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Defining success against al Qaeda in Yemen

By Katherine Zimmerman

May 11, 2012, 10:40 am

The disruption of the bomb plot from Yemen, details of which continue to leak into the press, is good news (setting aside the wisdom of the unplugged leaking). The last time authorities stopped a bomb plot out of Yemen, the attack was already underway and there was a last-minute scramble to find the cleverly disguised bombs. This time around, it seems that the bomb was turned in to authorities. But that begs the questions: Are there more bombs? And more importantly, why let the bombmakers operate in the first place?

There will be more bombs. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the group responsible for at least three attempted attacks on the United States, has proven that it will continue to try to attack America.

Why give the bombmakers free rein? The simple answer is we have little choice. AQAP’s leadership is only partially dismantled and it has significant safe havens in Yemen. The group’s chief bombmaker, Ibrahim al Asiri, is reportedly no longer building bombs. Instead, he’s passed along his expertise – and if reports about the technology in the recent explosive device are true – quite effectively. This production of a new group of operatives underscores a key problem in targeting the leaders: terrorist organizations regenerate leadership.

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta clearly outlined America’s counter-terrorism efforts in Yemen yesterday. The U.S., he said, will continue to go after the leadership and those planning attacks against Americans and the Yemenis will pursue and “make efforts” to reduce AQAP’s influence in Yemen. To date, Yemeni efforts have had little success in actually reducing AQAP’s space in the country.

The United States is caught in a vicious circle: We have been somewhat successful in targeting AQAP’s leadership. But AQAP is breeding leaders faster than we can kill them. And we can’t kill them faster as long as they have safe havens. So the key is on the ground in Yemen, where we have little presence, little leverage, and unreliable allies. So expect the attempted attacks to continue.

5 reasons to watch Yemen

By Katherine Zimmerman

February 23, 2012, 3:43 pm

It seems there’s too much going on in the Arab world to pay attention to Yemen. But President Obama can’t afford to ignore it. Here’s why:

1.    It’s the heartland of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This al Qaeda franchise has proven its intention of attacking the United States and maintains the capabilities to do so.

2.    The targeted killings of Anwar al Awlaki and other AQAP targets haven’t significantly reduced the long-term threat from AQAP. Indeed, AQAP will likely devise and carry out the next attempt on U.S. soil.

3.    AQAP’s insurgent wing, Ansar al Sharia, has secured territory in south Yemen and expanded the group’s territorial safe haven.

4.    American “strategy” in Yemen overlooks the issues that will plague the new Yemeni government, and relies on the government to be both a willing and able partner to defeat AQAP. It isn’t.

5.    Despite elections there this week, nothing in Yemeni politics has changed. Same team in power, same team in opposition, same southern secession, same Shiite rebellion.

Check out my report on Yemen from earlier this week, or listen to a conference call we did this morning on the same.

Al Qaeda officially welcomes al Shabaab

By Katherine Zimmerman

February 9, 2012, 4:12 pm

Al Shabaab is officially an al Qaeda affiliate. This development is not really new, since I and other analysts have assessed that relationship to be real for some time. But for the naysayers, al Qaeda’s media arm just released a video of al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri welcoming al Shabaab to al Qaeda. Is it right, then, to continue to assert that al Shabaab remains a local threat?

The Somalia-based terrorist organization has recently come under military pressure from joint Kenyan, Ethiopian, Somali, and African Union-led operations. Most of al Shabaab’s fighters have been caught up in the fight to protect the organization’s territory, which once extended from the Kenyan border up through central Somalia. Yet not all of al Shabaab is entirely focused on this local fight. A hard-line faction within the leadership has cycled through Somalia’s successive radical Islamist organizations—first al Ittihad al Islamiyya, designated a foreign terrorist organization after 9/11, and then Somalia’s Islamic Courts Union. These leaders, profiled by the Critical Threats Project, subscribe to al Qaeda’s ideology and have more global aspirations.

Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper testified to this distinction between nationalist and radical factions of al Shabaab. He said, “Members of this group—particularly a foreign fighter cadre that includes US passport holders—may also have aspirations to attack the United States.” He added that there are no insights into concrete plots to attack outside of the Horn of Africa, however. But the nationalist and radical factions are not entirely distinct. Al Shabaab’s hardliners rely on the safe havens secured by local fighters to operate, which opens up access to necessary networks to conduct operations. Current military operations in Somalia have begun to disrupt some of these networks, but al Shabaab still has safe havens in the country. And from there, the hardliners will continue to operate.

