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With presidential candidates vying for the best economic policy, perhaps they should take a page out of the book of John James Cowperthwaite, the hero of Hong Kong’s economic policy that has made them the envy of the world, as I mentioned earlier. Cowperthwaite was a strong advocate for positive non-interventionism, a philosophy that recognized the power of free markets while realizing that proper infrastructure and light regulations were sometimes essential to facilitate market decisions.

Cowperthwaite argued that the government needed a demonstrable competitive advantage to justify every intervention into the economy, and that very few of these demonstrable advantages existed. To facilitate this policy, Cowperthwaite famously refused to allow Hong Kong’s Ministry of Finance to collect official economic statistics, arguing that offering policymakers more information about private industry would encourage them to meddle. He also kept taxes low, refused to impose any tariffs, and focused his efforts on innocuous tasks, like building roads.

Cowperthwaite realized that businesses fail, but noted that:

In the long run, the aggregate of decisions of individual businessmen, exercising individual judgment in a free economy, even if often mistaken, is less likely to do harm than the centralized decisions of a government; and certainly the harm is likely to be counteracted faster.

The result was immense. Despite being devastated by Japanese occupation and war, a massive refugee influx, no natural resources to speak of, and overcrowding, Hong Kong grew rapidly through the ’60s and ’70s, establishing itself as an economic heavyweight, developing first-world standards of living and attracting large amounts of foreign investment. Today, Hong Kong continues to serve as a model for other Asian economies.

If presidential hopefuls want to make a strong case for growth, they should take a page out of Sir Cowperthwaite’s book—focus on the lubricant that keeps the economy moving and stay out of everything else.

Best place for business? Hong Kong, again

By Daniel Hanson

March 22, 2012, 10:36 am

If you want to attract business to your country, you have to have the right parameters for business to operate. Specifically, your country has to offer access to markets and freedom to use this access to the greatest degree possible. Bloomberg ranked the best countries for doing business recently, and their results are insightful. The top ten countries are listed below.

The index measures six factors—the cost of setting up a business; degree of economic integration; cost of labor and materials; cost of moving goods; less tangible costs like corruption, property rights violations, inflation, and taxes; and readiness of the consumer base. In sum, these six factors left the United States in third place, with Hong Kong at the top and Brazil at the bottom. The list ranked only the top 50 economies in the world.

Hong Kong has a sterling reputation, offering a corruption-free government, low taxes, and access to growing Asian markets. Hong Kong beats the U.S. on a number of important factors, like corporate income tax rates. Hong Kong charges 16.5%, less than half of the U.S.’s 35% rate. This is why many countries, like GE, Boeing, and GM, have made Hong Kong the center of their Asian operations.

A few other items of note:

  • A substantial gap exists between the competitiveness of the upper Eurozone countries—the Netherlands (2), Germany (6), France (8), and Austria (9)—and the embattled southern European countries, which don’t make an appearance until substantially later—at 20 (Italy), 21 (Spain), 26 (Ireland), and 29 (Portugal).
  • The U.S. ranks highly in large part because of its resilient consumer base. Even with high costs in other areas, the U.S. makes the grade because of their large group of conspicuous consumers.
  • Hong Kong’s free market ways continue to be praised and respected. After decades of open markets, Hong Kong is still business friendly and the main access point to Asian markets. Other indices of economic freedom—like the Heritage/WSJ and Frasier Institute’s indices—also rank Hong Kong number 1.

Countries that have a lot going for them—like the U.S. with its vast resources and huge consumer base—can learn a lot from places like Hong Kong. Despite not having a lot of obvious economic advantages, Hong Kong has been a pro-business haven for decades thanks to government staying out of the way. Imagine what southern Europe would look like right now absent a sovereign debt crisis and bloated welfare state.

The implications of China shunning U.S. debt

By Daniel Hanson

March 2, 2012, 2:56 pm

China owns $1.73 trillion in U.S. debt. This massive number—which is comparable to the $1.65 trillion owned by the Federal Reserve—keeps demand for Treasuries high, which in turn keeps borrowing costs for the U.S. government low.

Disturbing, then, is the news that China’s demand for U.S. Treasuries has slowed dramatically, accounting for just 15 percent of their new foreign exchange reserves. On average, China’s purchases of dollar-denominated U.S. debt has accounted for 63 percent of their forex increases. This is a substantial drop.

China is undoubtedly diversifying their portfolio to make it more balanced so it can weather global shocks more easily. Part of this strategy has been to dramatically increase their holdings of gold. Since 2010, China has purchased more than 750 tons of gold, more than any other country. China is the world’s largest producer of gold, and yet their insatiable demand in both the public and private sectors for gold means they are a net gold importer.

This has two important implications for the U.S. economy.

Firstly, if China is demanding gold as a foreign exchange backing, it heightens the concern that the U.S. dollar will be supplanted as the world’s best reserve currency. With the yuan set to be fully convertible for trading on international markets by 2015, the United States needs seriously to grapple with the implications that the dollar’s king status will be challenged.

Secondly, China is not the only country demanding less of our debt. Last week, foreigners signaled a downshift in their desire for U.S. debt, with a $5 billion drop in demand. If appetite for U.S. Treasuries slows,  interest rates on these assets will have to rise. A rise in interest rates, while good for savers, is bad for a government struggling with huge debt issues. The Obama budget, which projects huge deficits for years to come, bases its projections on access to low-cost borrowing through the foreseeable future. A rise in interest rates of as little as one percent on 10-year Treasury notes by the end of 2012 could add as much as $2.3 trillion to the U.S. debt by 2015.

When a major investor, like China, stops viewing us as a safe investment, expect the ripple effects to be substantial.

The chart that should terrify the ECB

By Daniel Hanson

March 2, 2012, 2:55 pm

European leaders are bragging today about how wildly successful they’ve been at fixing their crisis. Apparently a 74 percent write down on Greek debt, mounting debts, and rioting in the streets is a success story.

But don’t miss the big piece of news from Europe. Overnight deposits at the ECB increased to €776.9  billion yesterday, shattering the record for ECB deposits and underscoring the severity of the crisis facing the European financial system. The deposits, which pay interest at 0.25 percent, have largely been made with funds obtained through two rounds of long-term refinancing operations, which charge an interest rate of 1 percent. Basically, banks are hoarding cash and losing money on the deal—something that will surely be a problem for the European economy. See the chart below:

This cheap cash binge is the latest demonstration of European leaders’ inability to come to terms with the severity of the crisis they are facing. Rather, it is an attempt to kick the can down the road with artificial liquidity injections. As the FT notes:

In the boring old days, central bankers and regulators delighted in taking away the punch bowl from banking parties. Not any more. The European Central Bank has poured even more vodka into its second party-starter, hoping to stave off a liquidity crunch and boost eurozone lending. The first three-year facility in December was guzzled by about 520 banks that took €490bn. For weaker banks the so-called longer-term refinancing operation was critical as funding markets ran dry. During the latest LTRO on Wednesday, 800 banks downed €530bn. But this second punch bowl merely further delays a potentially nasty hangover.

