If 9/11 reminded Americans that they were at war, it was also an important signal to the U.S. military about the nature of the war. The war against al Qaeda, as we have seen in the past decade, is but a campaign in the larger, so-called “Long War,” where victory is defined not only by the crushing of a terrorist group or the toppling of a single tyrant, but also by the creation of a decent political order across the “greater Middle East.” The war has taxed men and women in uniform well past what we imagined were their reasonable limits. They have been remarkably successful, but also remarkably adaptable. The force built to win the late Cold War, and to defeat the Soviet armored hordes, had to relearn the tactics of irregular warfare, of Vietnam, the war it never wanted to fight again. Their tactical victories bought time for a larger strategic reappraisal.
The 9/11 attacks also opened our eyes to the full scope of the war. It has been fought from West Africa to East Asia. And it has employed almost the full spectrum of U.S. military capabilities, from the most sophisticated technologies to the most human and intuitive hunches of individual commanders. The force has been tested in many ways, and passed every examination.
But here at home we have become “war weary,” even though so few of us—just 1 percent of Americans—have borne the burden of the battle. Where America’s grunts have said, “Follow me!” our leaders shout, “Let’s lead from behind!” We tell ourselves we are too poor to tackle the hardest tasks, or that they are other people’s business. In sum, we are in danger of averting our eyes from some of the most profound lessons of 9/11: there is evil in the world, and evil people whose greatest ambition is to kill Americans; if we do not face our enemies abroad, they will seek us out at home; “hard” power, military power, has a lot to do with “soft” power, influence, and diplomacy.
Ten years after 9/11 is not just a time to look back but to look ahead, to “take increased devotion” to the “task that lies ahead.”
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