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President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad often describes his relationship with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as a “father/son relationship,” but he seems to have forgotten that in Persian mythology, as opposed to Oedipal patricides of the Western canon, fathers kill their sons. Following the arrest of Ahmadinejad’s advisers upon exotic — even by Iranian standards — charges of exorcism and relations with evil spirits, Khamenei is now containing his unruly son both directly and through proxies. Khamenei openly blames the Ahmadinejad government for Iran’s weak economic performance; Kayhan, Khamenei’s unofficial mouthpiece, calls Ahmadinejad a seditionist, and the president is not even invited to participate in Tehran Friday prayer.

Facing a clerical front united in their desire to crush him, Ahmadinejad has increasingly reached out to the victims of clerical orthodoxy for support. A special issue of Iran discussing the hijab of Iranian women is one such case, where Ahmadinejad supporter Mehdi Kalhor called the black chador a retrograde tradition beneath their dignity. As expected, Ahmadinejad’s opponents accused him of insulting religion, but the Iranian president failed to mobilize women for his cause. The Iranian public has not yet forgotten Ahmadinejad’s early alliance with ultra-conservative clergymen such as Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah Yazdi and other radical elements from the Basij and Revolutionary Guards who secured his victory in two consecutive presidential elections. It seems Ahmadinejad has been too tactical for his own good.

Earlier today, the U.S. Treasury Department enacted sanctions against two major Islamic Republic commercial entities: Tidewater Middle East Co. and national air carrier Iran Air.

Tidewater is a port operating company owned by Mehr-e Eqtesad-e Iranian Investment Company, itself owned by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The latest incident involving Tidewater was an arms shipment seized by Nigeria in October 2010, which was loaded at a port in Iran operated by Tidewater. Iran Air—a commercial airline—is accused of being used by the IRGC and the Islamic Republic’s defense ministry to transport military-related equipment.

Today’s sanctions not only tighten the grip on the IRGC, but also send a clear message to the allies of the Islamic Republic who may feel tempted to allow the Republic to use their transport infrastructure. Unfortunately, civilians may also suffer as an undesired side effect of the sanctions regime. Passengers to Tehran already experience prolonged trips and layovers in Yerevan, Armenia, because most European airports deny fuel to Iran Air, and the Iranian merchant class suffers under the weight of increased shipping prices and other commercial impediments.

But it isn’t U.S. sanctions that cause such suffering. Rather, it’s the self-serving policies of the Revolutionary Guards that have induced these hardships. Had the Guards not used civilian airliners, shipping lines, and port facilities to pursue its goals, average Iranians would not have to endure the unfortunate by-products of U.S. efforts to rein in the Islamic Republic’s most troublesome institution.

Leaders of the Islamic Republic are busy portraying the social revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa as “Islamic uprisings” inspired by Iran’s 1979 revolution. But regardless of the shrill tone of the propaganda, the regional developments can hardly be to the liking of the Iranian leadership.

The post-Mubarak government in Egypt does not seem to be in a hurry to normalize diplomatic relations with Iran, despite president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s pathetic declaration that he would go to Egypt the very moment he receives the invitation. The arrest of an Iranian diplomat in Cairo upon charges of espionage, and Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Director Ezzatollah Zarqami’s complaints on why “Hillary Clinton is allowed to take tourist photos on Tahrir Square while the Iranian officials are not invited to Cairo,” clearly show that the Islamic Republic is not exactly enchanted about how the events are unfolding in Egypt.

The aftermath of the upheavals in Bahrain provides another case in point. The Iranian leadership outsourced destabilization of Bahrain to Lebanese Hezbollah operatives, but could do little in the face of Saudi military intervention in defense of the political order in Bahrain. As a result, those Bahraini Shi’as who have long considered the Islamic Republic as their defender may develop second thoughts on the Islamic Republic’s willingness or ability to support the Shi’a bid for power in the Persian Gulf island. The Bahraini Shi’a may even realize that they would be better off negotiating a solution with the Sunni rulers—provided that the rulers are wise enough not to further alienate the Bahraini Shi’a—rather than relying on the Islamic Republic promise of support.

