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Obama expects to have ‘flexibility’ on missile defense after election

By Daniel Vajdic

March 26, 2012, 4:36 pm

Dany Pletka posted earlier this afternoon about President Obama’s open mike gaffe at the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, South Korea.

What Obama intends to do with the “space” and “flexibility” of his second term isn’t clear exactly. But it certainly suggests a change of course on missile defense. Above all, this could include two things: (1) the administration is willing to once again reconfigure our missile defense architecture in Europe in a way that would make it less “threatening” to Russia’s supposed anxieties and, at the same time, less effective against Iran’s growing ballistic missile capabilities (its intended target); or (2) the White House is willing to share sensitive interceptor data with Moscow to assuage the Kremlin’s “fears” about the system’s capacity to undermine its second strike capability in the event of a nuclear exchange with the U.S.

I recently wrote about the latter’s potential consequences. Senator Mark Kirk held up the appointment of Michael McFaul as U.S. ambassador to Moscow over the issue. He was right to ultimately approve McFaul’s nomination. But by stalling the process, Senator Kirk did well to extract a pledge from the administration that it would not share sensitive missile defense data with Russia.

Still, there were reports in recent weeks that the White House may do just that. President Obama’s assurances to Medvedev about his post-electoral “flexibility” on missile defense raise further doubts about the administration’s guarantee that it won’t share classified data with the Kremlin. And this wouldn’t be the first time that the administration reneged on U.S. missile defense commitments. Just ask Poland and the Czech Republic. They weren’t adequately consulted when President Obama scrapped plans for a ground-based midcourse system on their territories.

The president made that decision in 2009, shortly after his election—at a time he undoubtedly felt that that he had enough “space” to alter U.S. missile defense priorities in a way that would address Russia’s supposed anxieties. Clearly, that sense of flexibility will be even greater if President Obama is reelected in November.

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Missile defense cooperation with Russia should be limited

By Daniel Vajdic

March 14, 2012, 4:16 pm

The Obama administration is reportedly prepared to share interceptor data with the Kremlin to alleviate Russian concerns about U.S. missile defense plans in Europe. This would include information about interceptors’ “velocity at burnout,” or VBO, which indicates an interceptor’s speed when its motor stops.

Russia could use this data to develop more sophisticated countermeasures that would make it harder for U.S. interceptors to destroy these ballistic missiles. That’s a problem. Not because we intend to target Russian missiles in order to reduce and possibly eliminate Moscow’s second strike capability—as the Kremlin supposedly worries—but because of the potential proliferation of advanced countermeasures, which is a frequently overlooked threat.

Moscow’s use of VBO data to improve its countermeasure technology may not have much direct relevance for a U.S.-Russia relationship still defined by mutually assured destruction. But the real danger lies in the Kremlin’s transfer of such technology to Tehran, Pyongyang, or other hostile regimes. This would reduce the effectiveness of our missile defense systems vis-à-vis these countries and their growing ballistic missile (and nuclear) capabilities.

More attention should be paid to the likely byproducts of missile defense cooperation with the Kremlin.

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Russia’s presidential election—different rigging methods, same fixed outcome

By Daniel Vajdic

March 5, 2012, 10:34 am

Russia held its presidential vote yesterday, three months after a fraudulent parliamentary election in December incited a wave of massive protests—each larger than the last—in Moscow and other urban centers throughout the country. Below are a few key points about the election:

•    The Central Election Commission reports that Putin received 64 percent of the vote with 99 percent of the ballots counted. But data from Russia’s only independent election monitor, Golos, indicates that Putin garnered 50 percent.

•    Golos said that roughly the same number of violations were reported yesterday as in the December 4 parliamentary election. But the nature of the violations seems to have changed. The most frequent method for ensuring United Russia’s victory in December was ballot-stuffing. Yesterday’s presidential election, however, was marked by what Golos calls a “coercion to vote” or “centralized voting,” in which managers of state-owned enterprises and state-funded institutions—such as schools and hospitals—ensured that employees and other dependents cast their ballots according to the Kremlin’s preference. Many state companies bused employees from polling station to polling station in what’s known as “carousel-voting.”

•    Putin spoke at a victory rally outside the Kremlin shortly after the polls closed. He told the crowd—estimated at 110,000 by the Interior Ministry—that “we won an open, fair fight.” Smaller pro-Putin rallies were assembled throughout the day in all of Moscow’s major squares. A participant was asked why he decided to join. He responded, “It’s all the same to me. I’m neither for nor against. They simply drove us here.”

•    Protests will take place in Moscow today. Anti-corruption crusader and the de facto leader of the Russian protest movement Alexei Navalny has called for continued demonstrations and even hinted at the possibility of permanent encampments. Navalny will lead an unauthorized rally to the Kremlin after tonight’s official protest in Moscow’s Pushkin Square. This could—once again—result in his arrest.

It’s clear that the ostensible stability of Putin’s first two terms as president has come to an abrupt conclusion and certainly won’t reemerge with him formally back in the Kremlin. The rigged presidential vote will energize demonstrators. And the protest movement will undoubtedly grow as more and more Russians recognize that Putin’s corrupt and ineffective governance isn’t capable of solving the country’s myriad societal problems.

