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The New York Times reports that health spending may be flattening out, something that has surprised the experts. This apparent slow-down was spotted by AEI’s J.D. Kleinke in February. But if this trend is genuine, the best hope for its continuation would be to repeal and replace Obamacare.

First, this slow-down is hardly new news. In its most recent figures reported in January, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services found that health spending as a share of the economy in 2010 was identical to its share in 2009: 17.9 percent. This is encouraging, except that: a) in July 2011 CMS had already projected that the health share of GDP would be identical in 2009 and 2010; and b) last July CMS thought the share would be only 17.6 percent in both years, not 17.9 percent. Unfortunately, the actual percentage turned out to be higher both because actual per capita health spending in 2010 was slightly higher than CMS originally projected last summer and because actual GDP was lower. In short, things turned out worse than expected both on the health spending front and GDP front. In light of last year’s overly optimistic view of where health spending was headed, caution is in order.

More importantly, this apparent slow-down will merely be the lull before the storm if the Affordable Care Act is fully implemented. As I pointed out last summer, the best single metric for measuring our rate of health spending is to focus on how much of GDP growth is accounted for (or absorbed by) health expenditures. Raw comparisons of health spending growth over time can be highly misleading since changes in health spending are highly correlated with growth in the economy. Thus, hearing that “total health spending grew at less than 4 percent per year, the slowest annual pace in more than five decades” sounds far less impressive if you know how abysmally the economy also grew during the same period. My concern is that even using the overly optimistic projections of CMS, the health spending share of GDP will be rising over the last half of this decade as all the pieces of the Affordable Care Act are put into place.

It is true that the health spending share of GDP growth was much lower in 2010 compared to 2008. But as you can see, it is not at all unusual for health spending to absorb an out-sized share of economic growth during periods of economic slow-down. Even though growth in the economy was far more anemic in 2010 than anyone would have liked, we nevertheless technically were out of the recession by June, 2009 according to the official scorekeepers at NBER. But going forward, the health share of GDP growth is projected to be higher than in 2010 for every single remaining year of this decade. It is important to recognize these are optimistic projections. They assume Medicare will cut physician payment rates by more than 31 percent next January when the current “doc fix” has expired. But even the most recent Medicare Trustees report concedes “it is a virtual certainty” this will not happen. Thus, reality is likely to be much worse than the rosy scenario depicted in my figure.

Even leaving aside expert forecasts, there are substantive reasons to believe the Affordable Care Act might snuff out rather than fuel a slow-down in health spending growth. First, there has been a surge in the share of employees enrolled in high-deductible health plans (13% in 2011 vs. 3% in 2006). But Obamacare is biased against such plans and is likely to discourage their future growth. Second, much has been made of the potential for accountable care organizations (explicitly encouraged under Obamacare) to control costs. But such assessments have failed to consider the “dark side” of ACOs, thoroughly documented by AEI’s Scott Gottlieb, that ACOs likely will become local monopolies that both discourage innovation and increase market power to raise prices. Neither prospect bodes well for bending the cost curve.

Some will say it is unfair for me to focus on the cost-increasing effects of Obamacare as coverage is expanded in its initial years. Allegedly, the real potential of Obamacare lies in its ability to control costs over the long run. Unfortunately, official government agencies have cast considerable doubt on the original promise of Obamacare to bend the cost curve. For example, the official CBO score for the final bill passed by Congress in March 2010 explicitly acknowledged that ACA would “put into effect a number of policies that might be difficult to sustain over a long period of time,” including payment reductions to physicians and other providers, as well as savings required from the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB). The Medicare actuary likewise has explicitly conceded that the long-term savings projected for Medicare “may be unrealistic.” Given Congress’s own track record of repeatedly overriding statutorily required physician payment cuts, why should anyone believe they will not repeat this behavior when it comes to the aggressive payment cuts required under Obamacare? Even Medicare’s own actuary has stated these “are unlikely to be sustainable on a permanent annual basis.” Why? Roughly 15 percent of Medicare Part A providers (hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, home health agencies, and hospice providers) would become unprofitable within the first decade if the Obamacare productivity adjustments were adopted as scheduled by law. By 2065, these rules would result in Medicare and Medicaid payments for hospital inpatient services falling to 60 percent below the amounts paid by private health insurers! This prospect is so unlikely that the most recent Medicare Trustees report includes an alternative fiscal scenario that excludes such provisions. The bottom line? Medicare’s share of GDP in 2085 under the alternative fiscal scenario (10.4%) will be more than 50 percent larger than it would be were Obamacare massive cost-cutting adopted (6.7%). If that news does not seem bad enough, consider this: even under current law, Medicare’s fiscal situation has worsened considerably since last year’s Trustee report. Over the next 75 years, the fiscal shortfall (the mismatch between spending and payroll tax revenues) in Medicare Part A is now 70 percent higher than it was just a year ago. Under the alternative fiscal scenario, that shortfall would be even larger.

It would be wonderful news if we really were bending the cost curve in healthcare. But the available evidence suggests that Obamacare has in no way bent the cost curve even for Medicare. Instead, it is likely to make the burden of health spending even larger with each passing decade. The fastest path getting health spending under control would be to repeal Obamacare and replace it with a more sensible patient-centered approach to health reform.

Christopher J. Conover is a research scholar at Duke University’s Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research, an adjunct scholar at AEI, and affiliated senior scholar at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. His new book, American Health Economy Illustrated, was released in February 2012 by AEI Press. See PowerPoint version of Figure 1.3e and Excel spreadsheet containing trends in health spending as a share of GDP and GDP growth from 1929-2020 for data, sources and methods.

Christopher J. Conover

Death by taxes

By Christopher J. Conover

April 13, 2012, 3:21 pm

A new study in the Journal of the American Medical Association has concluded that there’s an extra 13 auto accident deaths attributable to Income Tax Day (i.e., generally April 15, but which falls on April 17 this year).  This is a drop in the bucket compared to the actual carnage that might be reasonably attributed to paying taxes in America.

A large body of literature has demonstrated the relationship between income (typically measured using GDP) and mortality. Such studies have been done for both countries as well as smaller geographic units such as counties. While the measured relationship varies across studies, the median figure across four of the best such studies is that 1 statistical death was associated with each $7.6 million reduction in income in a geographic area (holding the population constant).  This was in 2002 dollars; based on growth in per capita GDP between then and now, the equivalent figure today would be about $10 million. There are many factors that contribute to reductions in mortality risk as income rises. People can afford to drive bigger, safer cars, for example. They can live in safer neighborhoods. Wealthier societies are more able and willing to make investments in cleaner air and water. Thus, while researchers cannot identify a particular individual who may have died because of reduced income, they are able to estimate that when all these added risks are averaged across an entire population, 1 additional person can be expected to die within that group for each $10 million reduction in income in the geographic area in which they live.  In short, all other things being equal, mortality risk declines as income rises, and vice-versa.

The latest CBO figures show that federal government revenues this year will be $2.456 trillion. As every student of economics knows, every dollar of tax revenue is associated with lost output called “deadweight losses.”  If you tax something, you get less of it, whether it be labor, consumer purchases or savings. How much less depends on exactly what is taxed, but as a rough approximation, averaged across all federal taxes, such deadweight losses amount to about 25 cents for every dollar raised. Indeed, since 1992, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has required federal agencies doing cost-benefit analysis of any public investments that do not reduce federal spending to assign a shadow cost of 25 cents to every dollar of expenditures financed out of tax revenues to account for these very losses. Thus, in 2012, we can expect Uncle Sam’s tax collections to be associated with a hidden loss of $614 billion in lost output. That is, U.S. GDP will be $614 billion smaller than it would have been without all these federal taxes.

But according to the income-mortality literature, a $614 billion reduction in GDP implies the premature death of 61,400 Americans. That’s more people than are killed in highway accidents every year and more than the number of U.S. soldiers killed in Vietnam. But this is a quite conservative estimate, since it only accounts for federal tax revenues and ignores $1.171 trillion we will borrow this year to pay our bills. Assuming such borrowing ultimately is repaid with tax dollars, that would add 29,275 to the toll of Americans who died prematurely due to the lost output related to federal taxes. If we took into account another $2+ trillion related to state and local taxes, the annual death toll would rise by an additional 50,000 lives. Thus, all American taxes collectively account for approximately 140,000 premature deaths per year!

Taxes have profound consequences. Their adverse consequences on economic growth and the nation’s future wealth are paralleled by adverse consequences for health. Paul Ryan’s Path to Prosperity spends $5.3 trillion less over the next decade than the president’s budget. Apart from the enormous economic benefits that this alternative would produce, putting the country on that path implies 132,000 fewer premature deaths. Is whatever good the president imagines he can do with his budget worth losing 132,000 lives?  If we ever wish to right-size government, these are the kinds of tough questions all taxpayers should be asking.

Christopher J. Conover is a research scholar at Duke University’s Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research, an adjunct scholar at AEI and affiliated senior scholar at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. His new book “American Health Economy Illustrated,” was released in February 2012 by AEI Press.

According to Justice Ginsburg, the central justification for the individual mandate is to prevent “free riding” by the uninsured, who allegedly impose a cost of more than $1,000 apiece on other health insurance market participants. But the dirty little secret of American healthcare is that the mandate wouldn’t save taxpayers a dime. Why? Because the tax subsidies for people with health insurance are bigger than the unpaid medical bills left behind by the uninsured.

I reported earlier that, on average, uninsured Americans in 2011 generated $1,078 apiece in uncompensated care losses. With 49.9 million uninsured, this amounted to $53.8 billion last year. Leave aside the fact that the mandate will not apply to everyone (e.g., those qualifying for Medicaid) and that careful analysis has shown that the actual amount of uncompensated care that would be averted through a mandate is more likely to be 30% of the total amount of uncompensated care attributable to the uninsured. As the following analysis shows, even if we generously assume that the mandate will eliminate all uncompensated care losses for the uninsured, it will not save taxpayers a single penny!

It turns out that three quarters of the uncompensated care generated by those without coverage is financed by taxpayers, or about $728 per uninsured in 2011. However, for the 169 million Americans with employer-based health plans, federal and state taxpayers finance an average of $1,890 apiece for their health insurance coverage. That is, Uncle Sam (and states) encourages people to buy employer-provided health insurance by not taxing it, a subsidy that amounts to about 36% of premiums for employer-provided family coverage. The $1,890 represents the tax savings provided to those who purchase health insurance rather than receive the same dollar amount in cash wages. In short, most privately insured Americans cost the U.S. taxpayer at least $1,100 more apiece than their uninsured counterparts! So who is doing the free riding here? Admittedly, only three quarters of the uninsured are workers or their dependents, so not all of the uninsured would qualify for the subsidies for employer-sponsored coverage if they obtained insurance. But even taking this into account, this simple analysis demonstrates that it would cost taxpayers about $700 more per uninsured if this “free riding” ended than if it continued.* Note that I am only referring to existing tax subsidies for employer-provided health insurance under current law. If we took into account the much more lavish subsidies that will be provided to newly covered individuals under the Affordable Care Act, the figure would be much higher than $700 per previously uninsured individual.

