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Many have noted how Ron Paul does extremely well among the 18- to 29-year-olds in primary and caucus states. In fact, it goes deeper than that. In virtually every state, Paul’s support is directly correlated with age—the older the voter is, the less likely she or he is to support Paul.

Looking closely at the exit poll data, Paul’s support normally drops off at two age cuts—30 and 40. A 40-year-old is someone born in 1971—she/he has no adult memory of the pre-Berlin Wall period. A 30-year-old was born in 1981—his or her primary adult memories of foreign affairs are in the post–9/11 era. Thus, Ron Paul’s support is directly correlated to a worldview in which the United States is an unchallenged superpower and the only question appears to be how we should use our unquestioned power.

Those of us who are older worry that this period of unquestioned security and global preeminence will not last without our vigilance. That argument and worldview seems incomprehensible to many younger than us because of their life experience. The challenge for those of us who favor a stronger international presence and maintaining the defense budget is how to explain our policy conclusions to a generation that doesn’t share our premises.

Henry Olsen

Skiers and Mormons for Mitt

By Henry Olsen

February 8, 2012, 12:55 pm

Mitt Romney never has bad hair days, but yesterday was truly a bad political one. How bad? Consider this:

•    Romney did not win a single county in either Missouri or Minnesota.

•    He won the Minnesota caucus by 19 points in 2008, but finished third last night—28 points behind Santorum.

•    He won nearly 30 percent of the Missouri vote in 2008 in a tight three-man race, but won only 25 percent last night in a race with only one opponent whom the national media had given up for dead.

•    He won the Colorado caucus by over 40 points in 2008, but lost it last night by six.

Indeed, it was so bad that the only Colorado counties Romney carried by ten points or more were those with or bordering Denver’s Mormon temple (Arapahoe and Douglas), had strong Mormon populations (Conejos—41 percent LDS; Alamosa—12 percent LDS; Moffat—21 percent LDS); or contained ski resort towns (Pitkin—Aspen; Eagle—Vail; Summit—Breckenridge; Routt—Steamboat Springs).

Skiers and Mormons—not the shape of a winning coalition.

Henry Olsen

Ron Paul hurts Romney in GOP race

By Henry Olsen

December 20, 2011, 9:31 am

Today’s Washington Post-ABC News presidential poll has good long-term news for Newt Gingrich. While the topline results show him tied with Mitt Romney at 30 percent, looking more closely shows that Gingrich has more to gain as the other candidates drop out of the race—as long as Ron Paul stays in.

To see why, look at the splits between “very conservative” and “all other” GOP voters. Gingrich leads Romney among “very conservatives” 36-24, but Perry, Bachmann, and Santorum together receive another 29 percent. Other polls have shown that those voters are highly likely to back Gingrich if their first choice drops out. “Very conservative” voters comprise a bit less than a third of the sample.

Among “all other” voters, Romney leads Gingrich by the narrow margin of 32-28. The conservative trio noted above only receives 11 percent of these voters, while the more moderate Jon Huntsman receives 4 percent. Romney might pad his lead among these voters slightly when these candidates drop out, but not by enough to make up for his shortfall among “very conservatives.”

The wild card is Ron Paul. He’s known as a hardline libertarian, but he receives proportionally more support among “all others” (16 percent) than “very conservatives” (10 percent). This is likely because of his outspoken opposition to the war on terror and continuing involvement in Afghanistan. Other polls have shown Paul doing better among moderates than conservatives, and given his hardline ultra-conservatism on other issues it’s probably his hardline ultra-liberalism on foreign affairs that draws moderates and Independents upset at the ongoing wars that draws them in.

So that leaves Romney in a hard spot as long as Gingrich stays strong and Paul stays in the race. Moderates who might vote for Romney in a two-way race will vote for Paul, while “very conservatives” who back the conservative trio will switch to Newt. The result—Newt piling up delegates in a three-way race with later states employing winner-take-all primaries.

Henry Olsen

Why Gingrich is on top

By Henry Olsen

November 15, 2011, 10:49 am

A poll released today by Public Policy Polling shows former House Speaker Newt Gingrich capping off an amazing month’s rise by taking the lead in the GOP nomination race. Many commentators have focused on the unforced errors and attacks that have brought other conservative candidates down. But just because one person falls doesn’t mean another one has to rise. The reason Gingrich is coming back is because he, alone of all the conservative challengers, is hitting the GOP’s sweet spot—conservative principles plus practical prudence.

As I explain in my article on the GOP primary electorate,  A GOP Dark Horse?, Republican voters are not divided in two between conservatives and non-conservatives, Tea Partiers and others, or college-educated and non-college grads. Instead, they are, like Caesar’s Gaul, divided in three: moderates and liberals; very conservatives; and somewhat conservatives. The first group prefers non-conservatives and the second highly ideological and rhetorically grandiose conservatives. The third group is actually the largest of the three, and they prefer a candidate who is conservative enough on the issues but also has stability, maturity, and gravitas. This group embodies both senses of the word “conservative” in that their head is in line with the modern American conservative movement, but their heart inclines to caution and temperamental Burkeanism.

Newt is soaring because in the debates he has cast himself as the candidate who shares these somewhat conservative values. He’s come out as strongly conservative in ideas, but also as the most knowledgeable and experienced of the candidates not named Mitt. Tea Partiers like the principles, somewhat conservatives like the whole package.

The PPP poll is one of the few regular polls that divides conservatives along the very and somewhat lines, and those crosstabs bear out this analysis. Gingrich leads among very conservative voters with 31 percent, followed closely by Herman Cain at 29 percent and Mitt Romney at 15 percent. These voters are 36 percent of the sample, only slightly larger than in 2008. Among the 39 percent of voters who are somewhat conservative, Gingrich leads with 31 percent to Cain’s 25 percent and Romney’s 20 percent.

If Gingrich is going to fall, it will happen because of one of two reasons. Either somewhat conservative voters will decide that Romney is conservative enough, or they will decide that Gingrich doesn’t have the temperament to be president (or some combination of the two). After the initial attacks on Gingrich’s marriages and lobbying connections (“Newt, Inc.”) don’t work, watch for other candidates and the press to start to bait Gingrich to tempt his dark side to emerge.

Tonight’s Wisconsin state senate recall elections will be closely watched as a referendum on Governor Scott Walker’s controversial repeal of public union collective bargaining rights. The races have been well covered, and prognostications from the left and the right (here and here) go into lots of detail about each race. For me, I’ll be looking at only one race as the harbinger of any national trends:  Senate District 10 (SD 10).