Worst of all from Iranian perspective is Syria. The Islamic Republic whose constitution obliges the state to “support the just struggles of the mustad’afun [the oppressed] against the mustakbirun, [oppressors]” increasingly finds itself supporting one of the most oppressive regimes in the Middle East. The Islamic Republic, which for decades has shamelessly and ritually burned the stars and stripes, now witnesses Syrian protesters setting the Iranian flag ablaze in protest against Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) involvement in suppression of the protest movement in Syria. Burning of the Iranian flag came in the wake of reports of IRGC involvement in suppression of the democratic aspirations of the Syrians.

The Islamic Republic’s attempts at helping the Ba’th regime in Syria—despite the political costs—is understandable. Collapse of Bashar’s regime would be catastrophic for the Islamic Republic as it would severely restrict the Iranian leadership’s opportunities to arm Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad. This would in turn also minimize the Islamic Republic’s destructive influence on the peace process and normalization of relations between Israel and its neighbors. Without the spoiler role through proselytes, the Islamic Republic would be reduced to a nuisance, but hardly a serious challenge to regional security. This is why it is all the more important for the United States to reconsider its policies towards the Syrian regime.

The Islamic Republic is living through a state of permanent crisis, which has badly tarnished the prestige of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the regime as a whole. The latest round of the crisis was ignited by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s attempted sacking of Intelligence Minister Hojjat al-Eslam Heydar Moslehi, which was vetoed by Khamenei. On the surface, Khamenei has prevailed in the struggle with Ahmadinejad. All of Iran’s relevant political factions have condemned Ahmadinejad’s failed power grab. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has unambiguously sided with Khamenei. And Moslehi is back in the cabinet.

However, Ahmadinejad is trying to play the martyrdom card—snatching victory from the jaws of defeat. His demonstrative revolt against Khamenei’s authority serves the higher purpose of mobilizing the public against the Supreme Leader.

Khamenei is all too well aware of this, which was apparent in acting Tehran Friday Prayer leader Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati’s sermon today. Addressing Ahmadinejad and his supporters, Jannati asked rhetorically, “Do they think they can act against the national interest and the viewpoint of the Guardian Jurist?” He concluded, “Most of what they do is preparation for election!” Jannati also criticized the Ahmadinejad government for “showing a friendly face to the foreigners and a green light to the Americans,” and threatened “it is not expedient to deal with them today, but the regime and the people will make them pay!” Jannati ended his sermon with the words: “Their [the government’s] wings are being clipped. I don’t think they will last long.”

The state of permanent crisis does not only debilitate the Ahmadinejad cabinet’s ability to govern effectively, it also leaves the Islamic Republic in a state of total paralysis when it comes to anything from strategic decision-making and foreign relations to managing the day-to-day affairs of the state. But it is not only the wings of Ahmadinejad that have been clipped. The entire regime has become easy prey for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

(UN Photo/Marco Castro)

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad marked his return to office by presiding over the May 1 cabinet session after a two-week long absence from the limelight. Ahmadinejad called his absence “distance working” from home because of “reasons” he said he would rather keep to himself. However, Ahmadinejad also provided a coded explanation: “I am convinced and believe that a strong and powerful president would lead to dignity of the Leadership and especially the nation. A strong president can stand firm as a defensive shield, advance affairs of the state and bring dignity upon it. All leaders and executives are in need of strong arms.”

Ahmadinejad’s call for greater presidential authority is a subtle reference to his aborted April 17 sacking of Intelligence Minister Hojjat al-Eslam Heydar Moslehi. Appointing and dismissing cabinet ministers is a constitutional presidential prerogative, but less than an hour after Ahmadinejad’s decree appeared in the media, Fars News Agency reported that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had “opposed” the “resignation” of the intelligence minister and that Moslehi would, therefore, remain in the cabinet. Khamenei’s unconstitutional overruling of Ahmadinejad has ignited the latest round in this struggle for power between the president and the Supreme Leader.