But what about the one quarter of uncompensated care costs not paid by taxpayers? This amounts to $250 per uninsured and purportedly is borne by those with private health insurance. Subtracting this amount from $700 doesn’t change the conclusion that the typical insured individual costs society/taxpayers more in subsidies than the typical uninsured individual. Nevertheless, it does seem unfair that those with private insurance should bear this burden. But how big is this burden in actuality? As I demonstrated yesterday, cost-shifting by all the uninsured adds about 20 cents a day to the premiums of the average person with private health insurance coverage. But when we exclude all the uninsured individuals who will not be affected by the mandate, the maximum increase in premiums that might be averted by the mandate is only 6 cents a day, or $23 a year! Thus, the actual burden on the average privately insured family that the mandate will avert is less than $100 annually—far, far below the mythical $1,000 figure repeatedly cited this week by Justice Ginsburg.

But using the same logic, the $700 in added taxpayer spending per uninsured would, as a very rough approximation, translate into an added cost of $175 in the taxes paid per privately insured individual—or about $700 per privately insured family of four (this isn’t quite fair, since it does not account for taxpayers with Medicare and Medicaid, but in the grand scheme of things, the amount of taxes paid by such individuals is not that large). Thus, even the privately insured (the group supposedly “burdened” by the free riding of uninsured patients) would pay more if “free riding” were eliminated through an individual mandate than if it continued!

So if the mandate was not about saving money, what was it about? It was about forcing predominantly young people, whose annual healthcare costs are about $850 a year, to purchase coverage costing many thousands of dollars. The mandate was about forcing these individuals to pay for the care of other people (older and sicker) rather than their own care, a point that Justice Alito seems to have grasped quite astutely. But if that’s true, then the individual mandate had nothing to do with a legitimate exercise of the Commerce Clause, but instead was an end-around Congress’s taxing powers. The mandate is a hidden tax cloaked in the guise of making people responsible for their own health bills.

This is the knotty question now facing the Supreme Court. The mandate was a way of avoiding Congress having to impose additional taxes of $360 billion on Americans. The designers of Obamacare were well aware that if the true costs of the bill were accurately identified and taxes transparently increased to cover them, the public never would have supported health reform. This is why they resorted to all manner of smoke and mirrors to hide the true costs and to reliance on hidden taxes such as the individual mandate to further hide from view the burden this plan would impose on Americans. To their credit, the American public appears not to have been fooled. Since the law was passed nearly two year ago, RealClearPolitics.com has tracked more than 100 different polls on the issue. With the exception of one lone CBS/New York Times poll conducted in January 2011, every single poll has shown that those favoring repeal of the health law outnumber those who oppose repeal by margins that in some polls have reached as high as 31 percent. In all but 8 polls, an absolute majority of those surveyed favored repeal. In light of the reality that the individual mandate would actually increase rather than reduce the burden posed by today’s uninsured, it will be interesting to see what the Court ultimately decides about this contentious mandate.

Christopher J. Conover is a research scholar at Duke University’s Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research, an adjunct scholar at AEI and affiliated senior scholar at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. His new book American Health Economy Illustrated, was released in February 2012 by AEI Press.

*This adjustment entails multiplying $1,890 by 75% to obtain an “expected” subsidy for employer-based coverage of only $1,418 per average uninsured, yielding a net difference of about $700 rather than $1,100.

Justice Scalia made an interesting observation in yesterday’s proceedings: “everybody has to exercise, because there’s no doubt that lack of exercise cause—causes illness, and that causes healthcare costs to go up.” The government’s argument in support of the individual mandate hinges on the claim that there is an interstate market in healthcare. Failure to purchase insurance by some raises costs for other participants in that market. Justice Scalia’s point was that if we accept that premise, what is to stop the government from infringing on freedom in many other ways to avert a similar adverse cost impact on innocent market participants? His intuition is quite correct: In fact, if we accept the government’s argument, then the economic case for government-mandated exercise is actually greater than the case for the individual mandate to purchase insurance! Here’s the proof:

On average, uninsured Americans in 2011 generated $1,078 apiece in uncompensated care losses. With 49.9 million uninsured, this amounted to $53.8 billion last year, a rather hefty sum. Leave aside the fact that the mandate will not apply to everyone (e.g., those qualifying for Medicaid, illegal immigrants) and that careful analysis has shown that the actual amount of uncompensated care that would be averted through a mandate is at best 30% of the total amount of uncompensated care attributable to the uninsured. As the following analysis shows, even if we generously assume that the mandate will eliminate all uncompensated care losses for the uninsured—which it assuredly will not—compulsory exercise will spare innocent market participants an even larger amount.

It turns out that three quarters of the uncompensated care generated by those without coverage is financed by taxpayers, or about $728 per uninsured in 2011. But what about the one quarter of uncompensated care costs not paid by taxpayers? This amounts to $250 per uninsured and purportedly is borne by those with private health insurance. How big is this burden? There’s roughly four privately insured people for every uninsured person in the U.S. (inclusive of those with non-group coverage). Thus, cost-shifting by the uninsured places the following burden on the average person with private insurance: $70 apiece, which is less than $6 a month, or about 20 cents a day. [Note: Justice Ginsburg repeatedly made the erroneous claim that this burden increased private health insurance costs for the average family by more than $1,000; by failing to account for the three quarters of costs borne by taxpayers, her estimate exaggerates the burden on private health insurance premiums by a factor of four. When we account for the actual amount of uncompensated care that would be eliminated through the individual mandate—i.e., 30% of the total—the actual impact is only one-twelfth of the amount she kept misstating].

In short, failure to purchase health insurance affects interstate commerce by raising the cost of private health insurance for everyone else. As the foregoing illustrates, it does do that, by at most a mere 20 cents a day (and only 6 cents a day, accurately calculated). But this is far less than the societal burden posed by those who fail to engage in exercise, which was calculated in 1989 to be 24 cents for every mile that sedentary people do not walk, jog, or run (or about double that amount in today’s dollars). Thus, if we can justify forcing people to purchase insurance to avert their imposing a cost of 20 cents a day on the privately insured, what’s to stop us from forcing people to walk, jog, or run a mile a day to avert their imposing a cost of 50 cents a day on society? If the first is constitutional, then how can the second not be?

I’m no constitutional scholar, but I cannot imagine that the Founders pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor to create a government that could compel its citizens to exercise. Such a power would appear to lie far beyond the boundaries of the limited government envisioned by the Framers. If the individual mandate is upheld, Americans will have suffered a loss of liberty from which there will be no turning back. Let us cross our fingers that the Supreme Court does the right thing.

Christopher J. Conover is a research scholar at Duke University’s Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research, an adjunct scholar at AEI, and affiliated senior scholar at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. His new book, American Health Economy Illustrated, was released in February 2012 by AEI Press.

Paul Krugman says the opponents of the Affordable Care Act are liars. According to Mr. Krugman, “To understand the lies, you first have to understand the truth. How would ObamaRomneycare change American healthcare?  For most people the answer is, not at all. In particular, those receiving good health benefits from employers would keep them” (emphasis added).

I don’t wish to put words into Mr. Krugman’s mouth, but this claim sounds remarkably similar to President Obama’s oft-repeated promise “If you like your healthcare plan, you can keep your healthcare plan.” But even at the time it was uttered in August 2009, PolitiFact.com scored this claim as only half true. When pressed on this promise, President Obama gave a lengthy answer that PolitiFact summarized as follows: “Obama’s saying that the government will not force employers to change their health plans.” That was then, this is now. What we know now that the law has actually been passed and some of the regulations have been written, is that President Obama’s 2009 assertion is factually false.

One can quibble over whether the president was lying when he made this claim (which implies knowingly stating a falsehood) or was merely mistaken in guessing the contents of the final bill and attendant regulations. But for Mr. Krugman to, in essence, repeat this claim in 2012 is a flagrant falsehood. If Mr. Krugman is so ignorant of the projected effects of the Affordable Care Act, as codified in official estimates issued by the Congressional Budget Office, the Medicare actuary, and the regulations issued by the Obama administration himself, then he has no business pontificating about the “truth” of the Affordable Care Act on the pages of the New York Times. If he is aware of these projected impacts, then an impartial observer might be forgiven for concluding that he is lying. You be the judge.

Millions of Americans will be adversely affected by Obamacare, such as the 7.4 million elderly individuals who will lose their Medicare Advantage Plans by 2017, according to the Medicare actuary. But let me focus only on employer-based coverage, since that is where Mr. Krugman makes his most concrete (i.e., empirically testable) claim. If you like your current health plan, can you keep it? To borrow a phrase from Mr. Krugman, “For most people the answer is, not at all.” This, of course, is the precise opposite of what Mr. Krugman and the president have asserted. They would have you believe that most of the 169 million Americans with employer-based health coverage will be able to keep their current coverage (if they like it). Nothing could be further from the truth.

First, every single health plan in America, even those that are “grandfathered” from having to comply with the thicket of Obamacare regulations, has been forced to make changes in coverage. These include prohibition of pre-existing condition exclusions, prohibition on excessive waiting periods, no lifetime or annual limits, and prohibition on rescissions, each of which will add to the premium cost of insurance (if such provisions were cost-free, employers would have added them years ago).

Second, federal regulators have projected that only one in three small employers (under 100 employees) and half of large employers will remain grandfathered by 2013. In short, official government figures explicitly acknowledge that more than half of all employees will not be able to keep their current coverage. The grandfathering rules are far too strict to allow this. Worse, the regulators further concede that as few as one in five small employers and one in three large employers might qualify for grandfathered plan status under the rules they have issued. In that case, more than two-thirds of workers will have lost their current coverage by 2013.

Finally, looking beyond 2013, the restrictions on grandfathered plans are sufficiently binding that proponents of the ACA fully concede that “eventually, if the ACA remains in effect, grandfathered plans will disappear.” Knowing all this, do you feel confident in your ability to keep your current coverage? More to the point, does a claim that ObamaRomneycare will not change American healthcare for “most” people sound even remotely truthful?

Paul Krugman has no monopoly on deceptiveness when it comes to the Affordable Care Act. Just this week, Jonathan Tobin has observed: ‎”President Obama’s willingness to falsify the facts about a personal tragedy in order to make a political point speaks volumes about not only his cynicism but also his character. It’s important to remember that this is no misunderstanding but rather a bald-faced lie.”

But perhaps Mr. Krugman could set an example to which his students and readers could aspire.

Mr. Krugman, lying in the public square is despicable, inexcusable behavior. Please stop.

Christopher J. Conover is a research scholar at Duke University’s Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research, an adjunct scholar at AEI and affiliated senior scholar at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. His new book American Health Economy Illustrated, was released in February 2012 by AEI Press.