SD 10, represented by Republican Sheila Harsdorf, contains wide swathes of Wisconsin’s blue-collar white Democrat country. Hugging the north-central part of the Wisconsin/Minnesota border, it is the only one of the six seats up tonight to regularly swing back and forth between the parties. It gave President Bush 51.1 percent in 2004, backed Obama with 50.1 percent in 2008, gave landslide margins to Governor Walker and Senator Ron Johnson in 2010, and swung back to liberal challenger JoAnn Kloppenburg in the April 2011 Supreme Court election.

I’ve been following blue-collar whites in the last two years as the evidence has mounted that they are the key swing electorate for the GOP. Last year’s Republican landslide was possible only because of record-high margins among this key group. In recent elections (see here and here), these margins have ebbed as many blue-collar Independents and Democrats have resumed their normal voting patterns. If that trend continues tonight in SD 10, despite uniform agreement that incumbent Senator Harsdorf is facing one of the Democrats’ weaker challengers, it is yet another piece of evidence that Republicans have to do a lot of work to sell their agenda to a wary voting bloc.

Yesterday’s Canadian election had its share of historic moments, most of them nicely described by Jennifer Marsico’s post. But the decline of the Canadian Liberal Party is particularly fascinating and worth looking at closely.

The Liberals (or Grits, as they are colloquially known) were not merely the nation’s guiding party; they dominated modern Canadian politics to a degree unimaginable in the United States. Between 1935 and 2006, when Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Conservatives won, the Liberals formed the government for 55 of 71 years. In so doing, they became like the Swedish Social Democrats, so dominant that they were considered to be the bearer and definer of Canadian national identity.

Even today, the newspapers are filled with stories about what happened to the Liberals, whose 18.8 percent of the vote was the lowest they had received in Canada’s history, rather than the election of the new government. It is as if the nation died last night, and the country’s children are wondering what will happen next.

It’s easy to dismiss the Liberal loss as the product of selecting a terrible leader, Michael Ignatieff, who was so disliked by Canadians that he lost his own seat. But that overlooks some fundamental changes in the electorate.

The Liberals were Canada’s centrist party, placing themselves between the ardently social democrat New Democratic Party and the more traditional Conservatives. They oversaw the construction of the Canadian welfare state, but more than anything else they represented the consensus of Canadian elite opinion. Canada’s factions battled within the Liberals, and when they reached agreement all factions were taken care of.

The rejection of the Liberals is above all a rejection of this mode of operation. Voters on the left were tired of the compromises and special interest pleading such a system required; they swung to the New Democrats in droves. Voters in the center, meanwhile, had grown to believe they were no longer well served by such a party. The Tories offered a quiet respect for the average person and his or her aspirations, and argued that a state that listened to them and then acted was better than the Liberals. In the end, all the Liberals held were urban seats where Canada’s elite live—downtown Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver—and a few rural ridings in Atlantic Canada with declining economies, dependent upon central government grants. It’s hard to see how a Liberal Party can quickly rebuild itself from such a truncated base out of touch with modern suburban Canada.

The Liberal decline is also part of a worldwide trend against long dominant centrist parties. Sweden’s Social Democrats received their lowest share of the vote last year since 1928; Japan’s Liberal Democrats received their lowest share ever in that country’s last elections; Ireland’s Fianna Fail were thrust from power earlier this year and received their lowest share of the vote since the 1930s. Even Germany’s CDU has lost a series of state elections, including one in Baden-Württemberg, where they lost power for the first time since 1951.

Even where longtime powers still rule, they do so in coalitions like Britain and Australia. The British Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition is the first non-wartime coalition since 1931; Australia’s multi-party coalition is that country’s first since 1945.

Something is happening in virtually every developed country that is upending the political order we have all taken for granted. The political times are a changin’ everywhere. And everywhere the story is the same—the center does not hold.

I enjoyed Jonah’s reply to my post on Paul Ryan’s speech at AEI. I agree with much of what Jonah said about FDR—he taxed too much and grew the economy too little. Had America adopted his “Economic Bill of Rights,” Paul’s warning about the potential transformation of American character if we continue on our path would be unnecessary; our character would already have been transformed by the social democratic state FDR envisioned.

I also agree with Jonah that Paul echoes Ronald Reagan in his emphasis on growth and the extraordinary uniqueness and goodness of the American spirit. But I wonder whether Reagan himself would have drawn such a sharp distinction between his legacy and the public image of FDR’s.

Reagan was fond of saying that he voted four times for FDR, our AEI colleague Steve Hayward has observed. Furthermore, Reagan’s private diaries show a lingering admiration for the New Deal. In one entry, he notes that he—like many “Reagan Democrats”—believed LBJ’s Great Society was inconsistent in its scope, aspirations, and implementation with the New Deal. He sought to undo the former, he wrote, not the latter.

This could all have been political posturing from a master politician. After all, any politician knows his private diaries will be anything but after he’s gone. But even that posturing tells us something about the American electorate.

In essence, Reagan was planting the tree of liberty in the garden of Roosevelt. As we move to a national debate over the future of the programs created or inspired by FDR’s vision, a debate that would not be happening in the absence of Reagan’s statesmanship, is it really problematic for conservatives to ask themselves if the reforms we propose would better serve that vision than the alternatives? Isn’t that what Reagan himself would do?

Image by Gage Skidmore.

Henry Olsen

Paul Ryan, FDR’s Savior

By Henry Olsen

April 5, 2011, 2:06 pm

I heard Paul Ryan explain the House Republican budget proposal he released today. Paul made a fine case for why America needs to reverse direction and embrace fiscal stability before it’s too late. But there was an original and beguiling subtext to his talk: Republicans, not Democrats, are the true heirs of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

FDR’s New Deal economic policies have been justly criticized for prolonging the Great Depression. But to his tens of millions of supporters, his vision of America rang true. As articulated by Roosevelt, the New Deal was meant to provide economic growth for average Americans—the forgotten man—while also giving those same people the security that comes from knowing government will step in to help out if they fall in troubled times.

Eight decades later, millions of working class Americans still desire that combination of growth and security FDR promised. According to Ryan today, they should invest their hopes in his plan, not President Obama’s.

Ryan emphasized time and again that under his budget plan, Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid would be safe and secure. If you depend on the safety net, he said, you should support the Republican plan because it is the only way to ensure these programs will be there when you need them.