This injection of liquidity may be creating a huge problem for the European economies. Some money is being pumped into the economy from the banks, but most of it is going to insolvent sovereigns, not profitable businesses. This is problematic, as I note:

… extremely disconcerting features undermine the effectiveness of such an approach, however. Firstly, the ECB needs banks to reduce their leverage positions so as to reduce the impact of sovereign defaults on financial markets over the next several years. The current liquidity operations have forestalled a Lehman-style collapse for the moment, but by edging up risk appetite for sovereigns, the ECB has simply kicked the can down the road. Old habits die hard, and even after the Greek write-down debacle financial institutions are still incentivized to buy debt from countries that will be unlikely to repay it at full value. If the banks fail to have their loans to debtor nations repaid, they will find repaying their ECB loans to be a Herculean task.

But the store-it-under-the-mattress approach poses a massive danger as well:

Since August, the use of the ECB’s deposit facility has more than quadrupled, with funds in excess of 80 percent of ECB new long-term refinancing operations being dumped into the facility since early December. Primarily because of the uncertainty surrounding the lethal cocktail of higher EBA core capital regulations and uncertain sovereign debt, banks are sitting on piles of cheap cash that could be called up to combat disasters should they arise, and many banks fear that even the large amount of funding they have been offered so far will not be enough in the event of a real credit emergency. But so long as this cash is deposited at the ECB, it is doing little to help improve the underlying health of the European financial system, which needs real balance sheet adjustments to reduce strains over the long term.

The reality is that this kind of stockpiling of cheap cash has been observable here in the United States since our financial disaster, with predictably horrid results. But until the ECB can muster the courage to make Europe take its adjustment medicine, the problems will continue to grow.

Fed double standard: Manipulated interest rates are dangerous

By Daniel Hanson

March 2, 2012, 10:10 am

Regulators from the United States, Canada, Japan, and the European Union are collectively investigating the traders from banks that offer submissions comprising the Libor rate. The rate, which is used to set prices on hundreds of trillions of dollars worth of securities, is created using submissions from 9 major London banks.

Today’s Bloomberg notes:

Staff responsible for submissions to the London interbank offered rate regularly discussed where to set the measure with traders sitting near them, interdealer brokers and counterparts at rival banks, according to money-market traders with direct knowledge of procedures at three firms. The talks became common practice after money markets froze in 2007, making it difficult for individual bankers to gauge the cost of borrowing from other lenders, said the traders, who asked not to be identified because they weren’t authorized to speak about the subject.

“A few hundred people, mostly based in one city and sitting in close proximity to each other, set an index rate for trillions of dollars of securities with little or no oversight,” said Mark Sunshine, chief executive officer and chairman of Veritas Financial Partners, a Florida-based firm that provides loans to businesses and real estate companies. “That cannot continue. The mechanism itself, the oversight and the penalties if violated, are woefully inadequate.”

Apparently, regulators and market watchers are uncomfortable with a cabal of top investors manipulating interest rates. It’s as though they realize that central planning is a bad way to do economics because small groups of people can’t know adequately what’s happening in the rest of the economy.

Yet apparently an exception is made for the Fed, which is actively engaged in massive interest rate manipulation. Rather than allowing interest rates to accurately reflect risk and time preferences, the Fed has vigorously moved to keep interest rates artificially low, and has pledged to keep doing it through at least 2014.

The logical leap that remains unexplained in this policy is how back-room central planning is inappropriate for market participants (i.e., big banks) while interest rate manipulation from 12 people in Washington is lauded.

EU debt crisis: The $3.25 billion trigger that wasn’t pulled

By Daniel Hanson

March 1, 2012, 12:17 pm

Insurance on Greek bonds (called credit default swaps) has been trading at silly levels for the past several months. Spreads on 5-year CDS have been stuck over 5,000 percent for months, a number that symbolizes the stupidity of denying Greece’s status as a defaulting nation. The cost of insuring Greek debt currently signals a 95 percent probability of technical default within five years.

Despite the guarantee of Greek default—and a 74 percent write down on Greek debt—markets are still trading Greek CDS, but today’s policy announcement may dent enthusiasm. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association has decided that next week’s $275 billion debt swap, which involves a substantial loss of value for bondholders, does not constitute a “credit event,” meaning that the insurance money need not be paid out.

Payouts might be triggered in the future by any number of likely events, but for now, the bigger question is what this means for CDS contracts written on other sovereign countries. With swaps on Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Ireland trading at rates comparable to Greece’s summer numbers, traders are sure to reevaluate the likelihood of future payouts and re-price their holdings accordingly.

Additionally, a triggering of swaps could be highly problematic, as traders would be incentivized to bet against failing European nations, which would cause the debt crisis to intensify. As the conditions that trigger a payout becoming increasingly unclear, it is likely that the relevance of sovereign CDS will come under fire.

The $3.25 billion trigger has yet to be pulled, but one has to expect that the current restructuring package will eventually meet the ISDA’s standards for a “credit event” in the near future. When it happens, markets will react forcefully.

Ratings agencies acknowledge the obvious

By Daniel Hanson

February 16, 2012, 12:04 pm

The eurozone crisis is taking a toll on the financial crisis as it continues to pull down European growth prospects. To this point, the ratings agencies—S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s—have been  walking a fine line between keeping sovereign credit ratings higher than warranted and appeasing their government critics who are desperately trying to avoid a downgrade.

Now, in the aftermath of the MF Global collapse, ratings agencies are taking a closer look at banks that have large holdings of embattled sovereign debt—some with similar leverage positions to MF Global—and it appears that some substantial downgrades may be looming. Morgan Stanley, UBS, and Credit Suisse may see their ratings drop as much as three levels by Moody’s, while other mega-banks such as Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, and Deutsche Bank will likely see a two point downgrade. Other major downgrades, such as a one point drop in Bank of America’s rating, will probably follow suit.

Credit downgrades can be hugely damaging to securities firms because they will generally be obligated to put up more collateral for trades. As investor confidence continues to slip and the prospect of hard default comes more clearly to the fore, banks could be facing massive systemic risk.

Increased bank regulation also poses a risk to funding prospects, especially as the Basel requirements continue to be implemented more fully. Banks have thus far made the best of the situation, but the leverage positions of many banks on laughably classified “riskless” European debt make the prospect of cheap funding less likely over the coming months, absent massive (and likely) central bank intervention.

This is part of the reason that banks in Europe have been parking funds at the European Central Bank over the past few weeks. Despite unprecedented liquidity flowing from President Mario Draghi’s coffers, European banks have been loath to take on more risk, opting instead to shore up their balance sheets for the impending implosion of the eurozone. The result has been an expansion of the ECB’s deposit facility that looks remarkably similar to the 2008 U.S. crash’s effect on Fed deposits. Observe:

Clearly, the ratings agencies are willing to realize that the MF Global collapse might just be the tip of the iceberg.