The fact that Zawahiri and al Shabaab’s leadership decided to announce their relationship publicly at this time is in itself interesting, and merits further examination. For now, though, it is essential for American policymakers to register the fact that an Islamist organization that controls significant territory and resources—including U.S. passport-holders—has declared openly for al Qaeda.

Yemen’s Spring: It’s still a mess

By Katherine Zimmerman

December 23, 2011, 10:25 am

The Arab Spring in Yemen has yet to deliver democracy and may have left the country worse for the wear, especially in the short term. Yes, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh finally signed a transition deal on November 23. And yes, Yemen’s opposition parties have gained some power in the new government. There is also a recognition that popular grievances voiced for years by southerners, among others, are legitimate and need to be addressed. A new Yemeni constitution—yet to be drafted—could institutionalize the observance of basic rights. Further, a newly established military committee took action to demilitarize the country’s cities and to move military assets out of civilian areas.

A deeper look at the situation, however, should reveal how shallow these successes run. The transition deal, pushed forward by Gulf states (except Qatar) and backed by the international community, rings hollow despite some potential for bringing long-term stability. Saleh has yet to abdicate full presidential authority to his deputy. He must do so today, a full 30 days after the signing ceremony. The Saleh regime, including his family members, remains deeply entrenched in the Yemeni government. The shuffling of political figures in the government—including opposition members—does not truly establish a new democratic government. Diplomats can point to the much-lauded transition deal as progress in Yemen, but on-the-ground conditions in the country contradict that progress.

Yemen’s multitude of problems has only been exacerbated by months of unrest. The UN now predicts that 4 million people in Yemen will require significant humanitarian assistance in 2012 and that humanitarian conditions will continue to deteriorate over the course of the next year. This dire prediction rests atop a rapid depletion of natural resources in the country, especially oil and water, and high levels of unemployment. The Yemeni state itself has been severely weakened and there are areas completely outside of the state’s control. These include parts of north Yemen that had quietly been carved off by al Houthi rebels over the past ten months and territory in south Yemen that was seized by al Qaeda-linked militants. Al Qaeda’s franchise in Yemen, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, now has a much larger safe haven in the country than it did at the start of 2011.

The next few months are critical and, like much of the rest of the region, in Yemen the outcome is completely up in the air. The potential to affect the United States is high, but the White House has evinced indifference. The Middle East was so 2011.

AEI Debate Prep: How to respond to the growing threat from the Gulf of Aden?

By Katherine Zimmerman

November 7, 2011, 10:23 am

This post is part of an ongoing series preparing for the AEI/CNN/Heritage National Security & Foreign Policy GOP presidential debate on November 22. See the rest of the posts here.

Defeating al Qaeda is one the United States’ primary national security objectives and the strategy to achieve this is clear: deny al Qaeda safe havens, degrade its leadership, and disrupt its networks. American policy makers have failed to implement this strategy outside of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The result has been a growing threat from the Gulf of Aden region, where two of al Qaeda’s franchises—al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen and al Shabaab in Somalia—have established safe havens.

AQAP has already attacked America twice from Yemen and now it is benefiting from the spread of the Arab Spring to that country. Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, a long-unpopular ruler who at one point earned the moniker of “Little Saddam,” has clung to power at all costs. The already weak military is divided over support of Saleh and a defected division has repeatedly engaged loyalist security forces in the capital, Sana’a. In the spring, when international attention turned to Saleh’s unfulfilled promises of signing a transition deal, al Qaeda-linked militants quietly took over towns in south Yemen. These insurgents, calling themselves “Ansar al Sharia” (Supporters of Islamic Law), carved off significant swathes of territory in Abyan, which connects AQAP’s strongholds in Shabwah to Aden, south Yemen’s former capital. Ansar al Sharia is essentially AQAP’s insurgent arm.

Relying on the Yemeni military’s offensive in the south to roll back al Qaeda’s territorial control is problematic. First, this assumes that the military, which has been unsuccessful against armed opposition groups before, will be capable of defeating Ansar al Sharia in Abyan. Second, it also assumes that the regime will prioritize the fight against al Qaeda and deploy additional military assets as needed. And third, there is the underlying assumption that the regime will then pursue al Qaeda in other governorates where it has had established sanctuaries for years.