Implicitly, that means that Obama’s approach is the risky option. Ryan slyly implied that the president’s budget, by adding trillions of debt without reforming safety net programs, created risk and uncertainty for the very people least able to cope. Ryan presented a stark and simple choice to Americans. Support his budget, and rest assured that the safety net will be there for you for decades to come. Support the president and who knows what will be left over for you.

If this message is consistently communicated, it could be a game changer for the GOP. For decades, millions of Americans have seen the GOP as the party of business, growth—and risk. Many feared that a Republican government would result in a shredding of the safety net they believe they need. In short, the GOP was a risky alternative, one to embrace only in times of crisis (1980, 2010) or when a Democrat-led government seems to go too far too fast (1966, 1994).

By casting the Republicans as the party of growth and the party of stability and security, Ryan turns the political tables on the Democrats. The president and Democrats in Congress are now the risky option. They must either advocate reform to the safety net, which means they move toward Ryan’s policies, or they advocate for higher taxes for everyone, which working-class Americans believe will hurt their prospects for growth.

Just as Reagan-era conservatives learned how to talk about compassion from a congressman from working-class Buffalo, Jack Kemp, so this generation of Republicans will learn how to talk the language of security from a representative from working-class Racine. FDR must be rolling in his grave.

Image by Jeff Kubina.

How big should government be? Two of the most thoughtful conservatives, Representative Paul Ryan and New York Times columnist David Brooks, came to AEI today to debate it. So how did this fight between two men I respect immensely appear on this judge’s scorecard?

Neither pugilist scored a knockout. Both agreed that government should be energetic and provide a safety net for Americans in need. Both agreed that the looming debt crisis was so serious it ought to require immediate and significant restructuring of core welfare state programs. Paul noted that he was no libertarian, citing Friedrich Hayek as supporting the need for a safety net and noting his own Roadmap for America’s Future maintains Social Security, Medicare, and other core safety net programs. Brooks in turn explicitly endorsed the Ryan-Rivlin Medicare and Medicaid reform plan that replaces the current, open-ended programs with state block grants (Medicaid) and a defined-contribution program that would give older Americans vouchers to purchase private-sector insurance (Medicare).

The debate, then, was really about a subsidiary, but crucial, question. What type of narrative and rhetoric ought conservatives to embrace in addressing our current crisis? On this point, I think each man is partly right and partly wrong.

Paul argues that America faces a stark choice between free enterprise and European social democracy. David argues it does not, that the difference between whether government should be 19 or 25 percent of GDP, which is the practical choice before Americans now, does not rise to epic, regime-defining proportions. David also argued that this type of stark rhetoric unnecessarily divides Americans into two camps—when they really have much more in common—making future compromise more difficult.

I think Paul is more on the right path here. David argued that conservatives should embrace the legacy of Lincoln, who used government power to help advance social mobility in the shape of government support for roads, the Morrill Act establishing land grant colleges, and so on. But Lincoln as a politician embraced much more of Paul’s approach rhetorically than David’s.

Lincoln rose to national prominence on the heels of his “House Divided” speech. It scandalized the moderate, educated opinion of his day. Surely America was not really a “house divided against itself” with respect to slavery, fated to become “all one thing or all another”! The proximate causes of Lincoln’s declaration, the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the Dred Scott decision, did not mean that the free states of the north were in any danger of becoming slave states, as Lincoln boldly stated. The differences between North and South could be compromised, they argued, as had been done before in 1820 and 1850.

Lincoln in his speech, though, argued that Americans should not look solely at the specific questions before Americans in 1858, but rather at “whither we are tending.” He painstakingly showed that the direction of the course taken since the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the principle that underlay it, that there was no inherent natural right to freedom for a black man that either popular opinion (Kansas-Nebraska Act) or courts of law (Dred Scott) were obligated to observe, ineluctably led to the conclusion that no state could prevent slavery in its territory. Indeed, Lincoln went farther than that: he argued that “we find it impossible not to believe” that the current and past presidents of the United States, the Supreme Court’s chief justice, and Stephen Douglas, his senatorial opponent and the putative next president, were not consciously engaged in this effort and “all worked upon a common plan or draft drawn up before the first lick was struck.”

David said, as he has in many of his columns, that he embraces the Hamiltonian and Whig belief in an active federal government. But such policies were largely rejected by Americans for 60 years following the election of 1800. They became part of the nation’s governing philosophy only as a result of Lincoln’s emotional, stark, neo-populist rhetoric that led to rise of the Republican Party. Indeed, no enduring American political coalition has ever been built that does not have its rhetorical roots in the “the future of our nation is at risk” sort of rhetoric Paul employs.

Paul could do a better job of walking his audience through the points and logic of his position, as Lincoln did, to show why the Obama administration’s policies lead ineluctably to European social democracy. I’ve believed for quite some time that the left wing of the Democratic Party intends this, but for those who need more evidence a thorough, Lincolnian critique would be very helpful.

A deeper, more implied part of David’s critique, however, does ring true to me. David said at the end that many college-educated people, like those in the AEI audience, embrace risk, but many less-educated people do not. He said conservatives need to be conscious of this if we want to reform Social Security, Medicare, and other core entitlements. As I’ve written elsewhere (here and here), I believe David is spot-on about this and Paul’s rhetoric needs to recognize more of this reality if he is to succeed.

The Republican wave was fueled in large part by the white working class. They voted for Republican House candidates by a record 29-point margin, larger than in any previous House election and in any previous presidential election except perhaps those of 1972 and 1984. This crucial bloc of voters wants growth and security, and they are increasingly frustrated that one party seems to offer security and the other offers growth but neither offers both.

Paul’s intellectual and political mentor, Jack Kemp, used to argue that the GOP needed to abandon its “green eyeshade” approach to economics and domestic policy that seemingly put money before people. He came to this conclusion after years of representing a white, working-class district in Buffalo, and in his subsequent career he always made certain to emphasize his genuine love for the poor and working class while simultaneously embracing an economic approach focused every bit on growth and incentives as is Paul’s. Ronald Reagan also always made clear that he respected FDR’s New Deal (he never tired of saying he voted four times for FDR) and remade American politics by offering growth and stability. Dealing with the debt can bring out the green eyeshade mentality in all of us; conservative Republicans like Paul need to be extra careful in addressing the issue because many Americans still inherently fear that we still haven’t learned Kemp’s and Reagan’s lessons.

All in all, I came away thinking both fighters acquitted themselves well. I look forward to the rematch—these questions are not going away any time soon.