Moreover, President Obama may finally be forced to reevaluate his “reset” policy toward Russia. The administration’s misguided effort to downplay democracy and human rights in exchange for substantively nonexistent concessions and qualified cooperation from the Kremlin will have to end in the current environment. Or so it should.

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Was Moscow’s Syria veto good strategy?

By Daniel Vajdic

February 29, 2012, 10:12 am

A recent Moscow Times op-ed tries to explain Russia’s obstinate defense of the Assad regime in Syria. According to Peter Rutland of Wesleyan University and Nadiya Kravets of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, the Kremlin’s objectives extend beyond the “narrow self-interest of the Russian defense industry” and “its only warm-water naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus.” Here’s their argument:

From Moscow’s point of view, the Syrian veto makes perfect sense, given that a consistent goal of Russian diplomacy over the past decade has been the quest for recognition as a leading power.

By blocking the Syrian resolution, Moscow was simply sending a signal to the international community that it is a power that should be reckoned with — and one whose views must be taken into account. In the short term, Russia does not stand to gain anything specific from this action. But in the long term, it builds credibility for Russia as a leading power.

In one sense, the tactic has worked. Russia got the world’s attention at little or no cost to itself.

Hmmm. And how, exactly, will Russia assume its role as a “leading power” without any partners—let alone allies—in the Middle East? Its Syria policy has alienated nearly every country in the Arab world. There are even calls to boycott Russia’s already meager exports to the region. I’d hardly consider the Kremlin’s isolated support for Assad a cost-free strategy.

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Putin’s class warfare

By Daniel Vajdic

February 22, 2012, 10:56 am

The exploitation of socioeconomic differences for political ends isn’t limited to the United States these days. Russia’s de facto ruler of 12 years, Vladimir Putin, seems to be shifting his electoral strategy a few weeks before the country’s presidential vote. Last month, Putin offered Russia’s restless urban middle class “an invitation to dialogue.” He said that the “economy must be built in a way that citizens with high education and aspirations can find a worthy place in it.” And Putin’s election program devotes plenty of attention to “modernization”—a mantra throughout Dmitry Medvedev’s feeble presidency—and various “entrepreneurial freedoms.”

At the same time, he warned that “a recurring problem in Russian history is the desire of part of the elite to take a leap towards a revolution, rather than work for sequential development.” But Putin’s definition of the elite has changed since Russia’s wave of massive protests began in December, and now extends well beyond the Moscow intelligentsia. To Putin, the elite includes an ungrateful middle class whose living standards rose substantially during the economic expansion that preceded the financial crisis—which Putin attributes to the “stability” of his “managed democracy” rather than oil and natural gas windfalls.

However, what last month seemed like Putin’s effort to placate the middle class has recently given way to an almost exclusive emphasis on the consolidation of his low-income base. These factory employees, farmers, and other blue collar workers spend much of their leisure time watching state television, where news programs depict the anti-Putin protesters as privileged urban elites.

But Putin’s attempts to galvanize support by dividing the country won’t boost his legitimacy, nor will it help him return to the Kremlin under free and fair conditions. Class warfare isn’t a winning strategy. It can’t succeed in Russia and it certainly can’t succeed here at home.

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Despite recent failures, Russia continues to invest in drones

By Daniel Vajdic

January 19, 2012, 7:51 pm

The Russian Defense Ministry has reportedly given state-owned Russian Helicopters $158 million to develop a series of indigenous medium and heavy drones. Ever since its war with Georgia in 2008, when the Kremlin witnessed firsthand the effectiveness of Tbilisi’s Israeli-built drones, Russia has aspired to equip its armed forces with the same capabilities. Through 2010, Moscow invested about $172 million in a range of domestic drone designs whose speed, altitude, and airborne endurance couldn’t meet the Russian air force’s modest requirements.

Repeated failures to produce sophisticated drones domestically—much of this the result of corruption in the arms industry, a brain-drain of qualified engineers, and broad deterioration in the military-industrial base—have forced the Russians to procure what they can from abroad.

In 2009, eight months after seeing Israeli drones in action in Georgia, the Kremlin signed a $53 million contract with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) for 12 early generation reconnaissance drones. The deal was probably a quid pro quo: Israel agreed to sell the drones in exchange for Moscow’s pledge to cancel delivery of its advanced S-300 air defense system to Iran and MiG-31s to Syria. A year later, IAI and Russia’s Oboronprom formed a $400 million joint venture to manufacture one of Israel’s most sophisticated reconnaissance drones, the Heron-1, in Russia.

Despite the technology transfer that Russia inevitably reaps from its cooperation with Israel, the problems associated with its current batch of indigenous drones are substantial and will be difficult to overcome.

But the Kremlin’s support for Iran may have paid dividends in this area. In June 2011, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’s aerospace unit boasted that Russian experts were allowed to inspect U.S. drones supposedly downed by Tehran and “models made by the Guards through reverse engineering.”

That Iran possessed U.S. drones was questionable in June. However, doubts were dispelled last month when the Islamic Republic revealed an RQ-170 Sentinel apparently recovered by hacking into its control system. I wouldn’t be surprised if future Russian drones bear a striking resemblance to the Sentinel.