Resting American counterterrorism policy on the tactic of targeted killings is problematic as well. Targeted killings alone have not led to the defeat of any other al Qaeda organization and it is wrong to believe that they will in Yemen. The recent uptick in drone strikes in Yemen has not effectively degraded AQAP’s leadership. The long-term impact of Anwar al Awlaki’s death is minimal. Moreover, AQAP’s founding leadership, including the bomb maker for two attacks against the United States, remains untouched.

Is it acceptable, then, to cede control of territory in Yemen to an al Qaeda organization with the hope that continued targeting of its leadership will keep the organization’s activities in check? Or must the United States develop a more robust policy toward Yemen that will lead to the actual defeat of a virulent al Qaeda organization in the long term?

He’s Back: Implications of Saleh’s Return to Yemen

By Katherine Zimmerman

September 26, 2011, 9:40 am

Last weekend, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh unexpectedly returned to Sana’a, the capital. Saleh had been in Saudi Arabia since early June receiving medical treatment after the June 3 attack on the presidential mosque. It is unclear what effect Saleh’s return will have on the crisis in Yemen. Saleh’s probable motivation to return is either to complete the transition process or, more likely, to continue to fight for control in Sana’a. As the political crisis drags on, however, the challenges to the Yemeni state have grown and it is increasingly clear that any Yemeni government will be faced with the task of reuniting a fragmented state, part of which has been seized by al Qaeda militants, and mitigating the effects of a collapsing economy.

The situation in Sana’a has been tense for the past week as fighting flared. Saleh granted the vice president the authority to negotiate and sign a transition deal on September 12. This delegation of power to Vice President Abdul Rab Mansour al Hadi briefly breathed new life into ongoing political negotiations, along with Monday’s arrival of mediators from the UN and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The ruling and opposition parties seemed to be close to agreeing on the details of the GCC’s transition deal and a final agreement was projected to be reached by the end of this week.

Peaceful protests, however, turned violent Sunday. Anti-government demonstrators, previously kept in check by troops from the defected First Armored Division, were permitted to march outside of the protest camps toward loyalists’ territory. This march elicited a crackdown by security forces. Defected troops stepped in to protect the protestors, escalating the violence. Opposition tribesmen loyal to Hashid tribal confederation leader Sheikh Sadiq al Ahmar also fought sporadically with security forces in northern Sana’a. As of Saleh’s return today, the fighting is not on the same scale as earlier in the week, but tensions are running high.

The timing of Saleh’s reemergence on the Yemeni political scene is worth some consideration. First, Saleh may actually be seeking to fully transfer power to the vice president. A ruling party spokesman said that the GCC’s transition deal would be signed this coming Sunday. Should Saleh be seeking to transfer power, there would be no pressing reason for him to leave Riyadh for Sana’a unless his subordinates were not properly executing the deal—either they were unwilling to move forward in the process or unable to negotiate acceptable terms. The second and more likely reason for Saleh’s return is a decision to secure his hold on the Yemeni government. Should Saleh be forced out of power, it is likely that demands to arrest and try him would increase. Saleh has nothing to gain by transferring power and still has a significant section of the Yemeni military under his authority. The question still stands as to whether Saleh will or will not transfer power peacefully.

The ongoing political crisis masks underlying challenges to the Yemeni state. Yemen has long-term problems such as a weak economy, further stressed by the unrest, and resource depletion that will need to be addressed. State fragmentation, long a concern in Yemen, has become a reality. The al Houthi rebels in the north, whose last battle with the Yemeni state prompted Saudi military involvement, have carved off territory. Of more concern to the United States is the success that al Qaeda militants have had in south Yemen, which has increased the operating space of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. An al Qaeda-linked militant group calling itself Ansar al Sharia seized control of Abyan governorate’s capital, Zinjibar, in late May. From there, the militants increased the areas under their control and, at one point, controlled much of the highway running to Aden. A Yemeni military offensive has yet to defeat the militants and re-establish control in the south.

President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s sudden return to Sana’a will impact developments in Sana’a by either hastening a transfer of power or driving the country closer to broader armed conflict. Al Qaeda’s gains and long-term challenges to stability in Yemen should not be forgotten, however, as they could quickly erase any short-term gains made in the capital.