Henry Olsen

Gone With the Wind

By Henry Olsen

November 3, 2010, 9:21 pm

The modern Democratic Party was born in 1832 with a base among white, rural, primarily Scotch-Irish Southerners.  Once the backbone of the Democrats, many predominantly white, rural Southern districts continued to send Democrats to Congress even in recent years.

This long heritage was annihilated in the GOP romp. Seventeen seats held by white rural-based Democrats in the boundaries of the Old Confederacy were taken by Republicans last night. (Since Florida was not populated very far south in 1860, I do not include Alan Grayson, Suzanne Kosmas, or Ron Klein).  Where as recently as 1980 the bulk of Southern House seats were held by rural white Democrats, today only six are.  And of these, four won re-election on the strength of African-American voters:  only Heath Shuler in North Carolina-11 and Mike Ross in Arkansas-4 won re-election with a majority of rural white voters.

To put this in perspective, there are now more Republicans in the House from New England and New York than there are white Democrats from rural Southern districts.

Henry Olsen

Why an O’Donnell Win Is Possible

By Henry Olsen

September 21, 2010, 7:05 am

My colleague, Marc Thiessen, has a thought-provoking post arguing that Christine O’Donnell could actually win Delaware based on polling data that shows even liberal Delaware is sympathetic to many core Tea Party arguments. The noted Washington Post political journalist Chris Cillizza has a different view, arguing that Delaware’s prior election history and demographics bode ill for O’Donnell.  Who is right?

I’m not as optimistic as Marc, but more recent election and demographic data suggest that Delaware is more ripe for O’Donnell’s picking than Cillizza believes.

His column looks at New Castle County’s dominance of past general elections in the First State. Going back to competitive Senate races in 1994 and 2000, he finds that while New Castle County (home of the state’s largest city, Wilmington, and its suburbs) cast only half the vote in last week’s GOP primary, it casts two-thirds of the vote in general elections. Since New Castle County usually votes for Democrats by hefty margins and Mike Castle, the moderate Republican O’Donnell defeated, won that county solidly, Cillizza hypothesized that O’Donnell is highly unlikely to overcome that disadvantage in November.

Chris’s analysis is sound, but he fails to account for more recent data that shows New Castle County’s share of the electorate is slipping quickly. In 2004, it cast 64 percent of the statewide vote; by 2008 it cast only 62 percent, even though Wilmington is the home to most of Delaware’s African-American population, who voted for President Obama in record proportions. These election data are borne out by Census data which show that New Castle County grew by only 6.9 percent from 2000 to 2009, but the two more conservative counties, Kent and Sussex, grew by 24.5 and 23.1 percent, respectively.

This shift matters because the two southern counties vote much, much more conservatively than does New Castle. In 2004, Kerry carried New Castle with 61 percent, but received only 42 percent in Kent and 39 percent in Sussex. In 2008, President Obama (aided by high African-American turnout) carried New Castle with 70 percent, but received only 54 percent in Kent and 45 percent in Sussex. Note that the county fall off is similar in each election. Kent voted 19 percent less Democratic in ’04 and 16 percent less Democratic in ’08 than did New Castle; Sussex was 22 percent less Democratic in ’04 and 25 percent less Democratic in ’08.

O’Donnell’s uncompetitive race in 2008 against Vice President Biden exhibited identical patterns. She ran 15 percent better in Kent than in New Castle and 22 percent better in Sussex, nearly carrying that southernmost county.

Most election observers note that, if anything, turnout in 2010 is likely to favor Republicans, as all surveys suggest the GOP’s voters are much likelier to vote than the Democrats’. Throw this together with the recent election and demographic data above and one can see an O’Donnell victory scenario narrowly emerging.

Suppose New Castle County comprises 58 percent of the electorate this year, roughly in line with its long-term trend, with a small adjustment for differential partisan turnout this year. Further suppose that Kent comprises 18 percent (up from 16 in ’08) and Sussex comprises 24 percent (up from 22 in ’08). Finally, suppose that Democratic nominee Chris Coons carries 58 percent in New Castle County, 40 percent (18 points less) in Kent, and 34 percent (24 percent less) in Sussex. Those assumptions produce 49 percent of the vote. Assuming the Libertarian does not exceed two percent of the vote, they would give O’Donnell a narrow and shocking victory.

These estimates assume a lot. They especially assume O’Donnell’s campaign is competently run, well financed, and the personal baggage she carries does not resonate with swing voters. But if these things are true, in a year like 2010 is shaping up to be, it is not beyond reason to think Chris Coons will run slightly behind John Kerry’s totals. Combined with Delaware’s changing demographics, this would propel the most unlikely of all the GOP’s nominees to a job representing Delaware’s citizens in the Senate.

Henry Olsen

Another Polish Partition

By Henry Olsen

July 6, 2010, 12:09 pm

The Polish presidential election produced the expected result, a solid 7-point win for Bronoslaw Komorowski of the pro-free market Civic Platform party over Jaroslaw Kaczynski of the Christian Democratic Law and Justice Party. What’s more interesting is the geography of the voting and what it tells us about the relationship between voting, ideas, and culture.

Here’s the map, by Polish district, of yesterday’s results.

pol1

Note how Kaczynski leads in almost all districts in the east and the center of the nation, while Komorowski leads almost everywhere in the west and the north. The few exceptions in the center of the country are the big cities of Warsaw and Lodz—the free-market candidate won those handily.

Now look at this map, which superimposes the current map of Poland on the map of the Polish territories in 1864, when Poland was split up between Germany (Prussia), Russia, and the Austrian Empire.

poland-1864

Note how the 2010 election results mirror the 1864 boundaries almost precisely. If you are a Pole and live in a part of Poland that was ruled by Prussia in 1864, you almost certainly live in an area carried by Komorowski. If you live in one of the parts ruled by Russia or Austria, you almost certainly live in an area carried by Kaczynski, unless you live in a large city (over 100,000 people—those are the orange dots in the sea of blue).

The early analysis has focused on this difference between the city and country, and it’s true that the pro-market candidate carried the cities while the more protectionist candidate carried the country (scroll down to the bottom of the link to find the breakdown of the vote by city, county, and size of community). But this masks the very real cultural difference between the two halves of the nation. Here’s the city-country breakdown in one of the regions bordering Germany, heavily carried by Komorowski. Note that there is no difference between city and country here.

Now look at the difference in a far-eastern province bordering the Ukraine and Belarus. Here there is a huge difference between city and country. But even with that difference, Jaczynski carries municipalities of every size. Clearly, culture matters.