Painful inflation lessons for the United States and China

By Daniel Hanson

February 9, 2012, 1:56 pm

Much to the chagrin of party officials, China’s inflation rate rose by 0.4 percent in January, ending a much-needed five-month drop in the rate. While commentary has rightly noted that the rise in prices is largely due to holiday shopping, the continued volatility of China’s inflation rate has to be a concern. As the chart below shows, inflation levels have been elevated since 2007, and the range in which inflation varies is more than twice that of the decade prior.

The most pressing problem of the volatility is the problem presented to lower class Chinese families who are trying to plan for basic cost-of-living expenses like food and shelter. The lack of price stability has exacerbated the political tensions surrounding Chinese economic inequality, a problem so large that it led the Chinese government to reduce income taxes to zero for millions of low-income Chinese taxpayers last spring. Party higher-ups have made it clear that economic inequality will continue to be a focus of China’s economic development as they maintain their push to create a stable middle class.

More instructively, the volatility underscores the warnings issued by certain U.S. policymakers regarding the Pandora’s box of unanchored inflation expectations. Some Fed officials and members of Congress have mounted an offensive to dissuade the Fed from its hyper-focus on price stability, relying on the notion that a trade-off between inflation and unemployment could help our abysmal job numbers.

The problem is that unanchored expectations are hard to re-anchor, and, as the Chinese are learning, regaining an environment of low and steady inflation can be painful. Or, as Paul Volcker pointed out in September:

… the danger is that if, in desperation, we turn to deliberately seeking inflation to solve real problems — our economic imbalances, sluggish productivity, and excessive leverage — we would soon find that a little inflation doesn’t work. Then the instinct will be to do a little more — a seemingly temporary and “reasonable” 4 percent becomes 5, and then 6 and so on.

What we know, or should know, from the past is that once inflation becomes anticipated and ingrained — as it eventually would — then the stimulating effects are lost. Once an independent central bank does not simply tolerate a low level of inflation as consistent with “stability,” but invokes inflation as a policy, it becomes very difficult to eliminate.

It is precisely the common experience with this inflation dynamic that has led central banks around the world to place prime importance on price stability. They do so not at the expense of a strong productive economy. They do it because experience confirms that price stability — and the expectation of that stability — is a key element in keeping interest rates low and sustaining a strong, expanding, fully employed economy.

The Fed may not be perfect, but its emphasis on price stability is well-founded. China’s painful experience should only serve as a reminder to meddlesome congressmen and dissenting Fed presidents.

The key assumption of Obama’s budget

By Daniel Hanson

February 9, 2012, 10:40 am

In preparation for the president’s budget proposal next week, it’s important to discuss one of the assumptions on which all figures will be based.

Over the past few years, interest rates on federal debt have fallen to historically low levels thanks to manipulation by the Fed and risk aversion by markets. An unintended consequence of these low interest rates is that the federal debt has been financed very cheaply. Still, interest payments on federal debt have rising sharply since the end of the Clinton era.

The average maturity of the national debt is just over 62 months. This means that once every five years, almost all of our national debt is refinanced into new contracts. The CBO does its budget projections with this in mind, and guesses at what the interest rates will be. For their most recent projections, they assume interest rates will stay low until they begin to slowly rise until 2014.

This is a big assumption. Any number of things could cause interest rates to rise, from a market shock to another debt ceiling debacle to a debt downgrade and so on. Assuming interest rates don’t stay low, the cost of financing the public debt could rise extremely quickly. The chart below shows the national debt picture 62 months from now under different interest rates.

If interest rates rise to where they were at the end of the Clinton presidency, when the economy was rosy, the federal debt will be $4 trillion higher in five years. It’s amazing what a difference a little assumption can make.

Why Europe isn’t Hamiltonian

By Daniel Hanson

February 8, 2012, 2:14 pm

As Europe continues to careen off the fiscal cliff, technocrats are trying to find ways to write-down Europe’s debt without it being considered a technical default.

There is actually a strong parallel here to the United States in the early Constitution days. With extremely high war-time debts and a weak federal apparatus, the new republic was staggering under financial stresses that threatened the American project.

Alexander Hamilton, the newly minted Secretary of the Treasury, proposed a plan to solve the problem. Part of the proposal involved the national government assuming the debts of the states. Despite high opposition to the plan, particularly in the more fiscally-sound South, Hamilton hammered the proposal through Congress.

Maybe some sort of debt sharing deal could happen in Europe?

Not likely, writes AEI’s Alex Pollock:

Since it will not have a Hamiltonian central government, Europe cannot carry out a repetition of Hamilton’s celebrated assumption of state debts—in which the new United States Treasury paid par for debts which were trading at 25 cents or so on the dollar. Such a transaction is beyond the power of any confederation. It is impossible to imagine that the United States under the Articles of Confederation would have, or could have, carried out this famous debt assumption.

Thus, some of the accumulated debt of member governments of the European confederation will not be paid. It will be “restructured” in various ways with losses to creditors, as is in the process of happening with the Greek government’s debt and has historically happened over and over again with government debt.

What does this mean? It means that we’re stuck with creditors taking losses that European leaders will continue to deny constitute a default.

This, of course, is ludicrous, as any failure to service a debt in full is a default, regardless of what Europe’s leaders choose to call it, and markets are likely to penalize governments for their defaults.

We’ve seen this sort of smoke-and-mirrors before. As John Makin wrote about the “voluntary” write-down of Greek debt that happened in October:

The terms of the Greek rescue package included a “voluntary” 50 percent reduction in the value of Greek bonds held by its creditors, which include European commercial banks and the ECB. A 50 percent cut in a Greek bond’s value constitutes a default. If it is imposed on lenders who have purchased insurance on their Greek bonds, those lenders can be compensated for their losses by the sellers of that insurance. (The insurance vehicle is called a credit default swap). However, as the architects of the Greek rescue package discovered, if the lender accepts a voluntary write-down of an insured government bond, which was probably sold by an overleveraged lender who may not be able to honor it (think AIG after the Bear Sterns collapse), the holder need not be compensated for the loss.

The write-down proposed on the debt of Greece reminded those who had purchased insurance on their Italian, Spanish, and French bonds that the guarantees might not be valid, either by decree or in view of the inability of those who wrote the insurance policies to honor them. As a result, lenders to Italy, Spain, and France began to demand higher interest rates on their loans to those countries.

Europe has no Hamiltonian federalism to save it from its debts. There will be defaults, no matter what the politicians say.

Un-biasing the tax code

By Daniel Hanson

February 6, 2012, 3:43 pm

One of the biggest arguments regarding current tax rates is that they are an prohibitively high impediment to small business growth and creation, which, in turn, creates an impediment to job creation and innovation.

Yet singling out small businesses for tax breaks isn’t any more fair than singling out any other group. Or, as AEI economist Alan Viard points out:

The current tax policy debate has been misdirected because of the unwillingness of supporters of marginal rate reduction to articulate the real economic case for that reduction. Many supporters argue that rate reduction is justified because it will promote the growth of specific sectors, such as small business. Yet, the real case for marginal tax rate reduction is precisely that it does not single out particular sectors for special benefits, but instead reduces tax impediments to mutually beneficial transactions involving work, saving, and investment throughout the economy.