Americans have the highest health spending on the planet. Why? Because they can afford to do so. What few people realize is that the United States has increased its standard of living vis-à-vis its biggest competitors despite rising health expenditures (figure 1.6c).

It may seem trivial to observe that Americans spend more on healthcare because they can afford it. But it gets to the heart of an important question: Why are we so preoccupied with rising health costs in the first place? From the standpoint of the average American’s welfare—measured in terms of their standard of living—what really matters is how much they have to spend on everything else once healthcare has been purchased. We can approximate this standard of living by simply subtracting national health expenditures from the rest of GDP and then dividing by population. To make these comparisons, I have relied on Penn World Table estimates of GDP per capita, which have been carefully constructed to produce a standardized metric of living standards that allows for meaningful comparisons across countries and over time. That is, in these comparisons, a 2005 dollar has equivalent general purchasing power across each of the years and countries shown.

In the United States, real (inflation-adjusted) healthcare spending per capita has been rising faster than real GDP per capita for as long as we can measure it (back to 1929). Consequently, healthcare absorbs a growing share of GDP. But the same has been true for all our major competitors for as long as we can measure it (back to 1960). For purposes of discussion, I’m defining the nation’s major competitors as the rest of the countries in the G7 (Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, and Canada) since these represent our major industrialized trading partners. Countries such as China and India surely will grow in importance in the decade ahead, but right now their standard of living is far behind that of the United States.

The United States for many decades has enjoyed a far higher standard of living than in the rest of the G7. In 1960, non-health GDP per capita in Japan was 62 percent lower than in the United States. The rest of the G7 also lagged behind the United States, though by not quite as much (ranging from 43 percent lower in Italy to 19 percent lower in Canada, the country whose standard of living came closest to that of the United States). This should come as no surprise: the United States emerged as the world’s strongest industrial power after World War II, an advantage that could easily have been predicted to persist only 15 years later.

But here’s what may surprise many readers: in real dollar terms, the U.S. margin of advantage in non-health spending increased between 1960 and 2007 for every single G7 country except Japan. Moreover, even since 1980, this U.S. margin of advantage increased for every country except the UK (which saw a minuscule decline in this metric). This means that even countries which experienced a lower growth rate than the United States in real health spending per capita lost ground to the United States in their real non-health standard of living. How could that be? The absolute increase in real U.S. GDP per capita was more than enough to absorb the absolute increase in its real health spending per capita during the same period.

A concrete illustration will make this clearer. From 1980-2007, U.S. health spending per capita grew by 4.3 percent a year. In Germany, this increase was only 2.5 percent a year. One might suppose that this large difference in health spending growth rates would have allowed Germany to catch up with the United States in terms of its non-health GDP per capita. That is, if Americans were spending more on healthcare, they must be spending less on everything else. But that’s not what happened. Between 1980 and 2007, the difference between U.S. and German health spending per capita grew by more than $3,000 (i.e., Americans spent $528 apiece more than Germans in 1980, but by 2007, this difference had grown to $3,078). Had non-health GDP per capita grown by identical amounts in each country, this would have reduced the U.S. non-health standard of living by more than $3,000 vis-a-vis Germany. But the rise in U.S. GDP per capita instead was so large that it not only covered the $3,000 in added health spending, but increased the U.S. margin of advantage over Germany in non-health spending by nearly $4,000! This illustrates the enormous power of a growing economy: Americans literally were able to have their cake and eat it too.

This is a critically important truth: the United States spends more on healthcare in large part because it can afford to do so. And unless the United States suffers a sharp decline in its GDP growth compared to its competitors, this pattern can persist for many decades. Even today, the margin of advantage I have been describing remains so large that even for Canada (where the U.S. margin of advantage is smallest within the G7), the United States could afford to increase its health spending by 50 percent without entirely eradicating Americans’ higher non-health standard of living relative to Canadians.

A rich country has to spend its income in some fashion. Would critics of the U.S. health system feel better if all the extra income that found its way into the healthcare system had instead been devoted to buying pet food, lottery tickets, or fancier cars? Put another way: which would you rather be? The country that spent more on healthcare because its booming economy gave it the means to do so? Or the country whose growth in healthcare was constrained by lower economic growth? This is not to argue that we cannot and should not find ways to get rid of avoidable health spending where feasible. But it puts into perspective where the United States really sits relative to its competitors. The United States is not doing nearly as badly as some critics have alleged. Moreover, these figures raise serious questions about whether we really wish to go down the same path as other European social welfare states.

Christopher J. Conover will be hosting an event at AEI on Tuesday, February 28, “Bad Medicine: The Misconceptions Driving the Health Care Debate” (RSVP here). The charts shown in this blog post are based on his new book, American Health Economy Illustrated, to be released this month by AEI Press. See PowerPoint version of Figure 1.6c. and Excel spreadsheet containing international comparisons of GDP and health spending per capita from 1960-2008 for data, sources, and methods.

To pay for the increases in federal health spending promised 75 years from now, federal income taxes that year would have to be 175 percent higher than they are today. If you don’t like that idea, how about tripling the 15.3 percent bite that Uncle Sam takes out of every worker’s paycheck? Or, if you would prefer to spread the increase across all federal revenue sources, it would require that each one be increased by 75 percent (figure 20.7a).

As I’ve explained repeatedly, the alternative fiscal scenario is the most credible current projection of how much we will have to pay for Medicare, Medicaid, and Exchange subsidies under the Affordable Care Act. Even the actuarial experts who work for the government do not believe the baseline forecast. Yet the percentages I cite above greatly underestimate the size of the tax rate increases actually needed to raise the revenue to cover these promises, since they do not take into account the behavioral effects of higher taxes. I assure you that increasing federal income tax rates by 175 percent will not produce a 175 percent rise in income tax revenues. So think of all these figures as very conservative estimates of the tax increases looming over the horizon should we fail to get health entitlements under control.

Ask all your friends how comfortable they would feel imposing such punishing tax levels on their grandchildren. And if there’s no public sentiment for raising taxes by the gargantuan amounts required, then why are today’s policymakers making such promises? And if there’s no credible way we can tax our way out of this mess, why hasn’t the president offered a bold plan to substantially dial down on our promises (e.g., increase the Medicare retirement age) or fundamentally reform Medicare? The economy assuredly is a critical issue in the upcoming election. But well-informed voters also should be demanding that those wishing to inhabit the Oval Office answer some very tough questions about health entitlements as well.

Christopher J. Conover is a research scholar at Duke University’s Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research, an adjunct scholar at AEI, and affiliated senior scholar at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. The charts shown are from his new book American Health Economy Illustrated, to be released later this month by AEI Press. See PowerPoint version of Figure 20.7a and Excel spreadsheet containing projected federal healthcare obligations for data, sources, and methods.

Attention, children and grandchildren of Baby Boomers: save early and save often. Within 75 years, the average monthly premiums required for Medicare and out-of-pocket spending for Medicare-covered services (i.e., deductibles and coinsurance) will equal the average monthly Social Security check (figure 20.7b).

You heard that right. A typical senior counting on Social Security to pay for food, clothing, and shelter will be out of luck. That is, even assuming that Uncle Sam honors the promise to keep sending out Social Security checks, virtually every penny of the average check will be wiped out by the amount seniors will need to pay their premiums for Medicare Part B (outpatient services) and Part D (prescription drugs) and the average amount of cost-sharing paid by a typical senior for deductibles and the 20 percent coinsurance required on Part B services.

Currently, such typical Medicare costs (which do not even include elderly spending on private Medicare supplemental policies or spending on services not covered by Medicare) absorb 30 percent of the typical Social Security check. This is a sea change in the fiscal plight of seniors, and one more reason it is regrettable that the president elected to duck America’s “humongous healthcare problem” in his most recent State of the Union address.

Admittedly, under “current law” the Medicare cost burden facing seniors will grow “only” by about three-fifths between now and 2085. But few people believe current law will stick. According to the Medicare Trustees, “current-law costs are almost certainly understated as a result of the substantial physician payment reductions required under current law and are further understated if the productivity adjustments to other Medicare price updates under the Affordable Care Act cannot be continued in the long range.” This is why the Medicare actuary developed an “alternative fiscal scenario” whose results also are reported in the latest Medicare Trustees report. The most recent report issued by the Congressional Budget Office confirms the credibility of those alternative projections. CBO systematically reviewed all the evidence from Medicare’s past demonstration projects on disease management, care coordination, and value-based payment. This is the same laundry list of ideas that was stuffed into the Affordable Care Act in the expectation that surely one of these might actually bend the cost curve. This expectation appears to have been a triumph of hope over experience, as the CBO analysis concluded “In nearly every program involving disease management and care coordination, spending was either unchanged or increased relative to the spending that would have occurred in the absence of the program.” There was exactly one value-based purchasing program (out of four) that saved money.

Also, the 20 percent of seniors who rely exclusively on Social Security income in retirement are subject to lower premiums and cost sharing than others, so the picture for them will not be quite as bleak as shown. Nevertheless, future seniors with supplemental retirement savings who rely on Social Security to help pay at least some bills will be in for a rude awakening.

In short, there are two reasons policymakers need to take seriously the Wyden-Ryan bipartisan proposal to address Medicare’s long-term fiscal unsustainability. Financing the projected growth in Medicare over the next 75 years (which will rise from 3.6 percent of GDP in 2010 to 10.6 percent of GDP by 2085 under the alternative fiscal scenario) will require levels of federal taxation that are unprecedented in this country. There is no public opinion evidence I’ve seen that a majority of Americans (or even close to a majority) wish to be taxed at such levels. Moreover, the Affordable Care Act actually made the challenge of solving the Medicare entitlements crisis much greater by diverting a half trillion in potential savings and using these to expand coverage rather than shore up Medicare. But even if Congress magically could find a way to obtain the revenues to pay for Uncle Sam’s share, there is the inconvenient truth that a substantial fraction of seniors will simply be unable to afford their share of the massive increases in Medicare spending they will face.

The claim that 20-somethings are more likely to believe they will see flying saucers than collect from Social Security is exaggerated. Nevertheless, until and unless policymakers step up to the plate on this issue, those in their twenties (and especially their children) might do well to save as if Social Security will not be around. Should the Supreme Court strike down the Affordable Care Act this June, it might give policymakers a serendipitous opportunity for a do-over.

Christopher J. Conover is a research scholar at Duke University’s Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research, an adjunct scholar at AEI, and an affiliated senior scholar at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. The charts shown are from his new book American Health Economy Illustrated, to be released in February 2012 by AEI Press. See PowerPoint version of Figure 20.7b and Excel spreadsheet containing estimated Medicare cost sharing obligations as a percentage of average Social Security benefit, 2010 and 2085 for data, sources, and methods.

