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It has become a Washington commonplace that the federal government’s fiscal problems are increasingly becoming a strategic problem for the United States. “The most significant threat to our national security is our debt,” says Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The budget proposals advanced by Representative Paul Ryan, chairman of the House Budget Committee, echo this truth. Ryan’s resolution, “The Path to Prosperity,” argues that “on its current fiscal path, the United States will be unable to afford its role as an economic and military superpower.”

This is an arithmetic truth, but not a strategy.

Not to dismiss the arithmetic, of course: Our “current path” is fiscally unsustainable. If federal revenue is held at today’s levels, entitlement spending will eat up every federal tax dollar by about 2050. Already, the increase in “mandatory” spending—entitlements plus interest payments on the national debt—is changing what our government does and is able to do. Here’s a 50-year snapshot of the shift: In 1962, John Kennedy’s administration spent 9.3 percent of American gross domestic product on national defense, 6.1 percent on these mandatory categories. Mandatory spending surged past defense spending under Richard Nixon. When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, mandatory spending was double defense spending, 12 percent to 5.8 percent of gross domestic product. On 9/11, the ratio was nearly three to one: Defense was 3.0 percent of GDP, mandatory 11.9 percent. Mandatory spending continues to rise, consuming 15.1 percent of the economy today and moving steadily upward, while the defense burden will slip to the post–World War II low of 3 percent at the end of an eight-year Obama term in office.

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Guess who’s hiding the (strategic) ball?  If you guessed the administration that pledged it would be the most transparent in American history, you win!

On Monday, President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a “joint understanding” on the parameters for a follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which expires this December.  The White House press release on the joint understanding highlighted the mutual agreement to cut strategic warheads from current levels to a range of 1500-1675 and strategic delivery vehicles to somewhere between 500-1100. What the White House did not release was the actual text of the joint understanding.

But thank God the Kremlin does not seem to be as reluctant to publish the actual text.  And with good reason. Points 5 and 6 of the “joint understanding” commit the U.S. to negotiate provisions “on the interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms” and “on the impact on strategic stability of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration.” Through this back door, Moscow has once again tied Washington into linking missile defenses with strategic arms control and, equally problematic, gotten the Obama administration to negotiate about one of the most promising conventional capabilities the U.S. military will be able to field in the future: highly-accurate, non-nuclear, long-range strike weapons. Why we would want to resurrect the Cold War–era way of linking missile defenses with offensive strategic weapons is anybody’s guess. And why we would want to limit a capability that, for example, could be used for attacking North Korean or Iranian missiles on a launch pad without resorting to far more damaging alternatives is also anybody’s guess.

But our guess, in turn, is that there will be more than a few Republicans and moderate Democrats in the Senate wondering why the text of the commitments was kept out of sight and, more importantly, why the provisions are in the “joint understanding” at all.

The authors are resident fellows at the American Enterprise Institute.


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