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Russia, human rights, and the WTO

By Daniel Vajdic

December 19, 2011, 2:23 pm

Recently, my colleague Daniel Hanson outlined the mounting problems of the WTO system. He uses Russia’s 18-year accession negotiations as a case in point. I can’t speak to the WTO’s broader defects but I can echo his frustration with Russia’s prolonged exclusion from an organization that supervises global trade liberalization. Russia was finally inducted into the WTO on Friday.

Over the last 18 years, Russia’s WTO membership bid has faced two hurdles from U.S. opponents: trade issues (high tariffs, subsidies, intellectual property rights, etc.) and human rights. The former was largely settled by 2006 when the Bush administration signed a bilateral agreement on Russia’s entry into the WTO. But the issue of human rights continues to pose an impediment to U.S.-Russia trade relations. Even though Russia is now formally a member of the WTO, the United States will have to exempt Russia from WTO rules and regulations (and Moscow will respond in kind) if it doesn’t grant Russia permanent normal trade relations status. This requires repealing antiquated Cold War-era congressional legislation—known as the Jackson-Vanik amendment—that makes trade contingent on emigration rights for Soviet Jews. In short, unlike their counterparts throughout the WTO, U.S. businesses won’t benefit from Russia’s long overdue accession to the organization unless Congress takes swift action to graduate Russia from Jackson-Vanik.

But some argue that Jackson-Vanik should be used to highlight Russia’s poor human rights record, which in itself should preclude Russia from reaping the benefits of WTO membership. There are a few problems with this approach. First, misapplying legislation on Jewish emigration adopted 37 years ago against a country that no longer exists dilutes very justifiable concerns about human rights in Russia. Second, neither Russia’s exclusion from the WTO nor Congress’s refusal to excuse it from Jackson-Vanik have persuaded the Kremlin to improve Russia’s human rights record. If anyone has evidence that suggests otherwise I’d love to see it. Finally, as Daniel notes, countries with human rights records far worse than that of Russia have been admitted to the WTO in recent years—China being the most obvious example.

Trade liberalization and human rights promotion aren’t mutually exclusive. They’re objectives that can and should be pursued simultaneously. To achieve this with respect to Russia, Congress should replace Jackson-Vanik with the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law and Accountability Act (opposed by the Obama administration), which would punish Russian officials suspected of being involved in the torture and murky prison death of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. This would send a much clearer signal about the U.S. commitment to human rights in Russia. However, it wouldn’t do so at the expense of preventing discrimination against U.S. businesses and subjecting Russia to the rules, regulations, and norms of the WTO.

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Even with thumb on the scales, Putin’s party loses support

By Daniel Vajdic

December 5, 2011, 9:32 am

Russia went to the polls on Sunday to determine the future composition of its parliament. The Kremlin-backed United Russia party, led by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, received 50 percent of the vote—down significantly from 64 percent in 2007. After losing its 2/3 majority in the Duma, United Russia will no longer have the ability to change Russia’s constitution without formally co-opting at least part of the country’s pliant, and in some cases openly pro-Kremlin, opposition.

Russia’s only independent election monitoring organization, Golos, recorded 1,300 irregularities during Sunday’s vote, despite being barred from many polling stations. State media and law enforcement agencies exerted significant pressure on Golos immediately preceding the election. Last Friday, the group was fined $1,000 for publishing a map that documented accusations of unlawful campaigning—most of which were directed against United Russia. That same day, Golos’s offices in Siberia were raided and an influential state-owned television channel aired a documentary suggesting that the organization seeks to foment civil unrest in Russia akin to the Arab Spring. Then on Saturday its director was detained for several hours.

In Chechnya—which is administered by former warlord and persistent human rights violator Ramzan Kadyrov—turnout was 94 percent two hours before the polls closed and, according to a preliminary vote count, United Russia received 99.5 percent. Meanwhile, an early count in Moscow gave United Russia over 46 percent, although a credible exit poll estimated that the party would receive 27.6 percent.

Still, United Russia’s overall performance is consistent with recent public opinion polls. Roughly half the electorate backs the party. This support, however, is largely the result of an uneven playing field. Real opposition parties don’t receive any airtime on Russian television, unless they’re being attacked for supposed corruption or links to the West. Moreover, as the party of power, United Russia abuses its administrative resources. For example, local officials often promise subsidies to factories and companies whose employees vote for United Russia. Sunday’s election may have been free but it certainly wasn’t fair. Yet this, too, will change as the regime’s popularity continues to decline. Because of the Kremlin’s need to demonstrate overwhelming support for Putin, particularly after its favored party’s poor showing this weekend, Russia’s presidential election next March will be neither free nor fair.

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AEI Debate Prep: The Russian reset—good, bad… or nonexistent?

By Daniel Vajdic

November 2, 2011, 10:57 am

This post is part of an ongoing series preparing for the AEI/CNN/Heritage National Security & Foreign Policy GOP presidential debate on November 22nd. See the rest of the posts here.