Extraordinary. The president’s State of the Union address made no mention of what is purportedly his signature domestic policy achievement: the Affordable Care Act. In fact, the speech nearly ducked entirely the single largest problem most in need of the forward-looking bipartisan team effort repeatedly invoked by the president: America’s “humongous healthcare problem.” According to the Congressional Budget Office’s latest long-term spending projections, the federal government is slated to increase in size by more than 40 percent (relative to the economy) over the next 75 years. Fully 100 percent of that increase can be attributed to growth in federally-financed healthcare entitlements (figure 20.7c).

Of course, these estimates only represent CBO’s “extended baseline scenario.” Moreover, they exclude the 40 percent or so of Medicaid spending that is paid for by the states as well as non-mandatory health spending such as public health. Inclusion of these missing components would add several more percentage points of GDP to the totals shown.

More importantly, the CBO, like the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and even the Medicare Trustees, recognizes that some of the vaunted “savings” promised in the Affordable Care Act are unlikely to come to fruition. For example, Congress for a decade now has repeatedly granted physicians a temporary reprieve from spending cuts mandated by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. To comply with such statutory requirements now would require a nearly 30 percent reduction in physician fees paid by Medicare. In light of the devastating consequences to access that would result from imposition of such draconian reductions, no one seriously believes they will ever happen. Under a more realistic alternative fiscal scenario that assumes no physician fee reduction and other companion adjustments to how Medicare constraints really would play out as well as other assumptions, CBO projects that federal spending will have climbed to 75.9 percent of the economy by 2085!

One might suppose that a looming fiscal tsunami of that magnitude might be front and center in a president’s efforts to even-handedly describe the state of the union and what he planned to do about it. But, judging from the laundry list of new spending initiatives proposed by the president, he is not particularly alarmed by this massive increase in the size of government. There appeared to be not a single problem on his list of priorities for which additional federal spending was not his suggested solution. That attitude does not bode well for making any progress on health entitlements. To be fair, the president did say he would be willing to contemplate addressing the Medicare and Medicaid entitlements problem if and only if Congress were willing to raise taxes on the 1 percent of Americans who already pay (again, according to the CBO) 29.5 percent of all federal taxes. Perhaps I misunderstood, but the president appeared to be saying that if Congress were unwilling to play the game according to his rules, the president would be happy to pick up his marbles and go home. It is hard to picture President Lincoln telling Congress he would be willing to address the attack on Fort Sumter only if he first got from them a pet piece of legislation, or FDR insisting on approval of one more component of the New Deal before he would lift a finger to respond to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Admittedly, the impact is much further in the future, but having the federal government sop up so much of GDP within 75 years would have adverse consequences that arguably would rival the nation’s being split in two or facing a Nazi empire in Europe.

More stunning still is that a serious bipartisan proposal to address the Medicare problem just recently got put on the table by House Budget Committee Chairman Representative Paul Ryan and Senator Ron Wyden. Instead of hectoring Congress to learn a lesson from the U.S. military on teamwork, the president might have invoked the Wyden-Ryan proposal as a living, breathing example of the kind of teamwork that will be essential to resolve the entitlements tsunami. Readers can judge for themselves why the president failed to do so. What we can be certain of is that unless and until the country has a president willing to confront this problem squarely, our nation’s best days may no longer lie ahead.

Christopher J. Conover is a research scholar at Duke University’s Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research, an adjunct scholar at AEI and affiliated senior scholar at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. The charts shown are from his new book American Health Economy Illustrated, to be released in January 2012 by AEI Press. See PowerPoint version of Figure 20.7c. All figures were obtained from supporting tables from the CBO’s most recent Long Term Budget Outlook.

Michael Greve is a first-rate constitutional scholar, so I take on his argument that “the states will lose on Medicaid” with some trepidation. I’m no lawyer, so I’m in no position to quarrel with his legal argument. But I do know a thing or two about the Medicaid program and my analysis of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) leads to a very different conclusion. In my simple man-on-the-street view, states face a relatively simple (albeit stark) choice when it comes to Medicaid. They can either accept the new Medicaid spending required under the ACA or they can reject the “deal” offered by Congress, in which case they must forego all federal funding of Medicaid. This includes not only the very generous federal funding of some of the eligibility expansions (90 percent in perpetuity after 2020) but also whatever federal matching funds they had come to rely on for traditional Medicaid prior to ACA. No matter how we measure the burden of Medicaid for the average state, ACA increases the burden compared to what would have happened under the status quo (before ACA Medicaid expansions begin). But to reject Medicaid would impose obligations that are astronomically higher (figure 5.5c).

I have provided estimates for the three best measures of the Medicaid burden facing each state. All the changes shown are relative to a 2011 baseline, which are the latest official figures available through the National Association of State Budget Officers. The first commonly used metric (reported by NASBO itself in its annual state budget reports) is Medicaid as a percentage of the entire state budget inclusive of federal funds. In 2011, that average burden was 23.6 percent of state spending. Without ACA, I estimate that by the year 2019 the burden would increase by more than one-quarter simply because Medicaid spending routinely grows faster than state expenditures in general. With the ACA however, the increase in that burden would be more than 45 percent. If states reject the ACA, the increase would be just under 30 percent since states thereby avoid all the costs associated with increasing eligibility levels to 133 percent of poverty. In that regard, this metric does not accurately convey the enormous leverage Congress has attempted to wield to get states to do its bidding.

A better metric for that purpose is state Medicaid revenues as a percentage of own source state revenue. According to NASBO, federal funds currently make up more than one-third of the typical state’s budget and more than three-fifths of Medicaid. Own source revenues consists of all the other non-federal dollars in a state’s budget, whether these be obtained through general revenues, user or excise taxes, or even intergovernmental transfers from local governments to state government. These are revenues that for the most part have to be raised from a state’s own citizens. Currently, state revenues for Medicaid constitute 13.4 percent of all own source revenues. Under the status quo, however, this share will rise by 44 percent between 2011 and 2019, while under the ACA, it will rise by 52 percent. Thus, ACA is essentially forcing states to swallow an increase in their Medicaid burden that will be about one-fifth larger than it would have been under the status quo (i.e., 8.2 percentage points above the 44.7 percentage point increase states would have expected to accept under the current rules of the road). Here the consequences of rejecting Medicaid become more stark: this burden would increase 247 percent for the average state electing not to accept the conditions laid out in the ACA. Perhaps the analogy is a bad one, but in my non-lawyer’s view of the world, this is roughly equivalent to the neighborhood kid asking for a $20 “donation” by threatening to inflict $250 damage on your property if you decline. Is such a donation voluntary or coerced?

The choices look even more bleak when we consider the last measure of Medicaid burden: State Medicaid revenues per resident. Leaving aside the federal tax dollars shipped to the U.S. Treasury to bankroll Uncle Sam’s matching contributions, the average state collected $477 per capita to pay for the state share of Medicaid. Under the status quo, that will grow to nearly $930 by 2019, a 95 percent increase; under the ACA, it will more than double. But what happens to the average state electing to reject ACA? State Medicaid revenues per resident will balloon by 371 percent! Imagine you had a mortgage and were expecting to pay $9,500 a year for 30 years. The bank advises you that it would like to change the terms of your loan and charge you $10,600 instead; if you refuse, you have come up with a balloon payment of $37,000 to avoid losing your house. Would you feel that acceding to these new terms was voluntary?

These figures are state averages. For curiosity, I looked at the lowest income state, Mississippi, and a very high income state, New York, discovering that their state Medicaid revenues per residents would climb 654 percent and 523 percent respectively were they to reject ACA. I do not pretend to know the precise dividing line between coercion and a voluntary agreement. But thinking about this in the context of everyday life, if this is not coercion, what is?

One could argue that states long ago put themselves in this bind by agreeing to Medicaid in the first place. That may be true, but the Medicare actuary states that “in terms of the magnitude of changes to the program’s projected expenditures and enrollment, it is likely that the Affordable Care Act will be the largest legislative change to Medicaid since the program’s inception.” In that regard, the incremental magnitude of the increased expenditures expected of states is different than under previous Medicaid expansions. Moreover, having observed the policy process over decades, I can report repeated instances in which Medicaid expansion always was the default option in any state discussions of how to cover the uninsured. Medicaid rules notwithstanding, it was a no-brainer to opt for a coverage vehicle in which Uncle Sam would pick up 60 percent or more of the tab for whatever expansion was under discussion. This perverse incentive works at the federal level as well. Given that the states would always be on the hook for roughly half of the projected cost, it was always less expensive for Congress to generously expand Medicaid eligibility by ratcheting up the mandatory eligibility or benefits required under Medicaid than to contemplate any sort of subsidized coverage program fully financed from federal tax coffers. Thus, both sides of the federalism divide have been jointly culpable in slowly but surely ratcheting up Medicaid’s share of GDP sevenfold between its inception in 1966 and 2019, when ACA is fully implemented.

The problem with salami tactics like those encouraged through federal matching programs such as Medicaid is that eventually we will run out of salami. It’s very generous for the federal government to offer 90 percent matching in perpetuity for those newly eligible under the ACA. But it is not at all clear Uncle Sam is in a position to fund this promise, especially in light of the fiscal tsunami posed by Medicare in the decades ahead. And even Michael Greve would concede that the federal government is absolutely under no legal or constitutional obligation to honor the commitment codified in the ACA. Should Uncle Sam renege on this promise, the burden on states will be even more onerous than I have already described. In that context, perhaps the Supreme Court will do everyone a favor by halting this charade before Uncle Sam is forced by fiscal pressures to admit to the states a promise was made that federal taxpayers cannot afford.

Christopher J. Conover is a research scholar at Duke University’s Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research and an adjunct scholar at AEI. The charts shown are from his new book American Health Economy Illustrated, to be released in January 2012 by AEI Press. See PowerPoint version of Figure 5.5c and Excel spreadsheet containing the estimated impact of the Affordable Care Act on state Medicaid expenditures for data, sources, and methods.


In last week’s blog post, I showed that both ambulatory care and health facilities spending, relative to the national average, rose more quickly in Massachusetts during the Romney administration than did such spending in Texas under Governor Rick Perry or in Utah under Governor Jon Huntsman. In this article, I use newly-released figures from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to show what was happening to state health spending per resident in the New England states surrounding Massachusetts. It turns out that while Romney governed Massachusetts (2003-2007), health spending per resident was rising faster than the national average throughout New England, with the notable exception of Vermont (figure 12.6j).

That said, only New Hampshire outpaced Massachusetts in terms of the rate at which health spending per person outstripped the rate of growth in per capita health spending for the nation as a whole. In short, Governor Romney did not “bend the cost curve” even relative to his peers in the region. The above figures take into account any border-crossing that might otherwise have artificially inflated health spending in Massachusetts relative to much more isolated states such as Utah and Texas. Nevertheless, my earlier observation still holds true: governors have control over some, but not all of their state health expenditures.