What to make of all this? Voting in the here and now seems to be governed by the to-and-fro between parties arguing about current events. But these arguments are mediated by habits of the mind and cultural patterns that live in people for decades or centuries. How you view things today is often heavily influenced by how your grandfathers or great-great-grandmothers viewed things in the past.

Poland is not unique in the long-standing geographic divisions inherent to their politics. In America, the division between the North and the South extends back to the early days of the revolution. Vermont and Alabama, for example, have voted for different presidential candidates in all but four elections since Alabama was admitted into the union (excluding the Reconstruction elections of 1868 and 1872, when most Alabama whites were disenfranchised), agreeing only in the transition periods in the 1970s and 80s when the South moved to the GOP and the old Yankee Northern heartlands moved to the Democrats.

But culture can change. The Poles who live in the cities in the center and east clearly want a market economy that is tied to the West. Perhaps many of these Poles are emigrees from the western portions, but more likely they have been educated by their experiences since 1989 to want more freedom, both politically and economically. A similar pattern has emerged in the Czech Republic, where bustling Prague is the bastion of the right-wing parties TOP-09 and ODS.

Americans should keep this in mind as they view the current debates about the course of American life. The political decisions we make now will be heavily influenced by our past experiences. But if we choose to move clearly in the direction of greater government involvement in the economy, much like the Polish city-dwellers who have personally benefited from the freedom unleashed since 1989, we can expect that Americans who associate their benefits or harms with those changes will have their voting patterns altered. And such changes can last for a very, very long time.

american-flag-marchIndependence Day once celebrated a specific act: America’s separation from Great Britain. Today, we celebrate our way of life: the freedom and opportunity promised in the Declaration. Foremost among the reasons behind this change is the huge waves of immigration that have swept our land since the largely British-descended populace celebrated their centennial in 1876.

An American immigrant longs for freedom and is drawn to our land to satisfy that longing. The freedom he seeks differs: one wants freedom of worship, another like the Cuban, Hungarian, or Vietnamese fleeing Communism wants freedom of conscience; still another wants the freedom to make a better material life than they could in their native land. These new Americans can’t feel the same glory in the act of revolution that thrilled their Anglo neighbors whose ancestors won the War of Independence. But they can celebrate the virtue which inspired that act and which was politically enshrined by that act’s success—the virtue of freedom.

Continue reading this post.

Image by Edu-Tourist.

ayers-rockSix months ago, Kevin Rudd was one of Australia’s most popular prime ministers in history. The brainy and intense Labourite had beaten four-time Prime Minister John Howard in a smashing victory and his Australian Labour Party was comfortably ahead in the polls. Today he’s gone, resigning midterm rather than be dumped by his own party. What happened?

Cap-and-trade.

Rudd had made the pursuit of cap-and-trade a hallmark of his tenure, calling it “the greatest moral, economic, and social challenge of our time.” But once the opposition coalition picked a new leader, Tony Abbott, in December, prospects of an agreement that could send cap-and-trade through the Australian Senate faded. Abbott labeled the plan ”a great, new big tax” and the coalition started to climb in the polls. When Rudd announced in late April that he would not push his plan until 2013, well after the next scheduled elections, his support collapsed. Recent polls show the coalition in the lead, a stunning turnaround that if repeated in the elections due within a year would constitute the largest swing between elections in modern Australian history. Meanwhile, support for the Green Party has surged to record heights as disappointed climate activists have abandoned Labour in droves.

There’s a moral here for American politicians. Voters understand that cap-and-trade is not a free lunch; pointing out the real costs will resonate with voters.

Image by Corey Leopold

Henry Olsen

Europe’s Right Turn

By Henry Olsen

June 15, 2010, 6:29 am

flemish-flagsEuropean voters continued their turn to the right over the weekend with a surprise win by center-right parties in Slovakia and by Flemish nationalist parties in Belgium. In Slovakia, pre-election polls had suggested right up to the election that Prime Minister Robert Fico’s coalition of leftists and nationalists would easily win, but in the end that coalition fell well short of a parliamentary majority. Instead, Slovakians voted for a four-party coalition of center-right parties who want to cut the nation’s budget deficit and rely on the private sector to increase economic growth, two of which—the Freedom and Solidarity Party and the ethnic Hungarian Most-Hid Party—are entirely new.

In Belgium, the contest saw the economically vibrant Flemish regions give a new party, the New Flemish Alliance, the most votes. For many years, Flemings have been angry that the Belgian government taxes them to support programs that primarily benefit economically stagnant, French-speaking Wallonia. Indeed, Flemish-speaking regions gave nearly 40 percent of their votes to three parties (NFA, Flemish Interest, and List Dedecker) that advocate for Flemish independence or free-market policies.

These two results—support for economically conservative and new parties—were also found in recent elections in the Czech Republic and the Netherlands. They demonstrate again that the Greek debt crisis has focused voters’ minds worldwide on the need to reduce government spending and encourage growth or else face the possibility of default and wrenching changes.

Meanwhile in America, where polls show the public also concerned about rising debt, the Obama administration issued a weekend plea for Congress to approve an additional $50 billion in debt to bail out state and local governments.

Image by Skender

the-hagueThe Netherlands is famous for its large welfare state and high levels of taxation. Indeed, this cozy, communal society was even profiled in the New York Times magazine a couple of years ago to show what a kinder, gentler America might look like. So what in the world were Dutch voters thinking when they gave Holland’s most economically conservative party, the VVD, first place in yesterday’s elections for the first time since universal suffrage was introduced in 1918?

Like other voters in recent European elections, the Dutch are terrified of following Greece into de facto default and are willing to cut their cherished welfare state to do it. The VVD ran their campaign on a pledge to reduce the deficit by 20 million euros, or about two-thirds, over the term of their government. The Dutch now follow the Czechs, who earlier this month elected a center-right coalition pledging to slash the deficit. Opinion polls show parties of the Right leading in the upcoming Swedish elections and trouncing the incumbent Socialists in Spain. And the center-right prime ministers of both Britain and Hungary pledged in the last week to cut public spending, especially public employees’ pay, to slash their nations’ huge budget gaps.

It would be very odd if Americans, the people most committed to limited government and a small welfare state, were unwilling to embrace a similar call to action. Which party will be the first to sound that trumpet?

Image by Andrew.

