Kim Jong Il is dead. We can’t know what happens next, but there are four reasons to believe that this North Korean power transition will be quite different from the last one:
1. Kim Jong Un is young and inexperienced. Unlike his father, Jong Un has had very little time to shore up his power. The age difference between father and son at their ascension to power (54 and 28, respectively) is the most obvious factor that causes concern, but it is also a matter of their legitimacy and leadership histories. Whereas Jong Il was officially named the Dear Leader in 1985—eight years before his father died—yesterday morning was the first time Jong Un was called a leader of North Korea. Jong Il held prominent party positions as early as 1973, but the announcement that Jong Un had been appointed a four star general and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission did not occur until September 2010. Jong Un’s quick rise to prominence, his inexperience, and his lack of exposure to the public could make this succession process a tenuous and difficult one.
2. Kim Jong Un has two older brothers. Jong Il has been his father’s obvious successor since the 1970s, but Jong Un is the youngest of Jong Il’s three sons. The two elder brothers were passed over. Historically, this has never helped to make a transition more stable. The most likely scenario is that members of the ruling elite could play the brothers off one another or use one or both of the elder brothers as pawns to undermine or depose Jong Un. Of course, there are no real indications that either of Jong Un’s siblings have any interest in ruling. And perhaps they will not cause any problems, but it is a factor that should be kept in mind.
3. Jang Song Taek is still very powerful. Jang is Jong Il’s brother-in-law, and has played a large role in the regime. His hold on power hasn’t always been certain, since he and many of his affiliates were purged in 2004 and then restored in 2007. But he regained his political footing in the aftermath of Kim’s 2008 stroke and has taken on an important leadership role since. There are also indications that he has close connections with the military. While some analysts believe Jong Il chose Jang to mentor the young Jong Un, others believe Song Taek may have ambitions that could prove to be a source of succession troubles.
4. The Chinese. Jong Un will need Chinese support to be successful. He does seem well positioned to continue cooperative relations. He visited China in 2010 and the Chinese government stated yesterday they do not anticipate any changes in bilateral relations. But a lot will depend on what Jong Un does himself. The Chinese probably do not expect changes in relations because they do not expect Jong Un to make any radical changes to North Korean policy. The desire for stable relations with China will act as a constraint on Jong Un’s behavior. Still, Chinese reactions to his (or his mentor’s) early decisions will be a good indication of how that relationship will develop and how strong Jong Un’s regional position will be.
These are the political/diplomatic factors that the United States, Republic of Korea, and Japan need to keep in mind in reacting to Jong Il’s death. The United States and our allies need to react quickly and together, pressuring China to cooperate where possible. The window of opportunity to shape events is already closing rapidly, as the North Koreans have already tested a short range missile, demonstrating that not much has changed. At this point, our goal should be to ensure that Jong Un and his handlers do not get too comfortable and do not think their quick rise to power is welcomed.