But it is important to recognize that differences in economic growth may play an important role in determining the relative rates of spending growth across states. Indeed, when we compare per capita health spending across countries, for example, roughly 90 percent of the differences can be attributed to differences in GDP per capita. Thus, another measure we might use to gauge the relative performance of states relates to the burden of health spending on its citizens. Did the relative burden of health spending rise or fall during the Romney administration? It is easier to answer this question than to figure out what it means. Our rough measure of this burden is calculated using resident health spending as a percentage of gross state product. I again have indexed this burden so you can see how it rises or falls relative to the national average (the national burden rose from 11.6 percent of GDP in 1991 to 14.9 percent by 2009). Note that at the state level, we only track personal healthcare expenditures, i.e., spending on hospitals, physicians, pharmaceuticals, etc., but this excludes spending on Medicaid, Medicare, and private health insurance administrative expenses, as well as spending on public health, medical research, and health-related construction. Once again, the burden of spending rose more quickly in Massachusetts than in the nation overall, although there were other states in the region (Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island) where this burden rose just as quickly.

What conclusions can we draw from this? First, the states that did the most to expand health insurance coverage (Maine and Massachusetts) experienced the greatest increase in health spending per capita. It may seem intuitively obvious that expanded coverage is not self-financing, but there were many reformers who argued the opposite on grounds that the uninsured incur all sorts of avoidable costs due to their delaying and deferring needed care. Such arguments were made even though we have long known that compared to people with full-year private coverage, annual health spending for the full-year uninsured is less than half as high. This figure takes into account all sources of payment, including subsidized care for the uninsured as well as their out-of-pocket spending. Thus, even though the uninsured admittedly have greater use of the ER than those with private insurance and a higher rate of medically avoidable hospital admissions, they nevertheless have lower spending overall. What is apparent from the Massachusetts numbers is that universal coverage is not a free lunch. Expanding coverage inevitably will cost more as the spending of those who previously were uninsured gradually rises towards the average level of those with public or private coverage. Thus, the policy question is whether the benefits of universal coverage are worth these added costs. Vermont might be viewed as a counter-example, except that the state’s Health Care Affordability Act did not take effect until 2007. Thus, the state’s relative deceleration in health spending actually began several years before this law took effect and the spending curve flattened out post-2007. Even if relative spending had declined slightly post-2007, remember that all of these trends are relative to the national average: a slightly declining line merely means that health spending grew less slowly than elsewhere, not that it actually declined.

Second, rising incomes cannot explain the relative rise in health spending in Massachusetts. The figures showing a rising burden imply that the state’s health spending grew faster than the state’s economy. But in fairness to Governor Romney, the health burden in Massachusetts had been rising for many years prior to his coming into office. At best he failed to slow that growth. On the other hand, the relative burden declined post-2007, which some might want to attribute to “Romneycare.” As I explain in a forthcoming piece in The American next week, there really is no good way of determining whether this decline was related to Romneycare or the recession (or some combination).

Third, these figures reinforce my earlier observations about health services regulation. Having spent much of the past decade looking at such regulations in detail, I do not believe it is accidental that the six states shown generally rank among the most regulated states in the country (MA=49, RI=47, VT=44, CT=36, ME=35, NH=4, where 50 denotes the most regulated state in the country). While a definitive conclusion would require a careful analysis of time series data that relate changes in health services regulation to changes in health spending, this strong—albeit imperfect—correlation between health regulation and health spending seems unlikely to be purely coincidental.

Healthcare spending may not be the most important issue in the 2012 election. But whoever is elected president in 2012 will have to begin addressing the very serious issue of healthcare entitlements, as these commitments are the ones making the biggest contribution to the fiscal tsunami we will face if we take no action. Mitt Romney assuredly expanded coverage in his state, but the result was faster-than-average growth in the state’s health expenditures and faster-than-average growth in the burden of health spending relative to the state’s income. All indications are that the Affordable Care Act will play out in similar fashion. Massachusetts voters might have viewed this as a fair trade, but voters will have to decide whether the incremental gains in coverage under the ACA are worth the multitude of adverse effects being left in its wake.

Christopher J. Conover is a research scholar at Duke University’s Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research and an adjunct scholar at AEI. The charts shown are from his new book American Health Economy Illustrated, to be released in January 2012 by AEI Press. See PowerPoint versions of Figure 12.6j and Figure 12.6k and Excel spreadsheet containing indexes for a) health spending per resident; b) Medicaid spending per resident; c) resident health spending as a percentage of gross state product, and d) resident health spending by type of service for data, sources, and methods.

Mitt Romney has been attacked by many for his record on healthcare while he was governor of Massachusetts. But with three governors in the Republican race, it is useful to compare the track records of all three as they relate to health spending. No matter how the figures are sliced and diced, it is clear that health spending, relative to the national average, rose more quickly during the Romney administration than during either the administrations of Governor Rick Perry or Governor Jon Huntsman. For example, ambulatory healthcare spending per capita was declining relative to the national average when Governor Romney first took office, but has steadily increased every year since then, climbing from 19 percent above the national average in 2003 to 29 percent above the national average by 2007 (figure 12.6c).

In contrast, ambulatory health spending in Texas was steadily declining prior to the arrival of Governor Rick Perry and continued to do so for the first four years of his term. Subsequently, it has risen only slightly, from a low point of 8.8 percent below the U.S. average in 2006 to being 6.3 percent below the average by 2009. Jon Huntsman inherited a somewhat similar situation except that relative spending already had begun to rise slightly before he took office and continued to rise for his first two years, followed by a noticeable relative decline.

The pattern for health facilities is somewhat different, but the big-picture result is the same. In this case, Governor Romney inherited rising relative expenditures on health facilities, which fell slightly in his second year, but then continued to rise (figure 12.6d).

Governor Rick Perry inherited relatively stable health facilities expenditures (i.e., rising at about the same rate as the rest of the nation). Relative spending has declined in subsequent years. Governor Huntsman inherited a stable pattern of health facilities expenditures which continued throughout his tenure.

What conclusions can we draw from this? First, the figures shown focus on the gross domestic product attributable to the two large categories of health spending shown and divides this amount by state population to obtain per capita estimates. This is similar but not equivalent to each state’s expenditures on these services. It reflects sales generated within a state, but not necessarily only to that state’s residents. Thus, it is not an exact measure of how much Massachusetts residents spend relative to those in Texas. But it is a rough approximation. And unless there is a great deal of year-to-year variation in the fraction of cross-border spending by a state’s residents, the trends in per capita health-related GDP should approximately mirror trends in health spending. It would be quite unusual for per capita health-related GDP to be steadily rising when correctly measured health spending of that state’s residents was falling, for example.

Second, the figures only include spending on ambulatory care services (including services of physicians, dentists, and other health professionals) and spending on health facilities. Notably excluded are spending on prescription drugs and durable medical equipment (which account for one seventh of national health spending), among other things. So the figures admittedly do not provide the whole picture of health spending, but they do include the lion’s share of medical costs.

Third, state governors clearly are not responsible for aggregate health spending in their state. That said, state policy most assuredly has some effect on health spending. Medicaid spending accounts for nearly one fourth of state government spending, exceeding the amounts spent on elementary and secondary education. Even though the federal government contributes a larger share of Medicaid spending than state and local governments, state policymakers historically have had a great deal of discretion over eligibility standards, benefits, and payment rates. Likewise, in most states, state employees, dependents, and retirees typically constitute the largest single group obtaining employer-sponsored health insurance. All told, state and local policymakers control more than one quarter of health spending through Medicaid, state employee health benefits, and other categorical health spending (e.g., local health departments). Thus, gubernatorial health policy decisions most assuredly have some impact on trends in health spending.

As well, there are vast differences across states in their degree of health services regulation, with some states requiring the state’s permission for every hospital bed built and others imposing no state restrictions whatsoever on health facilities expenditures. Here the story gets quite interesting. As of 2009, Utah had the 13th least regulated health system in the country whereas Massachusetts had the second most regulated health system and Texas was in between, having the 29th most regulated system. As one example, Utah and Texas eliminated their certificate-of-need restrictions on hospitals in the mid-1980s, whereas Massachusetts not only retained its CON program, but made the program even more stringent two years after enacting their health reform law. One would be hard put to infer from the figures shown above either that the Massachusetts CON program was effective in restraining spending or that failure to have CON programs has led to an “explosion” in health spending in either Utah or Texas.

Healthcare spending is surely not the most important issue in the 2012 election. But for those who care about this issue, the available evidence suggests that Jon Huntsman and Rick Perry boast much better records than Mitt Romney in holding down health expenditures.

Christopher J. Conover is a research scholar at Duke University’s Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research and an adjunct scholar at AEI. The charts shown are from his new book American Health Economy Illustrated, to be released in January 2012 by AEI Press. See PowerPoint versions of Figure 12.6c and Figure 12.6d and Excel spreadsheets on a) total population, total GDP, GDP for ambulatory health care services, and GDP for hospitals and nursing & residential facilities; b) per capita GDP, ambulatory healthcare services, and hospitals and nursing & residential facilities, and c) index per capita amounts for these measures of merit for data, sources, and methods.

Joe Antos is right: waiting another decade to bend Medicare’s cost curve is not an option. Consequently, the Widen-Ryan reform proposal is a very promising development. Here’s why. Despite the Affordable Care Act, Medicare’s unfunded liabilities are large and growing. Absent fundamental Medicare reform, the mismatch between what Medicare takes in from Part A payroll taxes and what it spends on Part A, B, and D services will, by 2085, exceed 25 percent of taxable payroll (figure 20.6b.1).


In recent years, the Medicare actuary has issued two sets of projections. The official projections contained in the annual Medicare trustees report are required to reflect current law. Yet even according to current law, the 2011 report shows the Medicare shortfall growing to more than 12 percent of taxable payroll within 75 years. This is a useful reminder that notwithstanding the promise of substantial Medicare savings, the Affordable Care Act did little to actually bend the Medicare cost curve. Most of the vaunted savings from the new health law would arrive in the form of draconian cuts in payments to doctors and hospitals. Medicare actuaries project that under current law, Medicare and Medicaid would pay less than 35 percent of the amounts paid by private health insurers for inpatient hospital services in the year 2085. They also project that Medicare payment rates to physicians would be less than 30 percent of private health insurance levels.

These cuts are so deep that no one seriously believes they will take effect. Indeed, in every year since 2002, Congress has overridden a statutorily required reduction in Medicare physician fees; indeed, lawmakers are this week scrambling to prevent the 27.4 percent reduction in physician fees from taking effect on January 1, 2012. Since Congress effectively has ignored its own law more than a dozen times during this period, there is no good reason to suppose they will behave any differently once they are inundated by pleas for relief from the cuts required by the Affordable Care Act.

The alternative fiscal scenario uses much more realistic estimates of where payment levels will be set in future years. This more realistic projection shows a steady increase in Medicare’s unfunded liabilities. To say that these liabilities will reach more than one quarter of taxable payroll by 2085 does not imply we should raise payroll taxes to address this shortfall. It merely is a convenient metric to gauge how the size of the problem is growing over time relative to the nation’s ability to pay. Leaving aside the temporary payroll tax cut, Social Security normally collects 6.2 percent from employees and another 6.2 percent from employers, for a total of 12.4 percent of earnings up to $106,800.