It’s well-known that the Obama administration touts the “reset” in U.S.-Russia relations as one of its major foreign policy achievements. The United States has arguably made considerable concessions by reconfiguring its missile defense plans in Eastern Europe, reducing its stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, and de-emphasizing—at least rhetorically—human rights and democracy in both Russia and the remainder of the former Soviet Union. But Russia’s supposed concessions lack a corresponding level of substance.

On Iran, Russia has backed one additional round of Security Council sanctions during the reset. In 2006-2008, however, while Putin was still president, Russia agreed to three rounds of sanctions against Iran. This doesn’t suggest that Putin will be more likely than Medvedev to enact multilateral sanctions. But it does raise legitimate questions about what’s been achieved in the context of the reset.

In Afghanistan, Russia opened supply routes because, despite all its rhetoric about NATO, the Kremlin knows that the spread of Islamic fundamentalism from Afghanistan into Central Asia represents its primary external security threat. Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov admitted publicly in August that Russia cooperates with the United States in Afghanistan for its own interests and that, reset or no reset, Russia would help prevent a resurgence of the Taliban.

Missile defense is still a point of contention. Moscow was opposed to Bush’s ground-based midcourse system proposal, which Obama scrapped, but it’s also critical of the Obama administration’s phased-adaptive approach. The reset hasn’t altered the Kremlin’s stance on missile defense.

Finally, while New START has been hyped as the reset’s principal achievement, the treaty should be viewed for what it is—unilateral disarmament by the United States. The State Department conceded last spring that Russia was already below ceilings in both strategic nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles when the treaty came into force (although, strangely, Moscow has deployed additional nuclear weapons since then and is now over the cap).

The candidates must address the reset in this month’s debate. Is it good policy, bad policy, or—as this author argues—is there less to the reset than meets the eye? It’s all too easy to overlook Russia as revolutionary changes sweep the Middle East, relations with Pakistan deteriorate to an alarming degree, and the United States continues to withdraw troops from Iraq and begins a drawdown in Afghanistan. But the next president will likely face a restless Russia that deflects mounting domestic challenges through attempts to assert power abroad. Putin’s inevitable return to the Kremlin will amplify the challenges that the White House—regardless of who’s in it—faces from a country that continues to define its interests in opposition to those of the United States.

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Russia Shields Syria from Sanctions

By Daniel Vajdic

October 5, 2011, 4:55 pm

Russia vetoed a draft UN Security Council resolution on Syria yesterday. An increasingly assertive China joined Moscow in rejecting the already diluted proposal. The draft was watered down three times—and only hinted at the possibility of sanctions—in an attempt to gain Russia’s support. But the Kremlin’s indifference to the brutal suppression of protesters in Syria shouldn’t surprise anyone. Syria remains Russia’s principal ally in the Middle East and one of its largest arms buyers. Moscow’s unyielding opposition to sanctions is another harbinger of Vladimir Putin’s inevitable return to the Russian presidency. Russia under Putin, the message goes, won’t capitulate to Western pressure in Syria like Russia under Medvedev did in Libya. That was the supposedly liberal Medvedev. This is Putin. Russia’s current and potential allies, therefore, need not fear abandonment by the Kremlin.

Putin’s return has also created domestic incentives for resisting the sanctions and ensuring the survival of the Syrian regime. Leon Aron cogently outlined Russia’s mounting problems and the implications of a third Putin term in an LA Times op-ed earlier this week. The likelihood of revolution in Russia shouldn’t be overstated. But Russians’ growing frustration with their ever more disconnected political elites shouldn’t be overlooked either. Moscow’s decision to veto the Syria resolution plays to a domestic audience as well. It’s a reminder that revolts based on demands for greater freedom and more effective government are “domestic affairs” that will be dealt with internally. Russians shouldn’t get any ideas.

Moreover, Russia’s intransigence on Syria may preface the future of the “reset” in U.S.-Russian relations. Rather than result in its unraveling, however, Putin’s return will illustrate that the reset never really existed in the first place.

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Putin Announces Return to Russian Presidency

By Daniel Vajdic

September 26, 2011, 9:34 am

That Vladimir Putin intends to reclaim the Kremlin shouldn’t surprise anyone. Putin formally declared his candidacy over the weekend and he and the current president, Dmitry Medvedev, addressed United Russia’s party congress on Saturday. Medvedev informed delegates that he wouldn’t be running for a second term and called on voters to back Putin as Russia’s next president. Putin’s speech dispelled any doubts about the extent to which he administers Russia’s managed democracy. “I would like to say directly that the agreement about what should be done [was] reached a long time ago, several years ago,” he told the congress.

But Russia in 2011 differs substantially from Russia in 2004—when Putin last ran for president. Its economy was then growing at 7 percent, public sector debt was declining, and the government was running a budget surplus with oil priced at $40-45 per barrel. Today, however, Russia’s economic indicators are considerably worse across the board. After contracting by almost 8 percent in 2009, growth remains sluggish at 4 percent and is expected to slow further next year. A balanced budget would require oil to remain above $100 per barrel and even then wouldn’t materialize until 2014-15. Meanwhile, the Kremlin’s comprehensive, ten-year $720 billion defense modernization program and its mounting welfare commitments necessitate additional revenue. Growth in oil exports and the price of oil provided the state with more cash than it could spend during Putin’s first two terms. Russia’s oil output, however, will remain flat over the next decade and may begin to decline shortly thereafter depending on the accessibility of its Arctic and other offshore deposits.