As Viard points out, a fairer tax code is one that removes biases. It’s disingenuous to go into histrionics over tax breaks for pet liberal projects like, say, green energy, while simultaneously arguing for pet conservative projects like, say, small business creation.

If we want to actually improve the tax code and make it fairer, we need to reduce its biases, not increase them.

Obama’s confusion over American excellence

By Daniel Hanson

February 3, 2012, 3:45 pm

President Obama’s trade policy is a mess. It seems he doesn’t know precisely what he wants. On the one hand, we see very positive signs, like this, from the State of the Union:

Congress should make sure that no foreign company has an advantage over American manufacturing when it comes to accessing finance or new markets like Russia. Our workers are the most productive on Earth, and if the playing field is level, I promise you – America will always win.

He apparently realizes both that the United States is a giant in global trade, and that when unfettered by bad policy, U.S. companies will succeed. He even hints at one of those bad policies and says that it should be repealed. I agree. As I wrote:

…the U.S. will continue to trade with Russia under its current terms because U.S. policymakers have failed to resolve the real sticking point in Russian trade: the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. Despite brokering broad-scale bilateral agreements on market access and garnering small-scale compromises on auto parts, meat exports, and intellectual property, U.S. policymakers are rejecting Russia’s moves to open markets to U.S. producers, placing the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage … U.S. exporters will have substantially more items taxed at substantially higher rates than the rest of the world when Russia becomes part of the WTO … If we wish Russia to become more free market, we must offer them the opportunity to compete in free markets. Barring market access through trade barriers, particularly when the rest of the world embraces Russian trade, is counterproductive and denies the benefits of trade both to U.S. citizens and to Russians vying for more freedom.

But more often, his trade policy is confused and protectionist. Obama has proposed plans to engage in industrial targeting as a means of bolstering U.S. exports and creating jobs. But as Solyndra should remind us, and as AEI’s Matt Jensen notes today:

Globalized supply chains make the hard task of picking industries to support near impossible. Industrial clusters are becoming less prominent and less valuable. As business coordination costs fall due to improved communication technologies, the sub industries, like the manufacture of parts and components, are separating geographically from the headquarters, R&D, and distribution. A hollowed-out industry is not worth as large of a subsidy, and the proper industries to target will be harder to identify.

What’s more, as industries break down into their sub-industries, it is more likely that a new firm will play a larger role in a sub-industry. Specialized workers and inputs will cluster around that firm, and knowledge spillovers will begin to occur across departments. While no bank is big enough to move an entire industry to a more efficient location, it might be able to move a sub-industry. Where capital markets work, governments should not meddle.

No one can predict the future. The next communication or transportation revolutions will likely change the world as much as the internet revolution has, and policy-makers should not waste money predicting which industries will be valuable, and which will still cluster.

Americans don’t need help succeeding; they need the freedom to compete. If Obama wants to create jobs and boost exports, he should put his money where his mouth is: level the playing field and rely on American productivity and ingenuity to win.

The Swiss keep their anchor in the Eurozone

By Daniel Hanson

February 2, 2012, 3:58 pm

Acting Swiss National Bank head Thomas Jordan seems determined to stay the course on devaluing the franc, as I mentioned he would following Hildebrand’s resignation. In the FT today, he says:

We will enforce this minimum rate with the utmost determination and we are prepared to buy foreign currency in unlimited quantities if necessary… Our profits have been and will be very volatile … because our balance sheet is four to five times as big as it was five years ago. Last year, we had a loss of SFr20bn, but this year we have a gain of SFr13bn … I am convinced central banks should have sufficient capital for the long run. But, in the short run, central banks can bear heavy losses and even go into negative equity if necessary. In the case of the SNB there is no legal need to recapitalise the bank immediately. We will simply recapitalise the bank through future profits.

The SNB has undertaken the largest quantitative easing in the world by percentage since the financial crisis hit, and they have sustained massive losses in the process. In just two months of 2011, the SNB injected 40 percent of GDP into the money supply in an effort to drive the exchange rate with the euro down to SFr1.20 per euro.

For now, the Swiss don’t need to worry about their central bank’s losses because the bank is, as Jordan claims, sufficiently capitalized. Of greater concern to the Swiss should be the prospects for the franc should the eurozone collapse. In that context, the Swiss economy would be saddled with both rapid appreciation of the franc and the fallout from the prior interventions. Essentially, the SNB has bet 40 percent of its GDP that the eurozone is going to work out its problems.

Inflation fears, Ron Paul, and the big, bad Fed

By Daniel Hanson

February 2, 2012, 12:19 pm

Gold bugs like Ron Paul like to argue that economists have conflated inflation with price inflation. Paul says that inflation is, by definition, growth in the money supply. Some thoughts based on this perspective:

  1. By this analysis, assuming a 1-to-1 direct relationship between an increase in the supply of money and an increase in inflation (see below for why this is silly), we would have experienced an annual rate of inflation of about 1.5 percent per year in the postwar period if our money was gold. This is the rate at which the global gold supply has expanded. Also, while expanding at a fairly stable rate, the supply of gold has sometimes unexpectedly changed. We would have inflation and uncertainty in Ron Paul’s utopia.

  1. Price inflation has been quite low for the past decade. Since 2000, the CPI has gone up about 2.5 percent per year on average. Core inflation, which excludes food and energy, has gone up 2 percent per year over this span. The Fed thinks core inflation is a more appropriate measure for their purposes because they can control it more directly than they can headline inflation.

  1. Food and energy prices have been extremely volatile. Gold standard advocates such as Paul argue that such volatility is caused by the Fed; meanwhile, the Fed maintains that the shocks on these prices are outside of their control. Here’s a chart of oil price pressures over the past two decades; you decide which story is more plausible. (A similar chart could be made for food prices.)
  1. There are libraries of ink spilled over the relationship between money supply and inflation, but two things are clear. There is a relationship between how much money is in an economy and how much things cost, but that relationship is not very easy to track because price changes are influenced by many things other than the supply of money. Gold standard advocates understand this, but their rhetoric often makes it seem as though the Fed is the lone villain behind price inflation. Observe, then, the relationship between the quantity of money in the economy and price changes since 1980.
  1. Price inflation in the wake of QE-1 and QE-2 has risen from near zero, but inflation in general has been especially low, something that gold bugs, with their sole emphasis on the relationship between money supply inflation and price inflation, have yet to explain.

Questioning the efficacy of ‘blue laws’

By Daniel Hanson

January 31, 2012, 3:13 pm

Governor Daniel Malloy of Connecticut is currently embroiled in a debate over whether the state should revise its decades-old restrictions on the sale of alcoholic beverages to allow more consumer freedom. Opponents of lifting the so-called “blue laws” that restrict behavior based on religious prohibitions have gone into histrionics over the proposal, citing the supposed increased workload, decreased religiosity, and outbreaks of vandalism that are sure to follow such a move.

But do blue laws actually encourage better behavior?