Thus, filling the Medicare fiscal gap would require the equivalent of tripling current Social Security payroll deductions. However, rather than focus on who to soak to bankroll this shortfall, we instead would be better served by aggressive efforts to prevent the shortfall from occurring. This in turn requires fundamental Medicare reform, not tinkering at the edges. There’s no denying the bipartisan Wyden-Ryan reform initiative could be tweaked even further. But all in all, it offers a very consequential and promising step forward.

Christopher J. Conover is a research scholar at Duke University’s Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research and an adjunct scholar at AEI. The charts shown are from his new book American Health Economy Illustrated, to be released in January 2012 by AEI Press. See PowerPoint version of Figure 20.6b.1, and Excel spreadsheet  on Medicare funding shortfalls from 2009-2086 for data, sources, and methods.


Ezekiel Emanuel last month pointed out that if we want to rein in health expenditures, “real savings require changing the way we care for these chronically ill patients.” But to better understand the determinants of health spending, it is important to distinguish spending on chronic health conditions from spending on patients with chronic health conditions. The two are not the same. Admittedly, 9 of every 10 dollars in adult health spending can be attributed to those who have at least one chronic condition (right side of figure 2.5a).

Also, this share of health spending is disproportionate, insofar as only 60 percent of civilian adults not living in institutions have at least one chronic condition. This disproportionate share is observable across all ages, as the percentage with at least one chronic condition ranges from a low of 36 percent of young adults to approximately 92 percent of the elderly. Consequently, those with at least one chronic condition account for more than 60 percent of total personal healthcare spending among young adults and 99 percent among the elderly.

However, only half of adult health spending pays for actual medical services related to chronic conditions. Thus, while wrestling to contain such chronic care spending through better prevention and more efficient treatment certainly must be part of any strategy to get more value for money in healthcare, it is only half the battle. (Note that these figures only relate to the civilian non-institutionalized population, i.e., those outside of nursing homes or long-term mental facilities; all the percentages shown would be higher were those in institutions included.) Even people with chronic conditions require medical services for acute care needs entirely unrelated to their diabetes, cancer, asthma, or other similar conditions expected to last at least a year.

Moreover, this 50 percentage average masks a lot of variation across age groups. For adults younger than age 35, just less than 30 percent of spending is specifically attributable to treating chronic conditions (left side of figure 2.5a). Thus, if they are serious about cost containment, employers with younger workers should be focusing much more attention on the components of spending that may have nothing to do with better chronic disease management. Conversely, among the elderly, the share of personal healthcare expenditures having to do with chronic conditions is approximately double the level seen in young adults. Chronic conditions are a major reason that health expenditures increase so dramatically by age. Among adults having no chronic conditions, annual health expenses in 2005 averaged less than $1,000 per person, with elderly individuals experiencing only slightly higher spending than their adult counterparts in the lowest age category. Thus, for Medicare, placing much greater emphasis on chronic diseases makes a great deal of sense. By the same token, steps taken to reduce the prevalence of chronic conditions before age 65 will unquestionably reduce the average annual amount spent per person on Medicare. So chronic disease costs assuredly matter, but we cannot and should not ignore the equally sizable share of health spending unrelated to chronic care.

Christopher J. Conover is a research scholar at Duke University’s Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research and an adjunct scholar at AEI. The charts shown are from his new book American Health Economy Illustrated, to be released in January 2012 by AEI Press. See PowerPoint version of Figure 2.5a, and Excel spreadsheet on health expenditures for chronic conditions by age in 2005 for data, sources and methods.

Ezekiel Emanuel reminded New York Times readers last week of something health economists have known for eight decades. Health expenditures are highly concentrated, with just 10 percent of the population accounting for nearly two-thirds of annual health spending. Wall Street protesters have sparked a fierce debate over trends in the share of income and wealth controlled by the top 1 percent. But no informed American aspires to be in the health spending 1 percent.

The 1 percent of the population that has the highest annual health expenses accounts for one-fifth of health spending (figure 12.1a). Their annual spending in 2011 likely exceeded $115,000. (These figures exclude those institutionalized in nursing homes and long-term mental hospitals; their inclusion would drive these figures even higher). Those in the top 5 percent account for just under half of all spending, with average annual expenditures that exceed $50,000. With the average U.S. worker earning less than $45,000 a year, these numbers demonstrate the desirability of some kind of health insurance coverage. Few but the wealthiest families are in a position to self-insure spending at these amounts. It would be only a slight exaggeration to observe that only the 1 percent could comfortably afford to be in the health spending 1 percent.

At the other end of the distribution, individuals in the bottom half of spending account for only 3 percent of annual health costs. Their average annual spending is less than $360. Leaving aside administrative costs, an actuarially fair premium to cover only the catastrophic expenses of the top 1 percent would be almost $1,161 a year. To cover the risk of being in the top 5 percent would require annual premiums of approximately $2,700. The challenge in a voluntary health insurance system is to convince a sizable share of those who have expected expenses of less than $360 to spend more than $2,700 to secure protection against risks that have only a 5 percent chance of occurring. The more low-risk individuals who opt out, the higher will be the premiums needed for those who remain.

However, this greatly exaggerates the challenge when people are separated into different age groups. In that case, the difference between the lowest and highest spenders shrinks considerably. Indeed, for decades the non-group insurance market has successfully provided voluntary coverage through a combination of medical underwriting and pre-existing condition exclusions—together the equivalent of a homeowners insurance company checking to ensure the house is not burning down before it agrees to insure that risk—and premiums that steadily rise with age.

How to deal with the health spending 1 percent has been a contentious issue among policymakers. Someone who already has crossed the 1 percent spending threshold is by definition uninsurable: at that point, such individuals arguably need healthcare, not health insurance. But we have become so accustomed to health coverage that functions as prepaid healthcare rather than as insurance against unknown risks that this distinction escapes many people (including policymakers). In a perfect world, we would have universal coverage against the risk of landing in the health spending 1 percent. Most people would gladly pay $1,161 to avoid facing bills of $116,000. But not everyone can afford to do so. And many recognize that even if they ran up bills that large, they would not necessarily have to pay them: uncompensated care write-offs, retroactive Medicaid, and other safety net programs result in nearly two-thirds of uninsured medical bills being paid by someone other than the uninsured patient’s family. Unfortunately, these well-intentioned efforts to dissipate the adverse effects of being without health insurance concomitantly diminish incentives to obtain health insurance in the first place. The foregoing demonstrates why one Republican presidential candidate observed, a half decade ago, that ”Health is about 30 times more difficult than national security.” Perhaps it’s worth having a Republican presidential candidate debate on this issue alone.

Christopher J. Conover is a research scholar at Duke University’s Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research and an adjunct scholar at AEI. The charts shown are from his new book American Health Economy Illustrated, to be released in January 2012 by AEI Press. See PowerPoint version of Figure 12.1a, and Excel spreadsheet on the concentration of health spending in 2008 for data, sources, and methods.

The “super committee” faces a significant challenge in finding at least $1.2 trillion in savings over the next ten years. While AARP is engaged in a concerted effort to persuade the committee to keep its hands off Medicare, the reality is that reductions in projected health spending would be difficult to avoid if the committee is to reach its target. Here’s a long-term perspective to help understand how quickly health spending is crowding out other spending.

Tax-financed health expenditures over the past 50 years have grown faster than any other major functional area of government spending, including defense, income support, and education. Since 1960, the increase in government health spending as a percent of GDP more than exceeded the decline in defense spending’s share of the economy through 2010 (figure 5.2a). This is not to say that health spending caused national defense outlays to fall, but it is a useful reminder that every dollar spent on healthcare is a dollar that cannot be spend on any other national priority such as education, defense, or transportation.

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The latest Census figures show the United States now has 49.9 million uninsured, an increase of nearly 1 million over the preceding year. Both in terms of absolute numbers and the percentage of Americans without coverage, this is the highest figure recorded since the Bureau began asking questions about health insurance in its annual survey three decades ago. If fully implemented, the Affordable Care Act is expected to cut this number by more than half. But this is a pittance compared to the dramatic decline in the number of uninsured that occurred before the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid in 1966. This is not unlike the dramatic decline in the poverty rate that occurred before the nation officially declared a war on poverty in the 1960s.

Over 70 years, the uninsured rate has declined by more than 80 percent (figure 6.6). It is noteworthy to see just how much of this decline occurred before the government got heavily involved in providing coverage during the 1960s. In 1940, approximately nine of ten Americans lacked health insurance coverage. By 1960, this had fallen to 25 percent. There were at least 60 million fewer Americans without health insurance in 1960 compared to 1940 despite a population increase of nearly 50 million over that same period. This dramatic decline reflected the enormous expansion of employer-based health coverage fueled by the tax subsidy that began in 1943.

These numbers are approximations for the earliest decades. The nation did not start to seriously measure the extent of lack of coverage until the mid-1970s. Before that time, the only consistent annual data on coverage came from health insurance industry surveys that counted the number of individuals with various types of medical insurance policies (for example, hospital insurance). Thus, one could obtain an approximate count of the uninsured using assumptions about how much duplication there was between policies of various types and then subtracting this insured number from the total population. Today, the most widely quoted current numbers about the uninsured (such as this week’s report) come from the Current Population Survey (CPS), which did not start collecting a consistent measure of coverage until 1988. There are multiple surveys, each with various shortcomings, but the CPS has gradually improved over time so that it is less likely to over-count the number of uninsured than it was in the past. The point is that the numbers for 1990 forward are a more precise approximation of the truth than the numbers that precede it, although every effort has been made to convert these earlier figures into estimates of how many uninsured would have been counted had a CPS-like survey been conducted in those earlier years.

By 1970, the uninsured rate had fallen to less than 15 percent, reflecting continued expansion of employer-provided coverage and the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid. There is substantial evidence of “crowd-out” of private health coverage by both programs: that is, the programs cover individuals who otherwise would have had private insurance. For example, one-quarter of seniors had comprehensive health insurance even before Medicare was introduced. When Medicaid expanded coverage to children and pregnant women between 1987 and 1992, crowd-out accounted for nearly half of those who were newly enrolled through these eligibility expansions. Consequently, there is much less than a one-for-one reduction in the number of uninsured for each new beneficiary who is enrolled. Conversely, the entire decline in the uninsured rate through 1970 cannot be attributed to public coverage since private coverage also was expanding during this same period.

