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This afternoon, Senator Kerry issued an apology for the killing of two Pakistanis in an incident on January 27 in Lahore, Pakistan. According to U.S. officials and Raymond Davis, the American who killed the two men, the deaths occurred as a result of self-defense—the Pakistanis rode on motorcycles and brandished weapons, threatening Davis.

Yet Kerry’s message could be taken as accepting responsibility for the deaths, implying that Davis operated outside of legal bounds as a diplomat operating in Pakistan:

“We are deeply, deeply sorry for that tragic incident,” Kerry told a press conference soon after arriving in Pakistan’s eastern city of Lahore. “I want to come here to express our deepest regret for those tragic events and to express the sorrow of American people for the loss of life that has taken place,” he said.

Every death is tragic, and officials should express their sympathy for the loss of life. But doing so in a politically charged situation while on travel to the foreign country in question undercuts the ability of the U.S. government to achieve its objectives—in this case, pressuring the Pakistani government to release Davis.

Kerry’s message also contradicts a statement from President Obama earlier today. At a press conference, President Obama said that Davis should be released immediately, as the Pakistani government should respect the global system of diplomatic immunity, a system from which Pakistani diplomats also receive protection around the world. Article 37, Section 2 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations states that administrative staff of an embassy, such as Davis, may not receive immunity if they fall afoul of a host country’s laws outside the performance of official duties. Yet the would-be motorcycle assailants clearly targeted Davis due to his status as an American official (and Davis responded, fearing for his life), thus the incident falls within the bounds of diplomatic immunity.

Yet Obama’s comments also may confuse those Pakistani government officials who paid attention to the release of the White House’s proposed 2012 budget yesterday. The document allots $3.1 billion in financial assistance to Pakistan, continuing the flow of a massive amount of American dollars to the South Asian country and sending a message that Washington continues to approve of Pakistan’s behavior.

The contradictory messages stem partially from poor foreign policy management by the administration. As I argued last week on National Review’s Corner blog, the administration failed to coordinate policy among its various parts during the Egypt crisis. We see the same confusion-generating activity in its handling of the Raymond Davis case.

Raymond Davis is an American citizen under diplomatic protection detained by a foreign state. It is the responsibility of the U.S. government to protect American citizens abroad. The administration’s disorganized approach to Pakistan has failed to convince Islamabad that we are serious about securing Davis’ release.  An immediate, significant cut in aid to Pakistan might start to convince the Pakistani government of our intent—instead of mere threats of cuts astride budgetary requests for billions more in aid.

Image by Cliff1066.

Yesterday, the State Department recognized Jundallah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). This designation comes nearly 18 months after reports surfaced indicating that the administration was considering an FTO designation for Jundallah.

The delay is of a piece with the State Department’s belated designation of the Pakistani Taliban months after the group struck the United States in the Times Square attack and years after the group began operating in December 2007 (a lapse I discussed in August). The State Department also failed to designate al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula prior to the attack on Christmas Day 2009.

The timing of this announcement reveals a second problem with the FTO process. Two weeks from now, officials from the P5+1 group, consisting of the United States, Russia, China, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, hope to meet with Iranian officials for a new round of talks over Iran’s nuclear program. Did this announcement of Jundallah’s FTO designation occur now as a bargaining chip to encourage Iran to engage in talks over its nuclear program?

Calling terrorist groups terrorists should occur regardless of the current diplomatic and political environment. All violent Islamist groups, including Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Hamas, Hezbollah, and al Qaeda and its affiliates, threaten American interests and should trigger FTO designation as soon as credible evidence of their status emerges.

Jundallah has long had the resume for such a designation. While its leader denied the claims made by Iranian and some international media that the group has al Qaeda ties, Jundallah clearly adheres to a violent Islamist agenda. In just the last year, Jundallah killed 42 people, including civilians, in an October 2009 bombing; in May 2010, the group killed 27 individuals by bombing a mosque in southeastern Iran.

Just because Jundallah’s victims are Iranian does not mean the group does not present a threat to the United States—the rise of a violent Islamist group harms U.S. interests. Designating Jundallah as an FTO does not encourage Iran to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapon, which will continue without serious consideration by the United States of all its options regarding Iran.

Delay and political bargaining have polluted the FTO designation system. We must improve the process to strengthen our fight against the al Qaeda network. For further information on security developments in Iran, please visit IranTracker.org. For coverage of the al Qaeda network and the countries in which it operates, please visit CriticalThreats.org.

Charlie Szrom is a senior analyst and program manager for the Critical Threats Project.