Cross-posted from the Center for Defense Studies.

Suicide Attacks a Reminder of Terrorists’ Strength in Somalia

By Katherine Zimmerman

June 10, 2011, 5:27 pm

The spate of suicide attacks in Mogadishu – three in two weeks – could be an indicator that the gains after recent offensives were only temporary. Just Monday, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) reported that additional districts in the Somali capital had been cleared of al Shabaab militants. Al Shabaab, a radical Islamist group with ties to al Qaeda, already controls much of southern and central Somalia.

Today, an al Shabaab female suicide bomber killed the Somali Interior Minister. Reportedly, she had been staying with him in his home near the KM4 intersection in Mogadishu. The AMISOM headquarters are nearby, and KM4 serves as a key transit point for AMISOM and Somali government troops and supplies.

Yesterday, two al Shabaab suicide bombers attacked the main seaport. The attack killed one civilian and injured three AMISOM peacekeepers.

And on May 30, al Shabaab attacked AMISOM’s Shakala base along Makka al Mukarama Road, the main supply route. The attempted suicide attack killed two AMISOM peacekeepers and injured four others.

The AMISOM peacekeeping force, now an estimated 9,100 troops, is still shy of its mandated 12,000 troops. The force supports the weak UN-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Recent offensives increased the areas under the Somali government’s control, but there was not a comparative increase in government or AMISOM troops to hold the gains.

As changes sweep through the Arab world and demand attention, Somalia cannot be forgotten.

Katherine Zimmerman is a Critical Threats Project Analyst and Gulf of Aden Team Lead at AEI.

Yemen on Verge of Civil War: This Could Get Ugly

By Katherine Zimmerman

June 3, 2011, 3:51 pm

Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh was reportedly injured in an attack on the presidential palace today in Sana’a, the capital. The attack also killed four guards and injured the prime minister, deputy prime minister, and parliament speaker.

The fighting in Sana’a broke out May 23, the day after Saleh refused for the third time to sign a transition agreement. It has quickly escalated: footage from the capital show images of urban warfare, tribesmen and military forces from other areas are reinforcing military positions in Sana’a, and there have been sustained clashes outside of the capital. Today’s attack on the president himself may move the conflict toward outright war in the capital.

Why should the U.S. care? Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which has conducted multiple attacks on American soil, finds sanctuary in the country. AQAP only stands to gain as the situation in Yemen deteriorates. As I write for the Weekly Standard:

Yemen’s escalating violence, an economy on the brink of collapse, and the prospect of widespread civil war or a fragmented state may present the White House with a very dark reality—the emergence of a terrorist sanctuary on the Arabian peninsula hosting an outfit that has targeted the U.S. homeland.

AEI’s Critical Threats Project is providing daily updates and analysis of the situation in Yemen that are also sent out by email.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Ready to Step In

By Katherine Zimmerman

May 2, 2011, 11:59 am

Osama bin Laden’s death is unlikely to herald the collapse of the al Qaeda network. Al Qaeda’s Yemen-based branch, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), is the network’s most active al Qaeda node and is operationally independent of al Qaeda Central. AQAP conducted two successful attacks on the United States since its January 2009 founding and, unlike other al Qaeda-linked plots, the operational planning for these attacks does not have links back into Pakistan’s tribal regions. The prolonged political upheaval in Yemen has already expanded the group’s operating space—Yemen’s counter-terrorism units were redeployed into the capital to protect the president’s interests and tracking of AQAP operatives’ movements has suffered.

The conditions in Yemen will continue to benefit AQAP, as will any of the potential outcomes to the unrest. President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the United States’s partner in the fight against AQAP, is currently fighting for his own political survival. The recommencement of counterterrorism operations, which had been conducted sporadically prior to the unrest, is likely to be delayed in any scenario, whether it be a negotiated transition of power, military coup, or even a stalemate. The most likely result in Yemen is that AQAP will consolidate its network in areas under its control and will take advantage of Saleh’s and the United States’s distraction to conduct operations within the Arabian Peninsula, and also against Western targets.