After 1970, the uninsured rate remained quite stable for decades. Thus, the slight increase between 1990 and 2010 is barely a blip from this much longer-term view. Official government projections of what is supposed to happen to the uninsured rate if health reform is fully implemented are included in the figure shown. There still is substantial uncertainty about how much of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) will ultimately be implemented. But the 2020 number is a useful reminder that the ACA did not intend, nor will it possibly achieve, universal coverage. Some 23 million uninsured Americans would still be uninsured that year, according to the latest projections by the Congressional Budget Office. By 2021, assuming ACA is fully in place, half of the decline in the number of uninsured would be attributable to expansions of Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). This is a marked contrast to prevailing patterns of coverage: that is, in 2010, there were four people covered by private insurance for every person covered through Medicaid/CHIP. In short, notwithstanding the many severe limitations of Medicaid, the ACA would move the system in the direction of much heavier reliance on that program to cover those who cannot afford their own health insurance coverage. Moreover, the decline in the rate of being uninsured will be much more modest over the next decade than during the remarkable expansion of private coverage in the 1940s and 1950s. We can only imagine what might have happened had the designers of ACA been more willing to contemplate greater reliance on the expansion of private, rather than public health insurance.

Christopher J. Conover is a research scholar at Duke University’s Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research and an adjunct scholar at AEI. The charts shown are from his new book American Health Economy Illustrated, to be released in January 2012 by AEI Press. See PowerPoint version of Figure 6.6  and Excel spreadsheet on health insurance coverage from 1940-2020 for data, sources, and methods.

All levels of government face growing pressures to restrain spending. One downside to the rapid growth in tax-financed health spending that I have documented in several prior posts is the vulnerability of the health system to measures taken to curb government spending. But the degree of such vulnerability varies dramatically across different components of the health sector.

More than four-fifths of home healthcare, for example, is bankrolled through government-run programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, military healthcare, or other federal, state, or local health programs (figure 3.7c). Likewise, nearly three-fifths of spending for health facilities, including nursing homes and hospitals, is covered through such programs.

In contrast, outpatient care such as physician and clinical services, prescription drugs, and durable medical equipment (e.g., wheelchairs) are relatively less vulnerable. Even so, more than one third of expenses for such services are paid through government-sponsored programs. Strictly speaking, not every dime paid through such programs comes out of the pockets of taxpayers. Medicare, for example, is partially financed through premiums paid by elderly or disabled beneficiaries. Even though Medicare is partially financed through such “private” revenues and is technically administered through private health insurance companies that actually pay the claims, the program itself is government-run since it is government bureaucrats who determine the payment rates for various services or providers.

While we cannot be certain who the winners and losers might be in the battle ahead for finding Medicare and Medicaid savings, one thing for certain is that politics rather than market forces will increasingly determine how much providers are paid in the years ahead. Under current law, Medicare is slated to cut physician fees by 29.5 percent in January 2012. However, on 12 prior occasions that such statutorily required cuts in Medicare payments to physicians were supposed to be executed, fierce lobbying by physicians persuaded Congress to vote for a temporary reprieve. Reportedly, in advance of the debate over healthcare reform, the Democratic leaders in Congress had promised the American Medical Association (AMA) the permanent elimination of these looming cuts (the so-called “doc fix”) in exchange for their support of the bill.

No one is served well by the sort of rent-seeking behavior that inevitably arises when government elects to displace market forces with political decisions. Ironically, notwithstanding AMA support of both House and Senate reform bills, physicians never got the permanent doc fix they were promised. But more importantly, the public does not benefit from a process in which political considerations, such as campaign contributions, supplant market forces in determining the prices for goods and services. As just one example, physician specialists are paid substantially more on an hourly basis than primary care physicians, leading to a bias in favor of hospital-based and procedural services. In Medicare, this bias persists in part because the advisory panel that helps determine Medicare payment rates is stacked in favor of such specialists. And because the program is the single largest payer within the physician market, most private insurers peg their payment levels to some percentage of prevailing Medicare rates, thereby propagating that same bias throughout the medical care system.

Ironically, many of the problems in our current healthcare system that lead to demands for public policy fixes—the underpayment of primary care providers, overpayment for certain specialty procedures, excessive payments for medical supplies—actually originate in government-run health programs. Expecting things to get better by expanding the reach of government in medicine appears to be a triumph of hope over experience.

Christopher J. Conover is a research scholar at Duke University’s Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research and an adjunct scholar at AEI. The charts shown are from his new book American Health Economy Illustrated, to be released in January 2012 by AEI Press. See PowerPoint version of Figure 3.7c and Excel spreadsheet on government share of health spending by service  for data, sources, and methods.

A new study projects that U.S. healthcare spending will rise by as much as $66 billion a year by 2030 because of obesity. That’s about 2.6 percent of current health spending. While this trend is of obvious concern (and would be good to avoid), those figures pale in comparison to the total amount of U.S. health spending that can be attributed to behavior, lifestyle, and other avoidable causes.

Consider the underlying causes of diseases that give rise to health spending. The chart below lists 15 such causes, together with estimates of the share of 2011 personal healthcare expenditures (PHCE) attributable to them. (Note that PHCE represents only about six-sevenths of total health spending, as it does not include the costs of medical research, health-related construction, public health activities, or the administrative costs of health insurance or public programs such as Medicare).

The data represent the gross amount of health spending that hypothetically could be avoided in a perfect world. Because we do not live in a perfect world, it is not possible to eradicate every dollar of avoidable spending. Although individual efforts to “try harder” can yield fruitful results virtually without costs, any serious effort to influence spending of this magnitude would require an investment of resources to alter systems (for example, electronic medical records to reduce medication errors) or behaviors (for example, smoking cessation aids or counseling). Although it never would make sense to spend a dollar to save less than a dollar, some of these initiatives might well use a sizable fraction of the potential savings. It would be imprudent to spend hundreds of billions in potential savings before ascertaining the actual net savings attainable. That said, the enormous costs attributable to conditions such as hypertension, obesity, smoking, and physical activity highlight the extent to which personal responsibility can play a role in trimming these massive expenditures.

To the extent we insulate individuals from the cost consequences of their unhealthy behavior, we surely encourage more of it. A McKinsey survey of employees whose employers replaced all health plans with a high-deductible health plan coupled with a health reimbursement account showed that CDHP enrollees were a) 25 percent more likely to report that they engaged in healthy behavior than were members of traditional plans; b) 20 percent more likely to engage in wellness programs; c) over 30 percent more likely to take advantage of preventive services (e.g., annual checkups); and d) 20 percent more likely to carefully manage chronic conditions. Not surprisingly, the largest study ever conducted of high-deductible health plans found that spending was 14 percent lower than in conventional plans. In short, we know greater cost-sharing works and can be an important tool in bending the cost curve. Yet in a variety of ways, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) will reduce the amount of cost-sharing for most patients. Should PPACA be fully implemented, this does not bode well for trends in lifestyle-related health spending. We have met the enemy and it is us.

Christopher J. Conover is a research scholar at Duke University’s Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research and an adjunct scholar at AEI. The charts shown are from his new book American Health Economy Illustrated, to be released in January 2012 by AEI Press. See PowerPoint version of Figure 2.6 and Excel spreadsheet on the distribution of health spending related to selected behavior, lifestyle, and other avoidable causes for data, sources, and methods.

Last week, I pointed out that for almost 50 years, unemployment rates among males working in hospitals or other parts of the health services industry have been lower than for their counterparts in the rest of the economy. The pattern for women, however, is far different. For nearly a half century, women working in health services outside of hospitals have routinely experienced higher unemployment than their counterparts in the rest of the civilian workforce—typically by two to three percentage points (figure 16.3b). Recall that non-hospital health settings include nursing homes in addition to physician offices or other ambulatory locations.

Many decades ago, women working in hospitals also experienced higher unemployment rates than in the rest of the economy. Prior to the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid in 1966 (both programs were enacted on July 30, 1965, but Medicaid did not begin until January 1, 1966 and Medicare began on July 1, 1966), the unemployment rate among female hospital workers was double that of female workers in the civilian workforce and even slightly exceeded the unemployment rate for women in the rest of the health services industry. Subsequently, however, unemployment rates fell well below those for women in other health services jobs and since 1994, female hospital workers have been in the same position as their male counterparts, enjoying an unemployment rate well below that of workers in the rest of the economy.

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The New York Times today reports rising concerns that the role of healthcare in fueling economic growth may be in jeopardy due to cuts contemplated in Medicare and Medicaid. This is old news for those who read my post a month ago. But today I want to focus on the implications of these trends for individual healthcare workers.

For almost 50 years, unemployment rates among males working in hospitals or other parts of the health services industry have been lower than for their counterparts in the rest of the economy (figure 16.3a). For these data, non-hospital health settings include nursing homes in addition to physician offices or other ambulatory settings.

In 2009 the overall male unemployment rate was 10.3 percent, compared to only 3.0 percent among hospital workers and 5.3 percent among those working in the non-hospital health services sector. In 2010, overall male unemployment had risen slightly to 10.5 percent, whereas unemployment among male hospital workers had grown to 3.3 percent and male unemployment elsewhere in the health services industry had climbed to 6.4 percent. In short, males in the health sector continued to have a margin of advantage over workers in the general economy, but the margin’s size had shrunk. By July 2011, overall male unemployment was down to 9.2 percent (not seasonally adjusted), and hospital worker unemployment among males was back to its 2009 average of 3.0 percent. Male unemployment among non-hospital health services workers was even lower than 2009, at 4.3 percent.

Will this margin of advantage in unemployment for male workers in the healthcare industry disappear anytime soon? Probably not. First, as I’ve explained previously, it is unlikely that Medicare payments to physicians will be slashed by 29.5 percent this January even though current law requires it. Indeed, the prospect is so unlikely that the Congressional Budget Office’s alternative fiscal scenario used to make long-term budget projections is based on the assumption that such cuts do not occur. Likewise, the Medicare actuary has estimated that if the massive cuts contemplated for Medicare are put into effect as scheduled under this new law, Medicare and Medicaid payment rates for inpatient hospital services will by 2020 be 40 percent below the rates paid by private health insurers. Does anyone seriously believe cuts this severe are likely to happen?

Second, even the baseline projections made by the Medicare actuary (i.e., assuming all these cuts do proceed as statutorily required) show that health spending will be higher if the new health law is fully implemented than if it were not. However, if the 2012 elections or a Supreme Court decision result in the law’s being eviscerated entirely, this will only reduce the average annual rate of growth in health spending by one-tenth of a percent over the next 10 years. In short, regardless of what happens to the healthcare law, the health economy is projected to grow well in excess of growth in the general economy. Thus, the mix of employment in healthcare may vary depending on whether or not hospitals sustain deep cuts in Medicare or Medicaid payments, but the overall number of people employed in healthcare seems destined to rise faster than number of civilian workers overall.

None of this implies a guarantee against layoffs for individual male workers in the health sector. But the odds of facing the unemployment line are assuredly lower than for other male workers, and this is a pattern likely to remain for many decades. Next week I will explain how this story differs for women employed in the health services industry.

Christopher J. Conover is a research scholar at Duke University’s Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research and an adjunct scholar at AEI. The charts shown are from his new book American Health Economy Illustrated, to be released in January 2012 by AEI Press. See PowerPoint version of Figure 16.3a and Excel spreadsheet on unemployment by industry and sex for data, sources, and methods.