Henry Olsen

The Right Angle

By Henry Olsen

June 9, 2010, 12:44 pm

barry-goldwaterFormer Nevada Assemblywoman Sharron Angle’s win has delighted Democrats, as they believe her stalwart conservative views will scare moderates into Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid’s camp. Perhaps they are too hasty. Angle would not be the first Westerner with firm conservative beliefs and minimal political experience to knock off a sitting Democratic Majority Leader. That crown goes to Barry Goldwater, who was a first-term Phoenix city councilman when he defeated Senator Ernest MacFarland in 1952.

Image by terryballard.

The Czech elections produced an unexpected outcome—a clear majority for center-right parties placing debt control ahead of increased government spending. While pre-election polls showed the Czech Social Democrats with a clear lead, the results released yesterday gave them only a narrow 2-point margin over the long-dominant center-right party, the Civic Democrats (ODS). What’s more, two new center-right parties—TOP 09 and Public Affairs—entered the Chamber of Deputies and together with ODS have a clear majority of seats.

According to the New York Times, fear of becoming another Greece was the decisive factor in the election, with TOP 09 even sending mock invoices to voters showing the country’s growing debt.

This result is in line with other recent European election results and poll results showing center-right parties doing well. Despite a paltry 36 percent of the vote, Britain’s Tories won this month’s election and have formed a coalition government dedicated to reining in government spending and reducing debt. The Netherlands will hold an election in early June, and opinion polls show the most fiscally conservative party, the VVD, gaining during the campaign to become the top party in Holland. German polls also show that the public is very opposed to their country’s bailout of Greece.

American Democrats are beginning to get the lesson, as the pared-back jobs bill that passed the House on Friday demonstrates. As U.S. polls continue to show that controlling the deficit and reducing the debt are primary concerns among Independents, it would be wise for both parties to get in front of the curve before voters put them behind it.

britishflagAmerican conservatives distraught about David Cameron’s initial policy steps should be happier with the first leak of his intended welfare policies. New Work and Pensions Secretary Ian Duncan Smith told the Daily Mail yesterday that Britain’s welfare system was broken, bust, and unsustainable. His reforms are familiar to American welfare reformers—encourage the formation of two-parent households, require able-bodied recipients to work for benefits, and replace cash handouts with income tax cuts so people find work more valuable. He even touched on pension reform, saying retirement ages would need to rise and that they ought to be indexed to life expectancy the same way benefits are indexed to inflation.

These are the sorts of policies—reinforcing the values of family and work—that conservative welfare state reformers have long advocated.

Image by Michal Osmenda.

Was Democrat Mark Critz’s larger-than-expected victory due to high turnout among Dems? Democrats had the Sestak-Specter race and a competitive gubernatorial race to excite their voters; Republican statewide primaries were staid affairs whose outcomes were not in doubt. Is this the explanation?

The evidence says not. I looked at the primary results for every county in PA-12 and totaled up the Democrat and Republican total votes cast for governor or senator. I then took the highest turnout race in each county and compared them to the final pre-primary registration numbers by party. (In two counties, the election bureau gave the total number of votes cast by party, which invariably is higher than the total number of votes cast in any single race because of ballot spoilage and voter drop off. I used these totals in those instances.) In every county but one (Greene), the Republicans voted at a higher percentage than did the Democrats.

This result is in line with pre-election surveys that showed Republicans were more excited about the race than were Democrats, and comport with the statewide primary figures that also show Republicans voted at higher rates than did Democrats in Tuesday’s primaries.

Voting was much higher in most counties containing parts of PA-12 than statewide, suggesting that both parties’ campaigns motivated their base voters to come to the polls.

The parties’ efforts did not seem to motivate many registered Independents to vote, though. According to the Cook Report, only 6,000 of the 134,000 votes cast were from Independents, a much lower percentage of the vote than their share of registered voters. Under Pennsylvania law those voters cannot cast ballots in either party’s primary, but they could vote in the PA-12 special election. Those voters might be habitually unused to voting in primaries, and hence did not turn out, but they will know they are able to vote in general elections. If those largely Independent voters break differently than did the partisan part of the electorate this week, the PA-12 result in November could be quite different than it was Tuesday night.

Yesterday’s British election has produced a result the Tories have dreaded: a hung Parliament, or one in which no party commands a majority. Furthermore, the Tories have 307 seats, 19 short of a majority. To get to the 326 seats needed for a bare majority, they must cobble together a coalition consistent of no fewer than five separate parties, most of which are regional nationalists and left-wing, or turn to the major third party, the Liberal Democrats.

A coalition with Lib Dems is frought with peril for the Tories, for both policy and political reasons. Policy-wise, the Lib Dems are far to the left of the Tories on items like taxation, cutting spending, immigration, and defense. But the real deal breaker is widely considered to be the Lib Dems’ insistence on voting reform as a condition of entering into any coalition or alliance.

Britain’s two major parties, the Conservatives and Labour, have long benefited from the traditional “first past the post” (FPTP) electoral system. This system, identical to that employed in most states for American congressional races, breaks the electorate into single-member, geographically defined districts and then awards a district to the candidate who wins the most votes on election night, even if that person has well short of a majority. This rewards parties with geographically concentrated partisans and penalizes those with broad, but minority support throughout the nation.

The Lib Dems have been victimized by this system for more than 30 years. They regularly poll around a fifth of the vote but get at most a tenth of the seats. This happened again last night, as the Lib Dems received 23 percent of the votes, but only 57 of the 650 seats in the House of Commons.

The preferred Lib Dem solution is to adopt a “proportional representation” (PR) voting system. Much used throughout the world, this system in pure form eliminates districts in favor of one national electorate. Seats are awarded in proportion to the number of votes a party receives, with some minimum total set to weed out very minor parties. As applied to the British voting trends of the last 55 years, this would make the Lib Dems kingmakers in every Parliament, as neither Labour nor the Tories have received close to a majority of the total votes cast since 1959.

Applying a pure PR system to last night’s results starkly depicts the dilemma. Assuming a 5 percent floor, as is done in Germany, the Tories would have won 267 seats, or 40 fewer than they won last night. Labour would have won 215, 43 fewer, and the Lib Dems would have won 169, 112 more.

If a pure PR system were the only option available, it’s understandable why the Tories would avoid this like the plague. But there are many other voting systems used throughout the world that would hurt the Tories less while giving the Lib Dems added influence to reflect their voting strength. They could serve as the basis for a deal with the Lib Dems that can send David Cameron to 10 Downing Street while satisfying Lib Dem concerns.