It is unclear what impact the removal of al Qaeda’s leader will have on the broader al Qaeda network, but there are indications that bin Laden’s death may, in fact, lead to an upsurge in attacks, especially from AQAP. Bin Laden’s approval was previously sought for large-scale operations against the West; sign-off from al Qaeda Central’s leadership may no longer be required. Should bin Laden’s death lower al Qaeda Central’s profile, there may be jockeying within the al Qaeda network for the lead position. AQAP is already poised to assume the lead: it has quickly risen to the top of the network through the successful execution of its attacks on the West and it hosts one of al Qaeda’s top propagandists, American-born Yemeni cleric Anwar al Awlaki.

Yemen’s President Saleh will likely frame himself as the only viable leader in Yemen who can take on AQAP. His hold on power in Yemen will lead to continued unrest, and is unlikely to permit any sustained fight against AQAP. The United States should be wary of confusing bin Laden’s death with the defeat of the al Qaeda network. A first step in Yemen for the United States is a strong counterterrorism partner who is able, and willing, to take on the fight against AQAP.

Katherine Zimmerman is a Critical Threats Project Analyst and Gulf of Aden Team Lead at AEI.

Yemen Is Not Egypt, and That’s a Problem

By Katherine Zimmerman

February 18, 2011, 2:47 pm

The call for reform first heard in Tunisia and Egypt has spread throughout the Middle East. Yemen has not escaped the wave of unrest. Unlike Tunisia or Egypt, however, Yemen hosts an al Qaeda franchise, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), that is determined to attack U.S. interests. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified this month that “Deterioration of governance will present serious challenges to U.S. and regional interests, including leaving AQAP better positioned to plan and carry out attacks.” This is the al Qaeda group that John Brennan, assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism, called “the most operationally active node of the al Qaeda network.” The spread of protests across Yemen should be alarming not just for what they could herald for the Yemeni government, but for how they affect counterterrorism operations against AQAP.

Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has governed for more than 30 years, made preemptive economic and political concessions after the January 14 ousting of Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. But decades of political and economic marginalization could not be undone over the course of a few weeks. Saleh, who has managed to maintain power through the manipulation of tribal factions and blatant corruption, has not had popular support for years, and it came as no surprise that the concessions were not enough to stave off country-wide protests. The protesters do not have a unified voice, however. Some seek further reforms within the government or for Saleh to step down, and others in the south are calling for secession from the north.

The government response has been to increase the security presence in areas where major demonstrations are taking place. But Yemen doesn’t have sufficient military resources to deploy forces to all areas that are experiencing unrest, and there have been reports that civilian pro-government supporters were recruited to disperse protesters. Saleh, who has watched two Arab heads of state fall, is rightly concerned about the gravity of the situation for his own hold on power. Wednesday, Saleh said (apparently without a hint of irony) that those who seek power should use the ballot box, not chaos.

Needless to say, the battle against AQAP is now on the back burner. Security resources are focused on putting down the protests, and this bottom line is good news for al Qaeda. The group could well co-opt the protests to further its own goals. Increased unrest and a heavy-handed response by Yemen security forces would also play into AQAP’s portrayal of itself as a protector of the Yemeni tribes. Most importantly for the United States, AQAP can take advantage of the diversion of attention—both Yemeni and international—from its activities to plan operations to attack U.S. interests.

Herein lies the challenge for the Obama administration: The protesters have legitimate grievances that need to be recognized; Saleh, like most authoritarian dictators, has ignored those he hasn’t repressed. Still, the United States needs to have a strong partner in Yemen to defeat AQAP; Saleh, the United States’ only option, has been inconsistent and is now weakened by the protests. Squaring this circle isn’t going to be easy for President Obama. But square it he must.

Image by Helene C. Stikkel.

Twenty Years since the Somalian Government’s Collapse

By Katherine Zimmerman

January 26, 2011, 3:47 pm

Twenty years ago today the brutal regime of Mohammed Siad Barre collapsed in Somalia. Now, the weak Transitional Federal Government, whose very existence relies on international support, can claim control of key infrastructure in the capital—the airport, seaport, and primary government buildings—but has secured little else. Al Shabaab, a radical insurgent Islamist group with ties to al Qaeda, seeks to overthrow the government to establish an Islamic caliphate.