Russia’s economic difficulties are compounded by political challenges. In 2004, Putin campaigned on promises of continued “stability.” Russia was then only four years removed from the “chaotic” 1990s—which were and to some extent still are associated with democracy. Next year, however, the Russian electorate will be 12 years removed from that period. Putin’s attempts to invoke the supposed stability of his soft authoritarianism won’t resonate with Russians like in previous years. And his inability to address many societal problems will be even more evident. The level of corruption in Russia today, for example, is comparable to that of Tajikistan and Laos—which, ironically, represents a level of corruption exceeding that of the 1990s. Putin’s inevitable return to the presidency and Medvedev’s likely switch to prime minister has generated a sense of frustration among Russians that their political elites are playing musical chairs while failing to solve the country’s considerable problems.

And what does all this mean for the so-called “reset” in U.S.-Russian relations? Not much. For Moscow, the reset was never about making substantive concessions. “Our cooperation over Iran and Afghanistan is strictly balanced,” Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said last month. “Nothing in this cooperation is being done to the detriment of Russia, quite the opposite, it serves to strengthen our security interests, which is precisely why we are cooperating [with the U.S].” This logic won’t change with Putin back in the Kremlin. Reset or no reset, Russia will continue to pursue policies based on its interests, which have been defined by the same political elites for the last 12 years—and in light of Putin’s intention to return to the presidency will likely continue to be defined by those same elites for another 12 years.

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Russia’s Last Chance to Transform Its Image?

By Daniel Vajdic

September 2, 2011, 8:37 am

Exxon Mobil and Rosneft—Russia’s largest oil company—signed an agreement this week to explore Russia’s potentially vast Arctic oil and gas deposits in the Kara Sea. The two companies plan to form a joint venture whose ownership will be divided 67/33 in Rosneft’s favor. They’ve also reaffirmed a deal signed at the Davos World Economic Forum last January to develop offshore deposits in the Black Sea. The initial investment for both projects—about $3.2 billion—will be borne almost exclusively by Exxon.

Exxon’s arrangement with Rosneft resembles an earlier, now defunct, agreement between Rosneft and British Petroleum (BP) to explore Russia’s Arctic shelf. But there are a few notable differences. The Rosneft-BP deal included a $16 billion share swap in which Rosneft would receive 5 percent of BP’s ordinary voting shares for 9.5 percent of Rosneft’s shares. Because Rosneft is state-owned, the Russian government would have become one of BP’s largest shareholders. The tie-up fell through, however, after a legal challenge from the co-owners of BP’s Russian subsidiary TNK-BP.

This week’s agreement between Exxon and Rosneft involves none of that. But it does entail an asset exchange. Rosneft might acquire minority stakes in drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico and Texas. For the Russians, cooperation with the world’s top oil producer brings both an intangible sense of prestige and a more practical expectation that Rosneft will be able to tap Exxon’s technological prowess. They realize that Rosneft and other domestic producers aren’t capable of extracting oil from Russia’s offshore deposits and even some of its rapidly maturing onshore fields.

And the agreement looks like a win for Exxon too. While BP fought strenuously to prevent its agreement with Rosneft from collapsing, other supermajors—including Royal Dutch Shell and Chevron—had reportedly expressed an interest in exploring the Kara Sea, which, according to Rosneft, contains 36 billion barrels in recoverable oil reserves and 110 billion in total.

Yet working in one of Russia’s “strategic industries” comes with serious risk—something Exxon undoubtedly realizes. In 2006, the Kremlin essentially coerced Shell into selling a major stake in its $22 billion Sakhalin Island oil and gas project to Gazprom. Exxon is part of a consortium that’s developing a sister project on the island. And on Wednesday, the day after Exxon and Rosneft signed their Arctic agreement, masked commandos raided BP’s Moscow offices. The raid was apparently associated with a lawsuit filed against BP by TNK-BP’s minority shareholders.

But, for Russia, it’s difficult to overstate the importance of the Exxon deal. Further expropriations, forced sales, or other incidents that highlight the country’s flimsy rule of law and perilous business climate will inevitably scare off the foreign direct investment that Russia desperately needs. If it’s kicked out or isn’t allowed to profit fairly from investments Exxon won’t be doing business in Russia any time soon—and neither will any other major foreign oil company. This could be Russia’s last chance to transform its image as one of the world’s most inhospitable destinations for foreign capital.

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Iran Still Seeking to Acquire Advanced Air Defense System

By Daniel Vajdic

August 26, 2011, 10:14 am

Tehran recently filed suit against Moscow in the International Court of Arbitration for its decision to cancel sale of Russia’s S-300 surface-to-air missile system. Iran and Russia signed an $800 million contract in 2007 to supply Tehran with five battalions of the anti-aircraft system, which would substantially boost Iran’s capacity to defend its nuclear installations. But last September President Dmitry Medvedev banned transfer of the S-300 to Tehran. He argued that the most recent round of Security Council sanctions against Iran—adopted in June 2010—prohibited their delivery.