The first is the single-transferable-vote system with multi-member districts that is used in Ireland. Under this system, districts elect between three and five members each, and each voter ranks the candidates in the order of their preference. Thus, a Tory voter might make the Tories their first choice, the Lib Dems their second choice, and so on. The votes are counted in rounds, with the low-ranking candidate eliminated in each round and his votes given to the candidate ranked in the next order of preference until a person gets a majority and is elected. The winning candidate’s votes are then reallocated to their voters’ second preferences until another candidate is elected, and so on until all the seats are filled.

This system gives minority parties representation in Parliament, but also gives majority parties a larger share of the seats than their share of the votes would afford them. In 2007, the leading Irish party, Fianna Fail, received 41.5 percent of the votes but 46.6 percent of the seats. This system also helps the Tories recapture some ultra-conservative voters who are currently casting ballots for the splinter UK Independence Party. UKIP received 3.4 percent of the vote last night; under the Irish system, those voters’ ballots would have been reallocated to the major party they supported next, presumably in most cases the Tories. The Irish system increases the Lib Dem influence while giving the Tories or Labour a chance to form a majority government with a plurality of the vote, just like now.

The second is a split FPTP/PR system like that used in Mexico. Under that system, half of the seats are elected just as they are now with a FPTP election, while the other half are awarded on a national basis according to PR. Applied to last night’s results, the Tories would have won 153 FPTP seats and 133 PR seats for a total of 286, only 21 fewer than they won last night. Labour would have won 25 fewer seats while the Lib Dems would have won 58 more. This system again preserves the ability of a party to win a majority of seats with a plurality of votes while giving the Lib Dems added influence.

A third approach is nearly identical to the Hungarian system, a split FPTP/PR system with the PR seats being awarded regionally. This gives the regionalist parties that have strength in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland a chance to maintain or increase their influence as well. As applied to last night, and assuming England is treated as one region, the Tories would have won 280 seats, a 27-seat loss, but the Lib Dems would have only increased by 53, five fewer than under the Mexican-style system, with the regional parties increasing their share of the seats.

Note that under each approach, the basic fact of a Tory-Lib Dem alliance is unavoidable. That, however, is a result of the low Tory share of the vote, only 36 percent of the vote. Even under FPTP, it is very hard for the Tories to get a majority of the seats when they receive less than 40 percent of the vote. Any of these approaches would effectively raise the plurality share of the vote they would need to form a majority government but preserves the possibility of their doing so, unlike straight national PR.

If any of these systems are adopted, the Tories ought to insist on two other voting reforms that would directly benefit them and increase the fairness of the voting system. The first, fair apportionment, refers to how seats in the House of Commons are distributed among the United Kingdom’s four nations. Both Scotland and Wales are currently overrepresented when compared to their shares of the UK populations. Both Scotland and Wales are Labour bastions; Scotland in particular is a wasteland for the Tories, where they currently hold only one of the 59 seats. Fair apportionment would take 19 seats from these regions and add 18 seats to England (one would go to Northern Ireland). As the Tories carried England overwhelmingly, 40-28 over Labour, one should presume that most of these seats would be added to the Conservative column.

The final change is fair districting. In America, House seats must be drawn on the basis of one-person, one-vote so that the populations of each district are nearly identical to one another. In the United Kingdom, seats are drawn as much to keep certain communities whole as to equalize population. This has resulted in a systematic overpopulation of rural seats, which are overwhelmingly won by the Tories and the Lib Dems, and underpopulation of inner city seats, disproportionately Labour. Creating districts of more equal population will make the Tories and Lib Dems FPTP seat totals align more closely with the vote totals they receive.

The bottom line is that changes to the British voting system ought not to be a barrier to a Tory-Lib Dem pact. Tories have to give up some of the advantages of the current system, while Lib Dems have to give up the dream of being the permanent kingmakers in British politics. A compromise on this point could produce the stable and productive government British voters want and need.

For months, American conservatives have argued what the pending British elections, and particularly Tory leader David Cameron’s explicit move to “modernize” the Conservatives, mean for America. Some conservatives argue the GOP should emulate Cameron; others say he has abandoned principle for expediency and no political gain.

After last week’s first-ever debate among British party leaders, though, a third possibility is evident: voter disgust at two parties who have swapped rule for 60 years could make a third party electorally viable. In Britain’s case, that third party is the Liberal Democrats, long the doormat of British politics. Their leader, Nick Clegg, was widely considered to have won the debate with a clear “pox on both your houses” message, and the result has been a sudden surge placing the Lib Dems in the lead for the first time in their party’s history.

There’s still two more debates and two and a half weeks to go, but American pols should take notice. As I wrote recently in National Review, American polls and election results going back nearly 30 years have shown growing popular support for Independents with growing distrust of government. Polls continue to show that while the GOP is now beating the Democrats in a generic ballot test for Congress, both parties are at record lows in public standing. And a recent poll in Florida shows that moderate Governor Charlie Crist might beat conservative Republican Marco Rubio and liberal Democrat Kendrick Meek if he were to run as an Independent.

Americans are so used to our two-party system that is nearly inconceivable it might change. But political parties exist to serve public sentiment, and if both parties get far out of step with that sentiment their continued dominance ought not to be presumed. If America’s broad electoral and demographic middle continues to feel unrepresented by both major parties, an enterprising politician can run and win as an Independent in 2012.

Henry Olsen

Doomed to Repeat History?

By Henry Olsen

January 27, 2010, 9:03 pm

News Alert
06:32 PM EST Wednesday, January 27, 2010

Obama will ask for end to ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’

In tonight’s State of the Union address, president will push for an end to the policy prohibiting gays from openly serving in the military.

The political speculation in the Beltway tonight was about whether Obama’s State of the Union address would help reverse the disastrous poll numbers for his party that led to Scott Brown’s landmark election in Massachusetts last week. Here’s a quick checklist to see how he’s doing.

Clinton 1993-94:  Healthcare.
Obama 2009-2010:  Healthcare.

Clinton 1993-94:  Gays in the military.
Obama 2009-2010:  Gays in the military.

Clinton 1993-94:  Higher energy costs (BTU tax).
Obama 2009-2010:  Higher energy costs (cap-and-trade).

Clinton 1993:  Dems have 258 seats in House.
Obama 2009:  Dems have 257 seats in House.

Clinton 1995:  Dems lose majority and 54 seats.
Obama 2011: ???????

My AEI colleagues in our Political Corner have unearthed some interesting poll data that show Democrats have lost much of the public’s confidence in the last year on economic issues, as many observers have noted, but also on their signature issue, healthcare overhaul.
 