One paper, published by Jonathan Gruber and Daniel Hungerman in 2008, looked at the impact of blue laws on religiosity. The authors found a marked decline in religious charitable contributions and church attendance in the aftermath of a blue law repeal. As the authors note:

Under weak conditions repealing the laws will unambiguously lead to less time spent on religious activities. This is because after the laws are repealed formerly constrained individuals will increase time on work and secular consumption, and both of these crowd out time spent on religious activities. The situation is more complicated for religious donations. On the one hand, individuals who had been facing a restriction on work will respond to the laws being repealed by working more and spending more on both secular consumption and religious donations, and so religious donations could rise. On the other hand, if donations are normal, individuals who had been facing a restriction on secular consumption will respond to the laws being repealed by substituting out of religious donations and spending more on secular consumption.

But the results are actually more interesting. Since religious participation and moral decision-making are hugely related, the authors try to parse out whether there are other behavior changes associated with blue law repeal, like increases in drinking. They find:

Here we find a positive and significant effect on marijuana consumption of 3.2 percentage points. This is a very large effect which is more than 20 percent of the sample mean. For cocaine, the coefficient is again positive and significant, and the marginal effect is nearly the same as the sample mean … The results here are striking: for each of these three behaviors [drinking, cocaine use, marijuana use], we find significant effects of repeal on those who attend church, relative to those who do not. For example, for drinking, we find that attendees are 5.5 percent more likely to drink than those who don’t attend.

Apparently, the Puritans were correct: one sure fire way to get people to go to church and behave is to take away all their other options.

U.S. regulators think they can do better than the major credit ratings agencies. As part of the Dodd-Frank Act, U.S. regulators are no longer allowed to use ratings from independent companies to judge the appropriateness of bank capital levels. Under the newest proposal from the Fed, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC, ratings would instead be assigned based on OECD classifications, which are even worse than the ratings agencies’ diagnoses.

This week, the U.S. Congress will hold hearings regarding the major credit ratings agencies’ supposed inability to predict the collapse of MF Global. Despite the fact that both Moody and S&P downgraded the brokerage prior to the collapse and “did not have any understanding” of the firm’s bets on European sovereign debt until less than a week before the collapse, expect lawmakers to crack down harshly on ratings agencies yet again.

This comes amid accusations that ratings agencies are, apparently, being too harsh on European nations thanks to a spate of downgrades in sovereign creditworthiness over the past months. These accusations piggyback on prior claims that the ratings agencies failed to anticipate the wave of defaults in subprime mortgages that precipitated the U.S. housing crisis. (Never mind that U.S. regulators didn’t anticipate them either.)

Surely the OECD ratings can’t be worse?

Except that they can be. The OECD currently rates all of the troubled countries of the Eurozone as entirely riskless investments and has done so since they started producing ratings. This stands in stark contrast to the ratings agencies. See below for a breakdown of ratings, and notice how the OECD has totally failed to grasp the magnitude of the current crisis.

By cutting out ratings agencies, regulators have correctly sensed the conflicts of interest in the status quo, but they have merely replaced one set of conflicts of interest with another. The OECD is a collective of governments who are leveraged to the hilt with sovereign debts they are struggling to service. In this instance, the ratings agencies are right to say these countries are in trouble. It appears that in this instance, least wrong is the best we can hope for.

Fear and loathing of the Fed

By Daniel Hanson

January 26, 2012, 12:00 pm

As the GOP primary heats up, it appears that Ron Paul’s “End the Fed” message is catching on. In South Carolina, Gingrich dove head-first into the Gold Standard fray, promising a “gold commission” modeled after the double-digit inflation-battling commission built by Ronald Reagan (that, coincidentally, overwhelmingly rejected returning to a gold standard, and had Ron Paul as a member).

Ron Paul, a subscriber to Austrian Economics, has been advocating a return to gold for years. Part of his argument is that gold’s meteoric rise signals impending doom for the dollar. Between the massive debt overhang and distrust of the Fed, Paul argues that people will lose faith in the U.S. financial and monetary system.

Noteworthy, then, are the returns on asset classes in 2011.

If, as Paul and Gingrich argue, we are facing economic doom, shouldn’t gold be at the top of the list? And shouldn’t interest rates be rising? And shouldn’t inflation be going through the roof?

Yet, as AEI economist John Makin notes:

First among the reasons for low interest rates is the fact that actual inflation has been coming down. U.S. headline inflation is almost a full percentage point below where it was about four months ago and it is expected to fall further toward midyear. Inflation in Germany is coming down and Japan is actually experiencing deflation… The negative shocks of 2011 including the Arab spring, Japan’s tsunami-nuclear disaster, the ugly midyear battle over the U.S. debt ceiling, and the 4th quarter intensification of Europe’s sovereign debt crisis, all contributed to elevated risk aversion. As inflation risks abate, the safe haven represented by high-grade government bonds looks even safer.  For households and firms wishing to hold a high level of very liquid safe assets another alternative is U.S. treasury bills that are highly liquid and continue to be favored assets.

In other words, inflation is low and dropping, interest rates are low and will remain so, and markets view U.S. sovereign debt as their safest haven. Maybe the gold-bug-predicted crisis is still yet to come?

Why South Carolina is bad at values voting

By Daniel Hanson

January 23, 2012, 1:03 pm

South Carolinians are generally considered by pollsters and politicos to be values voters. Nestled firmly in the heart of the Bible Belt, South Carolina is home to culture war bastions like Bob Jones University and is associated with such famous values clashes as Berkeley County Detention allowing inmates to read nothing but the Bible in their cells.

But South Carolina, a state that has gone for the Republican candidate in every election since 1980, has a rather spotty history of picking candidates who are themselves embodiments of Christian values. A few noteworthy figures:

1.    Strom Thurmond – Perhaps the most influential politician ever in South Carolina, Thurmond fathered a child out of wedlock and vigorously supported segregation and other racist institutions.

2.    Mark Sanford – The former governor of South Carolina and head of the Republican governor’s association was famous for marketing his faith to conservative evangelical voters. But in June 2009, Sanford’s mysterious hiking trip in the Appalachian Trail unearthed a nearly decade-long extramarital affair. Sanford also violated campaign finance law more than 61 times.

3.    John C. Calhoun – Calhoun, a titan of American history, was a key figure in the Petticoat Affair, a social disaster that destabilized the Jackson presidency. The intellectual godfather of the South’s Civil War, Calhoun championed nullification, slavery, and succession.

4.    Francis Pickens – Pickens was the architect of South Carolina’s succession from the Union at the outset of the Civil War. Ostensibly a champion of state’s rights, Pickens was an ardent supporter of the slave system. According to Calhoun, Pickens had “a strong enfusion of envy, jealousy, and vanity in his composition.”

5.    Andrew Butler – South Carolina senator who, while vehemently supporting slavery, fathered several children with his slave mistresses.

6.    Preston Brooks – On May 22, 1856, Senator Preston Brooks beat Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts with his heavy walking cane. Sumner took more than three years to recover from his wounds.

7.    Newt Gingrich – The former Speaker won the South Carolina presidential primary on Saturday despite his three marriages, two of which were dissolved while his wives were battling serious illness. Gingrich is also the only Speaker in history to be convicted of a House ethics violation.