Tehran disagrees. In an interview on Wednesday, Iran’s ambassador to Russia reiterated his government’s view that the S-300 is a defensive weapons system that falls outside the confines of the sanctions regime. It’s a position that the Iranians have maintained since Medvedev issued his decree last fall. Russia, however, was apparently shocked by Iran’s lawsuit. “We recognize the statement by Iranian officials about the intention to dispute Russia’s actions in an arbitrational procedure,” a spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry said on Thursday. “At the same time, taking into account the traditionally friendly character of bilateral relations, it arouses surprise that our Iranian partners chose such a course.”

But a potential slip by the Iranian ambassador during his interview brings into question Russia’s purported surprise. “We filed suit so that the decision of the court would help Russia to realize these deliveries [of the S-300], so that Russia would have a legal trump,” the ambassador said. In other words, an evaluation by the court that existing UN sanctions don’t legally forbid sale of the S-300 to Iran—or an ambiguous verdict that fails to explicitly state that they do—would give Moscow a pretext to move forward with the transfer. And Russia has real interests in selling the S-300 to Iran. The system’s producer announced earlier this month that absent new costumers production of the S-300 will be halted by the end of the year. From Moscow’s perspective, the Iranian arms market looks increasingly attractive as two of its largest weapons buyers—Syria and Venezuela—face uncertainty at home.

The recent Russian-Iranian rapprochement makes Moscow’s supposed bewilderment at Tehran’s lawsuit even less credulous. This might be a coordinated effort.  Don’t be surprised if Iran ultimately acquires the S-300. And if it does, expect Tehran to be even more bold in its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Cross-posted at the Center for Defense Studies

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Don’t Let Russia Use Iran as a Bargaining Chip

By Daniel Vajdic

August 23, 2011, 8:34 am

Several events in recent days indicate deepening ties between Iran and Russia. Last Monday, Russian Security Council chief Nikolai Patrushev paid an official two-day visit to Iran. Patrushev held talks with Iran’s Supreme National Security Council head Saeed Jalili. He also met with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi. The next day Salehi traveled to Moscow at the invitation of his Russian counterpart.

Continue reading →

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Moscow to Annex South Ossetia as U.S.-Russia “Reset” Crumbles?

By Daniel Vajdic

August 5, 2011, 11:07 am

While events in the Middle East continue to dominate headlines, one of the cornerstones of the Obama administration’s foreign policy is coming loose—and few are paying attention.

U.S.-Russia relations have witnessed a flurry of activity in recent weeks that threatens to undermine one of President Obama’s central foreign policy initiatives—the “reset.” The administration claims that its reset—or fresh start—with Russia has boosted cooperation with Moscow on a number of issues, including Iran’s nuclear program, the stabilization of Afghanistan, and even Libya. But the reset seems to be unraveling.

Last week the Senate passed a resolution reaffirming U.S. support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia’s Foreign Ministry responded predictably by criticizing the resolution’s encouragement of a “revanchist mood” in Tbilisi. More noteworthy, however, was Prime Minister Putin’s recent response to a question about Russia’s potential absorption of South Ossetia. “This is indeed a problem,” he replied. “The future will depend on the people of South Ossetia themselves.” Putin’s vague indication that Russia might annex South Ossetia following a referendum in the territory—a referendum that would be about as free and fair as any Russian election—represents a potential policy shift in Moscow. This, in turn, may suggest that the reset is beginning to crumble. Continue reading →

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Potential NATO Rival to Fill Security Vacuum in Afghanistan?

By Daniel Vajdic

June 22, 2011, 11:17 am

Last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, was hailed by Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi for its “historic significance.” And in many ways it was historic. But for an event that brought together heads of state from China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, the most recent SCO Summit received surprisingly scant attention in the United States. Here’s what you likely missed:

• Participants expressed concern about events in the Arab world while supporting “the drive of regional states in the path of democratic development in accordance with their specific cultural and historical characteristics.”

• Afghan President Hamid Karzai formally requested SCO observer status, which gives non-members the ability to participate in some of the organization’s activities.

• Pakistan and India—already observers—filed official membership applications last year, and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari announced his expectation that Islamabad’s submission “will be put on a fast track.” Meanwhile, Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna voiced his country’s desire for “a larger and deeper role” in the organization and said that New Delhi shares the SCO’s goal of a more “democratic international system.”

• “The member states believe that unilateral and unlimited build-up of missile defense by one state or by a small group of states can cause damage to strategic stability and international security,” read a joint declaration. Asked whether Moscow pushed through the statement, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov responded, “No one talked anyone into it.”

• Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad characteristically criticized the existing world order as “managed and run by slavers and colonizers of the past,” adding, “I believe together we [the SCO] can reform the way the world is managed. We can restore the tranquility of the world.”

• In a Moscow Times op-ed on the day of the summit, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev wrote, “It is possible that the SCO will assume responsibility for many issues in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of coalition forces in 2014.”