Despite Ahmadinejad’s return to politics, the conflict seems far from over: According to Fars News, Moslehi was absent from the cabinet meeting due to a visit to the holy city of Qom. The conflict will likely continue throughout the remainder of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, and will doubtless escalate as Ahmadinejad’s supporters begin to question the unrestricted powers of Khamenei as Guardian Jurist and head of state during parliamentary elections in 2011 and next year’s presidential election.

Thirty-two years after the revolution of 1979, public support for rule by the clergy in Iran has waned to unprecedented levels. Ahmadinejad, who is well aware that clerical support for his government is no longer an asset but a liability in the eyes of most Iranians, has chosen confrontation with Khamenei as a means of mobilizing the masses. In the past, Iranian voters have often voted the enemy of their enemy into office. In 1997, for example, Mohammad Khatami was elected president with 20 million votes. More than electoral support for Khatami, the vote reflected opposition to Ali-Akbar Nateq Nouri, whose candidacy had been embraced by Khamenei.

There is no guarantee that Ahmadinejad’s tactics will resonate with Iranian voters. The memory of the fraudulent 2009 presidential election is still fresh. On the other hand, Khamenei can hardly be expected to give in to Ahmadinejad’s advances. Khamenei and Ahmadinejad correctly view the issue of who will head the intelligence ministry as a zero-sum game that neither can afford to lose. However, the struggle for power among civilian politicians may benefit a third party—the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which could solidify its position as the final arbiter of power in the Islamic Republic.

On April 17, 2011, the Iranian media reported on a presidential decree enacted by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in which he accepted the “resignation” of Intelligence Minister Hojjat al-Eslam Heydar Moslehi, who, according to Ahmadinejad, would “serve the regime and the Islamic revolution in other capacities.” In a separate decree, Ahmadinejad appointed Moslehi “presidential adviser in intelligence affairs,” a move clearly aimed to emasculate the influential minister. Less than an hour after Ahmadinejad’s decree appeared in the media, however, Fars News Agency reported that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had “opposed” the “resignation.”

While Ahmadinejad has yet to comment on Khamenei’s veto, his media director Ali-Akbar Javanfekr initially claimed that the Supreme Leader’s decree was fabricated. Although Khamenei remained publicly silent on the matter, Hojjat al-Eslam Morteza Aqa-Tehrani, Ahmadinejad’s clerical affairs spokesman, conceded that “the Leader of the Revolution is Fasl al-Khetab [has the final say].”

The failed attempt to dismiss Moslehi is part of Ahmadinejad’s wider campaign to cleanse his government of senior officials imposed on him by other power circles within the Islamic Republic. Moslehi’s resignation would also make Ahmadinejad’s cabinet – along with Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan’s short-lived transitional government in 1979 – the only cabinet in the history of the Islamic Republic devoid of representatives from the clergy.

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Iran’s Supreme National Security Council deputy secretary Ali Baqeri said this week that his government was ready to resume nuclear talks with the 5+1 Group. Baqeri’s remark came only a day after Iran denied IAEA access to inspect the TABA Company, which manufactures centrifuge parts.

Either Iran wants dialogue or confrontation. A recent speech by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is yet another testament to the fact that Iran has already made that choice. In his March 21, 2011 New Year speech, Khamenei told the people of Mashhad that Iran should learn from Libya’s mistake and should not compromise with the West over the nuclear issue:

“In recent years, he [Gaddafi] did a great service to the Westerners. They [Western powers] saw that this gentleman [Gaddafi] under a mild threat disassembled his nuclear capacities and shipped them to the Westerners, and said ‘take it away!’ …Take a look at the position of our nation and at the position [the Libyan regime] is finding itself in. Our nation witnessed that everyone under the U.S. leadership revolted against Iran’s nuclear drive. They made military threats and warned they would attack and so forth. Our country’s authorities not only refused to retreat in the face of the enemy threats, but they increased their nuclear capacity each year. Over there [in Libya], the people saw that their country’s authorities ordered to disassemble all the capacities they had in the face of Westerners’ threats, or because of Western incentives as they call it. Just like putting a sour lollypop or a chocolate into the mouth of a child, they gave them incentives and they lost everything forever.”