Following the 1991 collapse of the Somali government, the United States got involved in December 1992 to secure the UN humanitarian operation in Somalia. On October 3, 1993, U.S. Special Operations Forces fought the Battle of Mogadishu, better known by its moniker “Black Hawk Down,” as part of a mission to arrest two militia leaders threatening the UN presence. The ensuing battle resulted in the deaths of 19 U.S. servicemen and images of American soldiers being dragged through Mogadishu’s streets. Three days later, the United States announced March 31, 1994 as a deadline for withdrawing all American troops from Somalia and severely limited the scope of the U.S. mission to self-defense. Since then, the country has been like a third rail for the United States—a scene of humiliation not to be repeated. Al Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden, refer to it often as an example of U.S. weakness.

The threat to U.S. interests is now very serious. Al Shabaab possesses a safe haven in southern and central Somalia where it can conduct training camps and provide refuge to such terrorist groups as al Qaeda. Al Shabaab came very close to defeating the government and the African Union peacekeepers in Mogadishu in September of last year. The current conditions in Somalia are similar to those in Afghanistan that permitted al Qaeda to attack the United States, but a clear strategy for dealing with the threat posed by al Shabaab is still missing from U.S. policy.

U.S. officials have indicated that there is no desire to “Americanize” the conflict in Somalia. If the conflict continues to develop along its current trajectory, however, it may very well bring about a situation, such as the creation of a Taliban-like state, that will demand a U.S. response.

AEI’s Critical Threats Project has begun to examine the situation in Somalia to help develop a better understanding of the conflict. It has identified potential crisis scenarios that would require a rapid U.S. response and has a forthcoming assessment of al Shabaab’s capabilities.

Please find further analysis of the situation in Somalia here.

Katherine Zimmerman is a Critical Threats Project analyst at AEI.

AQAP and the ‘Parcel Plot’: Assessing this Critical Threat

By Katherine Zimmerman

November 5, 2010, 4:56 pm

Today, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claimed responsibility for last week’s so-called “parcel plot” and for the downing of a UPS cargo plane in Dubai in September this year. That crash had previously been attributed to a freak accident. AQAP is now saying that the same devices that went nearly undetected last week were used in September, but the group “kept quiet about the operation until the time came that we hit again.” The explosive device hidden in the underwear of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Christmas Day bomber, went undetected, too, until he tried to activate it on Delta flight 253.

AQAP has now successfully outmaneuvered airline security three times—even after a change in security procedures following the Christmas Day attack. As the group aptly points out, “We struck three blows to your aircraft within one year. Allah willing, we will continue to strike blows against American interest and the interests of America’s allies.” [Message translated by SITE Intelligence Group.] The Critical Threats Project (CTP) has followed the developments of the parcel plot over the past week. Here are CTP’s top five pieces on the subject:

For daily intelligence: Tracker: AQAP and Suspected AQAP Attacks in 2010

For overall anti-al Qaeda network strategy: Our Enemies Have a Strategy. Do We?

For policy towards Yemen: The Continued al Qaeda Threat from Yemen

For analysis of AQAP’s English-language publicity campaign: Expanding the Campaign of Violence

. . . and CTP’s other work on Yemen

Katherine Zimmerman is a Critical Threats Project analyst at AEI.

Deadly Days in Mogadishu

By Katherine Zimmerman

September 23, 2010, 1:50 pm

Fighting erupted today in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, with al Shabaab militants against Somali government troops and African Union (AU) peacekeepers. So far, more than 22 people have been killed and 80 injured in the most recent round of violence, making today one of the deadliest days since al Shabaab launched its Ramadan offensive on August 23. Residents report clashes throughout the contested districts in the capital. Hizb al Islam militants, who are currently supportive of the al Shabaab offensive, fought in the Hodan district. An attack on AU forces near the parliament building killed a Ugandan peacekeeper and wounded two others, according to the AU spokesman Barigye Ba-Hoku. The parliament building is a mere 500 meters west of the presidential palace.

Al Shabaab has waged an offensive in Mogadishu over the past month with the goal of driving out the African Union Mission in Somalia forces in order to take control of the city. On Monday, an al Shabaab militant blew himself up at the gates of the presidential palace. The Critical Threats Project is currently tracking the al Shabaab offensive in Mogadishu and has produced a map detailing major events since the beginning of the offensive.

moga1

Daily reporting on the situation in Mogadishu is available in AEI’s Gulf of Aden Security Review.

Katherine Zimmerman is a Critical Threats Project analyst at AEI.


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