Individually, these statements may not amount to much. But collectively, and in the context of an impending U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan, they should raise eyebrows. In some limited respects, the aims of the SCO are comparable to those of NATO in the early years of the Cold War. NATO in the 1950s was an alliance implicitly constructed to—in the words of its first Secretary General Lord Ismay—“keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” Moreover, with the exception of Portugal, Greece, and Turkey, it was an association of like-minded democracies. The SCO conversely is an association of like-minded autocracies whose raison d’être, from Moscow’s perspective, is to keep the Americans out of Central Asia, the Russians in, and the Chinese down in terms of their overall regional influence.

Islamabad and Kabul want in because they’re convinced that the United States is on its way out of Afghanistan. While Iran’s prospects for full-fledged membership are slim, Tehran’s observer status provides the Islamic Republic with one of its few remaining platforms for international legitimacy. Most troubling, however, is Nazarbayev’s contention that the SCO may need to “assume responsibility” for Afghanistan in the wake of a U.S. withdrawal. The reasons for maintaining a robust presence in Afghanistan have been discussed elsewhere at length and don’t need to be rehashed here. But what hasn’t been discussed is the potential relationship between a considerable and precipitous U.S. drawdown, the inevitable security vacuum that would result, and the emergence of a more cohesive, muscular, and militarily-inclined SCO in Afghanistan and beyond.

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Medvedev Suggests Second Term… For Obama

By Daniel Vajdic

June 20, 2011, 2:15 pm

Kremlin Presidential Press and Information Office

For months many of us have been scrutinizing Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s public appearances and parsing his speeches for evidence that he’ll at least attempt to spend another term in the Kremlin. There’s not much to report on that front. But Medvedev hasn’t shunned talk of second terms entirely. Today he announced his support for President Obama’s reelection bid. “I can tell you directly,” Medvedev said during an interview with the Financial Times, “I would like Barack Obama to be re-elected president of the United States maybe more than someone else.” He added, “We understand that there are representatives of a rather conservative wing there who are trying to achieve their political goals at the expense of inflaming passions in relation to Russia, among other things.”

While it may seem odd at first glance, Medvedev’s endorsement of Obama makes sense. The administration’s restart policy has been profoundly lopsided in Russia’s favor. In exchange for heavily watered down sanctions against Iran and a Russian transit corridor for largely non-lethal supplies to Afghanistan, the Obama administration has reconfigured missile defense by scrapping plans for a ground-based midcourse system in Central Europe, withheld rhetorical support for Russia’s beleaguered democrats, and essentially recognized what the Kremlin calls its “sphere of privileged interests” in the former Soviet Union.

And then there’s New START. A recent data exchange on U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons revealed that the treaty has been virtually inconsequential for Russia. According to figures released by the State Department this month, Russia was already below ceilings in both strategic nuclear arms (1,550) and launchers (700) when the treaty came into force on February 5. Moscow has 521 launchers and 1,537 accountable warheads as of June 1. What, then, beyond a feel-good sense of inching closer to the utopianism of global zero, has the administration achieved with New START?

What’s clear, however, is that Medvedev’s endorsement of Obama represents a clear double standard. When the State Department rightly criticizes the Kremlin for suppressing Russia’s besieged pro-democracy activists, shutting down NGOs that deviate too far from Putin’s “vertical” of power, and arresting opposition democrats such as Boris Nemtsov, the Kremlin responds by condemning the United States’s “consistent meddling” in the internal affairs of other countries. Medvedev’s endorsement of Obama represents the epitome of hypocrisy. The only difference between his meddling in U.S. politics and U.S. meddling in Russia’s democratic development is that the latter seeks to encourage a system of governance that benefits the Russian people. Medvedev, on the other hand, has publicly backed Obama simply because he’d like U.S. concessions to continue for another four years.

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Why is Russia Buying Mistral Assault Ships from France?

By Daniel Vajdic

June 13, 2011, 1:30 pm

Last month’s G8 Summit was fairly eventful for both Russia and France. The Obama administration unexpectedly added Moscow’s most wanted terrorist, Doku Umarov, to the Rewards for Justice Program—offering $5 million for information on his whereabouts. After weeks of vehement criticism, Russia finally conceded Gaddafi’s loss of legitimacy and offered its mediation services to end the Libyan conflict. For its part, Paris reiterated its support for the ongoing campaign in Libya, even advocating expansion, and forcefully condemned Damascus’s violent suppression of demonstrations in Syria.

But a “definitive agreement” on Russia’s purchase of four Mistral assault ships from France was largely buried beneath the headlines. French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Russian President Dimitry Medvedev announced that a formal contract stipulating price and components will be signed this month, which coincides with Prime Minster Vladimir Putin’s June 21 trip to Paris. The principal stumbling block in the Mistral negotiations—which formally began in October 2009—has been the inclusion of certain technological components and their potential production under license in Russia.

The components in question are the SENIT-9 combat management system and the SIC-21 command information system. In reality, however, the negotiations are centered on the SENIT-9. The aging SIC-21 doesn’t raise the same strategic concerns as the SENIT-9. But because of its use on France’s sole aircraft carrier, the Charles De Gaulle, the SIC-21 is a matter of prestige for the French. Many in the French military oppose its transfer to the Russians for reasons of national pride. The SENIT-9, however, would provide Russia with real advantages. Its operating modes are intended for coastal warfare and are designed to employ sophisticated anti-surface weapons and address “pop-up” air threats. Analogous systems have the capacity to track up to 1,000 targets simultaneously.