For voters who are said to care deeply about a personal morality, South Carolinians have overlooked an awful lot of personal indiscretions.

The 5 things you need to know about the next Swiss Bank head

By Daniel Hanson

January 10, 2012, 9:23 am

With the shocking resignation yesterday of Philipp Hildebrand as Swiss National Bank chairman, it seems clear that Thomas Jordan will be his successor. Here are the things you need to know about Jordan:

1. Jordan is an academic technocrat. He has a long academic CV but no private sector experience, putting him in company with many new European financial czars. His views on the Swiss system are the result of decades of literature review, but lack real-world perspective. Consequently, he has repeatedly shown little respect for actual business practices, like promising banks would have no trouble magically raising capital buffers to meet cautionary guidelines.

2. Jordan, a long-time Hildebrand ally, will only add fuel to the fires of opposition to the SNB’s current battles over massive reserve accumulation. Jordan has long urged a more aggressive reserve accumulation strategy, and the powerful political opposition to this move will grow under his tenure. The real takeaway here is that the SNB will continue to lose legitimacy as it fights this war of public opinion.

3. All signs point to Jordan being the architect of the Franc-Euro currency peg the Bank set up in September amid rising exchange rate concerns. Jordan was the principle defender of the peg in the media, established the public case for the legal framework of a peg, and dropped hints in interviews for months before the peg was announced about its possibility. Don’t expect a marked deviation from it.

4. Just like Bernanke, Jordan is terrified of deflation in 2012, and he is a major advocate of both inflation targeting and central bank coordination. Expect the SNB to undertake more liquidity operations with the Fed and ECB over the next months. Swiss voters should be concerned that, thanks to the SNB liquidity operations, the Swiss economy has chained itself to the eurozone. When the crash comes in Europe, Switzerland will feel the pain too.

5. Jordan’s push for more integration means that the scope of the de facto QE-3 currently being employed by the world’s central banks is only going to expand. In order to counter funding shortages, central banks have taken on more deposits and offered more loans. They have succeeded in supporting the liquidity of the world’s banks, but they have also engaged in credit allocation that makes them vulnerable to large-scale defaults. Jordan will only exacerbate this condition.

The short version of events is that anyone hoping for a change of direction in the post-Hildebrand Switzerland isn’t going to get what they want. Jordan will be more of the same.

 

It’s hard not to feel bad for Philipp Hildebrand, the former head of the Swiss National Bank who resigned this morning amid allegations of insider trading. His resignation came as a surprise, but was not altogether unwarranted given the scope of the charges against him and his wife. The reality is that his resignation is merely a symptom of a much large central banking problem.

Hildebrand has been an audacious policymaker since he took over the SNB in 2010. He has done a fairly good job reacting to the global financial crisis and European debt crisis, urging policymakers to implement academic solutions to real-world problems as a means of providing stability for average Swiss citizens. Hildebrand’s unique background of real-world bank experience and research acumen has made him a fantastic fit for the SNB as he has weathered the storms of the financial crisis by making bold decisions based on a solid theoretical footing. Not all of these decisions have panned out, as evidenced in the exchange rate interventions from March 2009 to June 2010, but Hildebrand has been quick to acknowledge failures and change course, something American policymakers could do more frequently.

Hildebrand is, in many ways, the wunderkind of European financial circles, as he joined the SNB governing board in 2003 at the relatively young age of 40. He participated in the World Economic Forum at Davos while still pursuing his university degree, and he began co-authoring papers on central bank policy while still a young student. His angling for the head of the SNB appears to have begun at a very young age.

The tragedy is that Hildebrand broke his own cardinal rule. Throughout his writings, he has consistently pointed out that the credibility of the central bank is the single most important feature of monetary policy; above and beyond the actual currency moves and financial interventions, markets must believe that the central bank is trustworthy. As he wrote in 2007, “credibility is not a permanent characteristic of a central bank, but must be continuously earned.”

The charges against Hildebrand are personal, but they are part of a broader climate of distrust in central banks. Central banks the world over have lost massive amounts of credibility since 2008 and have been unable to recover most of it. The Fed has been mired with the balance sheet problems of QE-2, high unemployment, stagnant housing and financial sectors, the perils of TBTF, and the limits of accommodation in monetary policy. The SNB has been battling high inflation and excessive appreciation with a bold currency peg. The ECB has recovered some sliver of credibility since Mario Draghi took the helm, but they are still viewed as impotent against the rising tide of recession and debt in Europe. Moreover, the last two years has seen the ECB raise interest rates at all the wrong times. And China’s central bank continues to fight unanchored inflation expectations and a bursting housing bubble. In the aggregate, these incidences constitute a massive crisis of confidence in the institutions governing the world’s major currencies.

Hildebrand, who may or may not be guilty of the accusations heretofore leveled at him, forgot that, far more important than the letter of the law is the respect of the markets. By forgetting his own principles, he caused his own downfall and jeopardized the credibility of the central banking system the world over. Let’s hope this incident serves as a wake-up call for the spate of central banks who have long stopped continuously earning their credibility.

Contradiction of confidence

By Daniel Hanson

December 22, 2011, 2:07 pm

It doesn’t take a financial analyst to realize that markets have been volatile for nearly the entire year. Much of the concern in financial markets is due to the ongoing eurozone crisis that threatens Europe and the United States with deep recessions. While the direct effects of the crisis (massive sovereign defaults, rising interest rates, etc) threaten firms, an under-discussed threat comes in the form of uncertainty.

A quick review of Financial Times headlines and news alerts is anecdotally telling. From July 1 to today, about 312 notices have been posted about equities rallying on hopes of a euro crisis resolution. There were about 440 mentions of stocks falling because of fears of the crisis growing larger. Many of these contrasting alerts were issued on the same day, as in the case of December 5, when stocks rallied on hopes for the EU summit and fell after S&P warned of mass sovereign debt downgrades.

Yesterday, the IMF’s official blog pointed out four lessons from 2011 that will hopefully guide IMF policy going forward. One particular point gave a head-nod to the trend I noted above:

…financial investors are schizophrenic about fiscal consolidation and growth.

They react positively to news of fiscal consolidation, but then react negatively later, when consolidation leads to lower growth—which it often does. Some preliminary estimates that the IMF is working on suggest that it does not take large multipliers for the joint effects of fiscal consolidation and the implied lower growth to lead in the end to an increase, not a decrease, in risk spreads on government bonds. To the extent that governments feel they have to respond to markets, they may be induced to consolidate too fast, even from the narrow point of view of debt sustainability.

This view reinforces what AEI’s Desmond Lachman has been saying throughout the crisis:

Stuck within a euro straightjacket that precludes currency depreciation to stimulate export growth, the application of major austerity policies is bound to lead to further economic contraction. And further economic contraction will again result in budget shortfalls and a further exacerbation of these countries’ debt problems. It is also bound to heighten social tensions and to erode those countries’ political willingness to stay the course.

The uncertainty created by policymakers’ actions is an externality to the broader crisis, but it is significant nonetheless. Perhaps this is why consumer confidence has also taken a nose-dive.

