior. They are beginning to coordinate their efforts to maintain peace in the region—and, notably, doing so without China’s participation, which they probably believe would be counter-productive.

This is no Asian NATO, not even close. But America’s friends in the region are taking baby steps in that direction.

Michael Mazza

White House Pandering to Beijing

By Michael Mazza

September 19, 2011, 12:55 pm

On Friday, I wrote about the Obama administration’s interference in Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election. I failed to point out that this interference coincided with the administration’s notification to Congress that it would not sell new, much needed F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan. The confluence of these moves is surprising. One would think the administration would at least try to avoid the appearance that Beijing is dictating the White House’s Taiwan policy. Instead, in a single week, the administration both displayed overt support for the Chinese Communist Party’s preferred Taiwanese presidential candidate, and refused to provide Taiwan with the arms it needs to defend itself from a hostile China. One can’t help but wonder what the president won’t do to pander to Beijing.

The Obama administration has, apparently, gotten into the business of interfering in other countries’ democratic elections.

Taiwan’s opposition candidate for president, Dr. Tsai Ing-wen, is making the rounds in Washington this week (she delivered a speech at AEI on Tuesday). Yesterday, the Financial Times reported the following:

A senior U.S. official said Ms. Tsai, the Democratic Progressive party leader who is visiting Washington, had sparked concerns about stability in the Taiwan Strait, which is “critically important” to the U.S.

“She left us with distinct doubts about whether she is both willing and able to continue the stability in cross-Strait relations the region has enjoyed in recent years,” the official told the Financial Times after Ms. Tsai met with administration officials …

The U.S. official said that while she understood the need “to avoid gratuitous provocations” of China, it was “far from clear … that she and her advisers fully appreciate the depth of [Chinese] mistrust of her motives and DPP aspirations.”

This blatant effort to undermine Tsai’s candidacy and influence the Taiwanese elections is disturbing on a number of levels.

First of all, we have no business instructing the Taiwanese people as to whom they should elect president. I keep trying to believe otherwise, but sometimes it really does seem that Obama’s is the first administration in a long time (ever?) that cares not a whit about democracy and its proliferation (note to the White House: this kind of proliferation is good). While Taiwan’s transition to democracy is first and foremost an accomplishment of the Taiwanese people, America played an important role as well—to interfere in free elections now is to turn our back on what should be a point of pride for the United States. It’s also ironic that while the administration has no problem meddling in Taiwan’s elections, it refuses to meddle elsewhere—for example, in not-yet-a-democracy Egypt, where the State Department won’t say anything negative about the Muslim Brotherhood’s participation in the government.

Second, the condescension expressed towards Tsai is embarrassing. Given that this administration seems to have little idea how to effectively deal with China (which has made a sport of humiliating U.S. leaders on visits to Beijing), that Taiwan shares an even more complex relationship with China than does the United States, and that the Taiwanese share with China both language and culture, it’s odd that the administration believes that its understanding of Beijing and cross-Strait politics is somehow superior.

Third, this interference could very well come back to bite the Obama administration in the long run. If Tsai wins the election next January, how will she be able to trust an untrustworthy administration? If cross-Strait stability is “critically important,” then isn’t the wise move to cultivate, rather than undercut, a relationship with Taiwan’s next potential president?

In today’s Wall Street Journal Asia, Dan Blumenthal and I focus on the perils for Asia of additional U.S. defense cuts. Last year, the Obama administration launched an effort to slash $400 billion in defense spending. Now the administration is calling for an additional $400 billion in cuts. It is, of course, easy to see how much money such cuts will save in the short term. Unfortunately, by lowering spending now, the United States risks incurring unacceptably high costs in the future.

America will bear those costs in the Asia-Pacific, where U.S. defense cuts and simultaneous Chinese military modernization will hamper the U.S. military’s ability to operate effectively. Instability will result and, as we write:

That instability could have far-reaching consequences. America’s military has ensured peace and stability in the region, made the seas safe for trade and transit, provided Asians with the political space to prosper, and guaranteed that no hostile power would again use the Pacific as an avenue of approach for an attack on American soil.

Indeed, there would be no possibility of an “Asian Century” absent U.S. power. The international trade that has fueled the region’s economic boom is dependent upon the immeasurable strategic tasks undertaken by the U.S. military—from keeping safe maritime shipping to reassuring friends and allies while deterring China and North Korea. The value of these daily operations is hard to price in a budget.

Fortunately, the Department of Defense does have an answer to the Chinese military challenge. AirSea Battle, a new military operational concept, would enable the U.S. Navy and Air Force to operate more closely together to deter and, if necessary, defeat Chinese forces. But putting AirSea Battle into practice is a capital-intensive undertaking, requiring significant investments in both new and existing capabilities. With defense budget cuts looming, the effort is already at risk.

The Navy, already suffering from a lack of resources, would in particular be severely hamstrung by further cuts:

Spending cuts will further encumber the Navy’s already withering fleet, which plays a central role in AirSea Battle. The Navy says it needs 328 ships compared to the current 284, but that goal remains out of reach. Further starving the already under-resourced Navy guarantees that the Navy will never have the number of ships it needs.

The nuclear attack submarine fleet, for example, will certainly come under additional strain. The Navy’s stated requirement is 48 such boats, a number that will increase with the demands of AirSea Battle. Yet if the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan does not receive additional funding the Navy will have substantially fewer than the 48 subs it needs. There is also no provision in the plan for surging production to meet China’s own growing sub acquisitions. China has fielded on average more than two subs annually for 16 years. It now has more than 60 attack subs in its fleet, with more in the pipeline. And unlike the U.S., which spreads its fleet among the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans, China operates all of its boats in Asia.

When the U.S. Navy can no longer patrol Asian waters unhindered, the long peace that has held in the region–a peace which has benefited Americans and Asians alike–will begin to whither away. An era of peace and prosperity will give way to one marked by Chinese aggression, energetic arms races, and nuclear proliferation–an era in which America will not be able to sit idly by.  Such are the real costs of cutting the defense budget.


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