As shown in this month’s issue of Political Report, Democrats held huge leads over Republicans in December 2008 with respect to the public perception of both parties’ ability to do a better job on virtually every issue. Back then, Democrats held 30 percentage point leads on who was better at dealing with the economy, reducing the federal budget deficit, and generating economic growth. Their biggest leads were on protecting the environment (+44) and reforming the U.S. healthcare system (+39).
 
Fast forward to December 2009 and the picture is totally different. Republicans are now seen as better able to reduce the federal budget deficit and generate economic growth, and the Democrat lead on dealing with the economy has shrunk to 1 point. In each of these areas, Democrats have lost between 30 and 37 points in one year.
 
But the decline in the public’s perception of Democrats’ ability to handle healthcare has fallen just as far just as fast. In December 2008, Democrats held a 39-point lead when it came to which party could do a better job reforming healthcare. Today, that lead is a mere 3 points, a 36-point drop in one year. To put this in perspective, Democrats lost more ground among the public in only one other issue, their ability to reduce the budget deficit (-37).
 
Democrats seem to have recognized their political vulnerability on economic issues, as both the administration and congressional leaders have pledged to make jobs, growth, and budget deficit reduction top priorities in 2010. Yet they seem strangely complacent on health, vowing to move full speed ahead on an overhaul plan that continues to lose public support the longer the issue is debated.
 
President George W. Bush often said he was willing to tackle big issues and take risks other politicians would not; his stubbornness in pursuit of his objectives was well noted and often criticized. It is ironic now to see the Democratic leadership emulating the same qualities in a man they have vociferously criticized for so long.

Henry Olsen

Is Conservatism Dead? (Part 2)

By Henry Olsen

September 10, 2009, 11:17 am

Sam Tanenhaus, in his new book The Death of Conservatism, takes one side in an old conservative family argument, namely the side of English Disraelian conservatives who place social stability ahead of individual liberty as a goal for public action. (Sam calls this “the Beaconsfield position,” which is what his idol, Whittaker Chambers, called it, using Disraeli’s formal title, the Earl of Beaconsfield.) He also says the conservative movement is “revanchist” in its aim and methods, desiring to overthrow the modern state using angry, populist rhetoric. Conservative criticism of Sam’s book has largely been substantive, contending he either misinterprets Burke, inserts liberal rhetoric into conservative clothes, or is simply wrong about the nature of today’s conservative movement.

My critique is different. Sam’s prescription falls short because it adopts a politics fit for English political soil and tries to implant it into America’s fertile plains. As such, it is doomed to fail, and indeed it has already failed when adopted by American politicians in the past.

Beaconsfieldian conservatism arose in 19th-century England in response to the French Revolution. Like other European nations, England was not a democracy (full male suffrage did not arise until after World War I). It also possessed a state church, a landed gentry, and great inequality of wealth derived from extraction of resources rather than the production of ideas and things. The democratic movements of the age threatened the power and property of these elites; like other groups of people, they tried to protect their privileges.

English conservatives learned from the failure of their French counterparts who tried, both in 1789 and again in 1830, to resist the democratic forces with little accommodation. The French conservative strategy produced violent revolutions and deprived the pre-modern elites of political power and wealth. Accordingly, English conservatives adopted a Beaconsfieldian emphasis on social stability—when it appeared that a liberal democratic force was settled on a particular demand, they would preemptively accommodate it, removing the excess from the demand and ensuring that they would remain powerful and wealthy, albeit less so than before.

The success of this tactic in turn rested upon a unique factor of English society: its remarkable class structure. Observers of English society have noticed the remarkable deference shown by average Englishmen to people of the ruling class even to this day.

English conservatism, when successful, has relied upon this deference, arguing that the ruling class makes itself worthy of rule by taking care of the material needs of those not able to rule themselves. This is the essence of “one nation” conservatism, the Tory Beaconsfieldian creed, which posits that there are in fact two Englands, the one of the ruling class haves and the one of the mass have-nots, and that it is the duty of the ruling class to create one nation under its beneficent governance. In essence, this is the formula British Conservative leader David Cameron is updating today when he argues, against Tory idol Margaret Thatcher, that there is such a thing as society and that conservatives must place social and environmental policies—taking care of those who cannot take care of themselves—at the center of their platform.

America, however, is not England. It was founded in a democratic revolution animated by precisely the abstract ideas of liberty and freedom that so unsettled the English gentry. It has never had a class structure like England’s. American politics has always been uniquely conducted by and for the people, and has always been uniquely concerned with how to interpret and apply the founding ideals to current circumstances.

Indeed, our first realigning election, in 1800, was fought precisely between those who argued for a form of Beaconsfieldian conservatism—the Federalists of John Adams—and the modern democratic Republicans of Jefferson and Madison. The democrats won, and all subsequent realigning elections have been fought by parties trying to interpret their principles. Successful parties have always demonstrated that those ideals—individual freedom and liberty—can be entrusted to their leaders.

Sam provides his own evidence that demonstrates that Beaconsfieldian conservatism cannot take root in American soil. He claims (p.26) that Eisenhower and Clinton adopted his approach and were politically successful, arguing:

Both Eisenhower and Clinton struggled against movement forces in Congress. Both succeeded. And both left office with soaring approval ratings. They are the modern era’s true conservative presidents—and the two best.

But, to borrow from Paul Harvey, there’s the rest of the story. Both Ike and Clinton saw their party lose control of Congress during their tenure, never to regain it until long after they had passed from the scene. Both were unable to secure the election of their own vice presidents in excruciatingly close elections. Both tried to form new political orders upon the principle of mediating between movement forces. Ike’s was called “the third way,” as he wrote in his memoir, Mandate for Change; Clinton’s was the New Democrat movement. Both attempts created intense reactions on the left and the right. And in both cases, within a few years of their leaving office there were effectively no adherents of their positions within their own parties, their attempts at creating a politics of Beaconsfieldian conservatism having provoked exactly the extreme ideological reaction that such conservatism is meant to defang.

Sam’s prescription for a healthy conservatism, then, suffers from precisely the flaw he accuses the conservative movement of possessing. Claiming to be a realist, he ignores the reality of American political culture. Sam’s Beaconsfieldian conservatism is a siren song, which, whether meant to or not, will lure American conservatives to their death.


The American Enterprise Institute takes no institutional positions on policy advocacy or political campaigns. The views expressed on The Enterprise Blog represent those of the individual writers.

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