Keeping the United States solvent, one crisis at a time

By Daniel Hanson

December 15, 2011, 12:50 pm

Mid-summer, U.S. prime money market funds became aware that they were alarmingly exposed to the eurozone crisis through their holdings in European banks. At that time, more than 45 percent—more than $1 trillion—of U.S. MMFs were invested in European banks which were themselves heavily exposed to bad European debt.

Since that time, MMFs have systematically been cutting their exposure to European banks. While MMFs still have more than a third of their exposure in European banks, they have steeply cut their holdings to about $700 billion.

In response, MMFs have started investing in U.S. Treasuries, providing the funds to drive congressional spending at a borrowing cost that is essentially zero. In other words, the massive fiscal crisis in Europe has allowed the U.S. to avert a massive fiscal crisis of its own. Note the growth of investment in U.S. debt by MMFs as European exposure declines below.

When free trade isn’t free

By Daniel Hanson

December 15, 2011, 10:02 am

The WTO is set to offer membership to Russia, and the Russians are largely expected to accept and approve the bid by early 2012, thus ending an 18-year struggle to join the ranks of free trade nations. Under the terms agreed to by Russia, tariffs will drop by about 22 percent for most Asian and European nations.

By contrast, the U.S. will continue to trade with Russia under its current terms because U.S. policymakers have failed to resolve the real sticking point in Russian trade: the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. Despite brokering broad-scale bilateral agreements on market access and garnering small-scale compromises on auto parts, meat exports, and intellectual property, U.S. policymakers are rejecting Russia’s moves to open markets to U.S. producers, placing the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage. As shown below, U.S. exporters will have substantially more items taxed at substantially higher rates than the rest of the world when Russia becomes part of the WTO.

The JVA was introduced as part of the 1974 Trade Act as a way of punishing nations that restrict freedom of immigration based on religious belief. At present, 12 countries are punished by the amendment, though all but two – North Korea and Cuba – are considered broadly to comply with its measures. Some countries have been exempted from the provisions of the amendment in various ways because the promotion of trade is considered more vital to spreading human rights in these nations than minor trade sanctions would be.

If we wish Russia to become more free market, we must offer them the opportunity to compete in free markets. Barring market access through trade barriers, particularly when the rest of the world embraces Russian trade, is counterproductive and denies the benefits of trade both to U.S. citizens and to Russians vying for more freedom.

Europe’s next Lost Generation

By Daniel Hanson

December 9, 2011, 12:06 pm

Onlookers to the European debt crisis have been fairly silent about what may be Europe’s most troubling problem: the proliferation of systemic unemployment among youth.

The unemployment rates for youth ages 16-25 in various countries are charted below. As you can see, they are substantially higher than their historic norms, and in some countries, half of the workforce under the age of 25 is unemployed. It’s little wonder that more than 50 percent of Europeans between the ages of 18 and 34 still live with their parents, and 67 percent say the primary reason they can’t move out is “material difficulties.”

 Youth Unemployment Rate in Crisis Countries

The bigger cause for concern is that, long term, the Europeans will find themselves without a stable workforce. European youth are increasingly susceptible to learned helplessness such that even if economic opportunity were robustly returned to the eurozone, it is unlikely that a young, skilled workforce will be capable of seizing their chance at success. European policymakers are obsessed with the present for good reason, but they ought not to forget that their highest obligation is to future generations. The poor policy environment of the present—rigid labor markets, structural unemployment, and high taxes—combined with a lack of principled leadership is sending exactly the wrong message to Europe’s next Lost Generation.

Blame Grover?

By Daniel Hanson

November 29, 2011, 1:40 pm

Tonight at 5:30pm, the American Enterprise Debate series returns as Grover Norquist debates Ross Douthat on the effectiveness of the Taxpayer Protection Pledge. The debate can be seen live on AEI’s website, on C-SPAN3, or live here at AEI. To help lay out the contours of the discussion, we asked some young bloggers from around DC to weigh in on the question.

Grover-bashing has become something of a cottage industry in Washington since the Super Committee failed to reach a comprehensive deficit reduction plan. It seems that Republicans and Democrats alike are keen to use Norquist as a scapegoat for the decisions they made or failed to make regarding the budget.

So, is the pledge effective?  You decide.

From Andrew McIndoe at the Bill of Rights Institute:

The Taxpayer Protection Pledge is one of the most impactful policy initiatives and political strategies currently advancing economic prosperity.

It is clear that our nation’s deficit is exclusively a result of Washington’s spending problem. Congress continually makes promises to the American people that are simply unaffordable. Living well beyond its proper functions, the U.S. government invariably lives beyond the means of the American people.

Revenues have remained largely where they have always been while spending has dramatically increased. As noted by the Office of Management and Budget, spending levels have historically equaled 19-20 percent of GDP but have risen to nearly 25 percent of GDP in recent years.

The American people know from experience that if more of their money is sent to Washington to “fix the deficit,” it will be spent on short-term political projects rather than being used to reduce the long-term debt. A pledge not to raise taxes forces politicians to face the real problem: spending.

Politically, the Pledge has ensured that politicians’ feet are held to the fire when they start to consider tax hikes as a way to fund their spending addiction. Critics of the Pledge argue that this does nothing more than create political stalemates. Such an outcome, while frustrating, is not necessarily ruinous. A political impasse is preferable to compromises on core principles that betray American voters in backroom deals.

The vast majority of center right voters believe that Washington has sold them out on issue after issue.  Americans—who are overwhelmingly conservative—have historically low faith in their Congress because of its multi-decade spending binge. The last line of defense for proponents of limited government is that taxes have not been raised. Many want those on the right to muddy the waters on the last bright line left with the American people.

Over the last 25 years, the Pledge has truly protected taxpayers (and their hard earned money) from the overreach of politicians like no one else could have.

From Joseph Henchman at the Tax Foundation:

“Starve the Beast” Not Effective at Federal Level

Before the first decade of the twentieth century, many smart people believed that “starve the beast” could work at restraining federal spending growth. After cutting taxes, or at least not raising them, as Milton Friedman explained, “[r]esulting deficits will be an effective restraint on the spending propensities of the executive branch and the legislature.” The much harder job of rolling up sleeves and cutting spending by terminating ineffective programs and confronting entrenched interests could thus be avoided.

After a decade of experience, we know now that “starve the beast” does not work at the federal level. Instead of creating pressure to reduce expenditures to a smaller revenue total, spending exploded. After the 2001-03 tax cuts, federal spending under the George W. Bush Administration grew 55 percent (29 percent after adjusting for inflation). Defense spending grew 6.8 percent a year even after adjusting for inflation, other discretionary spending grew 5.4 percent a year (again, after adjusting for inflation), and the federal debt rose to 66 percent of GDP.

Why? The best theory I’ve heard is “fiscal illusion”: that tax cuts without spending cuts just reduces the apparent cost of government to the taxpayer. Instead of paying $1 in taxes to get $1 in services, the taxpayer is apparently paying only 70 cents to get $1 in services. Taxpayers thus demand more services. (Some argue that something similar is happening with nearly half of Americans paying no federal income tax, in that they will demand more in services but paid for by other people.) While tax increases lead to increased government spending, so apparently do tax cuts. The only thing that leads to spending cuts is cutting spending.