Yesterday, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that he would travel to New York City for the UN General Assembly meeting in September. As part of the trip, Ahmadinejad renewed his challenge to President Obama for a public debate on “who has a better solution for managing the world.” On Saturday, Iran also offered a $40 million line of credit to Zimbabwe. These and other recent examples of Iranian outreach show that despite UN sanctions and other recent measures by the U.S., Australian, European, and Canadian authorities, Iran does not feel isolated—and in fact exudes confidence—on the world stage.

Tehran still finds friends in the developing world. Whether or not those friendships can salve the wounds sanctions will leave upon Iran or prevent Iran from further UN censure is a matter of debate. However, more important than the actual amount of aid is the Iranian regime’s worldview these friendships reinforce. The very fact that countries continue to take some action in support of Iran and continue to offer friendly rhetoric provides Tehran with assurance that its foreign and nuclear policies should not be altered because some countries still view it as a leader. The recent growth in Iranian exports to West Africa (the result of a long line of diplomatic actions, such as yesterday’s meeting between officials from Burkina Faso and the Iranian first vice president) provides backing for the Iranian leadership’s beliefs:

szrom-8310In a new Critical Threats Project report, I undertake a case study of the cultural, diplomatic, economic, and militaristic methods by which Iran builds support around the world. The report analyzes Iran’s outreach to West Africa, which goes far beyond the July trips Ahmadinejad took to Mali and Nigeria. It finds that Iran still has significant allies in the region and describes the priorities Iran values in its foreign policy: raw material supply, supportive statements, votes at the UN, and potential staging areas for security cooperation.

Iranian outreach to West Africa should alert American policy makers to the need to pay attention to a region often ignored by Washington. America must fully engage in the new diplomatic battleground that is West Africa: unlike allies in other regions, Iran has not yet succeeded in fully securing its friendships in the region. A strong American response to Iranian aid will be necessary, however, to deter Iranian success in its search for support in West Africa and around the world.

Please find the full report here.

Charlie Szrom is a senior analyst and program manager for the Critical Threats Project.

On Tuesday, U.S. Senators Charles Schumer, Kay Hagan, Kirsten Gillibrand, Robert Menendez, and Frank Lautenberg issued a press release urging the State Department to add the Pakistani Taliban, or the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), to the State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list. Also Tuesday, State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley stated that the State Department had considered adding the TTP to the terror list before the Times Square incident.

Adding the TTP to the FTO list is a necessary and correct action. However, the TTP struck the United States several months before the Times Square incident. In December 2009, a TTP-linked suicide bomber killed seven Americans in a suicide bombing at Camp Chapman in Khost, Afghanistan. Prior to that attack, TTP rhetoric threatened violence against Pakistani troops it saw as acting on behalf of America; the group’s spokesman said on November 15 that, “We will ensure that those who have sacrificed their honor for the sake of America meet their logical end very soon.” TTP actions and rhetoric before the Times Square incident suggest that the group should have long been identified as a terrorist group dedicated to targeting America.

Yet, the criteria for what makes a terrorist group a threat to America should not rest solely on the operations it conducts or threats it makes against the United States or her interests. Instead of reactively designating terror groups after they have conducted attacks on American soil, we should proactively add members of the violent Islamist network led by al Qaeda to the FTO list, so that we might identify our foes before they reach the American homeland.

Recognizing and identifying foreign terrorist groups that are inimical to our interests earlier will increase the probability of preventing attacks upon America, as the FTO designation allows authorities to target persons providing resources to designated groups, expel individuals connected to these groups, and squeeze the financing that sustains such entities.

Some groups, such as the Russia-based Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus, may never target America directly. However, such al Qaeda-linked groups, as Chris Harnisch and I detail in a piece yesterday in National Review Online, provide rhetorical, personnel, and likely material support to each other, as they are all associated with or franchised by al Qaeda central leadership. The current FTO list, for example, includes such entities as the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e Jhangvi and Jaish-e Mohammed, groups known to share resources, personnel, and operations with the as-of-yet unlisted TTP. Due to the joint assistance, participation in the violent Islamist network led by al Qaeda makes such groups partially complicit in the actions taken by any member of the network, and thus makes any member of that network worthy of FTO designation.

Moreover, we no longer can simply rule out which groups are and are not likely to take action inside the United States. The attacks by Yemen’s al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the TTP show that groups previously believed unable to conduct international attacks were able to do so. AQAP and TTP have also set the bar high for their peers: groups within the violent Islamist network led by al Qaeda compete for resources, personnel, and attention. Attacks in America often give the groups the most attention, thus providing other al Qaeda members with significant incentives to attack the United States.

The best way to safeguard against such attacks is to understand the enemy network we face, identify all of its units as terror organizations, and develop individualized strategies for dealing with each node of that network.

Cross-posted from CDS blog.


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