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Allan H. Meltzer

The Thatcher Model

By Allan H. Meltzer

June 30, 2010, 9:10 am

margaret_thatcher_headshotIn 1980, I had the privilege of advising Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to ignore the demands of 360 British economists who made the outrageous claim that Britain would never (yes, never) recover from her decision to reduce government spending during a severe recession. They wanted more spending. She responded with a speech promising to stay with her tight budget. She kept a sustained focus on long-term problems. Expectations about the economy’s future improved, and the recovery soon began.

That’s what the United States needs now.

Find more here.

Image by White House Photographic Office

Allan H. Meltzer

Jobs Saved?

By Allan H. Meltzer

January 27, 2010, 9:30 pm

President Obama mentioned jobs saved by the stimulus bill. But one can search economic textbooks forever without finding a concept called “jobs saved.” It doesn’t exist for good reason: how can anyone know that his or her job has been saved?

Many people, especially Federal Reserve people, tell all of us not to be concerned about inflation. The history of the 1960s and 1970s makes me skeptical.

During the 1970s, members of the Fed’s open market committee promised  themselves and each other that they would persist in their several efforts to slow or stop inflation. When the unemployment rate rose to about 6.5 or 7%, those commitments vanished. Policy instead aimed at reducing unemployment. That happened three or four times as recorded in the transcripts or minutes of their meetings.

One consequence was a growing belief that the Fed would not persist in an anti-inflation policy. Markets quickly lowered inflation in 1966-67, but they didn’t do much in the 1969-70 recession or after. They  learned that the Fed responded decisively to the unemployment rate but not to the inflation rate. The Fed and many others called this behavior “stagflation” and expressed puzzlement that recessions could coexist with inflation. They failed to recognize expectations that inflation would continue.

Contrary to the Phillips curve that predicts a negative relation between inflation and unemployment, the relation is broadly positive in the 1970s and 1980s. The Fed staff under-predicted the rise in inflation.

From 1979-82 the Fed changed policy. The main effort changed from preventing unemployment to controlling inflation. The unemployment rate rose to more than 10% in the fall of 1982, but inflation was down to 4% and later declined more.

Why did the policy change? Three reasons. First, opinion polls  showed that the public thought inflation was the main economic problem. That had not happened earlier. It changed the political consensus toward inflation control. Second, President Carter did not interfere with the Fed during the election of 1980. President Reagan supported the anti-inflation policy. Chairs of the key congressional committees also supported the anti-inflation policy and supported Paul Volcker, the Fed chairman and a committed anti-inflationist who had the courage and determination to carry the policy through.

I do not doubt that the current Fed has the technical ability to end inflation. I do not see the political consensus by the administration, Congress, business, labor, and the public to support an anti-inflation policy with unemployment currently 9.4 % and rising. It takes about two years from the start of the anti-inflation policy until inflation begins to fall. Part of the lag is the time it takes to convince markets that the policy will continue after unemployment rises.

Can the Fed control inflation? Absolutely. Will the Fed control inflation? Unlikely. The Fed will face political pressures. It has sacrificed much of its independence and will have a hard time getting it back.

How many more times must Paul Krugman tell us that we have to worry about deflation? (See an earlier exchange on this topic here.) Most others who shared his concern in December or January have learned that they were wrong. Some recognized the error as a failure to recognize that falling oil and food prices reduce the price level, not its sustained rate of change. Deflation and inflation refer to rates of change, not levels. Others recognize that oil prices have increased, so even a decline in the price level now seems unlikely.

It’s a pity that Krugman gives his readers a potted history of economic policy. Postwar inflation was a principal means the government used to reduce the wartime debt. And inflation was the way we reduced the debt again in the 1970s. I’m not sure which history he reads, but it does not get the facts right.

Krugman’s overriding concern is the current mess. More astute observers think that concern for present problems should not forsake future problems that arise because they are neglected. That single-minded focus on the unemployment rate brought the Great Inflation of the 1970s. Certainly the current Federal Reserve should provide money to avoid bank runs and to restore growth, and they have. But part of our current problem is a productivity shock to financial markets that has reduced the profitability of financial services. The Federal Reserve can do nothing about that.

Most economists have learned that it takes about two years from the time monetary stimulus increases to the beginning of inflation. Prudent central bankers take that lag into account. Krugman and the Federal Reserve do not. They wait for the inflation to occur. That’s too late to avoid its costs.

Does the Federal Reserve have the technical ability to prevent inflation? Certainly! Will the Federal Reserve show the political stomach in the face of a sluggish recovery and almost certain cries of alarm from Chairman Barney Frank, the administration, the business community, the labor unions, and Krugman? Certainly not!

After I published a piece in the New York Times op-ed page warning of future inflation (see: “Inflation Nation“), Paul Krugman claimed to offer me a “history lesson” on his Times blog (see his post: “A History Lesson for Alan [sic] Meltzer“).

In the piece I argued that no country with rapid money growth, a large budget deficit, and an expected depreciation of the exchange rate has ever experienced deflation, always inflation. He claims Japan’s “lost decade” as a counterexample. It is not. I am very familiar with Japan during this period—I served as honorary adviser to the Bank of Japan and met often with the then Governor Hayami. He opposed using monetary expansion, and I did not convince him that he was making a mistake. In the midst of the deflation, he raised the interest rate to avoid “sloppy” money markets. That was the wrong thing to do as several of us told the Bank of Japan at the time.

When Governor Fukui replaced Governor Hayami, he carried out the policy that I had urged Governor Hayami to follow. He bought long-term bonds.

The deflation ended, contrary to the advice of Professor Krugman, who claimed at the time that monetary policy was in a “liquidity trap” and useless. He was wrong then and he neglects that, unlike the United States today, Japan financed its excess spending from domestic saving. We have to borrow from others. The Chinese have sent several signals warning that they may be reluctant to finance our outrageously large deficits.

On the op-ed page in the Times on which we both appeared, Professor Krugman repeats the same message he writes regularly. We differ about the degree to which the Federal Reserve and the administration should concentrate solely on the near-term problems of the economy instead of considering the medium- and longer-term effects of their current actions. Tomorrow comes and a well run central bank neither ignores today’s problems nor neglects tomorrow’s. Wages are not falling, no matter how many times Professor Krugman reminds us that they might. To avoid the inflation that it is creating, the Federal Reserve should be less expansive.


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