How You Tax is Just as Important as How Much You Tax

Some advocates of limited government believe that any reduction in government revenue is effective to this end because it puts money in consumers’ hands. However, if the ultimate policy goal is to reduce government involvement in individual and market decisions, tax credits are a poor choice. These credits are often complex, administratively burdensome, use government policy to distort behavior, create damaging uncertainty, and are the result of political micromanaging. Even as a tax credit modestly drops government revenue, it increases government meddling in the economy and resultant harmful outcomes.

One recent example is the ethanol tax credit, which has heavily distorted domestic gasoline prices and foreign food prices (causing hunger overseas, as found by 17 studies) and warped economic decisions by just about everyone who uses energy, for the benefit of a small group of politically-connected insiders. Stopping this unconscionable policy and its harmful outcomes should supersede in importance the relatively small amount of additional revenue the government would gain from ending the tax subsidy. Serious analysis of this and other tax incentives should look not just at the revenue but also other economic costs.

Tax Foundation analysis is guided by the principles of economically sound tax policy: simplicity, transparency, neutrality, stability, and growth-promotion. These principles originally derive from Adam Smith’s “maxims” about taxes from The Wealth of Nations. While we look at revenue impacts, we also look at other costs to taxpayers, such as administrative and compliance costs (Americans now spend 7 billion hours per year complying with the federal tax code), and reduced economic activity caused by a badly designed tax system. We analyze not just whether a tax change would increase or reduce revenue, but also whether it moves us towards a simpler, more sensible tax system.

Conclusion

I don’t like paying taxes but if there are to be taxes, they should be as simple and sensible as possible. Tax policy should be used to raise revenue, not micromanage a complex economy by trying to pick winners and losers in the market. Everyone should kick in a bit, to avoid fiscal illusion. “Starve the beast” has not worked at the federal level, so we should recognize that there is no way out of the hard work of pursuing genuine tax reform.

From Curtis Dubay at the Heritage Foundation:

The Pledge works to keep Congress focused on the cause of our debt problem: Overspending driven by entitlement programs like Social Security and Medicare.

Members of Congress will always take the path of least resistance, and tax hikes—although not an actual solution—are often an easier political route to address the debt than reforming entitlements.

Tax hikes should never be considered to fix the debt for three reasons:

  1. Low tax collections are not the problem. Tax receipts are relatively low today because of the recession and anemic recovery. Once the economy recovers—and assuming that current tax policies remain in place (including all the Bush tax cuts)—receipts will quickly rise to their historical average and grow thereafter.
  2. Tax hikes don’t address the cause of the exploding debt. If Congress raises taxes to fix the problem and does nothing to slow the rapid growth in entitlement spending, it will have to continue raising taxes year after year to keep pace. The constantly growing tax burden will slow economic growth and leave succeeding generations a diminished future.
  3. Spending cuts never materialize in “balanced” deals. Any deal that offers spending cuts for tax hikes is fundamentally unbalanced. As Presidents Reagan and Bush I found out, the tax hikes in such deals become permanent law immediately, but succeeding Congresses are under no obligation to abide by the spending levels set by previous Congresses and quickly undo earlier cuts.

Congress needs to cut spending and reform entitlements. Not hike taxes.

From Rizqi Rachmat at the Mercatus Center:

The Taxpayer Protection Pledge seeks to restrict the size and scope of government by limiting tax revenues; however, the focus on taxes may distract our attention away from the central issue driving our debt spiral—excessive government spending. The weight of our compounding debt burden on future generations, then, will ultimately be determined by our ability to successfully address this spending.

The pledge is concomitant with the idea of starving the beast, popularized by Republicans in the 1980s, which assumes that once taxes have been cut, constituencies will demand lower levels of spending in response to deficits. The pledge’s ability to limit spending depends upon a government which views its level of revenue as a binding constraint on its level of spending—history tells us that this is not the modus operandi of the political system in which we operate. The federal government did not shrink much, if at all, under Reagan, and it expanded under George W. Bush. Tax cuts alone can’t bind spending.

While the pledge will not solve our debt problem, it maintains an important function in the debt discussion—it reminds us of the ideals of a free society. It reminds us that voters should be empowered and knowledgeable. It reminds us that politicians should be held accountable for the decisions that they make. It reminds us that we should be moving along the margins of increased freedom and prosperity.

The Taxpayer Protection Pledge places too much emphasis on taxation, so limiting the discussion around balanced-budget amendments, broad-based tax reform, and entitlement reform—some of the many tangible policy solutions that would move us closer to the ideals of a free society.

And, finally, one more contrarian:

The Taxpayer Protection Pledge fails in both principle and practice by creating a perverse structure within Congress’ operations in the following ways:

  1. Limits the ability of statesmen to govern. By taking policy options off the table, it limits the ability of statesmen to provide for the evolving demands of their constituencies. Moreover, politicians are now asked (or, in some instances, required) to sign a litany of pledges to win elections—effectively destroying their ability to govern when in office.
  2. Increases the real cost of government. When politicians are allowed to introduce new programs but are forbidden to introduce ways to fund the programs, the government overspends. Such overspending reallocates real money away from the private sector into government coffers, creating a promise of deficits, debt, and stagnation.
  3. Creates idiotic complexities. Legislators are encouraged to create an increasingly complex tax system in the name of keeping low marginal rates. The explosion of tax expenditures and deductions since 1986 has lowered Federal revenues while raising the real cost of tax compliance and fostering opportunities for tax evasion. While low taxes are positive, it’s idiotic that some mega-corporations pay no income taxes or wasteful programs such as agricultural subsidies cannot be cut—because the Pledge views changes to this system as tax increases.
  4. Makes the tax code unfair. Income taxes might be fundamentally unfair, but simple progressivity is more fair than the current nightmare we call the tax code. The abundant loopholes available to the super-rich add to the dearth of socioeconomic mobility in the United States and cause real tax rates to be much higher on the middle class than their architects (ie, the Reagan administration) intended.
  5. Causes taxes to rise. Because signatories could not make small concessions because of the Pledge, we are set for two massive tax hikes—the expiration of the payroll tax cut and the expiration of the Bush-era tax cuts. Compromise on smaller areas may have allowed these programs to be extended. When Norquist helped defeat George H.W. Bush because he broke his tax pledge, the resultant victory was rather hollow; eight years of Clinton resulted in an explosion of entitlement programs and a rise in tax rates.
  6. Creates political gridlock. Sometimes, gridlock can be positive, but this “do-nothing” Congress has earned its label, as fever-pitched hyper-partisanship has resulted in new lows of Congressional incompetence.

The Pledge, while nice in theory, isn’t effective at achieving what it set out to do: make the tax code simpler, fairer, and lower.

What do you think? Decide tonight and ask your questions on Twitter using the hashtag #AEIDebates.


The American Enterprise Institute takes no institutional positions on policy advocacy or political campaigns. The views expressed on The Enterprise Blog represent those of the individual writers.

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