 

John Steinbeck’s novel The Moon is Down depicts the darkest hours of a small Norwegian town under Nazi occupation during World War II. Last night, the moon was down in Iran, but in the midst of the night millions of Iranians shouted “God is great” and “Death to the Dictator.” They broke the silence by turning to God to complain against a regime that uses God and religion to legitimize itself, and they wished death, not for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s hated head of state, but for dictatorship as a mode of government.

Today, Iran’s pro-democracy movement has called for demonstrations in solidarity with the people of Tunisia and Egypt. The regime in Tehran has hitherto denied demonstration permits to Iran’s pro-democracy movement. Rather, the regime  has used its entire propaganda machinery to depict the popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt as Islamic revolutions inspired by the Iranian revolution of 1979. People power is good in Tunisia and Egypt, not in Iran, the regime argues.

During the past week, the regime in Tehran has arrested many pro-democracy activists, and as I am writing these lines, the security forces have forced former president Mohammad Khatami, presidential candidates Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karrubi, and their families into house arrest.

However, Iran’s pro-democracy movement does not need a demonstration permit, or leaders for that matter. Right now there are demonstrations in Tehran, Isfahan, Khorasan, Gilan, and many other provinces. Unlike Tunisia or Egypt, there are no foreign TV crews to document the brutality of the security forces against peaceful demonstrators, and the Islamic Republic Voice and Vision shows anti-government uprisings in Bahrain rather than those in Iran. These demonstrations may not topple the regime, but serve as a reminder to us all of the Iranian people’s will to resist dictatorship. All occupations come to an end, and even the darkest nights will give way to the dawn of freedom. I just wish the Obama administration would have given Iran’s pro-democracy movement the same moral support and encouragement it gave to the pro-democracy movement in Egypt.

Image by Mike Palmer.

“This is what happens when you don’t return the greetings of Hillary Clinton,” joked an Iranian blogger upon President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s sacking of Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki. The blogger was referring to the timid Mottaki’s desperate attempts to avoid the U.S. Secretary of State at the Ritz Carlton in Bahrain.

But the Hillary factor is overstated; Mottaki, in fact, fell victim to the increasingly intense power struggle between Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Eighteen months ago, Khamenei, eager to bypass newly elected reformists, mobilized all his forces to secure Ahmadinejad’s position in the presidential palace. Following the fraudulent election, Khamenei endorsed the result as “a divine miracle,” and the Islamic Republic Judiciary prosecuted outspoken critics of the election as “heads of the sedition” and “foreign agents.”

Khamenei likely thought that Ahmadinejad’s re-election would both suppress the reformists and, following the electoral scandal, render Ahmadinejad docile. Unfortunately for Khamenei, Ahmadinejad now seeks to prove Khamenei wrong on a daily basis. Rather than showing gratitude towards his patron, Ahmadinejad takes advantage of Khamenei’s alienation from the reformist camp and his lack of counterbalancing options.

While Khamenei attempts to restore the balance of power, Ahmadinejad is further consolidating his power. And there went Mottaki.

Mottaki, a career diplomat, was never able to join Ahmadinejad’s inner circle; he was imposed on the regime by Khamenei. By systematically “leaking” rumors of Mottaki’s “imminent sacking,” Ahmadinejad has for years painted Mottaki as a dead man walking. In addition, Ahmadinejad has diminished the prestige of the Foreign Ministry by systematically replacing career diplomats at Iran’s embassies with former officers of the Revolutionary Guards. The Foreign Ministry also suffered as Ahmadinejad appointed six of his confidantes as deputy foreign ministers. Following Khamenei’s protests against the “establishment of parallel institutions” and an outcry by parliament, Ahmadinejad re-appointed them as “special advisers.”