Last month, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services released its latest projections of health spending. These official projections showed that the health share of GDP would rise to 19.8 percent by 2020. But just as official estimates substantially understate the role of government in health spending, they fail to highlight a point that should be of concern to all Americans: by 2020, 29 percent of annual GDP growth will be absorbed by health spending.

The percentage of GDP devoted to healthcare has more than quadrupled during the past 80 years to more than one-sixth of the entire economy (figure 1.3c). Indeed, health spending has grown faster than almost all other major components of the economy.

But a better way to understand and predict the growth in the share of GDP related to health is to examine health’s share of the growth in GDP. As illustrated, health’s share of GDP growth is higher—sometimes much higher—than its average share of GDP. Think of a jar of marbles with 10 white marbles and 90 black ones. The white share of the total is only 10 percent. But now imagine adding a cup of four marbles in which the white share is 50 percent. White marbles now constitute only 11.5 percent of the total (i.e., 12 of 104), but what should be clear is that so long as white marbles constitute half of each new cup added, this average will rise, gradually approaching 50 percent. So if we want to know where the health share of GDP is headed, a good shortcut is to examine how much of the growth in GDP is accounted for by national health expenditures.

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Last month, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services released its latest report showing how the burden of health spending is divided between government, private business, and households. What may surprise some readers is just how little of health spending is paid directly by households: 28 percent of the total in 2009 (the latest year available).

In this so-called “sponsor” view of health spending, government is responsible (i.e., directly pays) for Medicare, Medicaid, military and VA health, a panoply of taxpayer-financed health programs (e.g., local health departments), and employer premium contributions on behalf of federal, state, and local workers. Private business is responsible (i.e., directly pays) for employer contributions to group health coverage, the employer share of payroll taxes (euphemistically termed “contributions”) related to Medicare’s Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (Part A), workers’ compensation, temporary disability insurance, and worksite healthcare.

All of the rest is borne by households in the form of a) the worker share of group health premiums and Medicare Part A payroll taxes, b) voluntary premiums paid for non-group health insurance, Medicare Parts B and D, and c) out-of-pocket medical expenses not covered by insurance. Yet when we add up all these components, they amount to only six cents of every dollar of family income. Households devote a far larger share of their family budgets to food, housing, and transportation than to healthcare.

Thus, even though healthcare now accounts for more than 20 percent of personal consumption spending as measured in the national income and product accounts, this greatly exaggerates the visibility of health expenditures in a typical family’s budget. What’s equally remarkable is how little this “burden” has changed over time since 1987, when it amounted to five cents per dollar of family income.

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Among many matters being discussed in the debate over the debt limit are proposals to reform health insurance policies used to supplement Medicare, such as so-called Medigap plans. Such reforms reportedly could save $53 billion over ten years. The reforms under discussion would entail increasing the amounts that seniors with such policies pay out-of-pocket. This, of course, might invite a tsunami of protest from angry seniors. So why is this controversial idea being debated?

While it may sound counterintuitive, the basic problem is that a large number of elderly have too much health insurance coverage. Admittedly, Medicare itself is not particularly good health coverage. In 2007, the average benefit value of Medicare ($10,610) was lower than the benefit value of both the typical large employer PPO ($12,160) and the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) standard option ($11,780). This benefit value represents the amount that each form of coverage would pay out of the average total amount of spending generated by a typical senior ($14,270). Put a different way, Medicare would pay only 74 percent of costs associated with covered benefits, whereas the typical large employer PPO would cover 85 percent and the most widely used plan for federal employees would cover 83 percent. Medicare is less generous because relative to these other plans offered by large employers, “it has higher cost-sharing for inpatient care under Part A (particularly for relatively short hospital stays), no out-of-pocket limit on services provided under Part B, and less generous drug coverage under the standard Part D benefit.” Medicare also has no annual maximum upper limit on the amount beneficiaries might have to pay—a shortcoming that understandably frightens many seniors relying on fixed incomes.

But the story does not end there. Because Medicare coverage is so inadequate, most elderly have some form of supplemental coverage to fill in the gaps. As illustrated in the chart, more than one-third of seniors have employer-based coverage (either from their own active or retiree health plan or that of a spouse), another one-quarter purchase their own individual (non-group) policy (the so-called Medigap policies), while one in eleven has Medicaid and one in twelve has military health benefits. In addition, about one-fifth of the elderly have coverage through a Medicare Advantage plan, many of which cover deductibles, coinsurance, or prescription drug costs that those relying exclusively on Medicare fee-for-service coverage would have to pay. In fact, excluding Medicare Advantage beneficiaries, 89 percent of non-institutionalized Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries had some form of secondary coverage in 2005.

Extensive evidence shows that the first dollar protection provided by many of these supplemental Medicare plans increases utilization of Medicare services. This is known as “moral hazard:” if something is subsidized, more of it will be purchased. The most recent study of this phenomenon found that Medicare spending for those with employer-sponsored supplemental Medicare policies was 17 percent higher than those without such supplements; those with Medigap policies had 33 percent higher spending. Closer examination showed that most of this additional use was accounted for by those whose supplements (in conjunction with Medicare) provided them with free or nearly free medical services. That is, among those whose combined coverage paid 95 percent or more of expenses, the increase in Medicare spending was 68 percent for those with employer-sponsored supplements and 85 percent for those with Medigap policies.

Obviously, not all of this incremental spending is waste: some of the additional services used surely had value to Medicare beneficiaries. The problem is that the value of these services is generally far below the actual cost of delivering them. Economists define “waste” as the difference between that value and actual cost and have sophisticated methods for measuring this difference. The best scientific evidence we have about the magnitude of waste associated with free (fully subsidized) medical care comes from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment. This study found that health spending for individuals with free medical care was 32 percent higher than for those who had to pay 25 percent of the bill out of pocket. Fully 93 percent of that spending difference came in the form of “waste” rather than added value to the patient.

If the sizable difference in spending was embedded in the premiums paid for supplemental Medicare coverage, there would be no problem. Those purchasing such policies would entirely finance the extra spending. But that’s not how health insurance coverage works. For each additional physician visit encouraged by a supplemental Medicare policy, Medicare will generally be on the hook for 80 percent of the cost and the supplement only has to pick up the remaining 20 percent. So most of the incremental cost is being loaded onto U.S. taxpayers. This is why budget negotiators are seriously considering proposals to charge $530 to seniors who buy the most generous Medicare supplements. Seniors may not be happy about having to pay more, but it’s hard to argue with the efficiency and equity logic driving these ideas.

Christopher J. Conover is a research scholar at Duke University’s Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research and an adjunct scholar at AEI. The charts shown are from his new book American Health Economy Illustrated, to be released in January 2012 by AEI Press. See PowerPoint version of Figure 13.5b and Excel spreadsheet on health insurance coverage for seniors  for data, sources and methods.

Friday’s jobs report showed an anemic gain of only 18,000 non-farm jobs across the entire economy. Health services accounted for an astonishing 13,500 of these new jobs. While it certainly is not typical for the health sector to account for three quarters of month-to-month job growth, employment growth in the health sector has outpaced that of the rest of the economy to a considerable extent for at least eight decades.

In every decade since the 1930s, total health services employment has increased two to three times as fast as the number of workers in the general economy or private business. Since 1930, if health services employment had increased only as fast as in the rest of the economy, the health sector would have employed nearly 11 million fewer workers in 2009. That’s the equivalent of one-twelfth of all non-farm employment in that year.

These numbers exclude workers in the goods-producing part of the health industry (pharmaceuticals and medical devices), along with employment by health insurers. It is uncertain whether inclusion of such workers would appreciably alter the trends shown. Because the general population grows at approximately 1 percent a year, the numbers in this chart also illustrate the ratio of health services growth to the overall population. That is, in the 1960s health services employment grew roughly six times as fast as the nation’s population. In none of those 80 years has health sector growth been less than 2 percent a year; in the 1970s, the annual increase reached almost 7 percent. These trends are generally consistent with the pattern of growth in healthcare expenditures relative to the economy, but not precisely. In light of the surge in spending that occurred in the aftermath of the arrival of Medicare and Medicaid in the mid-1960s, the extremely high relative growth in health sector employment might not be surprising. However, even in the 1950s, the health sector work force also grew three times as quickly as employment in private businesses overall. The 1980s were characterized by increasing concerns about rising health expenditures; indeed, this became an important issue in the 1992 election and a failed effort at health reform in 1993–94. Conversely, the late 1990s saw a noticeable slowdown in health spending, yet that increase in health industry employment relative to the rest of the economy during that decade was practically the mirror image of the pattern in the 1980s.

From 2000 to 2007, growth in health sector employment reached its lowest level since the 1930s in absolute terms. Yet this growth rate nevertheless was triple the rate of increase in both overall civilian employment and private business employment during that period. And even as the private sector shed more than 7.5 million jobs between 2007 and 2009 (not shown), health services employment grew by 4.4 percent. For at least 40 years, employment consistently has grown faster in ambulatory health services than in health facilities—a fact reflected in the latest jobs report: jobs in ambulatory health care grew by 16,500, whereas hospitals and nursing homes saw a decline of 3,000 jobs.

The dependence of the economy on health sector jobs highlights one of the risks of the Affordable Care Act. The Medicare actuary has estimated that if the massive cuts contemplated for Medicare are put into effect as scheduled under this new law, Medicare and Medicaid payment rates for inpatient hospital services will by 2020 be 40 percent below the rates paid by private health insurers. Consequently, roughly 15 percent of hospitals, skilled nursing facilities and home health agencies paid by Medicare would (according to the actuary’s projections) become unprofitable within the next ten years. How many of these facilities would actually go bankrupt remains to be seen, but such figures surely do not bode well for continued growth in employment in this sector. Similarly, under the cuts scheduled in the president’s health plan, Medicare payment rates for physicians by 2020 will be about half the levels paid by private insurers—lower than even the rates paid by Medicaid. Leaving aside the indisputable consequences such anemic payment levels would have on access to care, they also would have obvious adverse implications for employment in the ambulatory health services sector.

So long as healthcare employment growth outpaces the rate of growth in employment in the rest of the economy, healthcare is likely to grow as a share of GDP as well. This may distress those who believe we spend too much on healthcare. At the same time, we must recognize that every dollar of health spending also represents a dollar of income to someone employed in the health sector. That makes cutting health spending a two-edged sword. Making healthcare more affordable may seem like a Pyrrhic victory if it is achieved at the price of slower economic growth and/or higher unemployment.

Christopher J. Conover is a research scholar at Duke University’s Center for Health Policy and Inequalities Research. The charts shown are from his new book American Health Economy Illustrated, to be released in January 2012 by AEI Press. See PowerPoint version of Figure 10.1a and Excel spreadsheet on long-term employment trends for data, sources, and methods.


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