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Medvedev’s Speech as Meaningless as His Presidency

By Daniel Vajdic

May 20, 2011, 8:25 am

Medvedev’s press conference on Wednesday was indicative of his presidency—a lot of hype, anticipation, and encouraging rhetoric, but little to no substance. Those still hoping that Putin’s 20-year confidant might suddenly break with his mentor were surely disappointed. The big question, of course, was whether Medvedev would announce his candidacy for next year’s presidential election. He didn’t. Instead, he continued his and Putin’s mantra that they would decide amongst themselves who would run. Maybe the most interesting aspect of Medvedev’s Q&A (and that’s not saying much) was his response to a question about jailed Russian billionaire Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Asked whether Khodorkovsky’s release would pose “a danger to society,” Medvedev tersely replied, “He’s absolutely not a danger.”

Nice words. But they’re too reminiscent of his response to a similar question shortly before Khodorkovsky received a second, maximum jail sentence last December. Medvedev then made a vague reference to the importance of an independent judiciary, adding that “neither the president nor any other official has the right to present his position in this case or any other case before the verdict is read.” Several days earlier Putin said that “the thief [Khodorkovsky] must remain in jail.”

Observers quickly jumped at the opportunity to pronounce a schism in the ruling tandem. Finally the young, liberal Medvedev was abandoning his alliance with the aging, authoritarian Putin to pursue the types of systemic reforms he’s been discussing for the past 36 months, they argued. A few months later he even ordered Russia’s UN ambassador to abstain in the Security Council during the Libya vote, and rejected any talk of the intervention as another crusade—something that could have been directed at either Gaddafi or Putin, both of whom made similar references. Russian officials have been incessant in their criticism of the intervention since then.

Medvedev’s speech this week is just more of the same. It was all style and no substance. His responses consisted of statements that might or might not be construed as being directed at Putin, which has become the rule rather than the exception for virtually anything Medvedev says. Most telling, however, was Medvedev’s admission that he and Putin differ on the pace of Russia’s “modernization.” But this shouldn’t pique one’s interest because it confirms a rupture in the tandem. Instead, what it tells us is that Medvedev wants to modernize the existing system—which was established by Putin— rather than overhaul it entirely. True liberals don’t tweak authoritarian systems. They overturn them.

All this suggests that Medvedev and Putin continue to engage in what Leon Aron calls “imitation politics.” The schisms, ruptures, divisions, and differences between the two men are nothing more than an imitation of the honest, vibrant debates that take place in truly liberal democracies.

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Kremlin Continues to Manage Russia’s Democracy

By Daniel Vajdic

May 17, 2011, 1:38 pm

Russian billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov has formally announced his decision to lead the Right Cause political party following several months of speculation that Prokhorov—Russia’s third-richest man—might opt to enter politics. Right Cause, while seemingly liberal in its rhetoric and the policies advocated in its platform, doesn’t represent a genuine opposition to the Kremlin. No surprise there. The party was established in late 2008 on the Kremlin’s initiative. Those unfamiliar with Putin’s notions of “managed democracy” and “sovereign democracy” might wonder why the Kremlin would help construct a liberal opposition party that could, in theory, detract votes from United Russia. The latter is led by Putin, although he’s not a party member—a befuddling relationship in and of itself.

But we’ve seen this before. In 2003, the Kremlin created the Motherland party shortly preceding that year’s Duma elections. Motherland was intended to be a pro-Kremlin socialist party with nationalist tendencies. In essence, it was meant to attract voters away from the Communists and the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party. Then in 2006, the Kremlin, uneasy about Motherland’s growing popularity, dispatched its leader Dmitry Rogozin to Brussels as Russia’s ambassador to NATO, and engineered the merger of Motherland with the Russian Party of Life and the Russian Pensioner’s Party—creating A Just Russia. Its attempts to revive Right Cause with Prokhorov at the helm are similar in purpose. Rather than attracting voters from existing liberal parties, however, the Kremlin seeks to co-opt those disheartened, relatively liberal voters who choose to stay home on election day.

The timing of the Kremlin’s revitalization of Right Cause is best explained in the context of the upcoming December 2011 Duma elections and United Russia’s declining support, which has dropped below 50 percent for the first time in years. Putin is in a bit of a panic. And an effective method to compensate for United Russia’s decline and maintain control of the Duma, he reckons, would be to attract a growing number of dejected liberals to a party that, while nominally liberal in its policies, is no less pro-Kremlin than United Russia.

Prokhorov’s $18 billion bank account, ownership of the New Jersey Nets, and liberal, business-friendly rhetoric may give him some semblance of independence. But in Putin’s Russia oligarchs don’t exist anymore. The rich are only rich because the Kremlin allows them to accumulate wealth, and it rarely does so without strings attached. So don’t view Prokhorov as another potential Khodorkovsky. He isn’t. And he won’t be.

Daniel Vajdic is a research assistant at AEI.

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