By sacking Mottaki—during Motakki’s visit to Senegal, no less—without previous warning, Ahmadinejad sends messages to both international and domestic audiences. Looking West, Ahmadinejad shows that he, not Khamenei, controls the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy, including the nuclear negotiations. To the domestic audience, Mottaki’s sacking suggests the complete emasculation of Khamenei. Is Khamenei ready for a showdown with Ahmadinejad, or will he watch his prestige crumble amidst his rival’s provocations?

Regardless of the outcome of the power play between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, a third party may be the ultimate victor: the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, whose powers will only continue to increase as the civilian politicians continue their war of attrition.

There was a time when Iranian journalist Mohammad Nourizad was among the most ardent supporters of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Today, Nourizad urges Khamenei to apologize for the bloody crackdown on the post-presidential election protest movement. There was a time when Nourizad’s pen served the publication Kayhan [Universe], Khamenei’s unofficial mouthpiece. Today, Nourizad’s universe has shrunk to the limits of his small cell in Evin Prison. There was a time when Nourizad used the term “Father” when addressing Khamenei. Today, Nourizad sarcastically uses the term “our dear leader” in his open letters to Khamenei, which he manages to smuggle out of prison.

In the latest letter, Nourizad warns Khamenei of the hereafter. There will be a day, Nourizad writes, when people will complain of Khamenei, who “from the very beginning of his leadership began dividing the people under the banner of us and them … societal atmosphere was an atmosphere of terror … If there was security, it was the luxury of his flock and his critics had nothing but fear.”

On Saturday, Nourizad went on a hunger strike and refused to accept any solid food. “On the day of Ashoura I’ll bang my dead corpse on their head,” he told a fellow prisoner on his way out from court. Should Nourizad not survive the hunger strike, his blood will be another stain on Khamenei’s blood-soaked robe.

Image by Leonard Chien.

On Tuesday the Treasury Department sanctioned ten businesses and five individuals affiliated with the Bank Mellat and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, both previously blacklisted because of their involvement in the Islamic Republic’s nuclear weapons program. This move deserves praise. So does the systematic tracking—as apparent in recently WikiLeaked State Department cables—of money laundering activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

This effort would have been much more difficult without the fierce struggle for power in Tehran. After all, the released cables show that much of the information came from former elite members in the Islamic Republic, who are seeing their fortunes crumble as the IRGC’s economic activities force them out of business.

However, such sources are scarce. Open-source material remains the greatest window on the Islamic Republic. How good the United States is at using the open-source material is another question.

There is an abundance of open-source information about the financial and banking sector of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the engine of the nuclear program, which is systematically out-competing what remains of the private sector in Iran and even the previously powerful foundations (Bonyads). The list includes the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Basij Cooperative Foundation, Mehr Finance and Credit Institution, Mehr-e Eghtesad-e Iranian Investment Company, Ansar Financial Credit Institute, and the companies on Tehran Stock Exchange they own.

What has the United States done with this information? IRGC banks and financial institutes are still not sanctioned by the United States and little is known about their connections to the international banking sector. Victims of the IRGC’s predatory behavior in political and economic arenas in Iran may go to great lengths exposing the military institution which has ruined them, but this hardly helps if the United States does not sanction already-known IRGC-owned banks and financial institutions.

Image by the U.S. Treasury Department.

Kayhan, unofficial mouthpiece of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, editorializes:

Clearly, continuity of enmity with Iran and degenerating into a carbon copy of Bush is not a formula which has the slightest benefit for Obama’s political future… One must be joyful. Another enemy of Iran has fallen to the ground and Iran played a significant role in his fall.

Who knew Iran was such a factor in the midterm elections? Victory indeed has a thousand—and one— fathers!